Changes from resolution motion joint to adopted text

Change 1

AddedG. whereas a recent journalistic investigation, based on the infiltration of the ȘOR party network by an undercover reporter starting in 2024, revealed that hundreds of fake accounts, managed by activists from the ‘Victory’ political bloc under the control of Ilan Șor from Moscow, had been established to disseminate Russian propaganda on TikTok and Facebook; whereas this anti-European content, fully aligned with Kremlin narratives, was systematically monitored and coordinated through secret Telegram groups and channels;

Change 2

Changed12. Urges Moldova’s authorities and civil society and the EU to enhance strategic communication, debunking and combating false narratives promoted by Russia about the EU and its policies and highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for people throughout Moldova, with a special focus on communication in regions such as Gagauzia and in socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities; recommends, therefore, that full use be made of the European Parliament Liaison Office in Chișinău for disseminating information, countering disinformation and supporting citizen engagement, thereby contributing to strengthening Moldova’s democratic resilience; is deeply concerned about Russia’s extensive campaign of exploiting homophobia, including intimidation and physical attacks, and calls on the Commission, the Member States and Moldova to invest in Moldovan society’s resilience by supporting local LGBTIQ+ organisations and advocating for equality for all, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity;

Change 3

Changed13. Notes that Russia’s National Security Strategy, approved by President Putin on 31 December 2015, building on the Military Doctrine of 25 December 2014, explicitly defends so-called traditional Russian spiritual and moral values against perceived Western influence, thereby demonstrating Russia’s instrumentalisation of these values and their institutions for strategic purposes; expresses concern over Russia’s instrumentalisation of so-called traditional Russian values and stresses that one of the primary channels for Russian propaganda in Moldova is the Moscow-affiliated Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church; underlines that in April 2024 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognised the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of Kremlin propaganda, and in August 2024 the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople denounced it as militaristic, ethno-nationalist and heretical; condemns the intimidation of the clergy of the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia by Russian proxies;

Change 4

Added14. Recognises the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia as a victim of Soviet oppression; notes that after it was abusively abolished by the Soviet authorities, the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia was not officially recognised until 2002, following a decision by the European Court of Human Rights;

Change 5

Removed17. Welcomes the smooth adoption of the EUR 1.9 billion Growth Plan for Moldova, which represents an unprecedented level of support aimed at boosting the Moldovan economy and advancing the country’s path toward EU membership by accelerating key reforms in sectors such as energy, the environment, the digital sector, transport and others; welcomes the disbursement of the prefinancing tranche of EUR 270 million from the EUR 1.9 billion growth plan and calls for the swift release of the first ordinary tranche to support key reforms in infrastructure, human capital, business development and the digital and green transitions; urges the EU and Moldova to accelerate the country’s gradual integration into the EU single market in order to deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before formal EU accession; welcomes the recent agreement to review and update the trade provisions of the EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which will provide increased market access for Moldovan agricultural exports that have not yet been liberalised; supports the inclusion of Moldova in the pre-accession instrument under the next multiannual financial framework; commends the Council’s decision of 25 July 2025 to integrate Moldova into the ‘roam like at home’ area as of 1 January 2026, following a similar decision for Ukraine adopted on 14 July 2025;

Added18. Commends the Republic of Moldova on the significant progress it has made in phasing out Russian energy sources, accelerating the decarbonisation and digitalisation of its energy mix, and integrating into the EU energy market; reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to continue supporting Moldova’s energy security, supporting the construction and financing of new electricity interconnections with neighbouring countries, promoting energy efficiency and deploying renewables and energy storage systems in accordance with the targets set in its national energy and climate plan;

Added19. Welcomes the smooth adoption of the EUR 1,9 billion Growth Plan for Moldova, which represents an unprecedented level of support aimed at boosting the Moldovan economy and advancing the country’s path toward EU membership by accelerating key reforms in sectors such as energy, the environment, the digital sector, transport and others; welcomes the disbursement of the prefinancing tranche of EUR 270 million from the EUR 1.9 billion growth plan and calls for the swift release of the first ordinary tranche to support key reforms in infrastructure, human capital, business development and the digital and green transitions; urges the EU and Moldova to accelerate the country’s gradual integration into the EU single market in order to deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before formal EU accession; welcomes the recent agreement to review and update the trade provisions of the EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which will provide increased market access for Moldovan agricultural exports that have not yet been liberalised; supports the inclusion of Moldova in the pre-accession instrument under the next multiannual financial framework; commends the Council’s decision of 25 July 2025 to integrate Moldova into the ‘roam like at home’ area as of 1 January 2026, following a similar decision for Ukraine adopted on 14 July 2025;