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Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

AFET-PR-769901 → A-10-2025-0154

From
AFET-PR-769901 report parliamentary committee draft of 8 May 2025
To
A-10-2025-0154 Plenary report of 24 Jul 2025
Changes
Not comparable
Paragraphs
+122 added · −30 removed · 4 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine
Title (to)
on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine

These two texts have too little in common to be compared paragraph by paragraph (under 15 % of their paragraphs match): they are different documents rather than versions of one — for example a group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted.

Every difference

The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.

Part 1 of 4: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

5 unchanged paragraphs

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine

(2025/2026(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine,

– having regard to the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Ukraine 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0699) accompanying the 2024 Commission communication on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690),

Added– having regard to the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Ukraine 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0699) accompanying the 2023 Commission communication on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690),

Added– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 June 2022 granting Ukraine candidate status, of 15 December 2023 endorsing the opening of accession negotiations, and of 20 March 2025,

Added– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,

Added– having regard to the report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of 2021 entitled ‘OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Ukraine’ and the subsequent follow-up dialogues in 2024,

Added– having regard to the International Monetary Fund’s eighth review of the 2023–2026 Extended Fund Facility for Ukraine,

Added– having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, in particular the urgent follow-up opinion to the opinions on the Law ‘On Amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine to clarify the provisions on the competitive selection of candidates for the position of judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’ of 9 October 2023, and the follow-up opinion to the opinion on the law on national minorities (communities) of 9 October 2023,

Added– having regard to the reports by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on Ukraine, in particular the Fourth Evaluation Round and the addendum to the second compliance report on corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors in Ukraine of 22 November 2024,

Added– having regard to the report submitted by Ukraine pursuant to Article 68, paragraph 1 of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Baseline Report) of 3 July 2025 and to the additional information received by the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence from Ukrainian civil society organisations,

Added– having regard to Human Rights Watch reports on Ukraine, including its report of 5 December 2024 entitled ‘“All She Did Was Help People” – Flawed Anti-Collaboration Legislation in Ukraine’,

Added– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

Added– having regard to recent declarations, including the joint statement by the leaders of France, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom and Ukraine following the meeting in Kyiv on 10 May 2025 and the Weimar+ joint statement on Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic security of 12 May 2025,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0154/2025),

Change 1

ChangedA. whereas Parliament condemns in the strongest possible terms the illegal, unjustified and unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine and supports Ukraine’s right to sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; whereas Russia invaded Ukraine and therefore the most straightforward and only just path towards peace in Ukraine consists of Russia withdrawing its forces from the entirety of the Ukrainian territory and paying reparations for the damage it caused throughout its illegal war of aggression;

Change 2

RemovedB. whereas Ukraine has shown remarkable resilience and commitment to its European path despite the ongoing Russian war of aggression;

AddedB. whereas Russia, with the political, material and military support provided by its allies – in particular Belarus and North Korea – has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine began, however, in 2014 with the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

AddedC. whereas Russia has been committing documented war crimes and deportations in all the Ukrainian territories that it illegally occupies, and has been relying heavily on information manipulation, disinformation and the spreading of propaganda so as to purposefully keep the population mis- and uninformed;

AddedD. whereas, in response to Russia’s war of aggression, the Core Group for the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine was launched in January 2023; whereas the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression was set up in The Hague in March 2023 under Eurojust; whereas the Core Group finalised the legal framework for the Tribunal in March 2025; whereas over 40 countries endorsed its creation through the joint statement of the Foreign Ministers Meeting of 9 May 2025 on the conclusion of the work of the Core Group (Lviv Statement); whereas on 25 June 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset signed in Strasbourg the formal agreement establishing the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine;

AddedE. whereas Ukraine has shown remarkable resilience and commitment to its European path and has made tangible progress in this regard despite the ongoing Russian war of aggression, which has resulted in the deaths of thousands, inflicted deep trauma on veterans and their families, left many cities and vital civil infrastructure in ruins, and led to the continued occupation of parts of its territory by Russian forces;

AddedF. whereas, as a result of the Russian invasion, over 4 million Ukrainians are currently living in EU Member States under the temporary protection mechanism and benefit from rights to residence, access to the labour market, housing, medical care, social welfare assistance and education for their children;

AddedG. whereas Ukraine’s EU accession process constitutes a path toward peace and prosperity for Ukraine and also a strategic response to Russia’s aggression, reinforcing the EU’s geopolitical resilience;

H. whereas the legislative reforms Ukraine has initiated reflect its dedication to alignment with the EU acquis;

Change 3

ChangedD.I. whereas challengesGRECO remaincontinues to acknowledge the strong commitment shown by Ukraine in respect of work to counter corruption at an extremely difficult time for the country; whereas GRECO in particular recognised Ukraine’s progress in preventing corruption among parliamentarians, judges and prosecutors; whereas, despite progress in areas such as judicial independence and systemic corruption, challenges remain which must be addressed through greater governmental accountabilityaccountability, further strengthening of institutional capacities, and international oversight;

Change 4

RemovedE. whereas Ukraine has made advancements in regional cooperation and in socioeconomic reforms to align its policies with EU standards;

AddedJ. whereas the OECD noted that Ukraine has made significant strides in reforming its anti-corruption framework in the past decade through enhancing transparency, accountability and integrity through open data, digitalisation, and bolstering of the independence of anti-corruption bodies;

RemovedF. whereas Ukraine’s democratic institutions have demonstrated adaptability under martial law, though concerns remain regarding transparency and the balance of power during this period;

AddedK. whereas while Ukraine scored 35 out of 100 points and ranked 105th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, and while there has been a strong commitment to anti-corruption efforts, actual reforms to implement these intentions are still needed; whereas comprehensive public-administration reform, the fight against corruption, the promotion of fundamental rights and the effective functioning of democratic institutions are core conditions for EU accession;

RemovedG. whereas progress has been made on public administration reform, but further capacity building and improvements to human resources management are still required;

AddedL. whereas Ukraine has made advancements in regional cooperation and in socio-economic reforms to align its policies with EU standards;

RemovedH. whereas the judiciary has resumed key functions, including the vetting of judges and the implementation of anti-corruption measures, though integrity and transparency standards must be strengthened;

AddedM. whereas Ukraine’s democratic institutions have demonstrated adaptability by showcasing that, even amid Russia’s ongoing war of aggression and under martial law, Ukraine remains an institutionally, democratically and economically viable state; whereas, while Ukraine remains at war and is under martial law, elections are legally banned and impractical; whereas Parliament welcomes indications that preparations for elections may begin once martial law has ended; N. whereas progress has been made on public administration reform, but further capacity building, evidence-based policymaking, and improvements to human resources management are still required;

RemovedI. whereas Ukraine has shown a commitment to the green agenda through legislation on renewable energy and by aligning with the objectives of the European Green Deal;

AddedO. whereas the judiciary has resumed key functions, including the vetting of judges and the implementation of anti-corruption measures, though integrity and transparency standards must be strengthened and there should be continuous oversight from international partners;

RemovedJ. whereas civil society remains a pillar of resilience and democracy in Ukraine, though instances of pressure against activists raise concerns and require government action;

AddedP. whereas the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary has benefited from the assistance of international experts in judicial selection commissions, which has also built public trust in the judicial system;

RemovedK. whereas the freedom of expression and media independence face challenges, particularly under martial law; whereas reforms are required to restore pluralism and protect journalists;

AddedQ. whereas international experts’ involvement in the selection of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) ended on 1 June 2025;

AddedR. whereas Ukraine has shown a commitment, despite the continuous destruction of energy facilities by Russia, to the green agenda through legislation on renewable energy and by aligning with the objectives of the European Green Deal;

AddedS. whereas the environmental damage caused by Russia has had devastating consequences for Ukraine’s natural resources, critical ecosystems and people’s health, livelihoods and security; whereas green recovery is about remedying that damage and setting Ukraine on a new path of environmental and social sustainability aligned with the environmental laws in the EU acquis; whereas Ukraine ceased to operate as a transit country for Russian gas on 1 January 2025;

AddedT. whereas foreign investors and multinational corporations have significantly expanded their control over Ukraine’s natural resources, including agricultural land, minerals and critical infrastructure; whereas such developments risk undermining national sovereignty, food security and economic self-determination;

AddedU. whereas in 2024, the EU purchases of Russian fossil fuels totalled EUR 21.9 billion, surpassing the EUR 18.7 billion in financial aid provided to Ukraine that same year; whereas since the start of the full-scale invasion, the EU has spent more than EUR 200 billion on Russian fossil fuels, thus contributing to funding Russia’s war chest; whereas the Commission has announced an end to Russian gas imports by 2027; whereas if the EU continues importing Russian energy at the rate it did in 2024, it would pay an additional EUR 57.4 billion to Russia before the end of 2027;

AddedV. whereas civil society remains a pillar of resilience and democracy in Ukraine; whereas, despite the restrictions imposed by martial law, NGOs continue to operate relatively unhindered, though instances of pressure against activists raise concerns and require government action; whereas recent abrupt US funding cuts have had devastating consequences for Ukrainian civil society;

AddedW. whereas the freedom of expression and media independence face challenges, particularly under martial law; whereas measures are required to restore pluralism, protect journalists and create a financially enabling environment; whereas it is understandable that certain restrictions are necessary during martial law;

X. whereas Ukraine’s EU integration process is widely supported by public and institutional consensus, reflecting a strong societal commitment to EU membership despite the current difficulties;

Change 5

RemovedM. whereas EU membership remains a crucially important driver for the democratic development of Ukraine and will represent a key factor in ensuring the country’s future security, stability and independence;

AddedY. whereas EU accession carries a distinct security dimension and strong symbolic significance for the country and its population, in the context of Ukraine's existential war against ongoing Russian aggression; whereas the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence are not dependent on the speed of the country’s European integration;

RemovedOn the state of play of the Russian war of aggression and sanctions

AddedZ. whereas EU membership remains a crucially important driver for the democratic development of Ukraine and will represent a key factor in ensuring the country’s future security, stability and independence; whereas Ukraine’s EU membership is a strategic investment in peace, security, democracy and prosperity for the entire continent as it will strengthen the Union by contributing to its geopolitical resilience, enhancing its economic potential, and reinforcing its commitment to shared values of democracy, the rule of law and freedom;

Removed1. Reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; strongly underlines Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter;

AddedAA. whereas accession remains a merit-based process and progress on reform implementation must be assessed thoroughly and carefully, which is also in the interest of Ukraine;

Removed2. Stresses that the EU and its Member States must significantly increase the assistance they provide to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence; insists that the EU and its Member States, together with partner and allies, must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression;

AddedThe Russian war of aggression as the context for Ukraine's EU accession preparations

Added1. Condemns in the strongest terms the Russian Federation’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the brave people of Ukraine, who have paid the highest price over the past three years in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in protecting Europe and our shared democratic values and principles; expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the fallen heroes and innocent civilian victims of the Russian aggression, including the more than 600 children who have been killed;

Added2. Confirms its unwavering commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; reiterates its policy of non-recognition of temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine by Russia, including Crimea; strongly underlines Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which entails the right to strike military targets on Russian soil; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on terms that are acceptable to Ukraine and its people, ensuring the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the prosecution of those responsible for war crimes, as well as the payment of reparations; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for international law and Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, as well as Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; stresses that any peaceful solution must respect the will of the Ukrainian people and not be imposed by any other international actor and must not reward aggression or undermine Ukraine’s future security; regards the disingenuous approach to negotiations and unserious proposals by Russian leaders over the past months as additional proof that Russia intends to prolong its war on the entire Ukrainian territory as long as it can and is allowed to; stresses that peace negotiations must be preceded by an unconditional ceasefire; calls for continued EU support to Ukrainian and international efforts to strengthen the documentation and investigation of war crimes committed by Russian forces;

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
25 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2025). “Changes between AFET-PR-769901 and A-10-2025-0154”. Text, 24 July 2025. from AFET-PR-769901, to A-10-2025-0154, reference 2025/2026(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-769901/compare/A-10-2025-0154?all=1 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-07-24,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between AFET-PR-769901 and A-10-2025-0154}},
  year = {2025},
  date = {2025-07-24},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-769901/compare/A-10-2025-0154?all=1}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-769901/compare/A-10-2025-0154?all=1},
  urldate = {2026-09-25},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from AFET-PR-769901, to A-10-2025-0154, reference 2025/2026(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}