Changes from resolution motion joint to adopted text

– having regard to the previous EU statements on Serbia, in particular the open letter on Serbia of 5 February 2025 by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, and to her subsequent visit to Serbia in April 2025,

– having regard to the interim measure of 29 April 2025 issued by the European Court of Human Rights instructing Serbia to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

– having regard to the statement made by several UN Special Rapporteurs on 4 August 2025 condemning the Serbian Government’s violent crackdown on peaceful protesters,

– having regard to the numerous reports and statements by domestic and international human rights organisations, independent media and civic groups documenting systemic abuses in Serbia,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 22 December 2009,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to the European Council Presidency conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council decision of 27-28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) of 31 October 2003, to which Serbia is a signatory,

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 1 November 2024, a newly renovated concrete canopy at Novi Sad railway station collapsed, killing 16 people and injuring others; whereas one year after the tragedy, the investigations have not progressed;

B. whereas China’s presence and influence in Serbia has significantly increased in recent years through large-scale infrastructure investments, raising concerns about transparency, adherence to EU standards and environmental compliance; whereas the station project formed part of the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway line and was carried out under a Serbia-China intergovernmental agreement, outside the scope of the EU’s ordinary public procurement legislative framework, by two Chinese companies; whereas the 2024 Commission report on Serbia had already warned about the circumvention of procurement rules via such agreements; whereas in March 2025, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated an investigation into the potential misuse of EU funds allocated to the reconstruction of the Novi Sad railway station;

C. whereas the canopy collapse triggered unprecedented nationwide protests led by students demanding justice, institutional accountability, transparency, snap elections, electoral integrity, respect for civil liberties, the separation of powers, media freedom, an end to systemic corruption and investment in education; whereas the protests have since spread across Serbian society;

D. whereas from February to the end of September 2025 more than 10 700 protests took place across more than 630 communities and 1 200 local community assemblies, including the largest demonstration in Serbia’s history on 15 March 2025 and the secondlargest on 28 June 2025, making this the largest grassroots movement in decades;

E. whereas the protests organised by the student movement have been largely peaceful, although there were unfortunately a few violent incidents over the summer of 2025;

F. whereas there were isolated cases of radical symbols being displayed and extreme nationalist, pro-Russian and chauvinistic rhetoric being used during the mass protests, which have faced significant criticism from abroad and from within Serbia;

G. whereas previous elections, marred by pressure on voters, vote buying and organised busing of voters within Serbia and from abroad, were held under unfair conditions and the decisive involvement of the president and the ruling party’s systemic advantages undermined the election process overall; whereas independent observers reported that the recent local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić were neither free nor fair;

H. whereas the Serbian authorities have resorted to violence against political opponents and the use of excessive force against demonstrators across the country; whereas by early 2025, the repression had escalated;

I. whereas in March 2025, during the largest protest in Serbian history, protesters were attacked by a sonic weapon according to independent sources, raising serious concerns about the proportionality and legality of the use of force; whereas human rights organisations collected testimonies from 3 400 attendees impacted by the incident, despite official denials by the authorities; whereas the Serbian Government invited Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) to investigate the incident; whereas the official investigation into the incident, which includes more than 170 witness statements, remains at an early stage, with no indictments;

J. whereas since late 2024, protests have been met with repression, including beatings, arbitrary arrests, the use of tear gas, politically motivated detentions, deportations and mass surveillance; whereas more than 1 028 arrests and at least 340 violent incidents have been recorded, some of which caused serious injuries and involved high school students, while independent observers stress that this figure is not exhaustive;

K. whereas since August 2025 violence has further intensified, including police brutality, torture and sexual violence against students, threats by the police protection service (JZO), politically motivated prosecutions by the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office, and smear campaigns by pro-government media;

L. whereas security agencies have unlawfully recorded and televised private conversations, some of which were then used to accuse students and activists of preparing attacks against the constitutional order and security of Serbia, while the Cobras elite military unit has been deployed to respond to domestic clashes, even firing live ammunition on one occasion;

M. whereas pro-government mobs and prior convicts have been shielded by police during violent counterdemonstrations, while opposition figures, students and members of Serbia’s parliament have been beaten and abducted by plainclothes officers;

N. whereas between July and August 2025, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Serbian authorities to exercise restraint, halt their crackdown on the student movement and uphold human rights and academic freedom;

O. whereas concerns have been raised by civil society organisations regarding the proposed draft law on amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles, which introduce new offences and harsher penalties that could disproportionately restrict freedom of expression and assembly; whereas such provisions risk criminalising forms of peaceful protest or everyday civic behaviour that do not endanger public safety or constitutional order;

P. whereas President Vučić, who according to the Serbian Constitution has no formal authority over policing, has framed the protests as ‘colour revolutions’ organised and financed by foreign secret services of Western states, and has transmitted this via pro-government media; whereas Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has supported this narrative and accused the EU of carrying out ‘subversive activities’ to fuel the protests; whereas a number of journalists have been assaulted or denied protection while reporting on the protests;

Q. whereas President Vučić has also been using dehumanising language towards EU politicians, including Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who have expressed their support for the protesters;

R. whereas the government and the ruling elite have normalised repression through pardons for violent attacks committed by government supporters, the suspension of public transport to block protests, the politically motivated expulsion of foreign citizens and the occupation of central Belgrade by pro-government demonstrators;

4. Condemns in the strongest terms the wave of state-influenced violence, intimidation and indiscriminate arrests against peaceful protesters, journalists, civil society organisations and opposition representatives in Serbia; condemns smear campaigns, intimidation of the media and the abusive use of personal data to discredit protesters, and urges the Serbian authorities to ensure media freedom; calls on senior officials to end inflammatory rhetoric that incites hostility or violence; condemns the use of unlawful surveillance against demonstrators, such as through the use of Pegasus, Cellebrite and NoviSpy; expresses particular concern about the deployment of long-range acoustic devices and the extensive use of tear gas against civilians; urges the adoption and implementation of clear protocols on lawful crowdcontrol technologies and independent oversight mechanisms; calls on the Serbian Government to fully guarantee and respect the people’s right of assembly and freedom of expression in line with the Serbian Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights; further condemns all forms of hate speech and incitement to hatred, particularly against national minorities;

5. Holds the Serbian leadership politically responsible for escalating repression, normalising violence and weakening democratic institutions; deplores the fact that the highest state officials are actively spreading conspiracy theories about the collapse of the canopy being an act of sabotage or terrorist attack; is concerned about the lack of response from state institutions, including law enforcement and the judiciary, to refute these baseless claims;

6. Warns against the misuse of criminal law to suppress civic participation; stresses that amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles must not result in criminalising peaceful behaviour or non-violent forms of protest; recalls that the proportional application of criminal sanctions is a cornerstone of the rule of law and of Serbia’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights;

7. Is concerned about the illegal arrests made ahead of the protests of 15 March and 28 June 2025, which were preceded by leaked recordings of suspects’ conversations published by pro-government media; notes that several political activists and members of the Free Citizens Movement (PSG) opposition party were arrested on these grounds and that some remain under house arrest or in exile; calls for their immediate release;

8. Calls for urgent, impartial and transparent investigations into all allegations of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, sexual violence against detainees, politically motivated prosecutions and other grave human rights abuses, including spitting on and beating restrained detainees, verbal degradation and death threats; calls on the authorities to thoroughly examine the allegations that these violations originated from high-ranking officials of the JZO, particularly its commanding officer, Marko Kričak; reiterates that these actions could amount to inhumane and degrading treatment prohibited by international law and policing protocols;

9. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Vučević, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent appointment of the new government led by Đuro Macut on 16 April 2025;

10. Notes the August 2025 arrest, and subsequent release, of former government ministers Tomislav Momirović and Goran Vesić on charges of abuse of office and suspicion of damaging the Serbian state budget by at least USD 115 million in relation to the reconstruction of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, including the collapsed canopy of the Novi Sad railway station; deeply regrets the obstruction of justice that has prevented those responsible for the railway station canopy collapse from being held accountable; condemns the smear campaigns disseminated through pro-government channels against judges and prosecutors working to enforce the rule of law;

11. Strongly condemns the government’s retaliation against employees in the education and cultural sectors for supporting the protests, including job losses, salary reductions, the presence of police on university campuses and the withdrawal of funding for public universities;

12. Calls on the Serbian authorities to immediately restore financing to universities; calls on the competent institutions to ensure the unhindered participation of the academic and research community in projects funded by the EU;