Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

▸4 unchanged paragraphs

on European Defence Readiness 2030: assessment of needs

(2025/2142(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

Changed– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, in particular Chapter Two,2, Section Two2 thereof on the common security and defence policy,

Changed– having regard to the Whitewhite paper entitled ‘White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 20302030’, presented by the PresidencyCommission ofand the EuropeanHigh CommissionRepresentative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 19 March 2025, and its five-pillar financing plan,plan entitled ‘ReArm Europe’,

Changed– having regard to the Jointjoint Communicationcommunication tofrom the EuropeanCommission Parliament,and the European Council,High theRepresentative Council,of the European EconomicUnion andfor SocialForeign CommitteeAffairs and the Committee of theSecurity RegionsPolicy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

Changed– having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’,

Changed– having regard to the Jointjoint Communicationcommunication tofrom the European Parliament, theCommission Council,and the EuropeanHigh EconomicRepresentative andof Socialthe CommitteeUnion andfor theForeign CommitteeAffairs ofand theSecurity RegionsPolicy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’,Industry’ (JOIN(2022)0024),

Changed– having regard to Mario Draghi’sthe report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi on the future of European competitiveness (Draghi report),

– having regard to the European Investment Bank (EIB) Activity Report 2024,

Changed– having regard to theits Europeanposition Parliamentat reportfirst reading of 3025 AprilNovember 2025 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (COM(2024)0150 – C10-0005/2024 – 2024/0061(COD)),products,

Changed– having regard to the joint communiqué issued on 6 June 2025 by France, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal on the launch of the European ‘Finance Europe’ label,

Changed– having regard to the proposalCommission communication of the17 EuropeanJune Commission2025 on the Defence Readiness Omnibus package of 17 June 2025,(COM(2025)0820), aimed at simplifying the relevant legal and administrative frameworks to strengthen the EU’s defence readiness,

Added– having regard to the 10th progress report of June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

Added– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument,

Added– having regard to the report of 10 April 2024 by Enrico Letta on the future of the European single market (Letta report),

Added– having regard to the report of 30 October 2014 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ (Niinistö report),

Added– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

Added– having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2025 on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024,

Added– having regard to the Commission notice of 28 August 2025 on the application of the sustainable finance framework and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive to the defence sector (C(2025)3800),

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and the Committee on Budgets,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0234/2025),

Change 1

ChangedA. whereas,whereas according to the European Defence Agency (EDA), after a decline in 2014, Member States’ defence expenditure reached EUR 326343 billion in 2024, orcorresponding 1.9%to 1.9 % of theirGDP GDP;and representing a 19 % increase compared to 2023; whereas according to the EDA, Member States’ defence expenditure may exceed the 2 % NATO guideline in 2025;

Change 2

RemovedB. whereas the Commission estimates that Member States will need to invest an additional EUR 800 billion in defence by 2030 under the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, involving an annual increase of 10% in spending to reach around EUR 575 billion in 2030, or 3.15% of combined GDP; whereas, in its proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034, the Commission allocates EUR 131 billion to defence and space, five times more than in the previous period;

AddedB. whereas the current level of investment in security and defence in the EU is insufficient to meet the capability targets for every Member State; whereas the cost of isolated action is much higher than the cost of joint action; whereas the cost of non-preparedness and any potential military defeat and the consequent loss of autonomy is much higher than the cost of acting decisively now; whereas increasing national defence spending without addressing coordination issues, redundant efforts and misaligned strategies could be counterproductive as it may exacerbate force integration challenges and drive up procurement costs for all Member States by intensifying competition between them;

RemovedC. whereas, according to the EDA, 30% of Member States’ defence expenditure in 2024 was devoted to investment, of which 88.2% was for the acquisition of new equipment and 11.8% for research and development; whereas, under the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, this increase is expected to generate at least EUR 240 billion in additional investment by 2030;

AddedC. whereas the Niinistö report emphasises that increasing the available funding for defence cooperation is vital to overcome endemic fragmentation and decades of underinvestment; whereas the Commission identified a defence capability investment gap of EUR 800 billion for Member States to be closed by 2030 under the ReArm Europe plan, involving an annual increase of 10 % in spending, to reach around EUR 575 billion in 2030, or 3.15 % of combined GDP; whereas this is aligned with the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness;

RemovedD. whereas, according to the Commission, 78% of Member States’ defence procurement between February 2022 and June 2023 came from third countries, with the United States accounting for two thirds of this figure, and 70% of the turnover of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) depends on European public procurement;

AddedD. whereas in its proposal for the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2028-2034, the Commission is allocating EUR 115.7 billion (in 2025 prices) to defence and space under the European Competitiveness Fund, five times more than in the previous MFF period, as well as EUR 15.7 billion (in 2025 prices) for military mobility under the Connecting Europe Facility, a tenfold increase compared to the previous period, aiming at supporting the development of transport infrastructure that can be used for both civilian and military purposes;

RemovedE. whereas, according to the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), the EDTIB, which in 2023 accounted for around 580 000 direct jobs, 1.4 million indirect jobs and a turnover of EUR 160 billion (one third of which came from exports), faces a triple challenge: recruitment, procurement and financing;

AddedE. whereas EU citizens rightly expect more from the EU and its budget, including the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to evolving threats and to provide the necessary support to bolster defence capabilities, especially in times of crisis; whereas the next MFF should support a comprehensive security approach and appropriately fund measures that strengthen defence readiness and resilience;

RemovedF. whereas, according to a Commission study, SMEs in the EDTIB face greater difficulties than those in other sectors in obtaining credit and equity financing due to: (i) irregular public procurement and payment delays between subcontractors, which reduces cash flow visibility; (ii) the exclusion of defence activities by some investors for image reasons; and (iii) limited exit opportunities for defence assets on European capital markets;

AddedF. whereas according to the EDA, 31 % of Member States’ defence expenditure in 2024 was devoted to investment, of which 88.2 % was for the acquisition of new equipment and 11.8 % for research and development (R&D); whereas expenditure on defence equipment procurement reached EUR 88 billion in 2024, growing by 39 % compared to 2023; whereas under the ReArm Europe plan, this increase is expected to generate at least EUR 240 billion in additional investment by 2030; whereas expenditure on defence R&D in the Member States also rose by 20 % in 2024, reaching EUR 13 billion;

RemovedG. whereas additional financing needs for the EDTIB for the period 2025-2030 are estimated at between at least EUR 30 billion and EUR 40 billion, of which EUR 6 billion to EUR 18 billion will be in equity;

AddedG. whereas according to the Commission, 78 % of Member States’ defence procurement between February 2022 and June 2023 was from non-EU countries, with the United States accounting for two thirds of this figure, and 70 % of the turnover of the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) depends on European public procurement;

RemovedH. whereas the defence sector remains highly fragmented, structured around major buyers and fragile subcontracting chains, which limits the cash flow of small businesses, which are often forced to finance their working capital requirements with long-term resources;

AddedH. whereas according to the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe, the EDTIB, which in 2023 accounted for around 580 000 direct jobs, 1.4 million indirect jobs and a turnover of EUR 160 billion (one third of which came from exports), faces a triple challenge: recruitment, procurement and financing;

RemovedI. whereas the EIB mobilised nearly EUR 1 billion in 2024 to support short-term loans to SMEs and is aiming to mobilise EUR 2 billion in 2025; whereas it has already allocated EUR 13 billion to defence since 2017 and plans to allocate an additional EUR 6 billion by 2027, while expanding its activities to include dual-use projects and developing new financial instruments;

AddedI. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent a vital component of the EDTIB, providing innovation, flexibility and resilience across the entire value chain; whereas the Commission’s 2024 study on access to equity financing highlights, however, that SMEs in the EDTIB face greater difficulties than those in other sectors in obtaining credit and equity financing because of: (i) irregular public procurement and payment delays between subcontractors, which reduce cash flow visibility, (ii) the exclusion of defence activities by some investors for image reasons, and (iii) limited exit opportunities for defence assets on European capital markets; whereas addressing such financing obstacles is essential to give defence-related SMEs fair access to capital markets and private investment, thus improving competitiveness and economic resilience;

RemovedJ. whereas in 2023, among the foreign direct investments (FDI) notified under the European FDI screening cooperation mechanism, approximately 39 cases were subject to in-depth review, which particularly affected the defence and aeronautics sectors;

AddedJ. whereas additional financing needs for the EDTIB for the 2025-2030 period are estimated, at a minimum, at EUR 30 billion to EUR 40 billion, of which EUR 6 billion to EUR 18 billion is estimated to be met through equity; whereas this highlights the relevance of the EU’s savings and investments union (SIU) in mobilising long-term private capital and attracting institutional investors;

RemovedK. whereas, despite the establishment of specialised funds in Europe, only around 30 European funds specialising in defence existed in 2024, of which four had assets exceeding EUR 500 million, compared with more than 50 in the United States, including 30 of that size, and this situation leads to a less attractive secondary market, lower valuations during exit transactions and a risk of takeover by foreign investors;

AddedK. whereas the defence sector remains highly fragmented, structured around major buyers, fragile subcontracting chains and underdeveloped pan-European value chains, limiting the cash flow of small businesses, which are often forced to finance their working capital requirements with long-term resources; whereas this hampers the strengthening of the EDTIB, which is essential for building up defence capabilities;

AddedL. whereas the EIB prioritised the security and defence sector, adapted its lending criteria and internal processes and created a one-stop shop for financial support on security and defence, namely its Security and Defence Office; whereas the EIB mobilised nearly EUR 1 billion in 2024 and was aiming to mobilise EUR 2 billion in 2025 but has actually already reached EUR 3 billion; whereas it has already allocated EUR 13 billion to defence since 2017 and plans to allocate an additional EUR 6 billion by 2027, while expanding its activities to include dual-use projects and new financial instruments; whereas improving access to EIB instruments for SMEs and mid-caps in the defence and security ecosystem is key to ensuring inclusive and innovative growth across the EU;

AddedM. whereas the EIB plays a key role in promoting economic cohesion, sustainable development and competitiveness in the EU; whereas the establishment of a defence, security and resilience bank was proposed in the white paper on the future of European defence; whereas formally extending the EIB’s mandate to include support for the EDTIB would be a more effective and proportionate solution than creating a new defence, security and resilience bank;

AddedN. whereas any extension of the EIB’s lending policy and eligibility criteria to include defence-related equipment must be assessed against the need to preserve the EIB’s financial stability and its AAA credit rating, which remain essential safeguards for its ability to deliver on EU policy priorities, including defence readiness and the EU’s overall political independence;

AddedO. whereas in 2023, approximately 39 notified foreign direct investment (FDI) cases underwent an in-depth review under the EU FDI screening cooperation mechanism, with the defence and aeronautics sectors being particularly affected;

AddedP. whereas despite the establishment of specialised funds in Europe, only around 30 European funds specialising in defence existed in 2024, of which four had assets exceeding EUR 500 million, compared with more than 50 such funds in the United States, including 30 of that size, and this situation leads to a less attractive secondary market, lower valuations during exit transactions and a risk of takeover by foreign investors;

AddedQ. whereas the deteriorating security environment and growing hybrid and conventional threats throughout the EU underscore the need for sustained investment in defence readiness, resilience and military mobility; whereas the eastern flank constitutes a strategic area for Europe’s overall security, requiring enhanced infrastructure, surveillance capabilities and rapid reinforcement mechanisms; whereas strengthening border management, improving counter-drone and air defence systems, and developing regional industrial capacities for defence production and innovation are essential to ensure the EU’s preparedness; whereas these measures, including the implementation of key initiatives such as the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield, should be supported by adequate EU funding; whereas such efforts are crucial to protect the most exposed Member States, preserve the EU’s territorial integrity and uphold collective deterrence and stability across the continent;

Providing a stable foundation and long-term vision for private defence investment

Supporting and better directing Member States’ public investment in defence

Change 3

Removed1. Expresses concern that, despite the objectives of the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, by the end of July 2025 only 10 out of 27 Member States had announced a clear target to increase their defence spending to at least 3% of GDP by 2030; encourages each Member State to publish a detailed strategic vision for its military expenditure until 2030, including its capability targets;

Added1. Believes that the time has come for a renewed political commitment to make the EU a credible security provider by strengthening its defence readiness through fostering deeper cooperation among Member States, their armed forces and industries; calls on the Member States to pool efforts to achieve a coherent, ambitious and integrated European framework for defence; underlines, in this context, the need for the Commission and the Member States to prepare emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars, including faster allocation of public funds and private capital, as an integral element in ensuring readiness and the EU’s capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to emerging security threats;

Removed2. Welcomes the proposals set out in the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan to offer Member States greater budgetary flexibility, in particular the loan facility under the EUR 150 billion ‘Security Action for Europe’ instrument; regrets, however, that the Commission has based this instrument on Article 122 TFEU, thereby ruling out consultation with Parliament, which prevents monitoring and control of the funds and risks exacerbating disparities between Member States; calls on the Commission to refrain from applying this article to other components of the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, as well as to other issues related to defence financing;

Added2. Expresses concern that, despite the objectives of the ReArm Europe plan, by the end of July 2025 only 10 out of 27 Member States had announced a clear target to increase their defence spending to at least 3 % of GDP by 2030; calls on each Member State to draw up a detailed strategic vision for its military expenditure up to 2030, with a clear division between hard defence capabilities and dual-use infrastructure, including capability milestones, stockpile metrics, SME participation figures, and a target for the share of collaborative procurement; stresses the need for national defence budgets to close capability gaps, restore deterrence and ensure adequate support for Ukraine; underlines that future investment must prioritise cooperation, interoperability and joint procurement, making EU-level collaboration the norm within the European defence industrial sector; stresses, in this regard, the need to align Readiness 2030 with the concrete numerical targets set out in the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS), in particular by ensuring that at least 40 % of defence equipment is procured jointly by 2030, that at least 35 % of defence trade is intra-EU trade by 2030, and that at least 50 % of defence procurement is of EU-made products by 2030, and 60 % by 2035; commends those Member States that consistently allocate more than 3 % of GDP to defence; recalls that the Member States should regularly update their capability targets and military doctrines to address new and emerging threats;

Removed3. Welcomes the Commission’s proposals to facilitate and speed up defence procurement; Calls for the European preference to be strengthened by raising the eligibility criteria for the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, in particular by setting a minimum threshold of 70% of the estimated value of the products being financed coming from components from European or associated countries;

Added3. Acknowledges the stark deterioration in the EU’s security context, resulting in growing threats to the EU’s external borders; calls, consequently, for the EU and its Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach to defence, recognising that security extends beyond military assets and also encompasses defence against hybrid threats; stresses that internal political stability is a prerequisite for credible military strength, and that without citizens’ trust in institutions and democracy, the EU’s overall security and cohesion would remain fragile; calls for the swift and solidarity-based mobilisation of EU financial support, in particular for those Member States most exposed to conventional military threats;