Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

RemovedRecital 14: (14) The Commission’s Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28 highlights the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council. The Communication proposes to set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems for borders and security. This group should assess the necessity and proportionality of establishing interoperability with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS), the Visa Information Systems (VIS), and other relevant databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. In particular, the question whether interoperability should be established between EURODAC and the Entry-Exist-System (EES) database to allow consultation between the systems and the automatic transfer from the EES to Eurodac of the data of third-country nationals or stateless persons having exceeded the maximum duration of authorised stay should be assessed. Given the current lack of information sharing between Member States on return decisions, the Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability should also assess the potential benefits of registering return decisions and other measures relating to removal in Eurodac. / 28 COM(2016) 0205

AddedRecital 11: (11) The return of third-country nationals or stateless persons who do not have a right to stay in the Union, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union law as well as international law, including refugee protection, the principle of non-refoulement and human rights obligations, and in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC26, is an important part of the comprehensive efforts to address migration in a fair and efficient way and, in particular, to reduce and deter irregular migration. To increase the effectiveness of the Union system to return illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons is needed in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum system, and should go hand in hand with the efforts to protect those in need of protection.

RemovedRecital 19: (19) Access for comparisons to Eurodac data by Europol should be allowed only in specific cases, under specific circumstances and under strict conditions.

AddedRecital 12: (12) National authorities in the Member States experience difficulties in identifying illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons in view of their return and readmission. It is therefore essential to ensure that information on third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found to be staying illegally in the Union are collected and transmitted to Eurodac and are compared also with those collected and transmitted for the purpose of establishing the identity of applicants for international protection and of third-country nationals or stateless persons apprehended in connection with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Union, in order to facilitate their identification and re-documentation and to ensure their return and readmission, and to reduce identity fraud. It should also contribute to reducing the length of the administrative procedures necessary for ensuring return and readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals or stateless persons, including the period during which they may be kept in administrative detention awaiting removal. It should also allow identifying third countries of transit, where the illegally staying third-country national or stateless person may be readmitted. This should be without prejudice to the operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS), which remains the primary system to ensure cooperation and information exchange on return.

RemovedAmendment linked to Article1(1)(c) of proposal (non-codified) which provides that Eurodac will serve not only the purpose of implementation of the Dublin Regulation, but also law enforcement purposes. However, the current ex-ante control by an independent verifying authority of every access by Europol´s operating unit to Eurodac makes it extremely difficult to implement due to legal, data protection and technical reasons. The deletion of this requirement is counterbalanced by a new paragraph 3b in Article 22 reinforcing the obligation to comply with data protection rules and with the control mechanisms provided for therein.

AddedRecital 12 a (new): (12a) Member States should be able to derogate from the provisions of Article 14 in respect of illegally staying third-country nationals who entered the Union by legally crossing the external border where they have overstayed their authorised period of stay by a period of no more than 15 days.

RemovedRecital 22: (22) This Regulation also lays down the conditions under which requests for comparison of biometric or alphanumeric data with Eurodac data for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences should be allowed and the necessary safeguards to ensure the protection of the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. The strictness of those conditions reflects the fact that the Eurodac database registers biometric and alphanumeric data of persons who are not presumed to have committed a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. It is acknowledged that law enforcement authorities and Europol do not always have the biometric data of the perpetrator or victim whose case they are investigating, which may hamper their ability to check biometric matching databases such as Eurodac. In order to contribute further to investigations of those authorities and Europol, search based on alphanumeric data should be allowed in Eurodac in such cases, in particular where those authorities and Europol may possess evidence of the criminal suspect or victim's personal details or identity documents.

AddedRecital 13: (13) In its Conclusions of 8 October 2015 on the future of return policy, the Council endorsed the initiative announced by the Commission to explore an extension of the scope and purpose of Eurodac to enable the use of data for return purposes27. Member States should have the necessary tools at their disposal to be able to detect illegal migration to the Union and to identify secondary movements and illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons in the Union. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of the Member States.

RemovedUnder the proposal, national law enforcement authorities and Europol cannot request comparison with specific alphanumeric data, which is highly detrimental to investigations, especially in the counter-terrorism field, trying to establish the places and dates of entry in the EU of suspects for which a used identity is known, but no fingerprint is available. In this context, and given that Art.1.1(c) of the proposal, extends its scope of Eurodac to law enforcement purposes, it would be essential for national law enforcement authorities and Europol to have access to all data contained in Eurodac in order to properly carry out their tasks.

AddedRecital 13 a (new): (13 a) The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, as established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a, plays a key role in the Union’s efforts for a better management of external borders, and the prevention of illegal immigration and secondary movements. Consequently, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency should be provided with access to Eurodac data in order to be able to undertake risk analyses to the highest possible standard and to assist Member States with return-related tasks. Those data should be processed in compliance with the data protection safeguards provided for in that Regulation. / 1a Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L 251, 16.9.2016, p.1).

RemovedRecital 24: (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the biometric data of every applicant for international protection and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State, if they are at least six years of age.

AddedRecital 13 b (new): (13 b) As one of the tasks of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Union Agency for Asylum, referred to in this Regulation, is the taking and transmitting of biometric data, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Union Agency for Asylum should be provided with their own interfaces so that they no longer need to rely on national infrastructures. In the long run, those interfaces could be used as a single search interface, as described in the Commission Communication of 6 April 2016 entitled "Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security"1a . / 1a COM(2016) 0205.

RemovedRecital 30: (30) Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534, which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals or stateless persons. Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third-country nationals or stateless persons who are deemed to be vulnerable persons and minors should not be coerced into giving their fingerprints or facial image, except in duly justified circumstances that are permitted under national law.

AddedRecital 14: (14) In line with its Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security28, which highlighted the need to improve the interoperability of information systems as a long-term objective, as also identified by the European Council and the Council, the Commission set up an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability to address the legal and technical feasibility of achieving interoperability of the information systems which would allow for simpler and quicker access to all relevant information and for improving the quality of service that the relevant databases provide to their users. Therefore, technological solutions should be developed to ensure the interoperability of Eurodac with the Schengen Information Systems (SIS), the Visa Information Systems (VIS), Europol, and any new relevant information systems developed in the area of freedom, security and justice, in order to enhance effective cooperation among Member States in managing external borders and combatting serious crime. In particular, an assessment should be made as to whether interoperability should be established between Eurodac and the Entry-Exist-System (EES) in order to allow consultation between the EES and Eurodac of the data of third-country nationals or stateless persons having exceeded the maximum duration of authorised stay. / 28 COM(2016) 0205

AddedRecital 14 a (new): (14a) Eu-LISA should establish a secure communication channel between the EES central system and the Eurodac central system in order to enable interoperability between them. It is necessary to connect the two central systems to allow for the transfer to Eurodac of the biometric data of a third-country national registered in the EES where registration of those biometric data are required by this Regulation.

AddedRecital 15: (15) It is essential in the fight against terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences for the law enforcement authorities to have the fullest and most up-to-date information if they are to perform their tasks. The information contained in Eurodac is necessary for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences as referred to in Directive (EU) 2017/... of the European Parliament and of the Council [combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA] or of other serious criminal offences as referred to in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. Therefore, the data in Eurodac should be available, subject to the conditions set out in this Regulation, for comparison by the designated authorities of Member States and the European Police Office (Europol). / (deleted) / (deleted)

AddedRecital 19: (19) Requests for comparison of Eurodac data by Europol should be allowed only in specific cases, under specific circumstances and under strict conditions, in line with the principles of necessity and proportionality enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union1a. / 1a Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238;Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and Others, Joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.

AddedRecital 20: (20) Since Eurodac was originally established to facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention, access to Eurodac for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences constitutes a further development of the original purpose of Eurodac. In line with the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, any interference with the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac must be in accordance with the law, which must be formulated with sufficient precision to allow individuals to adjust their conduct and it must protect individuals against arbitrariness and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise. Any interference must be necessary to genuinely meet an objective of general interest and proportionate to the legitimate objective it aims to achieve.

AddedRecital 22: (22) This Regulation also lays down the conditions under which requests for comparison of biometric or alphanumeric data with Eurodac data for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences should be allowed and the necessary safeguards to ensure the protection of the fundamental right to respect for the private life of individuals whose personal data are processed in Eurodac. The strictness of those conditions reflects the fact that the Eurodac database registers biometric and alphanumeric data of persons who are not presumed to have committed a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence. Law enforcement authorities and Europol do not always have the biometric data of the suspect, perpetrator or victim whose case they are investigating, which can hamper their ability to check biometric matching databases such as Eurodac. In order to contribute further to the investigations carried out by those authorities and Europol, searches based on alphanumeric data should be allowed in Eurodac in such cases, in particular where those authorities and Europol possess evidence of the personal details or identity documents of the suspect, perpetrator or victim.

AddedRecital 23: (23) With a view to ensuring equal treatment for all applicants and beneficiaries of international protection, as well as in order to ensure consistency with the current Union asylum acquis, in particular with Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council32 and with [Regulation XXX/XXX] establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and Regulation (EU) No […/…], this Regulation includes in its scope applicants for subsidiary protection and persons eligible for subsidiary protection, as well as persons granted international protection on the basis of resettlement in accordance with [Regulation XXX/XXX].

AddedRecital 24: (24) It is also necessary to require the Member States promptly to take and transmit the biometric data of every applicant for international protection, of every resettled third-country national or stateless person in accordance with [Regulation XXX/XXX] and of every third-country national or stateless person who is apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border of a Member State or is found to be staying illegally in a Member State, if they are at least six years of age.

AddedRecital 25: (25) In view of strengthening the protection of all migrant and refugee children, including unaccompanied minors who have not applied for international protection and those children who may become separated from their families, it is also necessary to take biometric data for storage in the Central System and assist a Member State to trace any family or links they may have with another Member State. Biometric data should be taken for that sole purpose, and should be processed and used accordingly. Establishing family links is a key element in restoring family unity and must be closely linked to the determination of the best interests of the child and eventually, the determination of a sustainable solution. In the performance of those tasks, Member States should observe the principles laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989. Improved identification procedures for missing children should assist Member States in guaranteeing that adequate protection of children is ensured. To that end, Member States, upon the identification of a missing child or of a child who is the victim of crime, should promptly contact the competent national child protection authorities, which should undertake a needs assessment with a view to finding a sustainable solution for the child in accordance with his or her best interests.

AddedRecital 26: (26) The best interests of the minor should be a primary consideration for Member States when applying this Regulation. Where the requesting Member State establishes that Eurodac data pertain to a child, those data may only be used for law enforcement purposes, in particular those relating to the prevention, detection and investigation of child trafficking and other serious crimes against children, by the requesting Member State and in accordance with that State's laws applicable to minors and in accordance with the obligation to give primary consideration to the best interests of the child.

AddedRecital 30: (30) In order to ensure that all the persons referred to in Article 10(1), 12a, 13(1) and 14(1) are registered in Eurodac, Member States should refer to the Commission's Staff Working Document on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints adopted by the Council on 20 July 201534, which sets out a best practice approach to taking fingerprints of irregular third-country nationals or stateless persons. When carrying out that process, Member States should also take account of the guidelines established by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in its focus paper of May 2015 entitled "Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac". Where a Member State's national law allows for the taking of fingerprints by force or coercion as a last resort, those measures must fully respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor, refuses to give his or her fingerprints or facial image and there are reasonable grounds for believing that there are child safeguarding or protection risks, that minor should be referred to the competent national child protection authorities, national referral mechanisms, or both. Those authorities should undertake an assessment of the minor´s special needs in accordance with the relevant law with a view to finding a sustainable solution for the minor in full respect of the best interests of th…

RemovedRecital 50: (50) Transfers of personal data obtained by a Member State or Europol pursuant to this Regulation from the Central System to any third country or international organisation or private entity established in or outside the Union should be prohibited, in order to ensure the right to asylum and to safeguard applicants for international protection from having their data disclosed to a third country. This implies that Member States should not transfer information obtained from the Central System concerning: the name(s); date of birth; nationality; the Member State(s) of origin or Member State of allocation; the details of the identity or travel document; the place and date of application for international protection; the reference number used by the Member State of origin; the date on which the fingerprints were taken as well as the date on which the Member State(s) transmitted the data to Eurodac; the operator user ID; and any information relating to any transfer of the data subject under [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013]. That prohibition should be without prejudice to the right of Member States to transfer such data to third countries to which [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013] applies [in accordance with Regulation (EU) No […/2016] respectively with the national rules adopted pursuant to Directive [2016/…/EU] ], in order to ensure that Member States have the possibility of cooperating with such third countries for the purposes of this Regulation. That prohibition should be without preju…

AddedRecital 34: (34) The storage period should be shorter in certain special situations where there is no need to keep biometric data and all other personal data for that length of time. Biometric data and all other personal data belonging to a third-country national or a stateless person should be erased immediately and permanently once third-country nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship of a Member State.

RemovedAmendment linked to Article1(1)(c) of proposal (non-codified) which provides that Eurodac will serve not only the purpose of implementation of the Dublin Regulation, but also law enforcement purposes. This provision foresees the possibility for Europol to transmit data obtained from Eurodac to third Parties, under specific conditions and in accordance with the applicable rules on external relations of the Europol Regulation. In fact, one of Europol’s added values is to create synergies between law enforcement information originating within and outside the EU. Internal and external dimensions of the security of the Union are very much interlinked.

AddedRecital 37: (37) It is necessary to lay down clearly the respective responsibilities of the Commission and eu-LISA, in respect of the Central System, the Communication Infrastructure and interoperability with other information systems, and of the Member States, as regards data processing, data security, access to, and correction of recorded data.

RemovedRecital 51: (51) In individual cases, information obtained from the Central System may be shared with a third-country in order to assist with the identification of a third-country national in relation to his/her return. Sharing of any personal data must be subject to strict conditions. Where such information is shared, no information shall be disclosed to a third-country relating to the fact that an application for international protection has been made by a third-country national or a stateless person where the country the individual is being readmitted to, is also the individual's country of origin or another third-country where they will be readmitted. Any transfer of data to a third-country for the identification of a third-country national or a stateless person must be in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of Regulation (EU) No. [679/2016].

AddedRecital 42: (42) In addition, access should be allowed only on condition that a prior search in the national fingerprint and facial image databases of the Member State and in the automated fingerprinting identification systems of all other Member States under Council Decision 2008/615/JHA36 has been conducted. That condition requires the requesting Member State to conduct comparisons with the automated fingerprinting identification systems of all other Member States under Decision 2008/615/JHA which are technically available, unless that Member State can justify that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it would not lead to the establishment of the identity of the data subject. Such reasonable grounds exist in particular where the specific case does not present any operational or investigative link to a given Member State. That condition requires prior legal and technical implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA by the requesting Member State in the area of fingerprint data, as it should not be permitted to conduct a Eurodac check for law enforcement purposes where those above steps have not been first taken.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point b: (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including removal, repatriation and return measures for third-country nationals and stateless persons staying illegally.

AddedRecital 43: deleted / (deleted)

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point c: (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities may request the comparison of biometric data and alphanumeric data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences, as well as the conditions under which the European Police Office (Europol) may make comparisons against Eurodac data for the purpose of the performance of its tasks.

AddedRecital 50: (50) Transfers of personal data obtained by a Member State or Europol pursuant to this Regulation from the Central System to any third country or international organisation or private entity established in or outside the Union should be prohibited, in order to ensure the right to asylum and to safeguard applicants for international protection and resettled third-country nationals and stateless persons in accordance with [Regulation XXX/XXX] from having their data disclosed to a third country. This implies that Member States should not transfer information obtained from the Central System concerning: the name(s); date of birth; nationality; the Member State(s) of origin or Member State of allocation or the Member State of resettlement; the details of the identity or travel document; the place and date of resettlement or of the application for international protection; the reference number used by the Member State of origin; the date on which the fingerprints were taken as well as the date on which the Member State(s) transmitted the data to Eurodac; the operator user ID; and any information relating to any transfer of the data subject under [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013]. That prohibition should be without prejudice to the right of Member States to transfer such data to third countries to which [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013] applies [in accordance with Regulation (EU) No […/2016] respectively with the national rules adopted pursuant to Directive [2016/…/EU] ], in order to ensure…

RemovedThe purpose allowing Europol to use Eurodac data for comparisons differ from the purpose of national law enforcement authorities. Europol does not have law enforcement coercive powers. Its mandate is not to prevent, detect and investigate terrorist and other serious criminal offences but to support the competent national authorities of MSs to do so. Therefore, a separate indication of the purpose for the processing of Eurodac data by Europol is needed.

AddedRecital 51: (51) In individual cases, information obtained from the Central System may be shared with a third-country in order to assist with the identification of a third-country national or a stateless person in relation to his/her return. Sharing of any personal data must be subject to strict conditions. Where such information is shared, no information shall be disclosed to a third-country relating to the fact that an application for international protection has been made by a third-country national or a stateless person where the country the individual is being readmitted to, is also the individual's country of origin or another third-country where they will be readmitted. Any transfer of data to a third-country for the identification of a third-country national or a stateless person must be in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of Regulation (EU) No. [679/2016].

RemovedArticle 2 – paragraph 2: 2. Taking biometric data of minors from the age of six shall be carried out in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and to capture facial images. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner, both orally and in writing, using leaflets and/or infographics and/or demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors and they shall be accompanied by a responsible adult, guardian or legal representative at the time their biometric data are taken. At all times Member States must respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image.

AddedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new): (aa) assist with the identification of secondary movements of third-country nationals or stateless persons resettled in accordance with [Regulation XXX/XXX];

RemovedArticle 2 – paragraph 3: 3. Member States shall introduce administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law, for non-compliance with the fingerprinting process and capturing a facial image in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. These sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In this context, detention should only be used as a means of last resort in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity.

AddedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point b: (b) assist with the control of illegal immigration to the Union and with the identification of secondary movements and of illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member States, including as appropriate, removal and return of illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons, or granting permanent resident status;

RemovedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o a (new): (oa) "biometric data" means fingerprint data and facial image data;

AddedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point c: (c) lay down the conditions under which Member States' designated authorities may request the comparison of biometric data and alphanumeric data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement purposes for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences. This Regulation shall also lay down the conditions under which the European Police Office (Europol) may request comparisons with Eurodac data for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences falling within its mandate.

RemovedAmendment relating to horizontal Amendment 2 and needed to ensure the internal logic of the text.

AddedArticle 1 – paragraph 2: 2. Without prejudice to the processing of data intended for Eurodac by the Member State of origin in databases set up under the latter's national law, fingerprints and facial image data and other personal data may be processed in Eurodac only for the purposes set out in this Regulation and [Article 34(1) of Regulation (EU) ....]. The data of minors may be used by the Member States for the purposes of assisting them in the identification and tracing of missing children and of establishing family links of unaccompanied minors.

RemovedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o b (new): (ob) "alphanumeric data" means data represented by letters, digits, special characters, spaces and punctuation marks;

AddedArticle 2 – paragraph 1: 1. The persons referred to in Articles 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) shall be registered. Therefore, Member States shall take those person’s biometric data for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of this Regulation and shall impose on the data-subject the requirement to provide his or her biometric data and inform him or her as such in accordance with Article 30 of this Regulation. Member States shall, at all times, respect the dignity and physical integrity of the person during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing his or her facial image.

RemovedAmendment relating to Amendment 9 and needed to ensure the internal logic of the text.

AddedArticle 2 – paragraph 2: deleted

RemovedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o c (new): (oc) 'residence document' means a residence document as defined in point (...) of Article of Regulation ... [COD(2016)0133; Dublin IV];

RemovedNew definition introduced to a term used in a non-codifed text (Art. 19(5)) to ensure the internal logic of the text

AddedArticle 2 – paragraph 3: 3. In order to ensure that all the persons referred to in Articles 10(1), 13(1) and 14(1) are registered in accordance with paragraph 1, Member States may introduce, where appropriate, well-justified administrative sanctions, in accordance with their national law and with full respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, for non-compliance with the process of taking biometric data. Member States shall ensure that an opportunity for counselling has been provided to those persons in order to persuade them to cooperate with the procedure and to inform them of the possible implications of non-compliance. The administrative sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Detention shall only be used as a means of last resort and for as short a period as possible and necessary in order to determine or verify a third-country national's identity and, in particular, where there is a risk of absconding. Where a decision is taken to detain a third-county national or a stateless person, competent national authorities shall carry out an assessment in each individual case in order to verify whether the detention complies with all legal and procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary detention.

RemovedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o d (new): (od) 'interface control document' means a technical document that specifies the necessary requirements to which the national access points referred to in Article 4(3) are to comply with in order to be able to communicate electronically with the Central System, in particular by detailing the form and possible content of the information to be exchanged between the Central System and the national access points.

AddedArticle 2 – paragraph 4: 4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, where enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image is not possible from third-country nationals or stateless persons who are deemed to be vulnerable persons due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, the authorities of that Member State shall not use sanctions for non-compliance with the obligation to provide biometric data. A Member State may attempt to re-take the fingerprints or facial image of a vulnerable person who refuses to comply, where the reason for non-compliance is not related to the conditions of the fingertips or facial image or the health of the individual and where it is duly justified to do so.

RemovedNew definition introduced to a term used in a non-codifed text (Article 23(2)) to ensure internal logic of the text.

AddedArticle 2 – paragraph 5: 5. The procedure for taking fingerprints and a facial image shall be determined and applied in accordance with the national practice of the Member State concerned and in accordance with the safeguards laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

AddedArticle 2 a (new): Article 2a / Special provisions relating to minors / 1. The biometric data of minors from the age of six shall be taken by officials trained specifically to enrol minor's fingerprints and to capture facial images in full respect of the best interests of the child, the principles established by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in a child-friendly and child-appropriate and gender-appropriate manner. The minor shall be informed in an age-appropriate manner, both orally and in writing, using leaflets and infographics and demonstrations specifically designed to explain the fingerprinting and facial image procedure to minors in a language he or she can understand. The minor shall be accompanied by a responsible adult or legal guardian throughout the time his or her biometric data are taken. At all times Member States shall respect the dignity and physical integrity of the minor during the fingerprinting procedure and when capturing a facial image. Member States shall not use coercion to compel the taking of fingerprints of minors. Detention of minors shall be prohibited. / 2. Where the enrolment of the fingerprints or facial image of a minor is not possible due to the conditions of the fingertips or face, Article 2(3) shall apply. Where the fingerprints or facial image of a minor are retaken, the Member State concerned shall proceed in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. Where a minor, in particular an unaccompanied or separated minor, refuses to gi…

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new): (aa) 'resettled third-country national or stateless person’ means a third-country national or stateless person who, following a resettlement procedure in accordance with national law or with [Regulation XXX/XXX], arrives on the territory of the Member State of resettlement.

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – subpoint i a (new): (ia) in relation to a person covered by Article 12a, the Member State which transmits the personal data to the Central System and receives the results of the comparison;

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point d: (d) 'illegal stay' means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national or stateless person who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State;

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point f: (f) 'hit' means the existence of a match or matches established by the Central System by comparison between biometric data recorded in the computerised central database and those transmitted by a Member State with regard to a person, without prejudice to the requirement that Member States shall immediately check the results of the comparison pursuant to Article 26(4);

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point j: (j) 'Eurodac data' means all data stored in the Central System in accordance with Article 12, Article 12a, Article 13(2) and Article 14(2);

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point k: (k) 'law enforcement' means the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences; / (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point l: (l) 'terrorist offences' means the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 of Directive (EU) 2017/... of the European Parliament and of the Council [on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA].

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o a (new): (oa) ‘biometric data’ means fingerprint data and facial image data; / (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o b (new): (ob) 'stateless person' means a person who is not considered to be a national of any State under the operation of its law.

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o c (new): (oc) 'alphanumeric data' means data represented by letters, digits, special characters, spaces and punctuation marks;

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o d (new): (od) 'residence document' means a residence document as defined in point (...) of Article of Regulation ... [COD(2016)0133; Dublin IV];

AddedArticle 3 – paragraph 1 – point o e (new): (oe) 'interface control document' means a technical document that specifies the necessary requirements with which the national access points referred to in Article 4(3) are to comply in order to be able to communicate electronically with the Central System, in particular by detailing the form and possible content of the information to be exchanged between the Central System and the national access points.

RemovedThe proposal has included DubliNet and the operational responsibility of eu-LISA in Article 5 (5) which provides for the operational management of Eurodac , which was not entirely correct (see also relevant Amendments 58). The relevant text with additional provisions on the operational responsibility is tabled as amendment to Regulation 1077/2011(see Amendment 59).

AddedArticle 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2: In such cases, the security measures, access control and logging activities at the testing environment shall be equal to the ones for the Eurodac production system. Real personal data adopted for testing shall be subject to stringent conditions and rendered anonymous in such a way that the data-subject is no longer identifiable. Once the purpose for which the testing was carried out has been achieved or the tests have been completed, such real personal data shall be immediately and permanently erased from the testing environment. Eu-LISA shall ensure that relevant guarantees are provided in respect of the accessing of data by external contractors, in accordance with Articles 24 to 28 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

RemovedArticle 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1: 2. The verifying authority shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of biometric or alphanumeric data with Eurodac data are fulfilled.

AddedArticle 5 – paragraph 3 – point c a (new): (ca) interoperability with other information systems.

RemovedUnder the proposal, national law enforcement authorities and Europol cannot request comparison with specific alphanumeric data, which is highly detrimental to investigations, especially in the counter-terrorism field, trying to establish the places and dates of entry in the EU of suspects for which a used identity is known, but no fingerprint is available. In this context, and given that Art.1.1(c) of the proposal, extends its scope of Eurodac to law enforcement purposes, it would be essential for national law enforcement authorities and Europol to have access to all data contained in Eurodac in order to properly carry out their tasks.

AddedArticle 6 – paragraph 1: 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Member States shall designate the authorities that are authorised to request comparisons with Eurodac data pursuant to this Regulation. Designated authorities shall be authorities of the Member States which are responsible for the prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences or of other serious criminal offences.

RemovedArticle 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3: Only the verifying authority shall be authorised to forward requests for comparison of biometric and alphanumeric data to the National Access Point.

AddedArticle 6 – paragraph 2: 2. Each Member State shall keep a list of the designated authorities and communicate it without delay to the Commission and to eu-LISA. Eu-LISA shall publish a consolidated list of those designated authorities in the Official Journal of the European Union. Where that list has been amended, eu-LISA shall annually publish an updated consolidated list online.

RemovedUnder the proposal, national law enforcement authorities and Europol cannot request comparison with specific alphanumeric data, which is highly detrimental to investigations, especially in the counter-terrorism field, trying to establish the places and dates of entry in the EU of suspects for which a used identity is known, but no fingerprint is available. In this context, and given that Article 1 (1)(c) of the proposal, extends its scope of Eurodac to law enforcement purposes, it would be essential for national law enforcement authorities and Europol to have access to all data contained in Eurodac in order to properly carry out their tasks.

AddedArticle 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1: The verifying authority shall ensure that the conditions for requesting comparisons of biometric or alphanumeric data with Eurodac data are fulfilled.

RemovedArticle 8 – paragraph 1: deleted

AddedArticle 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3: Only the verifying authority shall be authorised to forward requests for comparison of biometrics or alphanumeric data to the National Access Point.

RemovedSee justification on amendment 8. Moreover, current, Europol’s dependency on a MS’s technical infrastructure in order to access Eurodac data creates unnecessary risk and once used, would be cumbersome and slow. The MS’s system connecting Europol to Eurodac would need to meet Europol’s stringent data security requirements. At present, the connection to Eurodac via the Dutch National Access point could not be successfully established due to technical and data security issues encountered.

AddedArticle 8 – paragraph 1: 1. For the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(c), Europol shall designate an authority which is authorised to request comparisons with Eurodac data through its designated Europol access point in order to prevent, detect and investigate terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences. The designated authority shall be an operating unit of Europol.

RemovedEu-LISA has been providing predefined statistics. However, there is a need for a number of ad hoc statistics, both of technical nature (e.g. measuring the performance and availability of the system) as well as of business nature that cannot be included in an exhaustive list as they are relevant with the everyday conditions (e.g. crisis) and an increased interest or relevance for the stakeholders of this regulation (COM, MS, other JHA Agencies) under certain circumstances such as weekly registrations in the Hotspots, increase of frequency of certain predefined statistics etc.

AddedArticle 9 – paragraph 1 – point e: (e) the number of biometric data which the Central System had to request more than once from the Member States of origin because the biometric data originally transmitted did not lend themselves to comparison using the computerised biometric recognition system;

RemovedArticle 10 – paragraph 3: 3. Where requested by the Member State concerned, the biometric data may also be taken and transmitted by members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams or by Member State asylum experts when performing tasks and exercising powers in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a. / 1a Regulation.(EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L 251, 16.9.2016, p.1).

AddedArticle 9 – paragraph 1 – point j: (j) the number and type of requests made for persons referred to in Article 31;

RemovedArticle 12 – point s a (new): (sa) details of family members (such as name and passport or identification card number), and a particular indication where the person is an unaccompanied minors.

AddedArticle 9 – paragraph 2: 2. The monthly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (h) shall contain a breakdown, where possible, of the data subjects' years of birth and genders, and shall be published and made public by each month. At the end of each year, the yearly statistical data for persons referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (h) shall be published and made public by eu-LISA.The statistics shall contain a breakdown of data for each Member State.

RemovedThe best interest of the child should be an essential part of this Regulation. This Amendment is linked to Article 2 (non-codified text).

AddedArticle 9 – paragraph 3 a (new): 3 a. The duly authorised staff of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency shall have access to the statistics drawn up by eu-LISA referred to in points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1 of this Regulation and to the relevant data referred to in Article (12)(d) to (s), Article 13(2)(d) to (m) and Article 14(2)(d) to (m) of this Regulation, solely for the purposes laid down in Article 1(1)(b) of this Regulation and for the purposes laid down in Articles 11 and 37 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624. Access shall be granted to such statistics and data in such a way as to ensure that individuals are not identified. The processing of those data shall be carried out in compliance with the data protection safeguards provided for in Regulation (EU) 2016/1624.