Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

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on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations

(2025/2041(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 31(3), 48 and 49 thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 81(3), 83, 136, 153(2), 192(2), 312(2) and 333 thereof,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23-24 June 2022, 29-30 June 2023, 26-27 October 2023, 14-15 December 2023 and 27 June 2024,

Added– having regard to the Granada declaration of the European Council of 6 October 2023,

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– having regard to the Council Presidency Progress Report on the future of Europe of 10 June 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 23 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to its resolutions of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, and of 11 July 2023 on the implementation of the passerelle clauses in the EU Treaties,

– having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe and to its resolution of 4 May 2022 on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe,

– having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties, and of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, including through the activation of Article 48 TEU asking the European Council to agree to call a Convention to reform the Treaties,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’, and the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the report of the Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform of 18 September 2023 entitled ‘Sailing on High Seas: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st century’,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0177/2025),

A. whereas 9 of the 10 countries currently aspiring to join the EU have candidate status, some of which have held this status for many years; whereas the candidate countries are at various stages of the accession process and negotiations; whereas Georgia unilaterally suspended EU accession negotiations on 28 November 2024;

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ChangedB. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other ongoing geopolitical challenges, including a worrying shift in transatlantic relations, have given new geostrategic meaning and impetus to the EU accession process and European unification;

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RemovedC. whereas enlargement is a historic commitment and a strategic geopolitical priority, representing an investment in the future of the European continent;

AddedC. whereas accession to the European Union must remain a merit-based process, based on an assessment of each applicant’s fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and the implementation of the necessary reforms, in particular in the areas of ‘fundamentals’, adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance, as well as alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, in order to ensure that enlargement strengthens rather than undermines the EU and its single market;

RemovedD. whereas the EU’s institutional framework, and in particular its decision-making process, is barely adequate for a Union of 27 Member States; whereas the prospect of future enlargements makes the reform of EU institutions, policies and decision-making procedures more indispensable and urgent than ever;

AddedD. whereas enlargement is a historic commitment, a key EU foreign policy tool, a strategic geopolitical priority and one of the EU’s most successful policies, representing an investment in the future of the European continent;

RemovedE. whereas all previous enlargements have been preceded or accompanied by internal institutional reforms;

AddedE. whereas accession countries should implement decisively the required reforms and achieve concrete and irreversible progress in core elements of the enlargement process; whereas the EU and the Member States should support the candidate countries with financial and technical assistance to achieve these criteria; whereas there cannot be shortcuts with EU values and fundamental principles;

AddedF. whereas an enlarged EU would gain greater political, economic and military power and leverage on the global stage while empowering shared democratic values across the EU enlargement region; whereas an enlarged single market is important to both the EU and the accession countries while making the EU an even more competitive economic player and attractive trading partner; whereas any failure to make progress in EU enlargement would undermine the EU’s economic and security interests and could ultimately push non-EU countries on the European continent to align economically and politically with other blocs (e.g. Russia and China), potentially creating rival economic areas and reducing the EU’s global economic influence, while creating opportunities for destabilisation efforts to be conducted from the immediate EU neighbourhood;

AddedG. whereas the countries that joined the EU in 2004 – and the EU as a whole – have experienced substantial economic growth and higher standards in several areas, including an increase in GDP per capita of 30 % on average; whereas, on average, all new Member States have experienced an additional 12 % of GDP growth compared to their projected growth if they had not joined the EU, and that this growth was discernible within five years of their accession; whereas, over the past 20 years, the EU’s economy has grown by 27 %; whereas the countries that were already part of the EU at the time of the 2004 enlargement have also experienced growth and prosperity, with a clear causal relationship with expanded markets, connectivity and investment resulting from the enlargement; whereas every region experiences economic growth through enlargement, but the poorest regions experience the highest relative economic growth;

AddedH. whereas the GDP per capita of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia remains around or below 50 % of that of the EU, although some candidate countries have demonstrated steady economic growth over recent years, which enables a merit-based and forward-looking approach; whereas the experience following all EU enlargements demonstrates the positive impact that EU membership and membership of the EU single market and access to structural funds have on economic and social convergence; whereas studies show that the addition of 10 new Member States would shrink the GDP per capita gap between the EU and the United States by 10 %; whereas expanded access to, among other things, labour markets, industrial capacity, digital technologies, in particular AI, and critical rare earth minerals would enable the EU to accelerate the green, digital and just transitions while decreasing its costs, at the same time becoming more strategically autonomous from Russia, China and other systemic competitors; whereas scenarios combining substantial enlargement with strong convergence could add up to an estimated USD 10 trillion to the EU’s GDP by 2035;

AddedI. whereas the pre-accession instruments play an important role as they provide valuable experience for designing modernised support tools tailored to specific country needs, as was the case with Phare (the Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe), SAPARD (pre-accession agricultural instrument) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession);

AddedJ. whereas some countries outside the EU are dealing with varying levels of political instability and whereas the implementation of EU membership-related reforms in these countries, as demonstrated in previous enlargements, should contribute to stability and the rule of law in the region; whereas the EU has at its disposal an extensive set of tools to enforce compliance with fundamental values in the Member States and safeguard the political stability of the European project as a whole; whereas this set of tools must still be reformed and strengthened, in particular through the consistent implementation of the rule of law mechanism and effective protection of the EU’s fundamental values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, including through setting out conditions in the current and next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

AddedK. whereas the Commission and Parliament should develop awareness-raising campaigns in Member States and candidate countries in order for citizens to be properly informed about the opportunities enlargement provides, while countering foreign information manipulation and interference from Russia and other countries designed to undermine public support for enlargement;

AddedL. whereas the EU’s institutional framework, and in particular its decision-making processes, need to be strengthened and improved for the current European Union of 27 Member States; whereas preparing for enlargement requires internal reforms within the EU and whereas the enlargement process should be pursued in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity; whereas the prospect of future enlargements makes the reform of the EU institutions, policies and decision-making procedures more necessary and urgent than ever;

AddedM. whereas previous enlargements were often preceded or accompanied by internal institutional reforms concerning the governance of the EU and whereas those enlargement processes have usually provided a powerful spur for the development and the economic and democratic progress of the candidate countries;

AddedN. whereas, in its Granada declaration of 6 October 2023, the European Council acknowledged that the necessary acceleration of reform efforts in candidate countries should be matched by a parallel process of groundwork and reforms within the EU;

AddedO. whereas, in its conclusions of 27 June 2024, the European Council set out a roadmap for future work on internal reforms; whereas the European Council recognises that strengthening the EU and European sovereignty requires reforms enabling the EU to meet its long-term ambitions, achieve its policies and priorities, and respond to new geopolitical realities and challenges;

AddedP. whereas, according to those conclusions, internal reforms should advance in parallel with the enlargement process, so that policies are fit for the future and financed in a suitable manner and so that that EU institutions continue to function and act effectively; whereas the European Council has invited the Commission to present an in-depth policy review in 2025 focusing on four strands, namely values and the rule of law, policies, budget and governance;

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Q. whereas the perspective of an upcoming enlargement exposes the EU to a threefold challenge of ensuring efficient decision-making procedures (the efficiency challenge), gathering sufficient resources to deliver on its strategic objectives (the power and resource challenge) and safeguarding the democratic legitimacy and accountability of its actions (the democracy challenge);

R. whereas pre-enlargement reforms of the EU’s institutional framework imply a possible advancement of differentiated integration solutions whenever the Treaties allow; whereas procedures pursuant to Articles 20, 42 and 46 TEU on enhanced cooperation and on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) allow willing Member States to deepen their integration and enhance their cooperation within the framework of the EU’s non-exclusive competences;

S. whereas passerelle clauses could be used immediately to switch from the requirement for unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) in specific policy areas; whereas the TEU establishes that the ultimate objective of the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy is the establishment of a common defence by unanimous decision of the European Council, which must be compatible with NATO;

T. whereas, due to the limited flexibility of the Treaties, a more in-depth reform by means of targeted Treaty changes should be envisaged; whereas Parliament has activated the Treaty revision procedure and has submitted proposals for the amendment of the Treaties to the Council in accordance with Article 48(2) TEU;

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RemovedJ. whereas Member States have on several occasions resorted to intergovernmental cooperation outside the framework of the Treaties where unanimity prevented the widening of EU competences in key policy areas and have at a later stage enshrined this cooperation in the Treaties;

The cost of not reforming the enlarged EU

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Changed1. Argues that the EU and candidate countries have always used enlargement as a policy and geopolitical tool to promote democracy, stability, security, the fight against climate change,security and prosperity across the continent; is of the view that EU enlargement represents a long-term geostrategic investment;

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Removed2. Recognises that an enlarged EU would gain higher economic power and leverage on the global stage, since a larger single market makes the EU an even more competitive economic player and an attractive trading partner; expresses concern that the failure to make progress in terms of EU enlargement could ultimately push non-EU countries on the European continent to align economically and politically with other blocs (e.g. Russia and China), potentially creating rival economic zones and reducing the EU’s global economic influence, while creating opportunities for destabilisation efforts to be conducted from the immediate EU neighbourhood;

2. Stresses that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other geopolitical challenges accentuate the urgency of advancing the enlargement process; maintains that a successful and sustainable enlargement requires long-term political vision and bold decisions, aiming at promoting an efficient, powerful and democratic Europe;

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Removed4. Underscores that the European Political Community represents an ideal forum to promote European unification and pursue policy coordination and the alignment of candidate and other non-EU countries, notably in terms of EU foreign, defence and security policy;

Added3. Notes that experience shows that each new wave of enlargement brings new institutional and political challenges and opportunities that should be addressed in a timely manner, preferably before the candidate countries become Member States, in order to ensure the effective functioning of the EU and prevent institutional gridlock; points out that every enlargement in the history of the European project has been preceded or accompanied by the necessary internal institutional reforms;

Removed5. Underlines that the countries that joined the EU in 2004 have experienced substantial economic growth and higher standards in several areas; highlights that over the past 20 years, the EU’s economy has grown by 27 %; underlines, furthermore, that the countries that were already part of the EU at the time of the 2004 enlargement have also experienced growth and prosperity;

Added4. Acknowledges that the aim of unanimity is to ensure that the legitimate concerns of all Member States are addressed; believes, however, that an enlarged EU will require more sophisticated coordination in addressing the challenges of the current enlargement process; underlines the importance of addressing the difficulties caused by unanimity in the Council, including the use of unanimity for intermediate steps in the enlargement process, which could slow down the EU accession of new members owing to bilateral issues; recalls that Article 49 TEU enables a move to QMV without requiring Treaty changes; takes note of the cumbersome and outdated structure and governance of the EU budget and the possible redistribution in the allocation of agricultural and cohesion funds; recalls that EU enlargement is an opportunity to recalibrate key EU policies in this respect; supports initiatives aimed at making the decision-making process more effective, which is key to enhancing the EU’s competitiveness;

Removed6. Recalls that GDP per capita of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia remains around or below 50 % of that of the EU, and that the pace of achieving convergence is slow, but highlights that the experience of EU enlargement in 2004 demonstrates the positive impact that membership of the EU single market and access to structural funds have on economic convergence;

Added5. Reiterates its position that the deepening of the Union, its enlargement processes and European unification should proceed hand in hand; stresses that EU institutional and financial reforms are needed to face the challenges of the current enlargement process and to ensure the EU’s capacity to absorb new members and to promote their successful integration without destabilising the other Member States’ economies or exacerbating social tensions;

Removed7. Recognises that some countries outside the European Union are dealing with varying levels of political instability and that bringing those countries into the EU will bring stability to the region and help protect the EU’s external borders, in particular as regards organised and cross-border crime, drug trafficking, the prevention of irregular migration and the smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime, interference in democratic and electoral processes, and money laundering; stresses that the EU has at its disposal an extensive set of tools to enforce compliance with fundamental values in the Member States and safeguard the political stability of the European project as a whole; points out, however, that this set of tools must still be strengthened;

Removed8. Notes that experience shows that each new wave of enlargement brings new challenges of an institutional and political nature that have to be addressed before the candidate countries become Member States, or else the EU risks institutional gridlock and its functioning becoming unwieldy and ineffective; points out that every enlargement in the history of the European project was preceded or accompanied by the necessary internal institutional reforms;

Removed9. Acknowledges that an enlarged EU will be more cumbersome to manage and more prone to paralysis with regard to the challenges faced in the current enlargement process: the use of unanimity in the Council for foreign affairs issues and for the enlargement policy, which could slow down accession of new members due to bilateral issues, the composition of the Commission and of Parliament, the cumbersome and outdated structure and governance of the EU budget, and the redistribution shocks in the allocation of agricultural and cohesion funds;

Removed10. Reiterates its position that the deepening of the Union and European unification should proceed hand in hand; stresses that EU institutional and financial reforms are needed to face those challenges and to ensure the EU’s capacity to absorb new members and to promote their successful integration without destabilising the other Member States’ economies or exacerbating social tensions;

6. Recognises that ad hoc solutions could serve as temporary fixes, but they lack the predictability, democratic transparency and accountability, and long-term sustainability that only structural reforms can bring about;

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Removed12. Encourages the Commission to develop an ambitious and comprehensive pre-enlargement policy and funding review in line with the below recommendations;

Objectives of the institutional pre-enlargement reforms: efficiency, power and democracy

7. Firmly believes that the EU institutional reforms, regardless of the decision-making procedure for their adoption, should increase the EU’s ability to act in an efficient and timely manner; points out that the pre-enlargement reforms of the EU institutional framework should meet the objectives of improving the EU’s efficiency, making the EU more powerful on the global stage and making the EU more democratic, legitimate and accountable;