Changes from plenary report to adopted text

27. Considers that the limited use of the yellow card procedure and the ineffectiveness of the ‘orange card’ procedure show that there is still room for improvement and that they have limitations due to their having no binding effect on the Commission’s legislative proposals; considers that better coordination between national parliaments is possible in this respect; underlines that better cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament would lead to more active engagement with EU legislative proposals, and that cooperation via national governments as intermediaries would lead to a strengthened role for national parliaments in shaping EU legislation;

28. Emphasises the important role of regional and local communities and urges the Commission to explore ways in which their input can be better incorporated in legislative proposals, as well as in the evaluation of current EU legislation; considers, in this regard, that the Commission should facilitate the organisation of public consultations at local and regional level to increase the agency and the participation of citizens in EU policymaking;

29. Encourages the EU institutions and regional parliaments with legislative powers to engage more actively and interact directly with each other, while fully respecting the role and competences of national parliaments; calls for national parliaments to include the reasoned opinions of regional parliaments with legislative powers into their final reasoned opinions that are sent to the Presidents of Parliament, the Council and the Commission when exclusive regional competences are affected; reaffirms that Article 12 TEU and Protocol No 1 give national parliaments the right to receive information directly from the EU institutions; suggests that the right to be informed be extended also to regional parliaments with legislative powers;

30. Calls on the Commission, in line with the recommendations of the Draghi report, to launch an EU-wide investigation to identify and analyse the reasons behind the limited exercise of national parliaments’ scrutiny capacity in relation to subsidiarity; encourages the Commission to draw on the expertise and experience of national and regional authorities regarding the transposition and implementation of EU legislation;

Role of the CJEU

31. Stresses that the CJEU plays a crucial role in applying and interpreting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the EU legal framework; stresses that, since its introduction as a general principle, the principle of subsidiarity has not been subject to intense judicial review by the CJEU; notes that the Advocates General show little engagement with subsidiarity arguments in their opinions;

32. Warns that the CJEU’s apparent reluctance to enforce subsidiarity might cause reluctance on the part of the Member States to approach the CJEU in the first place;

33. Recommends that the Commission, in its consultations with the Member States, makes sure that governments provide evidence of taking into account the positions of national and regional parliaments with legislative powers;

34. Acknowledges the perceived reluctance of the CJEU to robustly enforce subsidiarity as a meaningful constraint on EU legislative action;

35. Notes that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to law-making;

38. Underlines that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is crucial for citizens’ trust in the EU and its legislation, and should be more clearly communicated to the public during communication on single legislative initiatives;

39. Reiterates that impact assessments should be based on accurate, objective and complete information; considers it essential, consequently, for the EU co-legislators to collect input from the local and regional authorities, which are able to provide the most precise information on various issues;

40. Calls for a survey of national parliaments in order to assess what factors influence their use of the yellow card procedure and how they perceive respect for the subsidiarity principle in EU decision-making;

41. Considers it pertinent to conduct a survey among national legislative bodies in order to collect their feedback on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; suggests, therefore, that the Commission conduct such a survey in order to identify in which areas and to what extent national legislative bodies need to be protagonists of change;

Final observations

42. Calls for a clearer and more consistent definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, taking into account the active subsidiarity approach developed by the Task Force and ensuring that all EU institutions apply a shared understanding of these fundamental principles in the legislative process; proposes opening a discussion on the creation of a ‘subsidiarity court’ in view of future Treaty revision;

43. Demands that any loopholes be closed for greater transparency in the preparation of legislative proposals by the Commission, including earlier engagement with national parliaments to ensure that subsidiarity concerns are adequately addressed;

44. Endorses the Draghi report’s conclusion that EU policy and legislative action should focus on domains where the EU truly has greater added value compared to national or sub-national policy action; urges the EU institutions, further, to adopt a principle of self-restraint in policymaking by more carefully selecting future initiatives and streamlining current legislation;

45. Considers that current EU legislation should be regularly assessed in terms of its proportionality and adequacy in respect of modern realities; underlines that artificial intelligence can be instrumental in finding legal inconsistencies or disproportionate effects, and thus facilitate compliance and address, where applicable, any lack of proportionality;

46. Suggests that all the interparliamentary activities developed in the framework of Protocol No 1 to the Treaty of Lisbon (including COSAC, IPEX, ECPRD, etc.) by national parliaments and the European Parliament should be better used and synergistically integrated in order to better apply the subsidiarity and proportionality principles;

47. Points out that MEPs, as they are directly elected by the European citizens, have major powers for setting the EU legislative agenda; commits to using the right of initiative under Article 225 TFEU to propose repealing legislation to reduce the regulatory burden, in full respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

48. Reiterates that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will facilitate better law-making and will reduce regulatory burdens and red tape; insists that before making a legislative proposal, the Commission should assess whether the desired positive effect can be achieved at the local, regional or national level, and that, in cases of uncertainty about the most appropriate level for action, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of lower levels of government;

49. Underlines the Task Force’s conclusions that the Commission and the co-legislators should balance their work towards delivering more effective implementation rather than initiating new legislation or constantly amending current legislation in areas where the current body of legislation is outdated and/or has recently been substantially revised;

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50. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and national parliaments.