Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Added44. Urges the EU, in coordination with NATO, to support the strengthening of Ukraine’s defence capabilities; underlines that this includes developing a strengthened industrial partnership enabling transfers of technology and know-how, and the integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base into the EDTIB, while supporting EDTIB activities in Ukraine, including through the SAFE fund; in that respect, urges the Member States and their defence industries to make additional investments, set up joint ventures and develop partnerships with Ukraine for the joint development of defence products in the EU, particularly in the field of drone and counter-drone technology; welcomes the Commission’s initiatives in this regard; urges Member States’ armed forces and the EDTIB to learn critical lessons from Ukraine’s capability development and battlefield innovations, especially as regards unmanned and autonomous systems, and the techniques, tactics and procedures used in combat; commends the Danish model of support for Ukraine, and calls for greater incentives for closer cooperation between and integration of the EDTIB and Ukraine’s defence industrial base; highlights the benefit of allowing Ukraine’s defence industrial base to produce outside of Ukraine;

Added45. Highlights the need to develop proper civil protection infrastructure and emergency planning; urges to strengthen crisis-resilient and civil defence infrastructure; underlines that defence and security policies must be based on social cohesion and democratic mechanisms; calls for the integration of social dialogue, regional development and workforce upskilling into the Union’s defence planning; stresses that dual-use investments should contribute to civilian resilience and job creation in vulnerable regions, therefore contributing to a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to crisis preparedness;

Added46. Stresses the strategic importance of military mobility as a cornerstone of European strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation; urges the extension of the EU military mobility corridors to the eastern flank, including to Ukraine, by providing necessary funding, including from the Connecting Europe Facility, for dual-use infrastructure, and for these corridors to be equipped with the necessary capabilities, such as transport equipment, logistics hubs, fuel supply chains and secure digital systems; reiterates the importance of swift movement of equipment or troops from the west and of drawing lessons from the experience of the Ukrainian armed forces; calls for the mainstreaming of counter-mobility in the design of military corridors;

Added47. Considers it critical to rapidly address financial, regulatory and physical barriers to military mobility, with a focus on the four priority military mobility corridors, as well the streamlining of administrative procedures; underlines that military corridors are also crucial for civilian evacuation and the supply of humanitarian aid; urges concrete preparedness on military mobility by moving towards a comprehensive approach to ‘military logistics’, including security of critical infrastructure, transport hubs, maintenance, storage, refuelling and repair; emphasises the strategic importance of developing existing networks and investing in new dual-use corridors, via enhanced coordination between the EU and NATO, to ensure interoperability and cost-effectiveness; calls for EU support for projects such as the NATO fuel pipeline to Poland, Rail Baltica and the Black Sea Highway; underlines the growing strategic importance of the Atlantic and Mediterranean maritime corridors for the EU’s security and supply-chain resilience;

Added48. Underlines that forward-looking defence innovation is critical for tactical purposes, including the development of clean technology with defence applications, such as advanced materials, green energy, fuels and batteries;

AddedFinancing defence

Added49. Welcomes the recent substantial defence expenditure increases; notes the focus on national defence spending, including in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, which leaves critical issues around fragmentation, potential budgetary and operational synergies, and interoperability unresolved; notes that making joint procurement the rule of the EDTIB could save billions of euro in defence spending; stresses the need to ensure that EU funds are channelled into collaborative projects, with clear European added value, that reduce our dependencies on non-EU countries; is of the view that, without structural European reform and collaboration, increased national spending may lead to continued duplication of efforts and inefficiencies; emphasises that the development of an internal market for defence also requires a lasting and coordinated financial framework that enables long-term investment planning; calls for the pooling of parts of national defence budgets at EU level, in order to generate economies of scale and invest in capabilities used for the collective defence of the EU; stresses that defence investment must be supported by coordinated multiannual planning between the EU and the Member States, in line with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and NATO Capability Development Plan documents; calls on the Commission to further explore targeted EU grant funding options to complement funding from SAFE loans, EU programmes and national budgets;

Added50. Calls for the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) to provide sufficient and flexible funding to address both the ‘security’ and ‘defence’ aspects comprehensively, thereby strengthening the EU’s capacity to safeguard its citizens and to ensure their protection both within its borders and beyond, and also to promote stability in its neighbourhood; welcomes the Commission’s proposals to simplify, facilitate and accelerate defence procurement; calls on the Commission to consolidate and clarify the defence envelope provided for in the draft 2028-2034 MFF, exploring all options to support the Member States’ defence investments; recalls the specific nature of the defence sector and considers that the future European Competitiveness Fund, provided for in the Commission’s draft MFF, should retain all the criteria and modalities of the European defence industry financing instruments, in particular the criteria relating to the EDF and EDIP, while welcoming the Commission and the EIB’s initiative to establish the Defence Equity Facility with a budget of EUR 175 million; calls on the EIB to substantially increase this budget to better support strategic European defence capabilities;

Added51. Calls for a European financial architecture for defence based on European solidarity, cohesion, competitiveness and efficiency; urges the Commission and the Member States to position the 2028-2034 MFF so as to enable a genuine European Defence Union, including the necessary support and incentives for the EDTIB, and the delivery of the Defence Readiness 2030 commitments;

Added52. Underlines that reinforcing the EDTIB and Europe’s defence capabilities are alone insufficient for strengthening European defence and deterrence; stresses that Europe’s fundamental challenges to effective deterrence lie in political unity and posture, military doctrine, and the ability to exercise effective C2 outside of NATO structures when necessary; underlines that strengthening our capabilities, without forcefully reacting to Russia’s tests of EU military preparedness, undermines our deterrence; stresses, in this regard, the need to revise the EU’s Strategic Compass with a comprehensive approach that strengthens civil and military preparedness;

Added53. Underlines the need to integrate the concept of civil-military preparedness into European defence policy, including through joint exercises, strategic education and the strengthening of civilian crisis-response capabilities; emphasises, furthermore, that European defence readiness must be embedded in a comprehensive approach to societal resilience, including the protection of critical infrastructure, the establishment of robust cybersecurity and counter-hybrid capacities, tools to proactively identify, deter and counter disinformation campaigns and propaganda narratives, the safeguarding of our democratic institutions and the security of critical supply chains, in particular those related to rare earth minerals and other strategic resources; calls for annual whole-of-society defence exercises in every Member State, coordinated at EU level; stresses the need for EU co-funding of multi-country scenarios and an annual scoreboard of lessons learned, in line with best-practice recommendations on whole-of-society preparedness; stresses the need to pay adequate attention and grant sufficient funding to the development of those dual-use technologies that are instrumental to guaranteeing EU security and defence; stresses that dual-use investments should contribute to civilian resilience and job creation in vulnerable regions, thereby contributing to a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to crisis preparedness;

Added54. Recalls that the EU’s outermost regions are essential to the EU’s global security posture; stresses that their geographic position provides critical reach for maritime awareness, crisis management and the protection of sea lines of communication;

Added55. Urges the EU to invest significantly in its intelligence and information security, including through improved vetting procedures, better implementation of security classification schemes, and secure systems for sharing and accessing intelligence; urges the Member States to intensify intelligence-sharing with the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to explore vesting EU intelligence bodies with powers to gather, collect, process and disseminate open source intelligence products to the Member States and intelligence agencies; calls on the VP/HR to explore the creation of a fusion centre or data clearing house, in close cooperation with the Member States; underscores the need for EU institutions to make greater use of intelligence and commends the efforts of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre to reach out to key decision-makers, in this regard;

Reinforcing CSDP missions and operations

Change 4

Changed22.56. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to reinforce civilian and military CSDP missions and operations with robust, flexible, scalable and modular mandatesmandates, adapted to security contexts and host country needs; stresses the need for adequate and efficient resources and funding, as well as streamlined support structures,structures and reinforced political-strategic planning; calls for the strengthening of staffing and the better allocation of seconded staff; urges the standardisation of the duration of personnel deployments to CSDP missions; encourages the Member States to each deploy personnel to CSDP missions in Eastern Partnership countries, to ensure that all Member States are represented in missions throughout the region; underlines the need to strengthen the evaluation of the results and impact of CSDP missions and operations, ensuring transparency in their execution and coordination with NATO, the UN and regional organisations; urges the Member States to match their ambitions by fulfilling their pledges and commitments made in Council decisions; notes persistent obstacles, including resource gaps, vacancies, high turnover, national caveats, risk aversion, the need to improve poor coordination with EU programmes and partners, and weak strategic communication; calls for the strategic communication of CSDP missions and operations around the world, especially in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and candidate countries, such as BiH and Ukraine; calls for enhancing the visibility and strategic communication of the benefits, presence and role of the CSDP missions and operations; underlines that the CSDP missions and operations offer the most tangible external projection of the Union’sEU’s forceforce, and as such are a critical component of the Union’sEU’s strategic tools;

Change 5

Removed23. Reiterates its call for support for CSDP missions and operations defending against cyberwarfare and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in particular in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; strongly encourages the use of similar rapid response operational capabilities for other cross-cutting issues, as appropriate;

Added57. Reiterates its call for support for CSDP missions and operations, with mandates to enhance resilience to hybrid warfare, including cyberthreats and FIMI, in particular in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; highlights the importance of strengthening cooperation with NATO, its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the European cybersecurity network to combat disinformation and cyberattacks; strongly encourages the use of similar rapid-response operational capabilities for other cross-cutting issues, as appropriate; welcomes the Commission’s initiative to establish the European Democracy Shield (EUDS); considers that the experience and expertise required to counter FIMI in like-minded countries, in particular candidate and accession countries, can be synergetic with the EUDS; calls for greater coherence among the existing and upcoming EU regulations and efforts aimed at countering FIMI, including the EUDS, and for clear collaboration between all these components to be ensured; highlights the need for rapid, robust and collective responses to FIMI operations, alongside efforts to raise the costs for the perpetrators of these actions; encourages the closest possible cooperation, and rapid feedback and experience exchange, between the EUDS, CSDP missions and operations, as well as the intelligence and decision-making structures of Member States and candidate countries on their experience countering FIMI; stresses that the Russian Orthodox Church has been increasingly instrumentalised by the Russian Government as part of its FIMI efforts to undermine European democracies, social cohesion, pro-European orientations and religious tolerance; calls for the structured monitoring across all EU delegations, CSDP missions and operations, and EU Special Representatives, of Russian malign influence, including via the Russian Orthodox Church;

Removed24. Commends the achievements of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM) in bolstering the capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend Ukraine and of the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) in implementing, under difficult conditions, its mandate to foster an efficient, resilient and accountable civilian security sector;

Added58. Commends the achievements of EUMAM Ukraine in bolstering the capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend Ukraine, and of the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) in implementing, on the ground, under difficult conditions, its mandate to foster an efficient, resilient and accountable civilian security sector; considers EUMAM Ukraine to be the most significant CSDP mission currently ongoing; highlights that addressing EUMAM Ukraine’s urgent need for additional instructors, equipment, ammunition and dedicated training facilities to support its operational modules must be prioritised in CSDP mission planning and resourcing; welcomes the ongoing strategic review of EUAM Ukraine and underscores that countering hybrid threats, ensuring cybersecurity, and the integration of veterans are key challenges where the CSDP mission could provide critical assistance; underlines that EUAM Ukraine’s mandate should continuously evolve to meet Ukraine’s needs, including in the aftermath of Russia’s war of aggression; calls for the transformation of EUMAM Ukraine into a long-term EU military training and advisory mission, with a broadened mandate to include air defence operations, combined-arms tactics, logistics and officer leadership training, and with the aim of ensuring interoperability between EU and Ukrainian forces, in preparation for Ukraine’s future EU membership;

Removed25. Commends the contribution of the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) to enhancing the country’s resilience in crisis management and against hybrid threats; welcomes the role of the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM) and the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) in building confidence;

Added59. Recalls the importance, the achievements and the renewal of the mandate, until May 2027, of the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova), highlighting its effective contribution to strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s security and enhancing its resilience towards and ability to counter hybrid threats, including cybersecurity threats and FIMI, in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; further recognises that EUPM Moldova has deepened EU-Republic of Moldova cooperation, enhanced crisis management capabilities and contributed to the overall stability of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood; to this end, reiterates its calls on the European External Action Service to assess the adequacy of this partnership mission’s means, methods and resources, in relation to the mission’s objectives, especially as regards staff expertise for the needs of the mission, and to adapt them in the light of the evaluation’s conclusions; calls for continued and enhanced support to the Republic of Moldova through the EPF;

Removed26. Recommends that the out-of-country reserve forces of EUFOR Operation ALTHEA be fully manned, sustained and maintained at all times, given their importance for the operation’s deterrent effect in Bosnia and Herzegovina; strongly supports an active deterrent role for EUFOR and the extension of its mandate by the UN Security Council as well as NATO contingency planning, in the light of prolonged attacks on the BiH Constitution and the potential security implications; commends the role of the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo in strengthening security and stability;

Added60. Welcomes the role of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) and the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) in building confidence and reducing the levels of risk for the local population; urges the EU to remain actively engaged, in order to ensure that Russia fulfils its obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 2008 which includes, among others, full and unimpeded access of EU monitors to Georgia’s territories of the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia; supports the extension of the EUMM’s mandate and the reinforcement of its capacities so that it can effectively monitor and implement the ceasefire agreement; applauds the impartial observation role played by EUMA at Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan, contributing to the stabilisation of the situation; strongly urges the Azerbaijani authorities to engage in more constructive cooperation with relevant CSDP missions and operations; supports the recent renewal of the EUMA’s mandate until 2027, as Armenia is currently at a critical juncture; calls for further civilian CSDP involvement in the region to reinforce peacebuilding initiatives, including by focusing on transitional justice, in particular following the August 2025 US-brokered Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan; calls for enhanced assistance for Armenia in the fight against increasingly aggressive Russian malign interference, ahead of Armenia’s 2026 national elections;

Removed27. Considers that the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law (EUPOL COPPS) and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah can play a broader operational role in supporting the Palestinian Authority’s state-building and capacity-building efforts; encourages Israel and the Palestinian Authority to maintain full cooperation with both missions;

Added61. Recommends that the out-of-country reserve forces of the EUFOR Operation Althea be fully manned, sustained and maintained at all times, given their importance for the operation’s deterrent and reassurance effect in BiH; highlights, in the light of the prolonged attacks on BiH’s constitutional order and the potential security implications, that EUFOR’s role includes ensuring that the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of BiH are upheld, and that local stakeholders act consistently with these fundamental principles; strongly supports an active deterrent role for EUFOR and welcomes the extension of its executive mandate by the UN Security Council, reflecting the united commitment across the political spectrum in BiH to uphold peace and security, in cooperation with the EU as well as NATO contingency planning;

Removed28. Notes with concern that the Sahel has become a ‘blind spot’ in CSDP, with missions reduced or wound down, limited impact on stabilisation and a reduction in the Union’s security footprint in that important African region;

Added62. Acknowledges the renewal of the mandate of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) until June 2027, reaffirming the EU’s long-term commitment to supporting the rule of law, justice and institutional resilience in Kosovo and to strengthening security and stability in the region; notes EULEX Kosovo’s contribution to strengthening judicial independence, enhancing law enforcement capacities, and promoting institutional accountability and good governance while mentoring, monitoring and advising Kosovo’s institutions; calls for a thorough assessment of EULEX Kosovo’s achievements and the lessons learned; recalls that the experiences and lessons learned from all missions and operations add substantial value to all current and future CSDP missions and operations;

Removed29. Calls for the VP/HR to put forward proposals to develop European defence education, joint operational training and exercises, and leadership programmes for the armed forces and political leadership, complementary to national and NATO equivalents, learning from CSDP missions and operations to strengthen the CSDP and support implementation of Article 42(7) TEU;

Added63. Stresses the importance of the EUPOL COPPS and the EUBAM Rafah following the recent ceasefire and in the context of the implementation of the 20-point peace plan, as endorsed by the UN Security Council and leading towards the two-state solution; stresses, in particular, the importance of the reactivation of EUBAM Rafah, allowing it to act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the PA as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently adapt staffing to EUBAM Rafah’s growing needs; considers that EUPOL COPPS can play a significant role in supporting the necessary political transition in Gaza through the deployment of law enforcement personnel to promote stability, the rule of law, the principle of peaceful coexistence and the protection of fundamental human rights for populations in both Gaza and the West Bank; considers that they should assume a broader operational role in supporting the PA’s state-building and capacity-building efforts; calls on Israel and the PA to maintain full cooperation with both missions; encourages Israel and the PA to continue to cooperate fully, to ensure the demilitarisation of Hamas and the maintenance of a lasting peace;

RemovedEngaging in partnerships, including cooperation with NATO

Added64. Notes the renewal of the mandate, until March 2027, of Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, recognising its vital contribution to enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya and promoting peace and stability in the south-central Mediterranean; further commends the operation’s success in monitoring and preventing illicit arms and oil trafficking, contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks, enhancing maritime security, and supporting the implementation of international law; requests a review of the results achieved by EUNAVFOR MED IRINI;

Removed30. Welcomes the signing of EU security and defence partnerships with eight countries so far; calls for further security and defence cooperation with like-minded partners and for ways to be explored for deepening engagement with the most constructive partners;

Added65. Notes with concern that the Sahel region has become a ‘blind spot’ in the CSDP, with missions reduced or wound down, limited impact on stabilisation and a reduction in the EU’s security footprint in that important African region; expresses profound concern about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation across the Sahel region, in particular Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso; underlines that the Sahel remains a hotbed for jihadist activities, posing significant spillover risks to neighbouring regions and threatening European security, making sustained and coherent EU engagement in the region strategically essential; recalls that the mandates of the EU Training Mission in Mali, the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger and of the ground mission of personnel from the EU civilian capacity-building mission in Sahel Niger ended in 2024; regrets that these missions have not been able to achieve their goal of stabilising the region and its fragile democracies, or of ensuring peace in the region, due to the rejection of democratic governments by national military juntas which seized power following a succession of coups in their presence; notes, moreover, that the reliance by military juntas in the Sahel on Russian paramilitary militias and political support has undermined regional security and stability and has, in practice, led to terrorist groups regaining ground;

Removed31. Stresses that NATO remains a crucial component of collective transatlantic territorial defence and that the EU and NATO play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in enhancing international security; considers, however, that the term ‘European pillar of NATO’ lacks definition and masks the failure of EU Member States to properly implement the CSDP, in particular TEU Article 42, paragraphs 2 and 7; considers further that the Union and its Member States must be ready to act on the basis of these provisions in the unlikely event of paralysis of NATO decision-making;

Added66. Calls for an evidence-based, in-depth assessment of the EU’s mandates, roles and policies and for a profoundly revised, integrated CSDP strategy for the Sahel region; underlines the role of the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia in reinforcing Somali police, maritime security and rule-of-law capacities; urges, with a focus on mutually beneficial CSDP missions, a renewed EU-Africa partnership, based on security, development and governance; calls for the strengthening of cooperation with African regional organisations, in the light of our common security challenges; stresses the importance of coordinating CSDP actions with other international partners that share the same objectives;

Removed32. Calls for stronger military-security cooperation with candidate countries whose alignment with, and implementation of, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is above 80 %;

Added67. Stresses the positive contribution of the EU Military Assistance Mission in Mozambique in strengthening the operational capacities of the Mozambican armed forces to address the jihadist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, carried out by the local branch of Daesh; calls for the integration of human rights and governance safeguards to ensure lasting stabilisation and prevent regional spillover;

RemovedFuture European security architecture: genuine CSDP – if not now, then when?

Added68. Emphasises the major role played by Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES since February 2024 in preventing further Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, helping to protect merchant ships from attacks, accompanying them and enhancing the security of the maritime situation in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to consider merging this with Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, as originally envisaged, for the improved efficiency of both operations, and to ensure the adequate capabilities of Operation ASPIDES;

Removed33. Expresses deep concern that Russia’s repeated aggression has eroded Europe’s security architecture, undermining the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and exposing the failure of related institutional and political processes; stresses that only cooperation between all states, based on jointly agreed rules, can safeguard against war and provide common security; calls for progress on the strategic thinking needed to design a new European security architecture;

Added69. Calls for the VP/HR to put forward proposals to develop European defence education, joint operational training and exercises, and leadership programmes for the armed forces and political leadership, complementary to national and NATO equivalents, learning from CSDP missions and operations, in order to strengthen the CSDP and support the precise operationalisation and implementation of Article 42(7) TEU; calls for EU-funded programmes to train civilian and military leaders in hybrid threat response, strategic planning and EU-NATO coordination; recalls the importance of organising joint training and exercises between European armed forces, thereby promoting interoperability, with a view to maximising mission preparedness and addressing a broad range of threats, both conventional and non-conventional; reiterates, in that respect, its support for the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (Military Erasmus), operated by the European Security and Defence College, which aims to enable the national military education and training institutions to explore possibilities for the quantitative and qualitative exchange of knowledge and know-how, as well as developing a common security and defence culture, and therefore render the armed forces more interoperable;

Removed34. Stresses that unprecedented threats and shifting geopolitics profoundly affect EU strategic interests; underlines the need for a common threat perception and public awareness; underscores that these challenges and opportunities make it urgent to implement the CSDP as the basis for a genuine EDU and, ideally, to seize this pivotal moment for treaty change to meet new security and defence needs in line with citizens’ expectations;

Added70. Encourages the Member States to make greater and more strategic use of the EPF for the purpose of training and equipping the security and defence services of Eastern Partner countries; further encourages the Member States to ensure that all equipment support provided via the EPF is fully aligned with the specific needs of the recipient countries, and is coordinated with NATO as necessary, in order to ensure complementarity and avoid the unnecessary duplication of efforts; underlines that one of the key priorities of the CSDP in relation to the Eastern Partner countries must be the firm support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders;

Removed35. Urges the Union and its Member States to define operational procedures and mechanisms in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU, and to ensure coherence between Article 42(7) TEU and NATO equivalents; reaffirms the call for a Council of Defence Ministers and for a move from unanimity to qualified majority voting under Article 31 TEU;

Added71. Recalls that mainstreaming and operationalising gender perspectives in external relations and implementing the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions are long-standing priorities for the EU; recalls, in this regard, the importance of strengthening women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, humanitarian action and post-conflict reconstruction; stresses that the integration of a gender perspective into all external and internal CSDP activities helps to improve the CSDP’s operational effectiveness, and is a driver of the EU’s credibility as a proponent of gender equality worldwide; calls for measures to ensure gender equality and the full and meaningful participation of women in CSDP missions and operations;

Removed36. Stresses the need to strengthen EU structures, decision-making and operational autonomy; reiterates the call for greater coherence in CSDP governance linking Member States, the VP/HR and the Commissioners; welcomes the role of the Commissioner for Defence and Space in relation to CSDP, in line with Article 42(3) TEU; notes the organisational disconnect between the European Defence Agency and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space – both bodies implementing CSDP mandates yet one reporting to the VP/HR, the other reporting to the Commissioner for Defence and Space – and highlights possible synergies through institutional reform, while acknowledging that current cooperation is satisfactory;

Added72. Acknowledges the valuable contribution of religious actors, faith communities, intercultural and interfaith dialogue, and the preservation of cultural heritage in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, reconciliation and fostering community cohesion and calls for appropriate systemic attention to these aspects in CSDP missions and operations;

Removed37. Notes the importance of Coalitions of the Willing as a result of the current treaty framework and disunity among Member States, especially in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes however that their use moves the Union further away from the practical implementation of TEU Article 42, paragraphs 2 and 7; notes that Article 42(6) TEU on permanent structured cooperation has been interpreted in a limited fashion to mean cooperation on the development of capabilities without covering cooperation on executive and operational aspects; urges, therefore, that operational PESCO under Article 42(6) TEU be explored, including on secure military communications, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities through European space-based systems;

AddedEngaging in partnerships including cooperation with NATO

Added73. Welcomes the signing of EU security and defence partnerships (SDPs) with eight countries so far; calls for a swift and comprehensive implementation of the SDP provisions; calls for further security and defence cooperation with like-minded partners, and for exploring ways of deepening engagement with the most constructive among them, including but not limited to Canada, Japan, Norway, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Ukraine; stresses that, in order for an SDP to be effective, it must be complemented by economic diplomacy that strengthens resilience and reduces dependencies; calls for targeted cooperation with like-minded partners, including in Latin America and Africa, to diversify supply chains and ensure access to critical raw materials for the EDTIB;

Added74. Stresses that NATO remains a crucial component of collective transatlantic territorial defence, and that the EU and NATO play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in enhancing international security; underlines the need for further progress in EU-NATO cooperation, including through increased intelligence- and information-sharing, and cooperation on C2 systems; calls, furthermore, on European allies in NATO to take swift and concrete actions in order to build a strong and credible European pillar of the alliance; considers, however, that the term ‘European pillar of NATO’ lacks definition and masks the failure of EU Member States to properly implement the CSDP, in particular Article 42(2) and Article 42(7) TEU; stresses that the term ‘NATO’s European pillar’ can be understood as a responsible and complementary contribution by the EU to allied collective security, based on effective cooperation, interoperability and the equitable sharing of burdens within the alliance; stresses that any strengthening of the CSDP must be carried out in full consistency with NATO commitments; considers, further, that the EU and its Member States must be ready to act autonomously on the basis of Article 42(2) and Article 42(7) TEU, in particular in the unlikely event of paralysis of NATO decision-making;

Added75. Calls for stronger military-security cooperation with EU candidate countries whose alignment with, and implementation of, the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is above 80 %, especially those that are the most militarily exposed, including through their inclusion and participation in EU defence initiatives, such as PESCO projects; underscores the opportunities for defence industrial cooperation with these candidate countries; underscores the need to deepen cooperation and expand EU assistance to defend against FIMI, in order to counter the malign influence of non-EU countries, including through critical infrastructure resilience and strengthening cybersecurity; proposes the introduction of stronger benchmarks on security and defence in the Commission’s assessments, and of bilateral defence cooperation roadmaps between EU Member States and these candidate countries; underlines that enhanced cooperation and interoperability with these partners would strengthen European resilience and reinforce the stability of the region; emphasises that this approach is necessary to counter the influence of Russia, China and other third countries, and to reinforce the fight against arms trafficking;

Added76. Notes Taiwan’s leading role in high-tech development, and its extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks and FIMI, which should be a foremost consideration when assessing the possibilities of strengthening multilateral exchanges and cooperation; calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues, and for stronger cooperation on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables; encourages discussions on potential third-party cooperation on defence and security with like-minded partners, including Taiwan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to closely coordinate on security policy with Taiwan and partners in the South China Sea, including a regular naval presence and joint exercises; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to fulfil its commitment to Parliament to work towards effective deterrence against a possible invasion of Taiwan; reiterates its call for the EU to further engage with emerging strategic partners in the region, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam;

AddedFuture European security architecture: a genuine CSDP – if not now, then when?

Added77. Expresses deep concern that Russia’s repeated acts of aggression have eroded Europe’s security architecture, undermining the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and exposing the failure of related institutional and political processes; stresses that only cooperation between all states, based on jointly agreed rules, can safeguard against war and provide common security; highlights the importance of building a renewed European security architecture that strengthens the transatlantic link in line with the EU’s strategic interests, enhances cooperation with NATO and promotes stability in the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; calls for progress on the strategic thinking needed for that renewed European security architecture, including strengthening the Euro-Atlantic partnership; welcomes the positive steps taken so far, in the light of the aim, set out in the Commission President’s December 2024 mission letter to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, to create a true European Defence Union, and calls for the formulation of a clear vision and a strategic roadmap of the remaining steps, to ensure consistency across all required financial, institutional and operational aspects; calls for the Member States’ political engagement and commitment towards achieving the EDU;

Added78. Stresses that unprecedented threats and shifting geopolitics profoundly affect the EU’s strategic interests; underlines the need for a common threat perception and public awareness; underscores that these challenges and opportunities make it urgent to implement the CSDP as the basis for a genuine EDU and, ideally, to seize this pivotal moment to strengthen the effectiveness of existing instruments and, where appropriate, to advance cooperation between the Member States within the current framework of the Treaties;

Added79. Considers that strengthening the European pillar of NATO should go hand in hand with operationalising Article 42(7) TEU to ensure synergies and complementarity; urges the EU and its Member States to define operational procedures and mechanisms in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU, and to ensure coherence between Article 42(7) TEU and NATO equivalents, so that the mutual defence clause can provide a credible and robust layer of European security and defence, while ensuring full coherence with NATO, complementing national efforts, and preventing any competition with, and avoiding any unnecessary duplication of, the alliance’s defence mechanisms; calls, in this regard, for routine exercises to be carried out for scenarios under Article 42(7) TEU;

Added80. Reaffirms its call to create a permanent format for the Council of Defence Ministers as a forum for political and strategic coordination, as well as for a move from unanimity to qualified majority voting under Article 31 TEU, except for executive military mandates; recommends exploring flexible and pragmatic cooperation formulas that improve the effectiveness of decisions without altering the established institutional balance, and to strengthen political and strategic coordination within the EU;

Added81. Stresses the need to strengthen EU structures, decision-making and operational autonomy; reiterates its call for greater coherence in CSDP governance linking the Member States, the VP/HR and the Commissioners; welcomes the role and initiatives of the Commissioner for Defence and Space in relation to the CSDP, in line with Article 42(3) TEU; urges better coordination among the competent bodies within the EU to facilitate the swift and effective implementation of the decisions made; stresses the work of the EDA in enhancing European defence cooperation between the Member States, which is essential for a genuine EDU; notes the organisational disconnect between the EDA and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space – with both bodies implementing CSDP mandates, yet one reporting to the VP/HR, and the other reporting to the Commissioner for Defence and Space – and highlights possible synergies through institutional reform, while acknowledging that current cooperation is satisfactory; reiterates that any evolution in European defence governance must preserve the balance between national sovereignty and European coordination, avoiding the duplication of structures and ensuring democratic accountability;

Added82. Calls for the involvement of regional and local authorities in planning for and building defence resilience, especially in areas near borders and coasts; stresses the need for democratic oversight, transparency and public participation in shaping the future of European defence;