Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process

(2025/2042(INI))

The European Parliament,

Changed– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 on the conferral of competencescompetences, subsidiarity and subsidiarity,proportionality, Article 10(1) on representative democracy, Article 10(2) on the representation of EU citizens, Article 10(3) on the right of EU citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, Article 11 on participatory democracy and Article 12 on the role of national parliaments,

Changed– having regard to Protocol No 1 to the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the role of national parliaments in the European UnionUnion1 and to Protocol No 2 to the TEU and the TFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiary and proportionality,proportionality2,

Changed– having regard to Articles 2-62-6, and15 Articleand 15122 TFEU,

Changed– having regard to its resolutions of 7 May 2009 on the development of the relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon,Lisbon3, of 16 April 2014 on relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments,parliaments4, of 19 April 2018 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning national parliamentsparliaments5 and of 17 January 2024 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments,parliaments6,

Removed– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

Added– having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties7, in particular the proposed amendments related to the subsidiarity principle and Protocol No 2,

Added– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’8 (the Draghi report),

Added– having regard to the Commission’s annual reports on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and relations with national Parliaments,

Added– having regard to the final report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ of 10 July 20189,

Added– having regard to the Commission communication of 23 October 2018 entitled ‘The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality: Strengthening their role in the EU’s policymaking’ (COM(2018)0703),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0224/2025),

Change 1

ChangedA. whereas the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU, ensures that: ‘in areas that decisionsdo arenot madefall aswithin closeits toexclusive citizenscompetence, asthe possibleUnion shall act only if and thatin so far as the EUobjectives onlyof actsthe whenproposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member StatesStates, cannoteither achieveat central or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the relevantscale objectivesor alone;effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’; whereas this principle safeguards the balance of power in the EU; whereas the principle of proportionality, as outlined in Article 5(4) TEU, mandates that the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is necessary for achieving the objectives of the Treaties;

Change 2

ChangedB. whereas the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for ensuring the democratic legitimacy and regulatory impact and efficiency of the EU; whereas it is essential that the EU respects the diversity of its Member States and avoids unnecessary encroachmentregulatory burdens on Member StateStates competences;and their legal subjects;

C. whereas Articles 2-6 TFEU clearly delineate the exclusive, shared and supporting competences of the EU;

Change 3

ChangedD. whereas the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were introducedmentioned explicitly for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty to addressbalance concernsthe amonggrowing powers of the MemberEuropean StatesUnion aboutwith potentialthe overreachsovereignty byof the EU;Member States; whereas the role of the national parliaments was strengthened by Protocol No 2 to the Treaties, added by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the introduction of an early warning system (EWS);

Change 4

ChangedE. whereas 577 subsidiarity checks and reasoned opinions by national parliaments, 3 803 contributions from national parliaments, three yellow‘yellow cardscards’ and no orange‘orange cardscards’ have been submitted since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty of Lisbon in 2009;

Change 5

RemovedF. whereas only the first of the three yellow card procedures has led to the withdrawal of a proposal, the second led to enhanced cooperation between 20 Member States instead of unanimous implementation, and the third had no effect, despite a record number of 14 reasoned opinions submitted by parliaments in 11 Member States;

AddedF. whereas, in line with the principles enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the entire EU institutional framework must make consistent and sustained efforts to ensure the active involvement of national parliaments in the European decision-making process; whereas the yellow and orange card mechanisms, as provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon, should be strengthened, and consideration should be given to further enhancing their effectiveness;

AddedG. whereas only the first of the three yellow card procedures led to the withdrawal of a proposal for a regulation10, the second led to enhanced cooperation between 20 Member States instead of unanimous implementation11, and the third had no effect, while 14 reasoned opinions have been submitted by parliaments in 11 Member States12;

H. whereas the EWS has only led to two procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Change 6

ChangedH.I. whereas a stricterstrict adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the Commission and the co-legislators can assist in alleviating regulatory burdens and willcontribute ultimatelyto leada tomore betterefficient lawmaking;law-making process;

Change 7

Removed1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is essential for safeguarding the sovereignty and competences of the Member States;

AddedJ. whereas there is an established practice of each rotational presidency of the Council of the European Union having a parliamentary dimension, with national parliaments participating jointly with the European Parliament in numerous interparliamentary conferences on a variety of topics;

Removed2. Stresses that the underlying rationale behind the principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be made as close as possible to the citizens, and that actions should be taken at the lowest level of government capable of effectively addressing an issue;

AddedK. whereas national parliaments are included in the EU legislative process both under the specific provisions of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU, as well as through their exercise of democratic control over their respective national governments, which represent the interests of the Member States in the Council;

AddedL. whereas Article 122 TFEU is designed to be used only in exceptional and crisis situations and should not be misused as a way of circumventing other procedures laid down by the Treaties, especially as this would exclude Parliament’s participation and might therefore weaken public trust;

AddedM. whereas scrutiny over the Commission, as the executive body of the EU, should be exercised both by the European Parliament and the national parliaments;

Added1. Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality for the EU’s legal and institutional framework; recalls that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be essential elements of the Commission’s approach to better regulation, which is built on the three fundamental processes of evaluation, impact assessment and stakeholder consultation; reiterates that these principles are essential in safeguarding the division of powers and ensuring that EU actions are necessary and appropriate;

Added2. Stresses that the underlying rationale behind the principle of subsidiarity is to ensure that decisions should be made as closely as possible to the citizens, safeguarding the ability of the Member States to take decisions and action and authorise intervention by the EU when the objectives of an action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at EU level, by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed action, with the primary goal of maximising effectiveness and ensuring closer proximity to citizens;

Added3. Recalls that the principles of subsidiarity and of proportionality require that measures adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by EU legislation;

Added4. Underlines that the concept of ‘active subsidiarity’ as developed by the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ (the Task Force) is based on constructive cooperation between all levels of governance during all stages of the life-cycle of EU legislation for the benefit of EU citizens;

Role of the Commission

Change 8

Changed3.5. Calls on the Commission to showexercise restraintdue diligence and discretion when proposing legislation that falls under shared competences; calls on the Commission to moreclearly and thoroughly define the legal basis for EU legislation, and not to use a different legal basis to engage in legislating when the matter falls withinaction, theensuring competencefull ofrespect thefor Member States;State callscompetences onand the Commission to refrain from proposing legislation in areas of exclusiveappropriate competenceuse of thelegal Memberfoundations; Statesunderlines ifthat suchthe proposalsentire wouldEU goinstitutional beyondframework coordinationmust ormake supportingconsistent theand Membersustained States;efforts considersto thatensure the Commission should only proposeactive legislationinvolvement onof thesenational mattersparliaments atin the explicit request of theEuropean Memberdecision-making States;process;

Change 9

Removed4. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the impossibility of effective action at the national level; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between different Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the misuse of legal bases under Article 352 TFEU and calls for the establishment of a mechanism for prior validation by national parliaments before the adoption of any legislative proposal in an area of shared competence;

Added6. Notes with concern the Commission’s choice of Article 122 TFEU as a legal basis for the deployment of EUR 800 billion for the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 instrument; calls on the Commission to revise the legal basis of this initiative; urges the Commission to read Article 122 TFEU in the light of its initial design as an extraordinary and crisis management solution, and in the spirit of the principle of subsidiarity in any future proposals;

Removed5. Shares the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts;

Added7. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the need for effective action and the choice of instruments; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; recalls the Commission’s intention, expressed in its 2018 communication, to integrate an assessment grid into its better regulation guidance and to use it as part of the impact assessments, evaluations and explanatory memoranda that accompany its legislative proposals; regrets that so far this has not been fulfilled in practice; welcomes, in this regard, the subsidiarity grid developed by the European Committee of the Regions and encourages the Commission to use it as the basis for its subsidiarity assessments; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the use of Articles 122 and 352 TFEU as a legal basis and calls for a strengthened prior consultation of the national and regional parliaments with legislative powers before proposing legislation at EU level;

Removed6. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality in its assessment of legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere tick-box exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives;

Added8. Notes the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee13 regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts;

Removed7. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions are often perceived as dismissive, especially when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; notes that this risks overlooking the specific situation in individual Member States in favour of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, which does not take into account the diversity of legal traditions and regional differences across the EU; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments;

Added9. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission, jointly with the European Parliament, to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality when drafting legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere box-ticking exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives;

Removed8. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the ‘yellow card’ or ‘orange card’ procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments, but because of the lack of transparency in EU lawmaking, and more specifically, the low probability of success in having legislative proposals amended or withdrawn;

Added10. Notes that the Commission’s responses to reasoned opinions should be carefully considered even when they are not supported by a large number of national parliaments; stresses the importance of the specific situation in individual Member States, taking into account the diversity of legal traditions and regional differences across the EU; expresses concern about the fact that there is little evidence that the Commission significantly alters its proposals as a result of reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments;

Removed9. Welcomes the creation of informal procedures to enhance coordination between the Commission and national parliaments, such as the political dialogue, the rapporteur dialogue and the website entitled ‘National Parliament opinions and Commissions replies’; urges the Commission to explore avenues to further improve consultation with national parliaments on subsidiarity concerns, for example by establishing a ‘single subsidiarity hub’ (SSH) based on the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX), where reasoned opinions as well as contributions, opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, answers from the Commission, resolutions of the European Parliament, etc. would be collected and freely accessible; considers that the creation of an SSH would be a suitable place for the Member States to request the Commission to propose supporting or coordinating legislation in an area of exclusive competence of the Member States;

Added11. Points out that implementing new EU legislation can entail very high costs for municipalities, particularly in remote or scarcely populated areas; considers that municipalities must be equipped with sufficient financial resources to implement EU law, so as to enable them to comply with the new EU legislative norms; points out that these financial resources should correspond to the implementation costs that the municipalities incur;

Removed10. Notes the concerns raised regarding the Commission’s reactive approach to engaging with national parliaments and that this engagement is limited and takes place too late in the legislative process, which in turn limits the ability of national parliaments to influence legislative proposals; urges the Commission to invite input from national parliaments at an earlier stage, more specifically, when consultations take place;

Added12. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the yellow card or orange card procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments; notes that there are a number of possible explanations for the limited use of the yellow card procedure, including the lack of transparency in EU law-making, the lack of knowledge about the EU legislative process, and time constraints; considers that parliaments that refrain from using the instrument make it more difficult to reach the required threshold; recognises that the current procedure is too cumbersome and leaves room for improvement; recalls, in this context, its earlier proposals to extend the deadline for yellow card procedures to 12 weeks and to have a wider reflection on the possibility to upgrade the EWS to a tool to enable national parliaments to shape EU policies; recalls, in this sense, its latest resolution on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments, where it called on the Member States to ensure that national parliaments have enough resources to fulfil their constitutional role of oversight and recommended that national parliaments use the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX) more effectively and involve their regional parliaments in bringing the EWS into operation;

Removed11. Considers that the Commission should focus on coordinating and facilitating the work of national authorities, rather than creating additional supranational agencies or proposing EU legislation on matters that could be better managed at national or regional level;

Added13. Welcomes the creation of informal procedures to enhance coordination between the Commission, the European Parliament and national parliaments, such as the political dialogue, the rapporteurs’ dialogue and the website entitled ‘National Parliament opinions and Commission replies’14; urges the Commission to explore avenues to further improve consultation with national parliaments on subsidiarity concerns, for example by establishing a ‘single subsidiarity hub’ (SSH) based on the IPEX platform, where reasoned opinions, as well as, for example, contributions, opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, answers from the Commission and Parliament resolutions, would be collected and freely accessible; considers that an SSH would be a suitable place for the Member States to request that the Commission propose supporting or coordinating legislation in an area of the Member States’ exclusive competence;

Added14. Welcomes the Commission’s recent efforts to expand and improve the subsidiarity grid as part of its ex ante impact assessment of EU legislation using the better regulation toolbox; calls on the Commission to further mainstream the subsidiarity review in its policy cycle by, inter alia, extending the evaluation of subsidiarity following interinstitutional negotiations if required by the resulting amendments;

Added15. Notes the concerns that the Commission’s engagement with national parliaments is limited and takes place too late in the legislative process, which in turn limits the ability of national parliaments to influence legislative proposals; urges the Commission to invite national parliaments to provide input at an earlier stage, more specifically, when consultations take place;

Added16. Believes that formal and informal interparliamentary dialogue at an earlier stage in the law-making process is key to the subsidiarity principle being correctly transposed; notes that this could take the form of monthly or quarterly meetings between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and members of national parliaments in the spirit of Article 9 of Protocol No 1;

Added17. Calls on the Commission to always carefully consider whether increased coordination with national authorities would be a better solution in particular areas than the creation of new transnational agencies;

Added18. Emphasises the key role of parliaments at the heart of democracy and the need to respect the clear division of competences between the different levels of European liberal democracy, namely the local, regional, national and European levels, in line with the principles of subsidiarity as laid down in Article 5 TEU, in order to ensure democratic legitimacy and an efficient decision-making process and to enhance trust and cooperation between parliaments on different levels;

Added19. Calls on the Commission to take greater account of the opinions expressed by the European Committee of the Regions through the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network created to facilitate the exchange of information between regional and local authorities and the EU on the various legislative proposals which, following their adoption, will have a direct impact on these bodies and on the policies for which they are responsible;