Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report
ECON-PR-765240 → A-10-2025-0071
- From
- ECON-PR-765240 report parliamentary committee draft of 11 Dec 2024
- To
- A-10-2025-0071 Plenary report of 15 Apr 2025
- Changes
- 16 changes to the text
- Paragraphs
- +52 added · −21 removed · 13 changed
More facts (3)
- Dossier
- 2024/2079(INI)
- Title (from)
- on competition policy – annual report 2024
- Title (to)
- on competition policy – annual report 2024
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
The report broadens the scope of competition policy to include sustainability, energy, defence, and innovation, and adds references to the Draghi and Letta reports.1234 It strengthens State aid conditions, including bans for tax haven companies and a European Competitiveness Fund, and adds deadlines for IPCEI notifications.9 It expands merger control scrutiny to killer acquisitions and digital markets, and adds calls for a new competition tool and structural remedies.10111213 It adds numerous sector-specific concerns, including digital concentration, AI, financial sector, food supply chains, and payments, and calls for investigations.14 It increases Parliament's role in competition policy and updates the explanatory statement.1516
The notes class 14 changes as substance, 1 as formal, 1 as wording only.
Changes that matter, 16
Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.
Change 1
ChangedA. whereas athe current challenging economic, climate and geopolitical contextcontexts, requiresmarked by uncertainty and unpredictability, require a renewed approach to European competitiveness;competitiveness and concrete strategies to boost economic growth;
AI: Note on change 1 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces the description of the context with a broader one, adding economic, climate and geopolitical challenges and requiring concrete strategies for growth.
Change 2
ChangedB. whereas the proper enforcement of the EU competition policy framework leads to lower prices, higher quality, greater choice for consumers, faster innovation and a fairer and more resilient economy;economy, and protects entry conditions for operators in the internal market, tackling abuses of dominant position, monopolies and practices distortive to the internal market;
AI: Note on change 2 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds consumer choice, fairness, and protection of entry conditions to the benefits of competition enforcement.
Change 3
AddedC. whereas the Draghi report underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base, with a strong comparative advantage in green technologies, but that sustained efforts are needed in order to retain that advantage; whereas the integration of climate and environmental considerations into competition policy is essential, in that regard; whereas the Letta report maintains that the lack of EU integration in the financial, energy and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness;
AddedD. whereas the EU’s competition policy could contribute to bolstering the resilience of the internal market, as well as achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, the 2030 Digital Compass and the Competitiveness Compass, for which international exchange and cooperation are essential;
AddedE. whereas the Commission and the national competition authorities need to act in an impartial and objective way in order to preserve the credibility of the EU’s competition policy; whereas the political independence of national competition authorities is of utmost importance to ensure the impartiality and credibility of competition policy;
AI: Note on change 3 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds three new recitals referencing the Draghi and Letta reports, the Green Deal, Digital Compass, Competitiveness Compass, and the impartiality of competition authorities.
Change 4
Removed1. Considers that EU competition shields against concentrations and accumulations of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in protecting consumers;
Added1. Considers that EU competition law seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulation of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in encouraging efficiency, innovation and growth, creating a level playing field and protecting consumers, by assuring that markets remain competitive, efficient, dynamic and innovative, delivering high-quality products and services at fair prices and with a wider range of choice;
AI: Note on change 4 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Expands the role of competition policy to include encouraging efficiency, innovation, growth, and a level playing field, and clarifies it shields against excessive concentration.
Change 5
Changed2. Reiterates that competition policy should contribute to all of the EU’s policies, notably in the fields of thesustainability, environmentenergy, defence and digitalisation; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to a new State aid framework to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal;Deal, so as to ensure competitiveness through mobilising the necessary public support for the energy transition to decarbonise EU industry, while ensuring that this does not hinder innovation, increase prices or reduce competition in the internal market; reiterates that State aid should not distort fair and effective competition;
AI: Note on change 5 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Extends the policy fields to sustainability, energy, and defence, and adds conditions for State aid to support the Clean Industrial Deal without distorting competition.
Change 6
Removed3. Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common social and environmental standards;
Added3. Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common standards and guarantee territorial cohesion; notes that at the same time, policymakers should take due account of international regulatory and market developments and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, and the development of influence on competition policy, globally; highlights the importance of the European Competition Network (ECN) and calls on the Commission to prioritise sustained constructive dialogue and cooperation, in this regard, at international level; calls for the coordination between national competition authorities to ensure the uniform application of competition rules and underlines the necessity of increasing collaboration between antitrust and other sectoral regulators;
AI: Note on change 6 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces the mention of social and environmental standards with common standards and territorial cohesion, and adds calls for international cooperation and ECN coordination.
Change 7
Changed4. Supports the Commission’s commitment to investing in sustainable competitiveness; welcomes Mariothe Draghi’sDraghi report’s emphasis on innovation, investments, market integration, decarbonisation and resilience, and Enricothe Letta’sLetta report’s focus on integration, autonomy and solidarity; encourages policies that promote innovationinnovation, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth;
AI: Note on change 7 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Rephrases references to the Draghi and Letta reports and adds competitiveness to the list of policy goals.
Change 8
Changed5. Underlines the need for coordinated, targeted and truly European industrial policy to boost European competitiveness; notes that this must not result in market dominance or abuse thereof, price distortion or economic inefficiencies, and cautionspoints againstto allowingthe marketneed integrationfor througheffective mergers;merger control procedures;
AI: Note on change 8 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds requirements for industrial policy to be coordinated, targeted, and European, and to avoid price distortion and economic inefficiencies, with effective merger control.
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Change 9
Removed6. Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law;
Added6. Considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives; notes the Commission’s intention to provide guidance on the compatibility of State aid with innovation, climate and economic security considerations, as well as its actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies under the Clean Industrial Deal, and encourages the Member States to consider the introduction of further conditions for the receipt of State aid; calls for companies structured through non-EU tax havens to be barred from receiving State aid; invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation of clawback mechanisms;
Removed7. Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; notes the divergent fiscal capacities of Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects; calls on the Commission and Member States not to engage in a subsidy competition; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further fragmentation; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;
Added7. Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law; also takes note that this increase in markups was found to be driven by market share reallocation towards the largest firms; further notes that weak levels of competition have had significant negative impacts on consumers, purchasing power, and on the competitiveness of EU firms and overall economic growth; recalls that the application of competition law should focus on ensuring open, competitive markets free from anti-competitive practices;
Removed8. Takes note of Mario Draghi’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public investment in this context; considers the introduction of a permanent EU investment capacity to be vital;
Added8. Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; recalls that such aid, as permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, must not adversely affect trading conditions or the common interest; notes the divergent fiscal capabilities of the Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects and to ensure the integrity of the single market, which can be done through a common financing instrument for a European industrial policy, such as a European Competitiveness Fund, as proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines; calls on the Commission and the Member States not to engage in subsidy competition, which only exacerbates market distortions, notably when financing undertakings that are not efficient; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further market fragmentation and notes that only two of the Member States accounted for 77 % of State aid notified; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;
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Added9. Underlines the importance of the important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) for financing projects within the EU with a cross-border dimension; stresses that IPCEIs should have genuine EU added value, which means that they should have a positive impact on more than one Member State; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any such State aid notification is completed within six months at the latest;
Added10. Takes note of the Draghi report’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public and private investment in this context; underlines that the EU budget needs to be properly equipped to that end; regards the completion of the Savings and Investments Union as important for mobilising private investment, addressing the fragmentation of the internal market and supporting the EU’s industrial strategy; acknowledges the urgent need for reforms alongside the effective implementation of the three action areas outlined in the Draghi report: (i) closing the innovation gap with the US and China; (ii) a common plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to accelerate the energy transition and reduce energy costs; and (iii) enhancing security and reducing dependencies;
Added11. Welcomes the protection of the level playing field of European markets and European companies and their workers granted by anti-dumping measures that correct for distortive foreign State aid; calls on the Commission to make swift use of available trade instruments on procurement and foreign subsidies to prevent unfair competition in the internal market;
AI: Note on change 9 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces paragraphs on State aid and investment with new ones adding conditions for State aid, a ban for tax haven companies, a European Competitiveness Fund, IPCEI deadlines, and anti-dumping measures.
Change 10
Removed9. Welcomes Mario Draghi’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers;
Added12. Observes changes in business practices, highlighting a decline in cartel cases; cautions, however, against new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape;
Removed10. Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses; maintains that prioritising exploitative abuses of consumers could help to directly address price hikes caused by profit-driven inflation or greedflation; regrets that exploitative cases have seldom been pursued by the Commission and asks for the relevant guidelines to be updated with due regard to consumer vulnerability;
Added13. Notes the Draghi report’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems that do not result from anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, and to impose market-wide, forward-looking structural or behavioural remedies, including by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers; invites the Commission to analyse how this tool would complement the existing framework for sector investigations;
Removed11. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies;
Added14. Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses;
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Removed12. Welcomes the priority given to housing by the new Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls for an SGEI revision that expands the exemption for affordable housing to middle-income households; calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest;
Added15. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies, and encourages further efforts to strengthen their application when necessary; calls on the Commission to make better use of the interim measures instrument to stop any practice that would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;
Added16. Welcomes the priority given to housing by the 2024-2029 Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing;
Added17. Stresses the importance of State aid as a tool for closing the economic gap between more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, outermost regions and economically depressed areas; recalls that allowing State aid in the context of SGEIs remains essential for the survival of these areas, especially in the context of State support dedicated to connectivity and other basic provisions of services for communities residing in isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the EU; calls on the Commission to investigate possibilities of further flexibility in providing funding to these regions;
Added18. Takes note of the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which found that one of the Member States has failed to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national legislation; underlines the importance of transposing the ECN+ Directive fully; calls on all of the Member States to ensure a proper implementation of this Directive;
AI: Note on change 10 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds paragraphs on cartel decline, new competition tool, exploitative abuses, structural remedies, SGEI, regional aid, and ECN+ transposition, while removing some previous paragraphs.
Change 11
Changed13.19. Notes with concern the GeneralCourt Court’sof Justice of the European Union’s interpretation of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation in Case C-611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), rescinding the Commission’s approach of accepting referrals of non-notifiable deals; acknowledges that the EC Merger Regulation leavesdoes not provide the Commission ill-equippedwith tosufficient addresstools for dealing with killer acquisitions; strongly believes that the impact of merger decisions on the singleinternal market warrantsjustifies the additioninclusion of aan singleinternal market legal base in the EC Merger Regulation, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act;Act encourages(DMA); calls on the Commission to promptrequire Member States that have or can claim the relevant jurisdictioncompetence to reviewexamine potential killer acquisitions in the light of their national merger control laws, and to continue to refer those deals in accordance with Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of reviewing the EC Merger Regulation to be able to examine mergers that fall below EU or national thresholds, regardless of the sectors involved;
AI: Note on change 11 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Updates the Illumina case reference and adds calls for the Commission to require Member States to examine killer acquisitions and explore reviewing the Merger Regulation.
Change 12
Removed14. Welcomes Mario Draghi’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as climate protection, sustainability and the impact on workers, to be taken into account when examining the impact of a concentration on the internal market;
Added20. Notes that since the 2004 entry into force of the EC Merger Regulation, 0.7 % of notified mergers have been either blocked by the Commission or withdrawn following an investigation;
Removed15. Calls for merger assessment frameworks to be updated to reflect the realities of the digital economy, where market power can be manifested in ways beyond traditional market share; supports the development of new methodologies to analyse data-driven dominance and network effects;
Added21. Notes that the turnover thresholds in the EC Merger Regulation alone might not be suitable for detecting all cases that should be reviewed by the competition authorities; highlights practices used by dominant firms to avoid formal investigations, such as the growing use of ‘partnerships’ in the AI sector, which further suggests that a review of the EU Merger Regulation is necessary;
Removed16. Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations during which companies continue to benefit from their anticompetitive practices;
Added22. Welcomes the Draghi report’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’ in cases where a merger increases the ability and incentive to innovate, and invites the Commission to analyse and further develop this concept; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as the impact on workers, to be taken into account;
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Added23. Asks the Commission to identify the national barriers that may prevent it from considering the EU market as the relevant one in its analyses of mergers; calls on the Commission to present a legislative proposal to remove these impediments; notes that the international environment needs to be carefully analysed when deciding on the definition of the relevant market in competition and merger control cases; calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to consolidation in the EU where appropriate, as also proposed by the Draghi and Letta reports, taking into account the strategic importance and pro-competitive impact of scale and favourable investment conditions in certain sectors for driving innovation and long-term competition;
Added24. Calls for merger assessment frameworks to be updated to reflect the realities of the digital economy, where market power can be manifested in ways beyond traditional market share in clearly delineated markets; supports the development of advanced methodologies for analysing data-driven dominance and network effects, emphasising the critical role of consumer choice in selecting digital services and devices; encourages the Commission to enhance mechanisms enabling interoperability across services and devices, fostering innovation and competition in the digital ecosystem; urges the Commission to progress swiftly on the implementation of the existing interoperability obligations for messaging services under the DMA, the existing interoperability obligations for cloud providers under the Data Act and to start work on the review of the DMA for May 2026; urges the Commission to implement existing interoperability obligations under the DMA and look into extending interoperability obligations to online social networking services; supports the Commission in taking more account of the potential harm to competition when assessing mergers where expansion into adjacent markets would have the effect of further strengthening market dominance in the acquiring company’s core market;
Added25. Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations during which companies continue to benefit from their anticompetitive practices; calls on the Commission to set appropriate time limits for antitrust cases and ensure an effective follow-through of decisions taken; calls on the Commission to adopt further interim measures to stop any practice which would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;
AI: Note on change 12 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds paragraphs on merger statistics, thresholds, innovation defence, market definition, digital economy, and antitrust investigation time limits.
Change 13
Changed17.26. Welcomes the two recentSeptember 2024 landmark casesjudgments by the Court of Justice confirming the Commission’s assertion that the Irish tax deal with Apple constitutes illegal State aid and that Google constitutesabused anticompetitiveits practice;dominant position in contravention of the Treaties; acknowledges that the legal framework in Ireland has since changed; encourages the Commission to continue the clamp down on State aid abuses involving the selective granting of tax breaks to companies;
AI: Note on change 13 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Updates the Apple and Google cases, adding that Apple constitutes illegal State aid and Google abused its dominant position, and encourages continued clampdown on tax breaks.
Change 14
Removed18. Emphasises the worrying market concentrations in various digital markets, such as social media, search engines, artificial intelligence, cloud services and online advertising; underlines the actual and potential negative impact on European competitiveness, data protection, society and democracy; urges the Commission to address issues that are specific to the tech market, including infrastructural power, vertical concentration and market leveraging in digital markets;
Added27. Notes the detrimental effect of international tax competition; recalls its support for the implementation of Pillar Two of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); deeply regrets the US presidential Executive Order of 20 January 2025 which asserts that the OECD global tax agreement has ‘no force or effect within the United States’; stresses the importance of multilateralism in ensuring that multinationals pay their fair share of taxation where value is created; takes the view that the EU should fully stand by the OECD’s Pillar Two Directive;
Removed19. Calls for the vigorous enforcement of all competition rules, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the Digital Markets Act, to address gatekeeper practices and foster contestable markets and fair competition;
Added28. Emphasises the worrying market concentrations in various digital markets, such as social media, search engines, AI, cloud services, e-commerce, microchips and online advertising; underlines the actual and potential negative impact on EU competitiveness, the resilience of supply chains, media freedom, privacy and data protection, society and democracy; urges the Commission to address issues that are specific to the tech market, including infrastructural power in hardware and cloud computing layers, vertical concentration, algorithmic manipulation of the digital public sphere and market leveraging in digital markets, as demonstrated by the progress made under the DMA; additionally calls for the opening of new investigations into the cloud services sector to further ensure fair competition and innovation, taking into account the degree of market concentration in this sector and anticompetitive practices related to complex and non-transparent licensing terms or forced bundling; furthermore, urges the Commission to address the increasing vertical concentration of dominant players across the advertising value chain, which puts the EU online advertising sector at risk;
Removed20. Notes with concern the fragmentation in numerous consumer markets, including financial services, telecoms and household energy, and calls for faster and greater market integration where there are benefits for consumers;
Added29. Notes the rapid development of AI services, which has the potential to result in market concentration; calls on the Commission to take an ecosystemic approach towards this sector, including by developing and applying new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the dominant players in this sector; highlights that the DMA contains several provisions that must be used to prevent gatekeepers from restricting emerging AI developers, and asks the Commission to act swiftly to address the risk of consumers being forced into using pre-determined AI services on their mobile devices, ensuring that AI systems remain user-selectable and transparent, thereby safeguarding competition and consumer choice; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of adding generative AI as a new core platform service under the DMA;
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Removed21. Notes with concern the high degree of market concentration in the European financial sector, as well as its sustained over-reliance on non-EU service providers;
Added30. Notes that large digital players use their market power, power over consumers, financial resources and data concentration in one market to leverage their position in another; stresses that small players cannot compete with the aforementioned factors, which makes EU citizens even more dependent on the same small number of non-EU companies and endangers strategic autonomy; calls for increased scrutiny of the leveraging of position by dominant digital sector players into other sectors and the EU’s strategic autonomy, through a revision of the merger guidelines to ensure that market leveraging can be scrutinised more effectively;
Added31. Notes the importance of data and data analytics tools as one of the deterring factors for digital market concentrations and acquisitions in the digital sector; calls for an opinion of the European Data Protection Board in cases of concentrations involving one or more operators in digital sectors on the relevance of datasets for the intended concentration, the personal data the target acquisition processes and the potential impact on the rights to privacy and data protection the intended concentration has;
Added32. Expresses concern regarding the growing use of dynamic pricing mechanisms across the EU; calls on the Commission to explore regulatory measures against highly adaptive and opaque pricing methods;
Added33. Calls on the Commission to vigorously enforce all competition rules, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the DMA, in order to address gatekeeper practices and foster contestable markets and fair competition; stresses that the Commission must have sufficient staff for enforcement, while noting that new tools, as well as scientists and economists stemming from divergent disciplines, can work to improve competition law enforcement; underlines in particular that the DMA should be applied rigorously and independently, without any undermining by external pressures; stresses that the DMA and potential fines must not be used as a bargaining chip in relation to discussions on tariffs, but as a cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to ensure fair and competitive digital markets; notes the six non-compliance procedures launched against some designated gatekeepers; is deeply concerned about potential delays in critical investigations and the capacity of the Commission to respect their ‘best effort’ obligations and to make a decision on non-compliance procedures without undue delay;
Added34. Notes with concern the fragmentation in numerous consumer markets, including financial services, telecoms and household energy, and calls for faster and greater market integration where there are benefits for consumers, and for recognition that this market integration can drive investment and innovation;
Added35. Expresses alarm at the high concentration in the retail, agricultural and automotive sectors in overseas territories whereby excessive prices set by dominant undertakings on essential products and services amplify inequalities, precariousness and territorial disparities; calls on the Commission to launch an investigation into potential abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU;
Added36. Notes with concern the high degree of market concentration in the European financial sector, as well as its sustained over-reliance on a limited number of non-EU service providers; notes that the three largest credit rating agencies still hold a market share of over 90 %; expresses concern about the continued high concentration in the public interest entities (PIE) audit market, with four firms mainly holding the vast majority of EU revenues for PIE audits, limiting choice and risking supervisory capture; invites the Commission to present an impact assessmenton options to address these concerns; urges the Commission to carefully assess public tenders for expertise from audit market participants so that potential conflicts of interest are avoided;
Added37. Expresses concern about the food price crisis and notes, in this regard, the high levels of market concentration in food supply chains; reiterates its call for the Commission to urgently conduct a thorough analysis of the extent and effect of buying alliances, thereby devoting special attention to guaranteeing fair competition and greater transparency in supermarket and hypermarket chains’ commercial practices, particularly where such practices affect brand value and product choice or limit innovation or price comparability; recalls, in this light, the market concentration in agri-commodity trading wherein four companies account for the vast majority of the global crop trade; regrets that the Commission nonetheless conditionally approved the 2024 Bunge-Viterra merger (M.11204) despite competition concerns; asks the Commission to address excessive power accumulation in the hands of a few large players in this market, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers and consumers alike; highlights the implementation of the New Competition Tool in this context;
Added38. Notes the high-net profits of EU banks during this inflationary period, mostly driven by the delayed pass-through of the rapid monetary policy tightening to deposit rates;
Added39. Notes with particular concern the dominant position of two international card schemes in the EU payments market, and their engagement in practices that reinforce and extend their dominance of this market, potentially further increasing barriers to entry and hampering long-term innovation, as well as leading to higher costs for EU businesses and ultimately consumers; calls on the Commission to take decisive actions, emphasising the need for a review of the Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751) to tackle the significant increase in card scheme fees charged by international card schemes and to ensure a fair, competitive and transparent market environment;
AI: Note on change 14 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds many paragraphs on digital markets, AI, data, dynamic pricing, enforcement, financial sector, food supply chains, and payments, while removing some previous ones.
Change 15
Removed22. Stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; calls on the Commission to enter into negotiation for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy;
Added40. Stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments, such as guidance and temporary frameworks, in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; calls on the Commission to enter into negotiation for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy to formalise its enforcement priorities to Parliament; calls on the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7) TEU allowing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; stresses that Parliament should be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups in the International Competition Network and the OECD as an observer, and also in the High-Level Group on the DMA;
Added41. Calls on the responsible Executive Vice-President, also Commissioner in charge of competition policy to maintain close contact with Parliament’s competent committee and its working group on competition issues;
AI: Note on change 15 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds calls for an interinstitutional agreement, a Treaty change for ordinary legislative procedure, and more involvement of Parliament in competition policy.
Change 16 under “EXPLANATORY STATEMENT”
RemovedAccording to Rule 56(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the explanatory statement will be included closer to the vote.
AddedThe 2024 Annual Competition Report serves as a key instrument to take stock of competition policy in the Union and is drawn up against the backdrop of a challenging economic and geopolitical context.
AddedThe first section of the report, general considerations, recalls that EU competition seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulations of market power. It acknowledges the key role of European competitiveness and welcomes the input of the Draghi and Letta reports.
AddedThe ‘a competitive union’ section stresses that State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives. It cautions for the fragmentation that may be caused by overreliance on national State aid. It reiterates the Draghi report’s call for substantial additional public and private investments, and underlines the important role of completion of the Capital Market Union herein.
AddedThe next section of the report dwells on key demands as regards enforcement priorities, in which we take note of the suggestion of Draghi to introduce a new competition tool (NCT). It also asks the Commission to enforce exploitative abuse cases, and asks the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing.
AddedRegarding mergers the report dwells on the implications of the recent Illuma-Grail case for the capacity of the Commission to address killer acquisitions. It asks the Commission to explore the possibility to review of the Merger Regulation with appropriate involvement of the Parliament. We also welcome the innovation defence while upholding that the Commission, in certain cases, should be enabled to invoke matters of public interest when assessing mergers.
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AddedThe sectoral policy section dwells inter alia on topical developments in the fields of taxation and digitalisation, and points out the continued over-concentration and over-reliance on certain third country service providers in the financial sector, as well as possible avenues to address these issues.
AddedFinally the report asks for proper democratic involvement of the Parliament in shaping competition policy.
AI: Note on change 16 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces the placeholder explanatory statement with a full summary of the report's sections.
Sources & citation
Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2025). “Changes between ECON-PR-765240 and A-10-2025-0071”. Text, 15 April 2025. from ECON-PR-765240, to A-10-2025-0071, reference 2024/2079(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-765240/compare/A-10-2025-0071 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-04-15,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between ECON-PR-765240 and A-10-2025-0071}},
year = {2025},
date = {2025-04-15},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-765240/compare/A-10-2025-0071}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/ECON-PR-765240/compare/A-10-2025-0071},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from ECON-PR-765240, to A-10-2025-0071, reference 2024/2079(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}