Changes from resolution motion joint to adopted text

15. Reiterates its previous position that the exceptional character of Russian foreign interference requires special efforts by national and EU institutions, including the European Parliament, to identify, address and overcome this specific threat;

16. Strongly condemns the alarming revelation brought to light by reputable German media outlets exposing the fact that an employee affiliated with the AfD party and associated with a member of the German Bundestag was identified as a contact person for the FSB, raising serious concerns about potential foreign influence within the German political landscape;

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Changed17. Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; highlights that hybrid warfare and foreign information manipulation and interference are not just foreign policy and security issues, but in fact threaten the very basis of our democracies; urges the EU institutions to adopt a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively; considers that electoral interference in one Member State affects the EU as a whole, insofar as it can have an impact on the composition of the EU institutions; believes that national authorities cannot address these threats by working in isolation, nor can private sector self-regulation solve it all; welcomes the work done by the European External Action Service in its second Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats published on 23 January 2024;2024 and recommends closer cooperation with NATO in this area; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other things, through a dedicated parliamentary body;

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Changed18. Remains steadfast in its support for efforts to improve and enforce the rules that protect the integrity of this institution as a pillar of European democracy; considers that the allegations regarding the MEP concerned underline the need for an enhanced security culture within the European Parliament; calls for the highest level of political and administrative attention to be given to the recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption adopted on 13 July 2023 and calls for the full implementation of the measures proposed, including mandatory and regular security and integrity training for MEPs and staffers, appropriate security clearance and reinforced screening of staffers, in particular those attending in camera meetings; calls for stricter scrutiny of the organisation of events, of the invitation of external guests to Parliament and of access to Parliament’s communication platforms; calls on national authorities to follow procedures and a common timeframe whenever they are asked to give security clearance to MEPs and Parliament staff, as well as for any security screening related to the EU institutions; is of the firm opinion that Parliament resources, such as the sponsoring of events and trips, the granting of access to video recording studios and other communication platforms and the financing of political groups’ or MEPs’ communication projects, must not be used to undermine the values of the EU or for the purposes of disseminating hostile information by authoritarian regimes; reiterates its call for stricter rules for trips taken by MEPs that are paid for by foreign countries and entities; believes that similar rules should be drawn up for trips taken by accredited parliamentary assistants or political group staff;

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Added19. Reiterates its strong commitment to continuing to carry out serious and concrete reforms in the European Parliament in order to show zero tolerance for corruption and corrupting political interference and to protect European democracy;

20. Reiterates its support for the establishment of an independent ethics body as soon as possible, in line with its resolution of 16 September 2021; calls for all EU institutions to raise their ambitions regarding the establishment of this body;

21. Calls on the Secretariat of the EU Transparency Register to ban any entities with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia, pursuant to the Council decision of 3 June 2022 concerning restrictive measures;

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Changed21.22. Expects the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy package in order to urgently take action and close the numerous loopholes in EU party financing legislation, find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms and step up the EU’s cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system; urges the EU institutions and the Member States to make significant and lasting investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including through measures directed at enhancing the EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities; underlines that criminal investigations into spying charges are the competence of the Member States; highlights that, in almost all Member States, Russian spy networks have been uncovered; invites the Member States to strengthen their efforts and cooperation, including to neutralise attempts to acquire sensitive technology from EU companies to fuel Russia’s military capabilities; welcomes the fact that several EU countries have launched special investigative committees devoted to countering Russian influence;

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Changed22.23. Condemns all types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians, among others, by providing them with lucrative jobs in companies linked to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the EU; calls for MEPs to be banned from performing paid side jobs or activities on behalf of organisations or individuals included in the Transparency Register, or on behalf of non-EU countries, in order to limit potential conflicts of interest and foreign interference;

▸4 unchanged paragraphs

24. Notes that laws are essential to fight against corruption and criminal behaviour but cannot in themselves prevent criminal and unethical actions by individual MEPs; underlines that all political groups in the European Parliament bear a certain responsibility to monitor the actions of their Members, and therefore reminds all groups to quickly act in the event that they are made aware of any behaviour raising doubts about the integrity of any of their Members; calls on all MEPs and groups to fully cooperate with the relevant national and EU authorities in this context;

25. Believes that free and fair elections are at the heart of the democratic process and therefore urges the EU institutions and Member States to take decisive action to ensure that solely the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, without foreign interference by malign actors, with a particular focus on the preparations for the European elections of 6-9 June 2024; calls for the Member States and EU institutions to implement resilience strategies for the elections and underlines the need to strengthen permanent monitoring efforts and enhance their implementation well ahead of elections, referendums and other important political processes across Europe;

26. Underlines the key role of investigative journalism in revealing the attempts at foreign interference and covert activities; reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for investigative journalism;

27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.