Text · Comparison of two versions

Changes from resolution motion joint to adopted text

RC-10-2024-0028 → TA-10-2024-0012

From: RC-10-2024-0028 resolution motion joint of 18 Sept 2024
To: TA-10-2024-0012 Adopted text of 19 Sept 2024
Changes: 8 changes to the text
Paragraphs: +4 added · −2 removed · 8 changed

More facts (2)

Title (from): on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
Title (to): Continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States

Title (from): on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
Title (to): Continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States

What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Updates financial figures for EU support to Ukraine, increasing the total since the Ukraine Facility's establishment to EUR 14 billion.3 Adds concerns about a shadow fleet of Russian oil tankers in the Baltic Sea circumventing sanctions.4 Strengthens calls on Hungary to end its blockade of the European Peace Facility and keep pledges.6 Adds measures to prevent EU-made components from reaching Russia's military and to enhance sanctions enforcement.8 The other changes are formal or wording: decimal separators updated and references to Hungary rephrased.1 2 5 7

The notes class 4 changes as substance, 2 as formal, 2 as wording only.

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Changes that matter, 8

Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.

Change 1

ChangedG. whereas the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, especially near the front lines, has become increasingly critical; whereas, according to the UN, recent Russian attacks on critical civilian infrastructure have left tens of thousands of Ukrainians without essential services and more than ~~14.6~~14,6 million people, around 40 % of the Ukrainian population, will need humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the intensified hostilities in Kharkivska Oblast in May also caused the largest displacement in Ukraine since 2023; whereas, owing to a funding shortfall, the UN reports that humanitarian aid workers are currently unable to fully meet critical needs in the country; whereas the prolongation of the conflict will result in persisting and worsening urgent needs in the coming months; whereas the destruction of infrastructure in Ukraine is having disastrous consequences for the health of women, who are often doing the nursing, medical and care work;

Note on change 1 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Replaces the decimal separator in the number 14.6 with a comma, aligning with EU formatting conventions.

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Change 2

ChangedH. whereas ~~Hungary~~the Hungarian Government issued a decree in breach of the Temporary Protection Directive, cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine, leaving many, the majority women and children, homeless;

Note on change 2 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Rephrases the reference to Hungary, specifying 'the Hungarian Government' instead of just 'Hungary'.

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Change 3

ChangedJ. whereas the EU and its Member States have thus far contributed more than EUR 100 billion in financial, humanitarian, refugee and military assistance to Ukraine; whereas the EU provided over EUR 25 billion of macro-financial support to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and has established the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated financial instrument that will allow it to provide Ukraine with up to EUR 50 billion in predictable and flexible financial support from 2024 to 2027; whereas the EU made its first regular payment of approximately EUR 4.2 billion under the newly established Ukraine facility in July 2024; whereas this payment follows the previous bridge and pre-financing support, ~~totalling~~which totals almost EUR ~~12.2~~14 billion since the establishment of the Facility in March 2024;

Note on change 3 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Updates the total EU support figure from EUR 12.2 billion to EUR 14 billion since the Ukraine Facility's establishment, reflecting a higher amount.

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Change 4

ChangedP. whereas EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion, which is double that of the total funding provided to Ukraine over the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia; whereas increased Russian gas imports by Azerbaijan are a cause for concern about Azerbaijan’s role as an alternative gas supplier instead of Russia, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption; whereas a shadow fleet of environmentally hazardous and uninsured Russian oil tankers is still operating in the Baltic Sea and circumventing the sanction regime;

Note on change 4 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds a new clause highlighting the operation of a shadow fleet of Russian oil tankers in the Baltic Sea, circumventing sanctions.

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Change 5

Changed9. Underlines that insufficient deliveries of ammunition and weapons and restrictions on their use risk undermining efforts made so far and deeply deplores the declining financial volume of bilateral military aid to Ukraine from Member States, despite the strong statements made at the beginning of this year; reiterates, therefore, its calls on the Member States to fulfil their commitment of March 2023 to deliver one million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine, to accelerate weapons deliveries, in particular of modern air defence systems and other weapons and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs, including Taurus missiles; calls for the swift implementation of the commitments made in joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than ~~0.25~~0,25 % of their GDP annually;

Note on change 5 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Replaces the decimal separator in the percentage 0.25 with a comma, aligning with EU formatting conventions.

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Change 6

Changed14. Urges the Member States to actively pressure ~~Hungary~~the Hungarian Government to end its blockade of the EPF, including the newly established Ukraine Assistance ~~Fund;~~Fund, and thus keep the pledges made since February 2022 and agreed by all Member States;

Note on change 6 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Extends the call on Hungary to end its blockade of the European Peace Facility, adding that it should keep pledges made since February 2022.

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Change 7

Changed17. Urges ~~Hungary~~the Hungarian Government to withdraw the decree cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine and uphold its responsibilities under the EU Temporary Protection Directive;

Note on change 7 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Rephrases the reference to Hungary, specifying 'the Hungarian Government' instead of just 'Hungary'.

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Change 8

Changed18. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus and non-EU countries and entities providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing the policy’s effectiveness and impact; condemns Iran’s recent transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia; urges the Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea in view of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add additional Chinese entities and individuals to the EU sanctions list for their support to Russia’s defence and security sector; underlines the need to prevent critical components produced in EU countries from reaching the Russian military industry and considers it is essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, as well as to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU states; calls on the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU; invites the Council and the Member States to address, in particular, the issue of Western-designed components being used in Russian weapons and military equipment;

Note on change 8 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds a call to prevent EU-produced critical components from reaching Russia's military industry and to strengthen export controls and law enforcement.

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Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Permalink: https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2024-0028/compare/TA-10-2024-0012
Data source: European Parliament Open Data
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved: 25 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2024). “Changes between RC-10-2024-0028 and TA-10-2024-0012”. Text, 19 September 2024. from RC-10-2024-0028, to TA-10-2024-0012. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2024-0028/compare/TA-10-2024-0012 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).

BibTeX

@misc{epw-text-2024-09-19,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between RC-10-2024-0028 and TA-10-2024-0012}},
  year = {2024},
  date = {2024-09-19},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2024-0028/compare/TA-10-2024-0012}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/RC-10-2024-0028/compare/TA-10-2024-0012},
  urldate = {2026-09-25},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from RC-10-2024-0028, to TA-10-2024-0012. Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}