Changes from resolution motion to adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 4(3) and 7(1) thereof,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the protocols thereto,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the international human rights treaties of the United Nations and of the Council of Europe,

– having regard to the Rule of Law Checklist adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th plenary session in Venice on 11 and 12 March 2016,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

– having regard to Commission Decision C(2023) 8999 of 13 December 2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary,

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded,

– having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP,

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds,

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds,

– having regard to the country chapters on Hungary in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports,

– having regard to the Opinion of the Venice Commission on Hungary’s Act LXXXVIII of 2023 on the Protection of National Sovereignty, adopted at its 138th plenary session in Venice on 15 and 16 March 2024,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU and as reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas these values, which are shared by the Member States, constitute the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the EU;

B. whereas any clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU does not concern solely the individual Member State where the risk has materialised, but has an impact on the other Member States, on mutual trust between them and on the very nature of the EU and its citizens’ fundamental rights under EU law;

C. whereas the scope of Article 7 TEU is not confined to the obligations under the Treaties, unlike Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and whereas the EU can assess the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach of the common values in areas falling under Member States’ competences;

D. whereas in 2018, upon a proposal of the European Parliament, the Council initiated the procedure laid down in Article 7(1) TEU with a view to addressing a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU; whereas six hearings on the situation in Hungary under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure have taken place in the Council since the start of the procedure, but the Council has not yet attempted to determine whether such risk exists, and has not addressed any recommendations to the Government of Hungary;

E. whereas the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation is of utmost importance as it is the instrument enabling the protection of EU funds in an effective manner;

F. whereas the Commission decided to grant Hungary EUR 0.9 billion in pre-financing under REPowerEU; whereas such pre-financing may come without conditions, but not without checks;

G. whereas in its resolution of 15 September 2022, Parliament assessed that since the launch of the procedure under Article 7(1) TEU, multiple concerns with respect to Hungary’s compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU had persisted or substantially worsened, including as regards the independence of the judiciary, corruption, conflicts of interest, media independence and pluralism, the functioning of the constitutional and electoral system, and in the civic space;

H. whereas since the adoption of this resolution, the situation in some of these areas has shown limited improvement, in most areas it has remained alarming, and in some others it has deteriorated further; whereas new serious problems have emerged as a result of the Hungarian Government’s actions;

I. whereas in April 2024, tens of thousands of Hungarians took to the streets to protest against state capture and corruption;

J. whereas in 2023, the Hungarian Government adopted a legislative package of judicial reforms in order to improve certain aspects of the independence of the judiciary, which included strengthening the independence of the National Judicial Council (NJC); whereas the non-exhaustive list of serious deficiencies related to the rule of law in the justice system that remain unaddressed includes:

– rules related to the irremovability of the current president of the Curia, Hungary’s supreme court,

– a lack of meaningful safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the Curia,

– a lack of transparency and automatisation in the case allocation system in the Curia and lack of transparency with respect to rules on composition of the panels,

– political and administrative pressure on the independence of the NJC and its members, including by way of smear campaigns,

– rules related to the appointment, promotion and irremovability of judges,

– a lack of meaningful safeguards and guarantees of the independence of judges reviewing administrative decisions,

– a growing number of obstacles to preliminary referrals to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

– deficient rules on immunity and disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors and judges,

– political interference in the work of the prosecutorial services and individual prosecutors,

– a lack of efficient support services for victims of crime;

K. whereas the non-exhaustive list of persisting serious deficiencies related to anti-corruption and conflict of interest includes:

– the absence of a track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments concerning high-level corruption cases,

– the absence of stringent regulations on lobbying, revolving doors and effective oversight on asset declarations,

– a lack of sufficient competence, empowerment, access to information and adequate resources at the Integrity Authority,

– a lack of public consultation and debate on anti-corruption measures,

– a lack of accountability of the prosecutorial services, including in cases of negligence, breaches of duty and criminal behaviour,

– political interference in the work of the prosecutorial services tracking high-level corruption and criminal cases;

L. whereas the non-exhaustive list of persistent serious deficiencies related to media freedom and pluralism includes:

– a lack of functional independence of the media authority and of the digital services coordinator,

– a lack of editorial and financial independence of public service media and a lack of pluralism of political views in public service media, which is used by the ruling majority for political propaganda,

– the abuse of state advertising in pro-government media outlets and a lack of rules and transparency on this matter,

– smear campaigns against independent journalists and media,

– a growing number of restrictions on access to public information,

– a lack of meaningful investigation into the deployment of spyware targeting investigative journalists and media professionals,

– concentration of the media market and excessive influence of the government over the media landscape (including through the Central European Press and Media Foundation, or KESMA in its Hungarian acronym),

– the potential subjection of media outlets and journalists to investigations by the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO);

M. whereas the non-exhaustive list of persistent serious deficiencies related to the constitutional and electoral system, as well as checks and balances, includes: