Text · Comparison of two versions

Changes from resolution motion joint to adopted text

RC-9-2024-0124 → TA-9-2024-0079

From: RC-9-2024-0124 resolution motion joint of 7 Feb 2024
To: TA-9-2024-0079 Adopted text of 8 Feb 2024
Changes: 12 changes to the text
Paragraphs: +6 added · −2 removed · 10 changed

More facts (2)

Title (from): on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union
Title (to): Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Title (from): on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union
Title (to): Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Changes that matter, 12

Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.

Change 1

ChangedG. whereas funding from outside the EU of political activities and politicians within the European Union before and after 24 February 2022, in particular from Russia, continues to be revealed; whereas this funding poses a risk for the integrity of democratic processes in the EU Member States and requires thorough investigation to hold those complicit accountable; whereas the Kremlin has sponsored and supported a number of far-right and far-left parties and politicians in Europe and, among other things, allowed the party of Marine Le Pen to receive a loan of EUR ~~9.4~~9,4 million from a Russian bank in 2013; whereas since then, Le Pen and her party members have on multiple occasions expressed a pro-Kremlin stance;

Change 2

AddedI. whereas there are also ‘Russlandversteher’ (Russia-understanding) politicians within mainstream political parties; whereas several public figures from EU Member States, including former heads of government and cabinet members, most notably Gerhard Schröder, have held well-paid positions in Kremlin-controlled energy companies; whereas, even after the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, some of these people decided not to step down and continued to receive the Kremlin’s blood money, with the silent complicity of their political parties; whereas they continue to use their pro-Russian influence in both their domestic and the European political scenes;

Change 3

ChangedM.N. whereas newspaper reports have for a long time highlighted contacts and close personal relationships between secessionists in Catalonia, including authorities of the government of the autonomous community of Catalonia, and the Kremlin; whereas investigative journalists have reported that former Russian diplomat Nikolai Sadovnikov met with the then-separatist leader, now sitting MEP, Carles Puigdemont, in Barcelona on the eve of Catalonia’s illegal referendum in October 2017; whereas through its cultivation of contacts and relationships, Russia aims to build political and economic influence to destabilise democracy in the European Union; whereas Court of Instruction Number 1 in Barcelona, which is in charge of the investigation into the Voloh case, which links, among others, the former President of Catalonia and his entourage with Russia, recently extended the investigation for six months; whereas representatives of a group of Catalan secessionists in Spain who have maintained relations with personalities close to the Kremlin, including the MEP concerned, are demanding an amnesty for their alleged crimes;

Change 4

ChangedV.W. whereas 2024 is a crucial electoral year and several presidential, national, local and regional elections are due to be held in Member States, in addition to the European elections scheduled on 6-9 ~~June;~~June 2024; whereas the 2024 European elections are likely to be a special target for disinformation campaigns at local, regional and EU level;

Change 5

Changed2. Unequivocally condemns the ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe’s most tragic periods, ~~such~~including asthe consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the terror ofthat followed for the territories conquered by Nazi ~~regime,~~Germany and communist Russia, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy;

Change 6

Changed9. Expresses particular concern about recent reports that the Russian authorities are providing specific narratives to far-right political parties and actors in different EU countries, most notably in Germany and France, aimed at subverting public support for Ukraine, following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022; stresses the seriousness of Russia’s connections with parties and politicians in the Union and its extensive interference in secessionist movements in European ~~territories;~~territories, such as in Catalonia;

Change 7

Changed11. Is extremely concerned about the alleged relations between Catalan secessionists and the Russian administration; notes that Russian interference in Catalonia, if confirmed, would be part of a broader Russian strategy to promote internal destabilisation and EU disunity; expresses deep concern about the large-scale disinformation campaigns that Russia has pursued in Catalonia, as well as the alleged intense contacts and number of meetings between the agents responsible for Russian interference with the pro-independence ~~movement;~~movement and the regional government of the autonomous community of Catalonia; calls on the competent judicial authorities to effectively investigate the connections of the MEPs allegedly associated with the Kremlin and Russia’s attempts at destabilisation and interference in the EU and its Member States; deplores all attacks on judges investigating any interference activities; calls for the cases of the concerned Catalan MEPs to be referred to the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members;

Change 8

Changed17. Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; highlights that hybrid warfare and foreign information manipulation and interference are not just foreign policy and security issues, but in fact threaten the very basis of our democracies; urges the EU institutions to adopt a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively; considers that electoral interference in one Member State affects the EU as a whole, insofar as it can have an impact on the composition of the EU institutions; believes that national authorities cannot address these threats by working in isolation, nor can private sector self-regulation solve it all; welcomes the work done by the European External Action Service in its second Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats published on 23 January ~~2024;~~2024 and recommends closer cooperation with NATO in this area; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other things, through a dedicated parliamentary body;

Show 4 more changes

Change 9

Changed18. Remains steadfast in its support for efforts to improve and enforce the rules that protect the integrity of this institution as a pillar of European democracy; considers that the allegations regarding the MEP concerned underline the need for an enhanced security culture within the European Parliament; calls for the highest level of political and administrative attention to be given to the recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption adopted on 13 July 2023 and calls for the full implementation of the measures proposed, including mandatory and regular security and integrity training for MEPs and staffers, appropriate security clearance and reinforced screening of staffers, in particular those attending in camera meetings; calls for stricter scrutiny of the organisation of events, of the invitation of external guests to Parliament and of access to Parliament’s communication platforms; calls on national authorities to follow procedures and a common timeframe whenever they are asked to give security clearance to MEPs and Parliament staff, as well as for any security screening related to the EU institutions; is of the firm opinion that Parliament resources, such as the sponsoring of events and trips, the granting of access to video recording studios and other communication platforms and the financing of political groups’ or MEPs’ communication projects, must not be used to undermine the values of the EU or for the purposes of disseminating hostile information by authoritarian regimes; reiterates its call for stricter rules for trips taken by MEPs that are paid for by foreign countries and entities; believes that similar rules should be drawn up for trips taken by accredited parliamentary assistants or political group staff;

Change 10

Added19. Reiterates its strong commitment to continuing to carry out serious and concrete reforms in the European Parliament in order to show zero tolerance for corruption and corrupting political interference and to protect European democracy;

Change 11

Changed~~21.~~22. Expects the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy package in order to urgently take action and close the numerous loopholes in EU party financing legislation, find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms and step up the EU’s cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system; urges the EU institutions and the Member States to make significant and lasting investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including through measures directed at enhancing the EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities; underlines that criminal investigations into spying charges are the competence of the Member States; highlights that, in almost all Member States, Russian spy networks have been uncovered; invites the Member States to strengthen their efforts and cooperation, including to neutralise attempts to acquire sensitive technology from EU companies to fuel Russia’s military capabilities; welcomes the fact that several EU countries have launched special investigative committees devoted to countering Russian influence;

Change 12

Changed~~22.~~23. Condemns all types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians, among others, by providing them with lucrative jobs in companies linked to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the EU; calls for MEPs to be banned from performing paid side jobs or activities on behalf of organisations or individuals included in the Transparency Register, or on behalf of non-EU countries, in order to limit potential conflicts of interest and foreign interference;

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Permalink: https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-9-2024-0124/compare/TA-9-2024-0079
Data source: European Parliament Open Data
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved: 27 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2024). “Changes between RC-9-2024-0124 and TA-9-2024-0079”. Text, 8 February 2024. from RC-9-2024-0124, to TA-9-2024-0079. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-9-2024-0124/compare/TA-9-2024-0079 (retrieved 27 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).

BibTeX

@misc{epw-text-2024-02-08,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between RC-9-2024-0124 and TA-9-2024-0079}},
  year = {2024},
  date = {2024-02-08},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-9-2024-0124/compare/TA-9-2024-0079}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-9-2024-0124/compare/TA-9-2024-0079},
  urldate = {2026-09-27},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from RC-9-2024-0124, to TA-9-2024-0079. Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}