Changes from adopted text to adopted text

RemovedP9_TA(2024)0328

AddedP10_TA(2026)0090

Scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency (DGSD2)

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

RemovedPE753.698

AddedPE785.243

ChangedEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 2426 AprilMarch 20242026 on the proposalCouncil forposition at first reading with a view to the adoption of a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency (COM(2023)0228(15484/1/25 – C9-0133/2023C10-0074/2026 – 2023/0115(COD))

Changed(Ordinary legislative procedure: firstsecond reading)

The European Parliament,

Changed– having regard to the CommissionCouncil proposalposition toat Parliamentfirst andreading the(15484/1/25 Council– (COM(2023)0228),C10-0074/2026),

Removed– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 53(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C90133/2023),

Removed– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 July 2023,

Removed– having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

Added– having regard to its position at first reading on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2023)0228),

Changed– having regard to theArticle report294(7) of the CommitteeTreaty on Economicthe andFunctioning Monetaryof Affairsthe (A9-0154/2024),European Union,

Change 1

Removed1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

Added– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 75(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Removed2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

Added– having regard to Rule 68 of its Rules of Procedure,

Added– having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0065/2026),

Added1. Approves the Council position at first reading;

Added2. Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position;

Added3. Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

Added4. Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Change 2

RemovedP9_TC1-COD(2023)0115

RemovedPosition of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 April 2024 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency*

Removed(Text with EEA relevance)

RemovedTHE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

RemovedHaving regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 53(1) thereof,

RemovedHaving regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

RemovedAfter transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

RemovedHaving regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,

RemovedHaving regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,

RemovedHaving regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,

RemovedActing in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

RemovedWhereas:

Removed(1) In accordance with Article 19(5) and (6) of Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, the Commission has reviewed the application and the scope of that Directive and concluded that the objective of protection of depositors in the Union through the establishment of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) has mostly been met. However, the Commission also concluded that there is a need to address the remaining gaps in depositor protection and to enhance the functioning of DGSs, while harmonising rules for DGSs interventions other than payout proceedings.

Removed(1a) At present, the banking union rests on just two of its intended three pillars, namely, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It therefore remains incomplete, due to the absence of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). The ongoing review of the Union crisis management and deposit insurance framework is intended to pave the way towards the long-due completion of the banking union, including the establishment of EDIS. The completion of the banking union forms an integral part of economic and monetary union and of financial stability, most notably by mitigating the risks of so-called ‘doom loop’ that arise as a result of the bank-sovereign nexus.

Removed(1b) To ensure a smooth transition to the completion of the banking union, it is necessary to harmonise the functions that DGSs can perform. Therefore, the number of discretions under national law included in Directive 2014/49/EU should be limited and all DGSs should be able to finance resolution measures, preventive measures and other alternative measures to the payout of depositors.

Removed(1c) The Union crisis management framework should ensure at all times that losses are not being socialised and taxpayers’ resources are not employed to aid or rescue credit institutions in difficulty.

Removed(2) The failure to comply with the obligations to pay contributions to DGSs or to provide information to depositors and DGSs could undermine the objective of depositor protection. DGSs, or where relevant, designated authorities can apply pecuniary sanctions for late payment of contributions. It is important to improve coordination between DGSs, designated and competent authorities to take enforcement actions against a credit institution that does not comply with its obligations. Although the application of supervisory and enforcement measures by the competent authorities against credit institutions is regulated under national laws and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, it is necessary to ensure that designated authorities inform the competent authorities in time about any infringement of obligations of credit institutions under deposit protection rules.

Removed(3) To support further convergence of DGSs’ practices and assist DGSs in testing their resilience, the European Banking Authority (EBA) should develop draft regulatory standards on the performing of stress tests of DGS’ systems.

Removed(4) Pursuant to Article 5(1), point (d), of Directive 2014/49/EU, deposits of certain financial institutions, including investment firms are excluded from coverage by the DGS. However, the funds that those financial institutions receive from their clients and that they deposit in a credit institution on behalf of their clients, in the exercise of the services they offer, should be protected subject to certain conditions.

Removed(5) The range of depositors that are currently protected through repayment by a DGS is motivated by the wish to protect non-professional investors, while professional investors are deemed not to need such protection. For that reason, public authorities have been excluded from coverage. However, most public authorities (which in some Member States include schools and hospitals) cannot be considered to be professional investors. It is therefore necessary to ensure that deposits of all non-professional investors, including public authorities, can benefit from the protection offered by a DGS.

Removed(6) Deposits resulting from certain events, including real estate transactions relating to private residential properties or the payout of certain insurance benefits, can temporarily lead to large deposits. For that reason, Article 6(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU currently obliges Member States to ensure that deposits resulting from those events are protected above EUR 100 000 for at least 3 months, but for no longer than 12 months from the moment the amount has been credited or from the moment when such deposits become legally transferable. To harmonise depositor protection in the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to align their protection to a minimum amount of at least EUR 500 000 and a maximum of EUR 2 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage level of EUR 100 000. After their transposition by Member States, the Commission should carry out a review of the amounts which are protected, with a view to determining whether the maximum amount should be reduced, taking into account whether the amounts which are protected are proportionate and ensure a level playing field across the Union.

Removed(7) During a real estate transaction, the funds can transit through different accounts prior to the actual settlement of the transaction. Therefore, to protect depositors going through real estate transactions in a homogenous manner, protection of temporary high balances should apply to the proceeds of a sale as well as to the funds deposited for a purchase of a private residential property within a predefined short-term period.

Removed(8) To ensure timely disbursement of the amount to be repaid by a DGS, and to simplify the administrative and calculation rules, the discretion to take into account due liabilities when calculating the repayable amount should be removed.

Removed(9) It is necessary to optimise the operational capacities of DGSs and to reduce their administrative burden. For that reason, it should be established that when it comes to the identification of depositors that are entitled to deposits in beneficiary accounts or the assessment of whether depositors are eligible for temporary high balances safeguards, it remains the depositors’ and account holders’ responsibility to demonstrate, by their own means, their entitlement.

Removed(10) Certain deposits may be subject to a longer repayment period because they require DGSs to verify the claim for repayment. To harmonise the rules across the Union, the period for repayment should be limited to 20 working days after the reception of relevant documentation.

Removed(11) The administrative cost related to the repayment of small amounts on dormant accounts can outweigh the benefits for the depositor. It is therefore necessary to specify that DGSs should not be obliged to take active steps to repay deposits held in such accounts below certain thresholds that should be set at national level. The right of depositors to claim such amount should, however, be preserved. In addition, where the same depositor also has other active accounts, DGSs should include that amount in the calculation of the amount to be reimbursed.

Removed(12) DGSs have diverse methods to repay depositors, ranging from cash payouts to electronic transfers. However, to ensure the traceability of the repayment process from DGSs and to stay in line with the objectives of the Union framework on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, depositor reimbursements via credit transfers should be the default payout method when reimbursement exceeds the amount of EUR 10 000.

Removed(13) Financial institutions are excluded from deposit protection. However, certain financial institutions, including e-money institutions, payment institutions and investment firms, also deposit the funds received from their clients in bank accounts, often on a temporary basis, to comply with safeguarding obligations in line with sectorial legislation, including Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. Considering the growing role of those financial institutions, DGSs should protect such deposits under the condition that those clients are identified or identifiable.

Removed(14) Clients of financial institutions do not always know which credit institution the financial institution has chosen to deposit their funds. DGSs should therefore not aggregate such deposits with a deposit that the same clients might have in the same credit institution where the financial institution has placed their deposits. Credit institutions may not know the clients entitled to the sum held in the client accounts, or be able to check and record individual data of those clients. ▌

Removed(15) When reimbursing depositors, DGSs may encounter situations that give rise to money laundering concerns. DGS should therefore withhold the payout to a depositor when notified that a financial intelligence unit has suspended a bank or payment account in accordance with the applicable anti-money laundering rules.

Removed(16) Article 9 of Directive 2014/49/EU provides that where a DGS makes payments in the context of resolution proceedings, the DGS should have a claim against the credit institution concerned for an amount equal to its payments and that claim should rank pari passu with covered deposits. That provision does not distinguish between a DGS’s contribution when an open-bank bail-in tool is used, and DGS’s contribution to the financing of a transfer strategy (sale of business or bridge institution tool) followed by liquidation of the residual entity. To ensure clarity and legal certainty with respect to the existence and amount of a DGS’s claim in different scenarios, it is necessary to specify that when the DGS contributes to support the application of the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool, or alternative measures, whereby a set of assets, rights and liabilities, including deposits, of the credit institution are transferred to a recipient, that DGS should have a claim against the residual entity in its subsequent winding-up proceedings under national law. To ensure that the shareholders and creditors of the credit institution left behind in the residual entity effectively absorb the losses of that credit institution and improve the possibility of repayments in insolvency to the DGS, the DGS claim should have the same ranking as covered deposits. In case the open bank bail-in tool is applied (i.e., the credit institution continues its operations), the DGS contributes in the amount by which covered deposits would have been written down or converted to absorb the losses in that credit institution, had covered deposits been included within the scope of bail-in. Therefore, the DGS’s contribution should not result in a claim against the institution under resolution as it would eliminate the purpose of the DGS’s contribution.

Removed(17) To ensure convergence of DGS practices and legal certainty for depositors to claim their deposits, and to avoid operational hurdles for DGSs, it is important to set an adequately long period within which depositors can claim the repayment of their deposits, in those cases where the DGS has not repaid depositors within the deadlines laid down in Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU in the case of a payout.

Removed(18) Pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU, Member States are to ensure that by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0,8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. In order to objectively assess whether DGSs fulfil that requirement, a clear reference period should be set to determine the amount of covered deposits and DGSs’ available financial means. In consideration of the expansion of scope for DGS use, the adequacy of the 0,8 % target level should be subject to close monitoring and assessment.

Removed(19) To ensure the resilience of DGSs, their funds should derive from stable and irrevocable contributions. Certain sources of DGS financing, including loans and expected recoveries, are too contingent to be accounted as contributions to reach the DGS’ target level. To harmonise DGSs’ conditions for the fulfilment of their target level and to ensure that DGSs’ available financial means are financed by contributions from the industry, funds that qualify to reach the target level should be distinguished from funds that are considered as complementary sources of financing. Outflows of DGS funds, including foreseeable loan repayments, can be planned and factored in regular contributions from DGS members, and should therefore not lead to a decrease of the available financial means below the target level. It is therefore necessary to specify that, after the target level has been reached for the first time, only a shortfall in DGS’ available financial means caused by a DGS intervention (payout, or preventive, resolution or alternative measures) should trigger a four-year replenishment period. Where, after such a DGS intervention, the available financial means have been reduced by less than one third, the replenishment period should be two years. To ensure consistent application, the EBA should develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for the calculation of the target level by the DGSs.