Changes from plenary report to adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Title V thereof on EU external action,

– having regard to Articles 3 and 21 TEU, and Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009,

– having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2023 on Policy Coherence for Development,

– having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in September 2015,

– having regard to the thirty-two resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly in the period 1992 to 2024, including Resolution A/RES/79/7 of 1 November 2024, entitled ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba’,

– having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions on the situation in Haiti, notably Human Rights Council Resolution 58/32 of 4 April 2025 entitled ‘Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve the situation of human rights in Haiti, in connection with a request from the authorities of Haiti for coordinated and targeted international action’,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 May 2025 entitled ‘Pathways to progress: maximising impact for sustainable development and global prosperity’, approved at its 4099th meeting held ahead of the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville from 30 June to 3 July 2025,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 June 2023 entitled ‘A New Agenda for Relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean’ (JOIN(2023)0017),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’,

– having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 September 2007,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – An ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action’ (JOIN(2020)0017),

– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, adopted on 20 December 1993,

– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), to which the EU is a signatory,

– having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC on 12 December 2015,

– having regard to the Pact for the Future, adopted at the UN Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024,

– having regard to the Declaration of the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit 2023 held in Brussels on 17 and 18 July 2023,

– having regard to the EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda announced during the EU-CELAC summit in Brussels in July 2023,

– having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Interior and/or Security of the Member States of the European Union and the Ministers with responsibility for security matters of the Member States of the Latin American Committee on Internal Security adopted on 5 March 2025,

– having regard to the joint statement of 30 June 2017 by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission entitled ‘The New European Consensus on Development – “Our world, our dignity, our future”’,

– having regard to the European Drug Report 2025 published by the European Union Drugs Agency on 5 June 2025,

– having regard to the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú Agreement) of 4 March 2018,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0171/2025),

A. whereas the EU and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) share long-standing historical, religious, cultural and economic connections, forming a natural alliance grounded in democracy, human rights and multilateral cooperation; whereas these relations are strengthened by deep human bonds, as many LAC citizens also hold EU citizenship and vice versa; whereas the alliance between the countries of the region and the EU should be grounded in democracy, human rights and multilateral cooperation;

B. whereas the international order is undergoing a profound transformation, in which the cooperative logic that for decades underpinned global relations is being replaced by fierce strategic competition, in which the law of the strongest threatens to replace international law as a guiding principle; whereas in just a few years, the international system that had guaranteed a certain stability after World War II has been shaken by growing tensions, nationalist impulses and confrontational dynamics that threaten to fracture global equilibrium; whereas the EU, which has been one of the staunchest architects and defenders of a rules-based multilateral system, today faces a hostile and challenging environment; whereas structural tensions between the United States and China, the questioning of democratic values across various regions and the temptation to move towards a bipolarity that reduces the world’s complexity to a standoff between powers, demand a firm and strategic response from Europe; whereas few regional relationships offer as much potential and as many opportunities for Europe as those with LAC, particularly for addressing shared challenges such as securing raw materials and advancing the energy transition, managing migration, and combating organised crime and drug trafficking to shape a future of freedom, security and prosperity;

C. whereas the EU and LAC partners are committed to building their cooperation on stability, reliability, co-ownership, co-responsibility and a bi-regional dialogue that reflects the diversity and asymmetries of both regions, placing people, social cohesion and inclusive development at its core;

D. whereas engagement between the two regions is further strengthened through firm bilateral relations and deeper interactions with bi-regional and sub-regional entities such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Organisation of American States (OAS), Mercosur, the Andean Community, CARICOM/CARIFORUM and the Pacific Alliance; whereas the EU-LAC strategic partnership dates back to 1999, when the first bi-regional EU-LAC Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro;

F. whereas the EU and LAC countries together account for a third of the total population of the members of the United Nations, and for around 21 % of global GDP;

G. whereas high levels of public debt, combined with increasing service costs, particularly interest payments, and a high level of informal employment in the region in 2024, continue to pose challenges to workers’ social protection and contribute to further fiscal constraints, which are among the key obstacles to sustainable development in the region, with enduring impacts on growth, investment, poverty and inequality;

H. whereas such inequalities must be urgently addressed in order to promote fairer and more stable democracies, marginalise populism and extremism, and lay the groundwork for sustainable economic recovery, quality job creation, and shared prosperity, tackling the root causes of migration and forced displacement in the region, worsened by an unprecedented increase in violence, insecurity, impunity and human rights violations; whereas it is crucial to allow the development of a healthy civic space that protects human rights organisations and defenders of the environment;

I. whereas 74 % of LAC countries are highly exposed to extreme weather events and major climate-related challenges, such as the impact of El Niño on the food supply; whereas it is the second most disaster-prone region in the world, with more than 190 million people affected by natural disasters in the past three decades, particularly women and the most vulnerable populations; whereas climate change affects Caribbean Small Island Developing States in particular;

J. whereas LAC countries contain almost 35 % of the world’s total forest areas, 40 % of the world’s biodiversity and around 50 % of terrestrial species, which are essential in the fight against climate change; whereas the traditional knowledge of indigenous communities could play a pivotal role in the protection of these forests and species;

K. whereas both the EU and LAC are committed to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; whereas primary commodities (agricultural products and natural resources) account for approximately 50 % of all exports of goods from LAC countries; whereas LAC has large reserves of raw materials needed to ensure the green and energy transformation of our economies; whereas the need for these raw materials and the related cooperation within the framework of Global Gateway projects should be based on mutually beneficial partnerships that, among other things, generate employment and investment, thereby adding value to the region, while addressing the challenge of increasing pressure on diversity and food security; whereas the LAC region is facing a significant gap in the investments it needs to carry out its just green and digital transition;

L. whereas demographic and epidemiological trends and the effects of climate change in the EU and LAC countries are increasing demand for care, including long-term care, and thus have an impact on equal rights and opportunities for women, who are predominantly assigned paid and unpaid domestic and care work in the absence of sufficient care policies and services that ensure gender co-responsibility between men and women;

M. whereas the multilateral rules-based order on which peace and prosperity, respect for the rule of law, international law and human rights have been based for the last 80 years is increasingly being challenged by autocratic tendencies and autocracies across the globe; whereas both regions combined hold a third of the voting rights at the UN;

N. whereas Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a flagrant breach of international law and threatens global security, requiring a firm, coordinated and unequivocal stance on the part of democratic partners, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean; whereas most Latin American and Caribbean countries have supported the UN resolutions against Russian aggression against Ukraine;

O. whereas external actors, notably China, Russia and Iran, have expanded their footprint in LAC, with Beijing increasing investments in infrastructure and raw materials projects, Moscow reinforcing its diplomatic, political, propaganda, military and security presence, and Tehran increasing intelligence activities in the region; whereas these external actors are supporting local anti-democratic forces and contributing to democratic backsliding; whereas Russia leverages economic dependencies, including on fertilisers and diesel, and spreads disinformation campaigns to destabilise democratic systems; whereas China’s presence is also creating economic dependencies that influence foreign policy in the region;

P. whereas freedom of expression and assembly are crucial components and enablers of democratic, free and participative societies; whereas violence against political opponents poses a direct threat to the foundations of democracy, as exemplified by the assassination of Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay and the alarming rise of violence in Colombia;

Q. whereas the EU and Parliament have been very supportive of the agreement on the peace process in Colombia concluded in 2016, and continue to monitor its implementation; whereas this peace accord ended five decades of armed conflict; whereas continued EU support for the full implementation of the peace agreement should take into account the recent escalation of violence;

R. whereas the overall democratic backsliding in autocratic and illiberal regimes enables these regimes’ legitimisation strategies, including by removing effective checks on the enforcement of repressive laws;

S. whereas Parliament has recently and unequivocally expressed its position through numerous resolutions concerning non-compliance with the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Cuba; whereas there are currently 1 155 political prisoners in Cuba, and systematic human rights violations are being perpetrated by the Cuban regime;

T. whereas Parliament denounced the usurpation of the presidency in Venezuela by Nicolás Maduro on 10 January 2025 and recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela, and María Corina Machado as the leader of Venezuela’s democratic forces; whereas Parliament awarded them the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, symbolising support for the fight for freedom and democracy in Venezuela; whereas sympathy should be expressed for the more than 7 million Venezuelans who have been forced to flee their country since 2015, with around 6 million resettling in LAC; whereas considerable strain has been placed on neighbouring countries; whereas the solidarity and great efforts of host communities, especially Colombia, in providing access to healthcare, education and employment opportunities for Venezuelan refugees should be commended, as this is contributing to regional stability and the protection of fundamental rights;

U. whereas since 2018, the Nicaraguan regime has systematically, repeatedly and arbitrarily persecuted human rights defenders, and opposition and religious representatives, among others; whereas over 5 600 NGOs, including religious groups –mainly Catholic – have been dissolved, and their assets confiscated; whereas Parliament has repeatedly condemned the regime imposed in Nicaragua by Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo;

V. whereas the actions taken by the Trump administration in the United States have introduced geopolitical uncertainty, undermined multilateralism and hindered bi-regional cooperation, thereby reinforcing the need for a strong and autonomous EU-LAC alliance; whereas the EU-LAC strategic alliance is key to pushing forward shared values and interests, such as multilateralism and democracy;

W. whereas the LAC region remains under-represented in key international organisations and forums, including the G20 and international financial organisations; whereas Mexico and Brazil occupy a special place in bi-regional relations, being the two largest economies in LAC, wielding significant geopolitical influence and being officially designated as strategic partners of the EU;

X. whereas drug trafficking poses a serious threat to security in both regions; whereas since 2020 the Union has become the world’s largest market for cocaine; whereas this cocaine comes largely from LAC and enters the EU primarily through Europe’s Atlantic ports;