Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from resolution motion joint to adopted text
RC-10-2025-0146 → TA-10-2025-0034
- From
- RC-10-2025-0146 resolution motion joint of 10 Mar 2025
- To
- TA-10-2025-0034 Adopted text of 12 Mar 2025
- Changes
- 21 changes to the text
- Paragraphs
- +19 added · −3 removed · 12 changed
More facts (2)
- Title (from)
- on the white paper on the future of European defence
- Title (to)
- White paper on the future of European defence
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds calls for a complete overhaul of European defence cooperation and for flagship projects like the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line.35 Expands the scope of threats to include candidate countries and hybrid incidents, and adds calls for action on drones, hybrid preparedness, and shadow fleet.161011 Adds emphasis on geographical balance in defence financing and industry development, and on partnerships with the UK, Norway, and Western Balkan countries.71521 Softens the stance on European preference and drops the specific 3% GDP defence spending target.1820 Other changes are formal or wording: decimal separator, grammar, and terminology.91419
The notes class 18 changes as substance, 2 as formal, 1 as wording only.
Changes that matter, 21
Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.
Change 1
ChangedA. whereas over the last decade, major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale war to our neighbourhood, have been threatening the security of the EU, its Member StatesStates, the candidate countries and itstheir respective citizens; whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action; whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and the global order as a whole;
AI: Note on change 1 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Extends the scope of threats to include candidate countries and their citizens, and adds hybrid incidents inside EU borders as a risk.
Change 2
AddedK. whereas the Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of neutrality, and such policies should be respected;
AI: Note on change 2 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a recital stating that member states have different military and security policies, including neutrality, and these should be respected.
Change 3
Removed4. Believes that Russia, supported by its allies including Belarus, China, North Korea and Iran, is the most significant direct and indirect threat to the EU and its security, as well as that of EU candidate countries and partners; reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, the need to consider fully the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power and the increased aggressiveness of the middle powers, which appear ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same; notes that the recent actions and statements of the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;
Added4. Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, and making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO, to achieve a common European defence;
Added5. Believes that Russia, supported by its allies including Belarus, China, North Korea and Iran, is the most significant direct and indirect threat to the EU and its security, as well as that of EU candidate countries and partners; reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, the need to consider fully the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power and the increased aggressiveness of the middle powers, which appear ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same; notes that the recent actions and statements of the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; strongly condemns US threats against Greenland;
AI: Note on change 3 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a new paragraph calling for a complete overhaul of European defence cooperation, and moves the threat assessment to a later paragraph with an added condemnation.
Change 4
Added7. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;
Added8. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member state and EU candidate country, to abide by international law, recognise the Republic of Cyprus and immediately end the occupation and withdraw its troops from the island;
AI: Note on change 4 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds paragraphs affirming diplomacy as a cornerstone of EU foreign policy and calling on Türkiye to recognize Cyprus and withdraw troops.
Change 5
Changed12.15. Expects the white paper on the future of European defence to identify the most pressing threats, structural risks and competitors, and define the extent to which the EU can develop contingency plans to ensure mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and help Europe anticipate, prepare for and deter potential aggressors and defend itself in the short and long term, in order to become a credible power and European pillar within NATO; underlines that the protection of EU land, air and maritime borders contributes to the security of the entire EU, in particular the EU’s eastern border, and thus stresses that the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the East;
AI: Note on change 5 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a sentence stressing that the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line should be flagship EU projects for deterrence.
Change 6
Changed13.16. Calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats;threats including energy weaponisation, infrastructure sabotage and the instrumentalisation of migration; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;
AI: Note on change 6 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Expands the list of hybrid threats to include energy weaponisation, infrastructure sabotage, and instrumentalisation of migration.
Change 7
Added20. Emphasises the importance of ensuring a geographically balanced distribution of defence financing in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);
AI: Note on change 7 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a paragraph emphasizing geographically balanced distribution of defence financing in the next multiannual financial framework.
Change 8
Added22. Calls for urgent financial support to ensure the timely supply of defence products through joint procurement, industrial coordination, stockpiling, access to finance for manufacturers and the expansion and modernisation of production capacities;
AI: Note on change 8 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a call for urgent financial support for joint procurement, industrial coordination, stockpiling, and production expansion.
Show 13 more changes
Change 9
Changed19.24. Calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support for Ukraine; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0.250,25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine; condemns the veto imposed by one Member State on the functioning of the European Peace Facility; calls on the EU Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets to serve as a foundation for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, as a legally sound and financially significant way to maintain and increase our support for Ukraine’s military needs;
AI: Note on change 9 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Changes the decimal separator from a point to a comma in the GDP percentage figure.
Change 10
Changed20.25. Urges the Council and the Member States to review and strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and non-EU states facilitating the circumvention of sanctions, providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; urges the Member States to pay special attention to the Russian shadow fleet and the security and environmental risks this poses;
AI: Note on change 10 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a call for member states to pay special attention to the Russian shadow fleet and its security and environmental risks.
Change 11
Added28. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should draw on lessons learnt from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drone and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;
AI: Note on change 11 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a paragraph calling on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, including research, development, and joint procurement.
Change 12
Added29. Stresses that preparedness for hybrid and grey zone attacks must become part of the EU’s strategic culture, with permanent exercises, joint threat assessments and pre-planned, coordinated responses among Member States, particularly in regions bordering hostile powers;
AI: Note on change 12 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a paragraph stressing that preparedness for hybrid and grey zone attacks must become part of the EU's strategic culture.
Change 13
Added40. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and work constructively to find a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;
AI: Note on change 13 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a paragraph reiterating the call on Türkiye to withdraw troops from Cyprus and work for a peaceful solution.
Change 14
Changed39.47. Considers that the CSDP must strongly participate in the fight against hybrid warfare against partner countries, particularly candidate countries; is deeply worried by the sharp increase in hybrid attacks, including sabotage, cyberattacks, information manipulation and election interference, with the objective of weakening the EU and its candidate countries; calls on the EU Member States to consider appropriate deterrence and countermeasures, including through the use of Article 42(7) TEU; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to pool resources and expertise in the field of cybersecurity; strongly advocates the development of a unified European approach to cyber forces; further insists on the swift creation of joint European cyber capabilities; recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyberthreatscyber threats in real time;
AI: Note on change 14 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Rephrases 'cyberthreats' to 'cyber threats' for consistency.
Change 15
Changed46.54. Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and new market entrants through simplified access to funding; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production; suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the line of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year; calls for a more geographically balanced development of the EDTIB, ensuring that critical capabilities, such as ammunition production, air defence systems and drone technologies, are also developed in frontline states, which have a direct understanding of operational needs;
AI: Note on change 15 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a call for a more geographically balanced development of the European defence industry, including in frontline states.
Change 16
Changed50.58. Welcomes the proposal for European Defence Projects of Common Interest on the development of common capabilities that go beyond the financial means of a single Member State; believes that these projects should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin the major common priorities of several Member States and in fields such as external border protection and defence, in particular in the land domain, as well as strategic enablers, particularly in space and European air defence, to act on the whole spectrum of threats, military mobility, in particular strategic and tactical air transport, deep strikes, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, in order to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that pragmatism must prevail due to the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focusfocus, where possible, on rapidly available and proven European technologies that gradually reduce our dependencies and improve our security; highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by incorporating companies throughout the Union and to boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers and champions; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair return, our defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence;
AI: Note on change 16 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds external border protection and defence, particularly in the land domain, to the fields for European Defence Projects of Common Interest.
Change 17
Changed53.61. Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened; calls for the Commission and the Member States to be jointly tasked with the mapping and monitoring of the EDTIB, with the aims of protecting its strengths, reducing its vulnerabilities, avoiding crises and providing it with an effective and efficient industrial policy;
AI: Note on change 17 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds that the Commission and member states should be jointly tasked with mapping and monitoring the European defence industry.
Change 18
Changed61. Strongly69. believesConsiders that European preference shouldmust be the cornerstoneguiding ofprinciple alland long-term ambition of EU policies related to the European defence market, as a strategic imperative aimed at protecting European expertise, in order to strengthen European defencedevelop capabilitiesand onprotect aEuropean long-termtechnological basisexcellence; andstresses, ashowever, EUthat taxpayersuch moneypreference must create addednot valuebe onpursued EUat territory;the underlinesexpense thatof the European preferencedefence principlereadiness mustof bethe reflectedUnion, ingiven EUthe defenceextent regulationsof ininternational clearsupply and unambiguous eligibility criteria bothvalue forchains entitiesin andthe fordefence products;sector;
AI: Note on change 18 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces the strong belief in European preference as a cornerstone with a consideration that it must be the guiding principle, but not at the expense of defence readiness.
Change 19
Changed63.71. Urges the Member States to stop invoking Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive (2009/81/EC), thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to review the DirectivesDirective on the transfer of defence-related products and the Directive on defence procurement as well as the inter-community transfer directive (2009/43/EC) with a view to strengthening the common market for defence and introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like the one we are currently facing;
AI: Note on change 19 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Corrects 'Directives' to 'Directive' and adds 'the Directive on' before defence procurement for grammatical accuracy.
Change 20
Changed69.77. Strongly supports the idea that EU Member States must increase their defence and security financing to new levels; notes that some Member States have already increased their defence spending to 5 % of GDP and insists that the current security environment and the multiple, complex and evolving security threats require Member States to increase their defence spending to at least 3 % of GDP;
AI: Note on change 20 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Drops the insistence that member states increase defence spending to at least 3% of GDP, leaving only a general call for higher spending.
Change 21
Added85. Underlines the need to enhance our partnerships with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for a broad EU-UK security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;
Added86. Calls for enhanced cooperation with Western Balkan countries in the area of defence industries; emphasises that Western Balkan countries have significant expertise in defence industries and that the EU should consider procuring military equipment from Western Balkan countries; emphasises that this approach would help make Western Balkan countries stronger allies of the EU;
Added87. Believes that every effort must be made to maintain and, if possible, foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sector, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop greater sovereignty;
AI: Note on change 21 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds paragraphs on enhancing partnerships with like-minded countries, including the UK, Norway, and Western Balkan countries, and maintaining transatlantic cooperation.
Sources & citation
Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2025). “Changes between RC-10-2025-0146 and TA-10-2025-0034”. Text, 12 March 2025. from RC-10-2025-0146, to TA-10-2025-0034. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2025-0146/compare/TA-10-2025-0034 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-03-12,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between RC-10-2025-0146 and TA-10-2025-0034}},
year = {2025},
date = {2025-03-12},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2025-0146/compare/TA-10-2025-0034}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2025-0146/compare/TA-10-2025-0034},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from RC-10-2025-0146, to TA-10-2025-0034. Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}