Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Role of national parliaments

Change 10

Changed12.20. Emphasises that thenational involvementparliaments ofhave nationala parliamentspivotal role in the EU’s conformity with the subsidiarity principle and that the legislative process will enhance the validity and democratic legitimacy of the EU and its legislative initiatives; stresses the need for continued scrutiny of EU legislation and more active participation of national parliaments through the mechanisms provided for in the Treaties, including the ‘yellowyellow card’card and ‘orangeorange card’card procedures; encourages national parliaments to enhance their capacity to scrutinise and challenge EU action effectively under the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, exercising stronger and more timely oversight over legislative proposals and ensuring that EU legislative initiatives respect the balance and distributionsharing of powerscompetences between the EU and its Member States;

Change 11

Removed13. Believes that national parliaments should be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; further calls for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1 to twelve weeks;

Added21. Recalls that national parliaments exercise democratic control over their respective national governments, which represent the interests of Member States in the Council; highlights that some Member States provide for more active participation of their national and/or regional parliaments in the European legislative process by, for example, exercising parliamentary reserve; encourages all Member States to implement measures ensuring more active participation of national parliaments in the forming of their national positions in order to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Council’s deliberations;

Removed14. Considers that the ‘yellow card’ mechanism has shown its limitations due to the lack of a binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; proposes the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism, which, by qualified majority of the national parliaments (i.e. 55 % of the Member States representing at least 65 % of the EU population, in accordance with Article 238 TFEU), would automatically result in the withdrawal of the contested legislative proposal;

Added22. Welcomes the contributions of the LXXII Plenary Meeting of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC)15, which recommended strengthening the subsidiarity review by the national parliaments by extending the eight-week deadline for submitting opinions to 10 weeks and through lowering the threshold for triggering the yellow card to one quarter of the votes cast;

Removed15. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals;

Added23. Calls for a strengthening of the role of national parliaments in the EU by enhancing transparency, dialogue, and cooperation mechanisms between national parliaments and the Commission; stresses that while national parliaments do not hold formal direct powers over the Commission akin to those of the European Parliament, their political influence should be reinforced to ensure more transparency and legitimacy of the Commission’s actions;

Removed16. Calls on the Commission, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report, to launch an EU-wide investigation to identify and analyse the reasons behind the limited exercise of national parliaments’ scrutiny capacity in relation to subsidiarity;

Added24. Believes that national parliaments should be given a more positive and proactive role by, for instance, creating a ‘green card’ that would operate with lower thresholds; calls, furthermore, for the extension, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, of the current eight-week deadline to 12 weeks for national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions under Article 4 of Protocol No 1; recalls that the Commission has already provided for certain flexibility in the deadlines, by additionally excluding the period between 20 December and 10 January;

Added25. Reiterates the need to strengthen the structural cooperation of the EU co-legislators with national, regional and local law-makers; underlines that, in this regard, the European Parliamentary Week and Interparliamentary Committee Meetings have been instrumental; believes that the further development of an expanded annual European Parliamentary Week would allow MEPs, Commissioners and ministers of sitting Council presidencies to stand before all national and, where appropriate, regional parliaments in order to discuss and explain the European agenda alongside national parliamentarians;

Added26. Suggests opening a discussion on drawing up a common political declaration or framework agreement between the national parliaments and the European Parliament concerning the organisation of the proposed European Parliamentary Week in order to provide a more coherent framework of cooperation at political, institutional and administrative level; considers that the proposed European Parliamentary Week should draw lessons from current and previous forums, such as the parliamentary week held by the European Semester Conference and the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the European Union, as well as the Conference on the Future of Europe; believes, further, that political family meetings and caucuses between and within national and European political groups in the framework of EU interparliamentary cooperation could bring added value in the form of authentic European political debate;

Added27. Considers that the limited use of the yellow card procedure and the ineffectiveness of the ‘orange card’ procedure show that there is still room for improvement and that they have limitations due to their having no binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; considers that better coordination between national parliaments is possible in this respect; underlines that better cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament would lead to more active engagement with EU legislative proposals, and that cooperation via national governments as intermediaries would lead to a strengthened role for national parliaments in shaping EU legislation;

Added28. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals, as well as in the evaluation of current EU legislation; considers, in this regard, that the Commission should facilitate the organisation of public consultations at local and regional level to increase the agency and the participation of citizens in EU policymaking;

Added29. Encourages the EU institutions and regional parliaments with legislative powers to engage more actively and interact directly with each other, while fully respecting the role and competences of national parliaments; calls for national parliaments to include the reasoned opinions of regional parliaments with legislative powers into their final reasoned opinions that are sent to the Presidents of Parliament, the Council and the Commission when exclusive regional competences are affected; reaffirms that Article 12 TEU and Protocol No 1 give national parliaments the right to receive information directly from the EU institutions; suggests that the right to be informed be extended also to regional parliaments with legislative powers;

Added30. Calls on the Commission, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report, to launch an EU-wide investigation to identify and analyse the reasons behind the limited exercise of national parliaments’ scrutiny capacity in relation to subsidiarity; encourages the Commission to draw on the expertise and experience of national and regional authorities regarding the transposition and implementation of EU legislation;

Role of the CJEU

Change 12

Changed17.31. Stresses that the CJEU plays a crucial role in applying and interpreting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the EU legal framework; stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; regretsnotes that the Advocates General show little engagement with subsidiarity arguments in their opinions;

Change 13

Changed18.32. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place; notes that the CJEU’s reluctance to substantively address subsidiarity concerns can add to the perception that the CJEU is biased in favour of the Commission, to the detriment of the Member States;

Change 14

Removed19. Echoes the criticism that the CJEU has interpreted EU competences too broadly and has been reluctant to strictly enforce subsidiarity, raising concerns of judicial activism; acknowledges that such interpretations may be perceived as advancing European integration at the expense of national sovereignty and the Member States’ ability to regulate matters beyond the scope of EU competence;

Added33. Recommends that the Commission, in its consultations with the Member States, makes sure that governments provide evidence of taking into account the positions of national and regional parliaments with legislative powers;

Removed20. Insists that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to lawmaking;

Added34. Acknowledges the perceived reluctance of the CJEU to robustly enforce subsidiarity as a meaningful constraint on EU legislative action;

Removed21. Expresses concern regarding the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into the account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation and that proportionality should not only be applied to the EU as a whole;

Added35. Notes that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to law-making;

Removed22. Expresses concern about the CJEU’s judgment that the failure to carry out an impact assessment cannot be regarded as a breach of the principle of proportionality; calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception and ensure that legislative proposals do not go beyond the scope of the original impact assessment;

Added36. Takes note of the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality16; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation for the EU as a whole;

Removed23. Calls on the Commission to conduct a survey among all legislative bodies in all Member States to assess their perception of the judicial independence of the CJEU, as well as their probability calculation of a successful appeal before the CJEU in matters regarding subsidiarity and proportionality;

Added37. Expresses concern about the CJEU’s judgment stating that the failure to carry out an impact assessment cannot be regarded as a breach of the principle of proportionality17; calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception and ensure that when the scope of the legislative proposal changes, the Commission comes forward with a new impact assessment;

Added38. Underlines that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is crucial for citizens’ trust in the EU and its legislation, and should be more clearly communicated to the public during communication on single legislative initiatives;

Added39. Reiterates that impact assessments should be based on accurate, objective and complete information; considers it essential, consequently, for the EU co-legislators to collect input from the local and regional authorities, which are able to provide the most precise information on various issues;

Added40. Calls for a survey of national parliaments in order to assess what factors influence their use of the yellow card procedure and how they perceive respect for the subsidiarity principle in EU decision-making;

Added41. Considers it pertinent to conduct a survey among national legislative bodies in order to collect their feedback on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; suggests, therefore, that the Commission conduct such a survey in order to identify in which areas and to what extent national legislative bodies need to be protagonists of change;

Final observations

Change 15

Changed24.42. Calls for a clearer and more consistent definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, taking into account the active subsidiarity approach developed by the Task Force and ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; proposes opening a discussion on the creation of a ‘subsidiarity court’ asin partview of any future Treaty revision process;revision;

Change 16

Changed25.43. Demands that any loopholes be closed for greater transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments and stakeholders to ensure that subsidiarity concerns are adequately addressed;

Change 17

Changed26.44. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should refocusfocus on domains where the EU ‘truly’truly has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; further urges the EU institutionsinstitutions, further, to adopt a principle of self-restraint in policymaking by more carefully selecting future initiatives and streamlining existingcurrent legislation;

Change 18

Removed27. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better lawmaking and will reduce regulatory burdens and bureaucratic red tape; insists that if a legislative objective can be achieved at the local, regional or national level, the Commission should not propose legislation and that, in cases of uncertainty about the most appropriate level for action, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of lower levels of government;

Added45. Considers that current EU legislation should be regularly assessed in terms of its proportionality and adequacy in respect of modern realities; underlines that artificial intelligence can be instrumental in finding legal inconsistencies or disproportionate effects, and thus facilitate compliance and address, where applicable, any lack of proportionality;

Added46. Suggests that all the interparliamentary activities developed in the framework of Protocol No 1 to the Treaty of Lisbon (including COSAC, IPEX, ECPRD, etc.) by national parliaments and the European Parliament should be better used and synergistically integrated in order to better apply the subsidiarity and proportionality principles;

Added47. Points out that MEPs, as they are directly elected by the European citizens, have major powers for setting the EU legislative agenda; commits to using the right of initiative under Article 225 TFEU to propose repealing legislation to reduce the regulatory burden, in full respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Added48. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better law-making and will reduce regulatory burdens and red tape; insists that before making a legislative proposal, the Commission should assess whether the desired positive effect can be achieved at the local, regional or national level, and that, in cases of uncertainty about the most appropriate level for action, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of lower levels of government;

Added49. Underlines the Task Force’s conclusions that the Commission and the co-legislators should balance their work towards delivering more effective implementation rather than initiating new legislation or constantly amending current legislation in areas where the current body of legislation is outdated and/or has recently been substantially revised;

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Change 19

Changed28.50. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the CouncilCouncil, the Commission and thenational Commission.parliaments.