Changes from resolution motion joint to adopted text

B. whereas the global order is fragmenting and increasingly characterised by complex and entrenched instabilities;

C. whereas there cannot be any European security without security in its immediate neighbourhood, starting with Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russia’s war of aggression;

D. whereas recent statements by members of the US administration, accompanied by the heavy pressure exerted on Ukraine by the US leadership, reflect a shift in US foreign policy as the Trump administration is proposing the normalisation of ties with Russia and it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe needs to strengthen its security and defence to be able to help Ukraine to defend itself;

E. whereas the quickest and most extensive expansion of Russia’s capabilities is taking place near its borders with the West, while the EU is taking its time to enhance its defence capacity;

F. whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests;

G. whereas the impact of wars, terrorism, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to EU security; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with, and remain an ongoing challenge for, the EU’s management of its external borders;

H. whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter these challenges and protect the EU’s strategic interests;

I. whereas, in the light of the worsening external environment and despite the efforts made in recent years to enhance the EU’s crisis preparedness through new legislation, mechanisms and tools across various policy areas, the EU and its Member States remain vulnerable to multiple crisis scenarios;

J. whereas there is an urgent need to further reform and strengthen the EU’s defence policy in the light of Ukraine’s recent war experience and the use of new war technologies;

L. whereas it is in the EU’s interest to see Ukraine as an integral part of a genuine European security system;

M. whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and alongside the Baltic Sea, it has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

N. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while, at the same time, facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

O. whereas as a result of investment in military equipment and ammunition, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

P. whereas the Strategic Compass was mainly drafted and negotiated before 24 February 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass is a very broad strategy that provides little guidance with regards to the urgent need to accomplish defence readiness and provide deterrence and defence capabilities to prepare for the most urgent military contingencies;

Q. whereas the 2024 Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade, and underlines a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB;

R. whereas the Niinistö report underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios;

S. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

T. whereas the EU’s ability to take decisive action in response to external threats has been repeatedly hampered by the requirement for unanimity, with certain Member States and candidate countries blocking or delaying critical military aid to Ukraine and hence undermining European security;

U. whereas, in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of their term of office;

V. whereas Parliament and experts have been calling for a white paper on defence for more than a decade;

A historic time for European defence: ‘become a genuine security provider’

1. Considers that the EU must act urgently to ensure its own autonomous security, strengthening its partnerships with like-minded partners and significantly reducing its dependencies on non-EU countries; stresses, therefore, that the EU is now at a turning point in its history and construction; insists that a ‘business as usual’ approach is no longer an option as it would lead to the end of a safe and secure Europe; considers that the EU and its Member States must choose between joining forces and working in unison to overcome the threats and attacks on EU security, and standing alone at the mercy of aggressive adversaries and unpredictable partners;

2. Recalls that the EU is a peace project and should strive towards peace and stability, while condemning aggression; underlines that in order to achieve peace and stability, we must support Ukraine and become more resilient ourselves;

3. Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European values, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the end of the Cold War;

9. Underlines that the EU must now adopt a holistic and horizontal approach that integrates a defence and security dimension into most EU policies, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments and identified capability needs and gaps;

10. Believes, therefore, that the time has come for a renewed political ambition to act and turn the EU into a genuine security provider, increase the EU’s defence readiness and build a true European Defence Union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was a good starting point, but notes that its timely implementation remains necessary; welcomes the recently introduced EU defence instruments and insists on the urgent need to scale up as EU defence efforts cannot remain limited in size, fragmented in scope and lengthy in delivery; calls for a quantum leap and a new approach to defence, including strong decisions, an action plan and both short- to long-term defence investment plans; underlines that this requires vision, concreteness and shared commitments, both in the strictly military field and in the industrial, technological and intelligence sectors;

11. Deplores the reluctance of the Council and the EU Member States when it comes to addressing deep structural challenges of the European defence industrial landscape and the lack of ambition as regards cooperation at EU level between the Member States’ armed forces; calls on the Member States to join forces and support a major step towards a very ambitious and comprehensive framework on defence;

12. Urges the EU to adopt a coherent and robust comprehensive framework to strengthen its security and that of its partners, better identify potential future breaking points and prevent further crises, and coordinate joint responses with its Member States similar to those used in wartime;

13. Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence should put forward concrete measures and options to the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and necessary efforts can be undertaken, differentiating between short- and long-term plans and objectives, addressing defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs, and framing the overall approach to EU defence integration; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

14. Considers that common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations need to be reassessed and reviewed from this perspective; insists that the CSDP must be strengthened and made more agile, including by becoming the EU’s main instrument to fight hybrid warfare, in order to fulfil its role as an insurance policy for Europe’s security, as well as a power and security provider;

17. Stresses the need to enhance capabilities and resources, while overcoming the fragmentation of the defence market; fully agrees with the Draghi report’s view that the EU and its Member States must urgently decide on incentives for the EU defence industry and find creative solutions for large-scale public and private investments in security and defence;

Short-term: defending Ukraine against an existential threat to Europe’s security

18. Urges the EU and its Member States to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine; recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided and that the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine will be decisively shifted; underlines that such a shift now depends almost entirely on Europe; urges the Member States, therefore, to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine before negotiations are concluded; warns that, if the EU were to fail in its support and Ukraine were forced to surrender, Russia would then turn against other countries, including possibly the EU Member States; calls on the EU Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

19. Strongly believes that the EU must further expand and improve its tailor-made training operations to respond to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and, in return, create conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons and strategic practices from them; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including in Ukrainian territory;