Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from resolution motion joint to adopted text
RC-10-2025-0419 → TA-10-2025-0230
- From
- RC-10-2025-0419 resolution motion joint of 7 Oct 2025
- To
- TA-10-2025-0230 Adopted text of 9 Oct 2025
- Changes
- 7 changes to the text
- Paragraphs
- +6 added · −2 removed · 6 changed
More facts (2)
- Title (from)
- on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure
- Title (to)
- United response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
The resolution now includes Lithuania and Latvia in solidarity, adds calls for drone countermeasures and southern flank coverage, and emphasizes societal resilience.2345 It also adds a new paragraph on Russian overflight fees and bilateral agreements with China, while removing details on European Peace Facility funding and Council voting.67 The other changes are formal: a date format update.1
The notes class 6 changes as substance, 1 as formal, 0 as wording only.
Changes that matter, 7
Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.
Change 1
ChangedS. whereas for the protection of the informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 October 2025 in Copenhagen, the Danish authorities prohibited all civilian drone flights in Danish airspace from 29 September to 3 October;October 2025; whereas several Member States supported Denmark in providing these security measures for the informal meeting;
AI: Note on change 1 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Updates the date range for the drone ban to include the year 2025.
Change 2
Changed1. Expresses its full solidarity with Moldova as well as with Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Romania, Estonia and all other Member States exposed to Russia’s direct threats, military provocations and acts of hybrid warfare; considers that the deliberate disruption, by Russian agents, of the EU’s air traffic, targeting Europe’s military critical services and infrastructure, and of the functioning of the political institutions of the EU and the Member States using UAVs is escalatory, risks miscalculation, endangers lives, constitutes a serious violation of applicable international norms and poses a serious threat to EU citizens and to peace and security in Europe;
AI: Note on change 2 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds Lithuania and Latvia to the list of member states expressing solidarity with.
Change 3
Added12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be appropriate for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;
AI: Note on change 3 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a call for the EU and member states to equip authorities with drone countermeasures at critical infrastructure.
Change 4
Changed15.16. Welcomes the EU drone wall initiative, as announced by Commission President von der Leyen, Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas, and the Eastern Flank Watch initiative, noting that the ambitious deadline mentioned by Commissioner Kubilius for its completion requires rapid implementation as part of a broader defence shield along the EU’s and NATO’s eastern flank in response to repeated Russian airspace violations;violations, while underlining the need to ensure comprehensive coverage of all Member States facing direct security challenges along the southern flank; calls on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States, in close coordination with NATO, to accelerate the development of a concrete and operational plan for its swift deployment; calls on the Commission to present a coherent plan at the European Council meeting on 23-24 October 2025; recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of intercepting drones and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective counter-UAV capabilities;
AI: Note on change 4 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a call for comprehensive coverage of southern flank member states in the drone wall initiative.
Change 5
Changed24.25. CallsEmphasises that Russia’s clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare to sow fear and distrust, and are intended to test and destabilise the societies of EU Member States and NATO allies; stresses, therefore, the importance of societal resilience and preparedness, as highlighted in the recommendations of the Niinistö report on European civilian and military preparedness and readiness; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure swift implementation of the European internal security strategy (ProtectEU) and the preparedness strategy to ensure comprehensive readiness and protection against threats posed by Russia’s breaches of European airspace and other threats; stresses the need for sufficient EU funding in this respect under the current and next MFFs; recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies against aerial and missile threats, including UAVs, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community and household levels, and that these strategies emphasise early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions regarding response behaviour, and protected spaces (sheltering);
AI: Note on change 5 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces a call for implementation with emphasis on societal resilience and preparedness, adding references to the Niinistö report.
Change 6
Added26. Recalls that, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, aircraft registered in Russia or operated by Russian operators are not allowed to fly into the European Union, with limited exceptions; recalls that although no EU airlines currently fly to, from or over the airspace of the Russian Federation, following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a number of carriers from non-EU countries continue to do so despite the war-related risks, and despite paying overflight fees to Russia; stresses that such overflight fees result in an estimated EUR 18 million being paid to Russia yearly from Chinese-operated flights departing from Schiphol Airport alone; recalls that air transport between the EU and China is currently governed by bilateral agreements between the Member States and China; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in the light of the full-scale war of aggression in Ukraine, to re-examine the bilateral agreements and propose measures to stop Russia from benefitting from overflight fees;
AI: Note on change 6 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a paragraph recalling EU sanctions on Russian aircraft and calling for re-examination of bilateral air agreements with China.
Change 7
Changed27.29. Calls on the Member States to activate Article 42(7) TEU where such gross aggressive actions amount to an armed attack or contribute to preparing an imminent attack; urges the EU and its Member States to set out operational procedures and mechanisms for the event that a Member State triggers Article 42(7) TEU, and calls for military support for the Member States concerned to be funded from the European Peace Facility; is convinced that any Member State that opposes recourse to the European Peace Facility in such cases contravenes its duty of loyalty and solidarity under Article 24(3) TEU and its obligation of mutual aid and assistance enshrined in Article 42(7) TEU; considers, therefore, that an opposing vote may not be considered in the Council; recalls that constructive abstention should be possible for those Member States whose constitutional prerogatives require it;
AI: Note on change 7 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Drops provisions on funding military support from the European Peace Facility and on voting procedures in the Council.
Sources & citation
Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2025). “Changes between RC-10-2025-0419 and TA-10-2025-0230”. Text, 9 October 2025. from RC-10-2025-0419, to TA-10-2025-0230. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2025-0419/compare/TA-10-2025-0230 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-10-09,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between RC-10-2025-0419 and TA-10-2025-0230}},
year = {2025},
date = {2025-10-09},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2025-0419/compare/TA-10-2025-0230}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2025-0419/compare/TA-10-2025-0230},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from RC-10-2025-0419, to TA-10-2025-0230. Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}