Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

▸7 unchanged paragraphs

on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders

(2025/2048(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the UN declaration on human rights defenders (HRDs) and to the UN Human Rights Council Resolution of 4 April 2025 entitled ‘Human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies: protecting human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, in the digital age’,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 3 and 21 thereof,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in June 2004, and to its resolution of 16 March 2023 on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,

Added– having regard to the Council Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025 of 27 January 2025,

Added– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, extended until 2027,

Added– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act),

Added– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859,

Added– having regard to the Commission’s 2024 annual report on human rights and democracy in the world by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Added– having regard to its report of the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware,

Added– having regard to the G7 Leaders’ statement on transnational repression of 17 June 2025 and the G7 multistakeholder dialogue on transnational repression held in February 2025,

Added– having regard to the study of its Directorate-General for External Policies of the Unionof June 2025 entitled ‘Transnational repression of human rights defenders: The impacts on civic space and the responsibility of host states’,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A100000/2025),(A10-0206/2025),

Change 1

ChangedA. whereas transnational repression (TNR) is a well-documented phenomenon, taking place in a global context of deteriorating human rights, shrinking civic space and a growing prevalence of increasingly repressive and assertive authoritarian regimes;

Change 2

RemovedB. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) are crucial EU allies in defending and promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law; whereas the implementation of the EU Guidelines on HRDs and its commitments remains uneven;

AddedB. whereas there is no universally adopted definition of transnational repression and official data is limited, which is an obstacle to the fight against this phenomenon; whereas according to Freedom House, in the period 2014-2024 over 25 % of the world’s governments had engaged in transnational repression, with 1 219 direct physical incidents across 103 target countries; whereas 10 regimes account for nearly 80 % of all transnational repression cases, namely China, Türkiye, Tajikistan, Russia, Egypt, Cambodia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Belarus; whereas countries in other regions, such as Nicaragua and Venezuela in Latin America, Saudi Arabia in the Gulf and Eritrea in Africa are also registered as perpetrators of transnational repression;

RemovedC. whereas HRDs worldwide are at risk of TNR, with growing numbers of cases registered in recent years;

AddedC. whereas the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders defines human rights defenders (HRDs) as individuals or groups who act to promote, protect or strive for the protection and realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms at national and international level, through peaceful means;

RemovedD. whereas there is no universally adopted definition of TNR and official data is limited; whereas TNR commonly refers to attacks and threats by states that aim to defend and advance their interests by reaching across national borders to coerce, control or silence dissidents, political opponents, journalists, activists, HRDs and diaspora members through a broad range of methods;

AddedD. whereas HRDs are key EU allies in defending and promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as in denouncing violations thereof; whereas the implementation of the EU Guidelines on HRDs and related commitments remains uneven;

RemovedE. whereas despite growing awareness, EU foreign and domestic policy responses to TNR remain limited;

AddedE. whereas HRDs worldwide are at risk of transnational repression, with a growing number of cases registered in recent years; whereas many cases remain unregistered owing to fear of further retaliation;

RemovedF. whereas social media and other digital platforms may provide an enabling environment for TNR;

AddedF. whereas transnational repression frequently undermines the security, sovereignty and legal order of host states and poses systemic threats to civic space, democratic institutions and the rule of law both at international level and within the state concerned, as evidenced by reports from the intelligence services of Member States and like-minded countries;

AddedG. whereas despite growing awareness of the existence and scale of transnational repression, EU foreign and domestic policy responses to transnational repression remain limited and fragmented, resulting in a concerning gap in protection for HRDs at risk;

AddedH. whereas new technologies, notably spyware such as Pegasus, are an essential tool of modern transnational repression, which governments use to spy on and surveil HRDs;

AddedI. whereas social media and other digital platforms provide an enabling environment for transnational repression, including in the form of hacking attacks, online harassment, intimidation and defamation and disinformation campaigns, which are deeply intertwined with traditional methods of transnational repression against HRDs;

AddedJ. whereas digital transnational repression increasingly exploits the dual-use nature of internet technologies, including social media and digital platforms, which serve as essential public spaces for civil society organisations, HRDs, journalists, lawyers, bloggers and other independent voices to expose abuses and advocate for fundamental freedoms; whereas authoritarian actors seek to flood, monitor, manipulate or silence these platforms through harassment, disinformation and surveillance; whereas some technology companies have at times played a passive or even active role in facilitating digital repression, thus becoming significant enablers of transnational repression;

AddedK. whereas increased transparency is neeeded on how technology companies respond to government requests to remove content or access user information;

AddedL. whereas exiled and diaspora women HRDs face gender-specific forms of transnational repression such as gender-based harassment, abuse and intimidation, leading to stigmatisation and social isolation; whereas gender-based digital transnational repression occurs when state and state-affiliated actors deploy digital technologies and weaponise gender and misogyny as tools of repression against women HRDs residing outside their countries of origin;

AddedM. whereas full respect for harmonised human rights legal frameworks and a secure legal status at national and EU level reduce HRDs’ exposure to transnational repression;

Transnational repression against HRDs: growing trends and threats

Change 3

Removed1. Condemns TNR as a serious threat to international human rights law and the rights to freedom, expression, association and protection from arbitrary detention and violence, and as a challenge to the sovereignty of host countries, through foreign interference tactics;

Added1. Proposes defining transnational repression as attacks and threats by states, including authoritarian regimes and their proxies, that aim to defend and advance their interests by reaching across national borders to coerce, control or silence dissidents, political opponents, journalists, activists, HRDs and diaspora members, through a broad range of physical methods, such as targeted killings, abductions, violence, harassment and enforced returns, disappearances and deportations, and the strategic misuse of legal instruments, including abuse of consular services, extradition procedures or red notices, and arrests, as well as non-physical methods, such as digital surveillance, intimidation, blackmail and threats against HRDs’ families;

Removed2. Highlights that state-sponsored TNR is taking increasingly insidious forms, including physical harm and torture, surveillance, legal pressure, digital threats, enforced disappearances and abductions, often for forced repatriation, extradition requests, threats against family members and unlawful killings;

Added2. Condemns any form of transnational repression as a serious threat to international human rights law and a violation of the sovereignty of host countries through foreign interference tactics; stresses, in this context, the need to adopt a broadly agreed definition of transnational repression and to step up the common fight against this phenomenon through a well-established legal framework at multilateral, regional and national level;

Removed3. Condemns authoritarian regimes worldwide for increasingly resorting to digital TNR and AI-powered technologies, spyware, hacking and doxing to harass, surveil and intimidate HRDs, especially women, who are disproportionately targeted by sexualised abuse and threats;

Added3. Expresses grave concern about the escalation of transnational repression; notes that the number of transnational repression cases is most likely underestimated, as transnational repression is often conducted in a covert manner;

Removed4. Condemns perpetrators for exerting legal and diplomatic pressure, including through politically motivated Interpol red notices, to request the arrest and extradition of exiled HRDs, misuse of the ‘terrorist’ labelling, criminal prosecutions in absentia, and other measures of an administrative nature, such as the revocation of citizenship, travel bans, and the denial of identity documents and consular or banking services;

Added4. Highlights that state-sponsored transnational repression is taking increasingly insidious forms, including physical harm, torture, deportation, surveillance, legal pressure, defamation campaigns, digital threats, enforced disappearances and abductions, forced repatriation, extradition requests, freezing of assets, threats against family members and unlawful killings;

Removed5. Expresses serious concerns about the role of host countries and non-state actors, such as the private spyware industry, criminal organisations and proxies, in facilitating TNR;

Added5. Condemns authoritarian regimes and other perpetrators and their proxies worldwide for increasingly resorting to digital transnational repression; notes the use of AI-powered technologies, spyware, hacking and doxing to harass, surveil, discredit and intimidate HRDs and targeted individuals; underscores that digital transnational repression also encompasses content-based censorship, including the use of takedown requests, legal threats, content moderation pressure and the blocking of exile-run media outlets in order to suppress or remove information critical of authoritarian regimes;

Removed6. Worries about shrinking civic space and the silencing of exiles, whose voices are instrumental in documenting abuse in authoritarian states; recalls that free, democratic societies, particularly in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, are in its interest;

Added6. Condemns tactics of gender-based digital transnational repression, which disproportionately target women HRDs residing outside their countries of origin; is deeply concerned by the rise in sexual abuse and threats by means of digital technologies, aimed at discrediting women HRDs and discouraging them from continuing their activities;

Removed7. Highlights the lasting psychological toll of TNR on victims’ mental health and general well-being;

Added7. Condemns perpetrators for exerting legal and diplomatic pressure, including through politically motivated Interpol red notices and the international institutional counterterrorism architecture, to request the arrest and extradition of exiled HRDs and targeted individuals; condemns, futhermore, the abuse of the ‘terrorist’ labelling, criminal prosecutions in absentia and other measures of an administrative nature, such as the revocation of citizenship, denial of visa-related documents, travel and entry bans, and the denial of identity documents and consular or banking services;

RemovedII. Mainstreaming TNR in EU policies

Added8. Expresses serious concerns about the role of some host countries, including some EU Member States, and non-state actors, such as digital service providers and other technology intermediaries, the private spyware industry, security contractors, private investigators, criminal organisations and proxies, including diaspora members, in facilitating transnational repression, including through collaboration among states’ border and security forces;

Removed8. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to systematically address TNR in the context of human rights dialogues with non-EU countries and in other forums for bilateral and multilateral cooperation, such as the UN Human Rights Council;

Added9. Highlights, moreover, that transnational repression as a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of states, including the EU Member States, enables foreign state actors to exercise intimidation, coercion and control beyond their borders; recalls that, while national security remains the sole responsibility of the Member States, the scale and cross-border nature of these practices require a coordinated EU-level response, including cooperation initiatives among national authorities, EU institutions and civil society actors;

Removed9. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to revise the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy and the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders to include the growing threat of TNR against HRDs, as well as provisions for the protection, and safety of HRDs and financial support for them;

Added10. Expresses serious concerns about shrinking civic space and the silencing of exiles, whose voices are instrumental in documenting human rights situations and abuse by authoritarian states; recalls that defending and supporting free and democratic societies, including in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, is in the EU’s own strategic interest;

Removed10. Calls for the EU and its Member States to implement the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in a way that protects HRDs seeking refuge from non-EU countries with authoritarian regimes;

Added11. Highlights the lasting psychological toll of transnational repression on the mental health and general well-being of victims and their families, including their sense of safety, psychological integrity, social relationships and their ability to continue public activities, leading in many cases to long-lasting trauma, isolation and exclusion; strongly condemns perpetrators’ retaliation against families of HRDs living abroad as a means of transnational repression; notes the particularly chilling effect of transnational repression also among diaspora and civil society living in exile;

Removed11. Call on the Member States to make best use of their national policies and flexibility to formulate a more coherent, coordinated and predictable visa policy for HRDs targeted by TNR;