Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

The European Parliament,

Changed– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular the provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

Changed– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 11 March 2022,

▸8 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States1,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility2,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/10923,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 26 June 2025, 20 March 2025 and 6 March 2025,

Added– having regard to the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government held in Copenhagen on 1 October 2025,

Added– having regard to the Council conclusions on Arms Export Control, adopted on 14 April 2025,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

Changed– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, presented on 18 July 20252024 by the candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen,

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ and, in particular, Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships signed by the EU and Canada on 23 June 2025 and by the EU and the United Kingdom on 19 May 2025,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, which came into force in 1949,

Changed– having regard to the The Hague Summit Declaration issued by the headsHeads of stateState and governmentGovernment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in The Hague on 25 June 2025,

Changed– having regard to the 10th progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

Changed– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 510 July 2018 and 68 DecemberJuly 2016 respectively,

Changed– having regard to its resolution of 29 AprilOctober 2025 on thea implementationunited ofresponse theto commonrecent securityRussian andviolations defenceof policythe –EU annualMember reportStates’ 20244,airspace and critical infrastructure,

Changed– having regard to its resolution of 122 MarchApril 2025 on the white paperimplementation onof the futurecommon ofsecurity Europeanand defence5,defence policy – annual report 2024,

Changed– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on continuing the unwavering EU support forwhite Ukraine,paper afteron threethe yearsfuture of Russia’s war ofEuropean aggression6,defence,

Added– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression,

Added– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan,

Added– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0265/2025),

Change 1

RemovedA. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated and strategic competition is increasing in our wider neighbourhood;

AddedA. whereas the EU must be able to protect its citizens; whereas 81 % of EU citizens favour a common security and defence policy, and 69 % are in favour of reinforcing the EU’s defence equipment capacity;

AddedB. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated, and strategic competition is increasing in our Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods and beyond; whereas the EU’s threat assessment should be based on a 360-degree assessment; whereas the EU is facing multifaceted threats that continuously manifest themselves in new ways, making them difficult to anticipate and counter; whereas the Euro-Atlantic, Middle Eastern, African and Indo-Pacific theatres are increasingly interconnected;

AddedC. whereas certain international actors, most notably authoritarian states, are jeopardising European security and stability through a vast set of hybrid tactics that includes, inter alia, cyberattacks, the sabotage of critical infrastructure, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, the instrumentalisation of migration, subversive political influence and coordinated, continuous attempts to interfere in the democratic functioning of our countries through foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), especially in electoral processes; whereas the use of these hybrid tactics by foreign malign actors represent a fully fledged security threat to the EU and its Member States; whereas the EU should include provisions on how to counter these threats as an integral part of its CSDP;

AddedD. whereas Russia and China are increasingly using hybrid tools to undermine the security of the EU; whereas there has been a noticeable increase in violations of the airspace and the territorial waters of EU Member States; whereas terrorism and extremism, not least when financed by foreign powers, require constant attention in order to be countered by the EU and its Member States;

AddedE. whereas in response to the threats it faces, the EU urgently needs to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy to defend its interests and values within the EU and in the Western Balkans and its immediate Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods; whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of greater EU support, as well as increased defence cooperation, in order to preserve stability and security, especially in terms of the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; whereas the security situation in these regions is negatively affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which carries the risk of spillover effects;

AddedF. whereas Europe needs to design its security and defence in a comprehensive and multifaceted manner by enhancing conventional military capacities, protecting critical civilian infrastructure, supply chains and energy facilities, countering disinformation and cybersecurity threats and enhancing societal resilience;

AddedG. whereas the European continent is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats as a result of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has severely endangered the EU’s security and stability; whereas Russia’s allies – China, Iran, Belarus and North Korea, among others – also pose active threats both to Europe and to global peace and security; whereas in September 2025, Russia, together with Belarus and other partner countries, carried out the Zapad military exercises along the EU border;

AddedH. whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities for as long as it takes to end Russia’s illegal war of aggression and to restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order and has endangered the current multilateral world order; whereas Ukraine defends not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also overall European security; whereas EU-NATO cooperation has been fundamental in coordinating weapons deliveries to Ukraine;

AddedI. whereas NATO Heads of State and Government, in their Washington Summit Declaration of 10 July 2024, described China as a key enabler of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas China is expanding its military capabilities, thereby significantly altering the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific and beyond;

AddedJ. whereas the joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 provides a capability-driven roadmap for Member States and the EU by identifying critical gaps in and priorities for the EU’s security and defence, including air and missile defence, artillery and ammunition, drone and counter-drone systems, cyber and electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, strategic enablers and the protection of critical infrastructure; whereas the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 translates strategic priorities into concrete flagship projects, notably the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Drone Defence Initiative, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield, which are designed to deliver collective deterrence and resilience by 2030;

AddedK. whereas the EU institutions and the Member States are adopting measures under the Defence Readiness Omnibus, with the aim of scaling up the EU’s defence capabilities and infrastructure to reach the required levels of readiness to prepare for and thereby deter a high-intensity conflict; whereas the Defence Readiness Omnibus package seeks to remove cross-border barriers, simplify licensing and permitting procedures, and incentivise joint innovation, thus laying the foundation for a genuine European defence market and greater industrial scaling;

AddedL. whereas the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument establishes an EU-level facility of up to EUR 150 billion to support collaborative defence procurement, with a view to increasing industrial production capacity and providing pre-financing mechanisms linked to national implementation plans, thereby aiming to reduce duplication and strengthen the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB);

AddedM. whereas the current complex geopolitical situation highlights the need to step up efforts to strengthen the EDTIB, notably by building on the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and its European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs); whereas EDIP should be used to its full potential to boost common procurement and ensure reliable access to essential military products to handle potential supply crises; whereas EDPCIs are collaborative industrial projects designed to promote the joint development, production, acquisition and management of strategic military capabilities, while simultaneously strengthening the governance framework for coordinated and efficient defence investments;

AddedN. whereas the EU needs to further boost research, technological development and innovation in the field of security and defence, especially regarding cybersecurity;

AddedO. whereas military mobility is a strategic pillar of the CSDP and an essential tool for ensuring the EU’s readiness, interoperability and deterrence, particularly along its eastern and southern flanks;

AddedP. whereas EU defence spending is estimated to hit a record of EUR 381 billion by the end of 2025, reflecting a more than 10 % increase since 2024; whereas defence investment hit EUR 106 billion in 2024 and is projected to be close to EUR 130 billion by the end of 2025; whereas NATO’s Defence Investment Plan sets a trajectory towards 5 % of GDP in defence expenditure by 2035, with at least 3.5 % dedicated to core defence; whereas several EU Member States have already announced national plans to move in this direction, reflecting a step change from earlier commitments to the 2 % benchmark; whereas relevant Member States’ commitment to meet the target of 3.5 % of GDP would require spending a total of more than EUR 630 billion per year, as estimated by the European Defence Agency (EDA); whereas the plan comprises a commitment by NATO allies to spend up to 1.5 % of GDP on protecting critical infrastructure, defending information technology networks, ensuring civil preparedness and resilience, and innovating and strengthening the defence industrial base, among other measures; whereas the EU Member States have agreed on more, better and smarter defence spending that should primarily be channelled into cooperative initiatives; whereas previous agreements to do so failed to achieve set targets;

AddedQ. whereas the CSDP has 12 civilian missions, eight military operations and one civilian-military mission, with around 4 000 personnel on three continents; whereas Operation EUFOR ALTHEA sets a route towards peace, stabilisation and the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and still plays a pivotal role in preserving the security and stability of BiH and the region; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo, fighting illicit weapons and human trafficking and training the Libyan coastguard;

AddedR. whereas it is becoming increasingly important to further develop existing partnerships with allies and establish more strategic partnerships around the world; whereas the EU needs tailor-made security and defence partnerships that focus on delivering results, enhancing capabilities and reducing overall dependencies on single actors and providers; whereas NATO is an important pillar of the defence of many EU Member States;

AddedS. whereas the EU needs to be able to effectively and autonomously protect all EU Member States and citizens by taking full advantage of Article 42(2) TEU and developing a European Defence Union; whereas there is the need to further strengthen the operational value of the mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7) TEU and to provide more clarity on its practical arrangements in case of its activation by a Member State;

AddedT. whereas Parliament’s active role in shaping CSDP policies bolsters the EU’s democratic foundations;

A deteriorating geopolitical context

Change 2

Changed1. StressesEmphasises that Russia represents the seriousnessprimary and most significant threat to the EU and its Member States; stresses the gravity and urgency of the threats to European security emanatingposed fromby Russia and its allies;allies such as Belarus, Iran and North Korea; reiterates its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s continued war of aggression and barbaric attacks on civilians; strongly opposes any initiative that would deny Ukraine its sovereignty, reward Russia for its aggression, lead to territorial changes through the use of force, result in impunity and see the future of Ukraine decided on without Ukraine, and the security of Europe decided on without Europeans; underscores that Russia is also attacking Member States and other vulnerable countries in the EU neighbourhood and aims to undermine our societal resilience through its recent, repeated, intensified and increasingly frequent violations of EU airspace, affecting Estonia, Poland, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania, among other countries, and its hybrid warfare such asincluding (attempted) assassinations, arson, cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructureinfrastructure, economic coercion, weaponisation of migration and disinformation;border pressure, lawfare tactics, support to extremist and separatist groups, interference in electoral processes and information manipulation; notes with concern that Russia portrays itself as a global defender of so-called ‘traditional values’, using this narrative as a tool to expand its influence abroad; calls for specific measures to be integrated into the CSDP to counter this influence; notes that Russia engages in the online recruitment of citizens and criminal gangs from EU and other European countries for its hybrid attacks;

Change 3

Removed2. Highlights Russia’s growing aggression and hybrid war against the Republic of Moldova with a view to destabilising the pro-EU government through unprecedented levels of malign interference and the continued militarisation of Transnistria; is concerned about the Georgian Government’s alignment with false Russian narratives; stresses the need to further safeguard the US-brokered agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan through broader confidence-building and transitional justice efforts;

Added2. Reiterates its support for any initiative that would enable the EU and its Member States to take coordinated, united and proportionate action against all violations of their airspace, including shooting down airborne threats; reiterates its calls on the Commission and the Council to develop an action plan on preventing and countering the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare against EU Member States in the terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains originating in Russia or any other country, including options for EU retaliatory measures that match the severity and intensity of hostile activities undertaken against the EU; calls on the Member States to review, in coordination with NATO and NATO allies, the rules of engagement for all types of threats to ensure they are capable of responding to the most innovative threats; stresses that the EU must show resolve and signal that any attempt by a non-EU country to violate the sovereignty of its Member States will be met with immediate retaliation; underlines that Russia’s hybrid warfare will continue unabated unless its actions elicit political or military retaliation; underlines that the EU, in close coordination with NATO, should take further action to prevent hybrid warfare on European soil, including through appropriate restrictions on Russian diplomats and the interdiction of the Russian shadow fleet using all available means; calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; urges the EU and its Member States to work together to ban trade and commercial activities with Russia and Belarus, particularly focusing on any potential dual-use items, as well as the transit of goods to and from the EU via their territories, and to reinforce sanctions; calls for further sanctions targeting Russia’s primary sources of revenue; calls on the Council, along with its US partners, to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet and for further action against it using the full spectrum of legal means to halt, obstruct or impede its operations, given its possible involvement in the launch of drones targeting critical infrastructure; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by malicious non-EU entities based in the EU through thorough investigations and tougher penalties for entities that violate sanctions or fail to exercise due diligence in export controls and end-user verification; reiterates that any form of military support provided to the aggressor by states such as Iran, North Korea and China must entail direct consequences for all other relations with those countries;

Removed3. Notes the negative influence of Russia in the Western Balkans; expresses concern about the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH);