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Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

AFET-PR-774242 → A-10-2025-0206

From
AFET-PR-774242 report parliamentary committee draft of 10 Jun 2025
To
A-10-2025-0206 Plenary report of 23 Oct 2025
Changes
6 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+61 added · −30 removed · 4 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders
Title (to)
on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

The report now proposes a formal definition of transnational repression and adds detailed statistics on its prevalence, naming specific perpetrator states.23 New provisions address digital repression, including spyware, social media, and technology companies' accountability, with calls for due diligence and reporting mechanisms.3 Protection measures for human rights defenders are expanded, covering visas, asylum, relocation, and support for gender-specific threats.35 The report strengthens calls for sanctions, legal accountability, and diplomatic coordination against perpetrators, including within EU member states.45 The other changes are formal: updated statistics in the explanatory statement.6

The notes class 4 changes as substance, 1 as formal, 1 as wording only.

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Part 3 of 3: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

5 unchanged paragraphs

Parliament has called for this INI report among growing awareness and documentation around transnational repression (TNR). It provides a comprehensive analysis and recommendations to EU institutions and Member States to facilitate, expand and strengthen the protection of Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) subject to TNR by third countries, whose authorities and proxies have worked tirelessly to silence, intimidate or harass defenders in their host countries. Actions include physical harm, surveillance, legal pressure, digital threats, abductions, extradition and deportation requests, threats against family members, as well as unlawful killings.

TNR by authoritarian regimes works domestically by deterring dissent and denying safety to defenders and their families; as well as externally, by testing host countries and their capacity to respond and protect defenders, thus exposing the fragility of their legal systems. It violates fundamental human rights, undermines the rule of law and democracy, and threatens national sovereignty and security through foreign interference. As a result, civic space is shrinking across the world while HRDs reporting abuse and authoritarian practices are silenced and prevented from informing their communities.

Yet neither the international nor the European legal framework provides for a shared conceptual framework or definition, let alone a coordinated, intergovernmental EU-level response made of preventive and protective measures.

State perpetrators take advantage of legal gaps and the scarcity of official data. Using ever more insidious tactics, they rely on non-state actors or “proxies” to carry out repression beyond their borders and jurisdiction, such as private spyware and surveillance companies, organised crime networks or affiliated diaspora groups.

Digital platforms, communication technologies, social media paltforms and other emerging instruments such as artificial intelligence have exacerbated risks including gender-based digital repression, cyber-harassment, disinformation and bullying, constituting additional obstacles to upholding accountability.

Change 6

ChangedAccording to Freedom House, who has compiled the largest available database on the topic, in 2024 over 20%25 % of the world’s governments had engaged in transnational repression since 2014, with 1,0341,219 direct, physical incidents across 100103 target countries. This points to a pattern of “global authoritarianism”.Interestingly, ten regimes account for nearly 80%80 % of abuses - China, Turkey, Tajikistan, Russia, Egypt, Cambodia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Belarus.

4 unchanged paragraphs

Host states must abide by their obligations under international human rights law, embed TNR in their national legislations, raise awareness, provide training to all relevant agencies and staff, and support victims seeking justice.

The EU has intensified its support to HRDs but needs stronger accountability mechanisms, improved inter-agency coordination and greater corporate responsibility. Europol’s mandate should be broadened so the agency is empowered to assess and carry out due diligence in regard to politically motivated Interpol red notices and their link to TNR. Other improvements include updating the EU Guidelines on HRDs to feature transnational repression, extending the mandate of ProtectDefenders.eu, establishing data collection and monitoring mechanisms, and streamlining visa policies and residence regimes.

As for digital TNR, it should be addressed through stringent regulations on enablers of TNR, such as spyware industries and social media, notably through preventing spyware export to authoritarian regimes for which TNR acts have been evidenced and the effective enforcement of the EU Digital Services Act.

On the external stage, the EU must make TNR an integral part of EU foreign policy action and, notably by raising the transnational repression issue within its Human Rights Dialogues with third countries and other international fora, enforcing the human rights conditionality on bilateral agreements and financial assistance, and impose targeted sanctions when necessary.

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
27 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2025). “Changes between AFET-PR-774242 and A-10-2025-0206”. Text, 23 October 2025. from AFET-PR-774242, to A-10-2025-0206, reference 2025/2048(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-774242/compare/A-10-2025-0206?all=1&part=3 (retrieved 27 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-10-23,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between AFET-PR-774242 and A-10-2025-0206}},
  year = {2025},
  date = {2025-10-23},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-774242/compare/A-10-2025-0206?all=1&part=3}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-774242/compare/A-10-2025-0206?all=1&part=3},
  urldate = {2026-09-27},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from AFET-PR-774242, to A-10-2025-0206, reference 2025/2048(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}