Changes from resolution motion to resolution motion joint

RemovedB100307/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Removed– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law,

Added– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, notably that of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

Removed– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, in particular those adopted since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,

Added– having regard to the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law,

Changed– having regard to the Strategic CompassTreaty foron SecurityEuropean andUnion Defence,(TEU), adoptedin byparticular theArticles Council24(3), on42(7) 21and March222 2022,thereof,

Removed– having regard to the report by Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

Added– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, in particular Articles 4 and 5 thereof,

Changed– having regard to the joint white papercommunication fromof the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint Whitewhite Paperpaper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),(JOIN(2025)0120) and to its resolution of 12 March 2025 thereon,

Change 1

Removed– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence,

Added– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025, entitled ‘Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

Removed– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

Added– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 March 2026 on the EU’s continued support for Ukraine,

Removed– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025,

Added– having regard to the statements made by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 20 May 2026 regarding Russian threats against the Baltic states,

Removed– having regard to its resolution of 18 December 2025 on the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania,

Added– having regard to the statement made by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas of 29 May 2026 condemning the reckless violation of the EU’s airspace by Russia,

Removed– having regard to the Commission’s Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security, which was published on 11 February 2026,

Added– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Removed– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 March 2026 on advancing the EU’s capacity to counter hybrid threats,

AddedA. whereas more than four years ago Russia launched its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, continuing its 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donbas in flagrant violation of international law and Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty; whereas intrusions into EU and NATO airspace, caused by Russia, have been occurring since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but have recently increased in frequency and intensity;

Removed– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2022 updating guidelines on general visa issuance in relation to Russian applicants following Council Decision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9 September 2022 on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation, and on providing guidelines on controls of Russian citizens at the external borders (C(2022)7111),

AddedB. whereas Russia’s military build-up along the EU’s eastern flank is ongoing and also includes the territory of Belarus, which is complicit in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and hybrid attacks against the EU, notably via its instrumentalisation of irregular migration, organised crime, disinformation and the launch of meteorological balloons, which pose serious security threats, including the constant disruption of civilian aviation, the terrorisation of countries bordering Belarus like Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and damage to local economies;

Removed– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

AddedC. whereas Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania and other EU Member States have been targeted by Russia’s attempts at destabilisation, which take the form of drone incursions and airspace violations, propaganda and disinformation, electronic warfare, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) interference, cyberattacks and sabotage;

RemovedA. whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations and its own international commitments; whereas Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas Region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea; whereas during this time, Russia’s forces have continued and escalated indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting have continued throughout 2026;

AddedD. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone crashed into a residential building in Galați, Romania, causing an explosion that injured two people; whereas this was the first such incident on the territory of an EU and NATO Member State to result in injuries requiring medical treatment; whereas more than 70 people had to be evacuated;

RemovedB. whereas in recent weeks, several drones have entered Romanian, Finnish, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian airspace; whereas Russia has repeatedly violated the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies for decades; whereas these recent airspace violations present a reckless and ongoing escalation that threatens regional security;

AddedE. whereas on 19 May 2026, an intruding drone flying in Estonian airspace was shot down by a Romanian fighter jet participating in the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission; whereas on 20 May 2026, the incursion of an unidentified drone into Lithuanian airspace forced authorities to issue an unprecedented air raid alert, compelling civilians to seek shelter; whereas on 8 June 2026, French NATO fighter jets, participating in a NATO mission, shot down drones flying over Latvia; whereas these drone incursions are a direct result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with the majority entering EU airspace as a result of Russian electronic warfare; whereas, in March 2026, due to the interference from Russian electronic warfare systems, at least three Ukrainian drones were diverted from their intended course and entered Finnish territory, where they crashed;

RemovedC. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated the decisive role of unmanned and autonomous systems, low-cost attrition warfare and electronic warfare in modern combat, with drones now reshaping the battlefield and the nature of the threats facing the EU; whereas the EU’s ability to deter and counter these threats depends on its capacity to develop, test and field its own innovative drone and counter-drone solutions at speed;

AddedF. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Ukrainian naval drone exploded in the Romanian port of Constanța as a result of electronic warfare measures employed by the Russian Federation, causing damage to property but no human casualties;

RemovedD. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace and struck a residential building in the city of Galați, forcing approximately 70 civilians to evacuate and injuring two; whereas this incident was not isolated, as multiple prior violations of Romanian airspace have been documented;

AddedG. whereas on 7 May 2026, two Ukrainian drones, jammed by Russian electronic warfare systems, struck a fuel storage depot in Rēzekne, Latvia; whereas the Latvian military’s five-hour delay in communicating its response, the lack of public warnings in Rēzekne and the failure of initial radar detection ignited an intense public backlash, causing a political crisis that led to the collapse of the Latvian Government;

RemovedE. whereas since March 2026, Russia has started electronically hijacking Ukrainian military drones to make incursions into the sovereign territory of EU Member States; whereas a similar incursion into Finland occurred on 15 May 2026 when a Ukrainian drone was redirected by Russia into Finnish airspace, leading to a shelter in place warning for a large part of the population and a three-hour closure of Helsinki Airport; whereas on 18 May 2026 a drone was redirected into Estonia’s airspace, after which it was shot down by a Romanian NATO fighter jet; whereas on 20 May 2026 a drone alert caused the Lithuanian capital Vilnius to come to a standstill, forcing citizens to seek shelter underground; whereas such alerts have become increasingly common in recent months; whereas on 5 June 2026 a Ukrainian naval drone that had been electronically hijacked by Russia exploded near an oil terminal in the Romanian port of Constanța; whereas on 8 June 2026 a French fighter jet had to shoot down a drone entering Latvian airspace, which marks the first time a drone has been shot down over Latvia’s territory;

AddedH. whereas the Baltic Sea region contains a high concentration of critical infrastructure, including subsea energy and telecommunications networks, transport links and other strategic assets, making it particularly vulnerable to hybrid attacks, sabotage and drone-related threats; whereas the protection of critical infrastructure requires both physical hardening and increased redundancy and decentralisation, as demonstrated by the lessons learned from Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure;

RemovedF. whereas Russia is waging a disinformation campaign in the Baltic states, falsely claiming that Ukraine is launching drone attacks on Russia from their territory; whereas on 19 May 2026 Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that Ukrainian drone units were stationed at Latvian military bases, a claim firmly rejected as disinformation by the Latvian authorities and disproved by NATO’s interception of stray drones over Baltic territory; whereas such fabrications seek to intimidate front line Member States and to manufacture pretexts for retaliation;

AddedI. whereas the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania presents significant regional security and environmental hazards due to the presence of large volumes of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste stored in temporary overground facilities, and whereas any accident or intentional provocation to this critical infrastructure could have severe consequences for the entire Baltic region and far beyond;

RemovedG. whereas in response to ongoing airspace violations, on 12 September 2025 NATO announced the launch of ‘Eastern Sentry’, a multi-domain military activity aimed at bolstering NATO’s position along the eastern flank; whereas this was followed by the introduction on 16 October 2025 of the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch as flagship projects under the Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; whereas on 11 February 2026 the Commission published the Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security;

AddedJ. whereas there have been other serious incidents of suspected Russian violations of EU Member States’ airspace;

RemovedH. whereas on 9 June 2026 the Commission published its 21st sanctions package against Russia, which includes export restrictions for metals and alloys used in Russian drones and sanctions against entities involved in drone production; whereas, despite calls from several Member States and Members of this Parliament, exports of alumina to Russia were not included in the 21st sanctions package;

AddedK. whereas the security and protection of the EU Member States along its eastern flank are an immediate priority and a joint European responsibility, especially given that hybrid attacks are being carried out using modern drone warfare, an area in which the EU Member States’ capacity is far from complete;

RemovedI. whereas, in its communication of 30 September 2022, the Commission called for heightened scrutiny of short-stay visa applications by Russian nationals and stated that a very strict approach is justified for Russian citizens travelling for tourism, including refusal where reasonable doubts exist regarding the purpose of travel, security risks or the applicant’s intention to leave the Schengen area;

AddedL. whereas drone incidents on the EU’s eastern flank have exposed significant gaps in both military and civilian preparedness; whereas existing radar systems often prove unable to track low-altitude objects, methods chosen for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) interception are economically inefficient and reports on incidents revealed that some air-raid shelters were locked or inaccessible to the public; whereas these failures highlight urgent systemic vulnerabilities in alert and reaction procedures, and broader societal resilience;

RemovedJ. whereas trade data exposed by reporters and information released by the Ukrainian military show that dual-use goods produced in Europe are still found in large quantities in Russian Geran-2 drones; whereas without Western technologies, Russia would not be able to produce the Geran-2 drones it uses to hit civilian targets in Ukraine;

AddedM. whereas in its latest attacks against Ukraine, Russia set ablaze the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, a historic monastery of Eastern Christianity and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, among other invaluable cultural heritage sites;

Removed1. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated deliberate violations of the sovereign airspace and territory of EU Member States; expresses its undivided solidarity with the countries affected by Russian airspace violations and hijacked drone incursions, and stresses the importance for EU Member States to stand united in the face of Russia’s provocations;

AddedN. whereas those recent drone incidents have demonstrated the urgent need for multilayered defence capabilities integrating kinetic and non-kinetic counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); whereas drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare and hybrid conflict, and their use in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped defence requirements and operational doctrines across the continent;

Removed2. Highlights that these clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare designed to destabilise, divide and undermine the EU, its Member States and NATO; stresses the importance of societal resilience and preparedness as highlighted in the Niinistö report, which presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to preparedness and readiness that encompasses all civilian and military aspects;

AddedO. whereas the Arctic and the High North are becoming increasingly important for European security, while limited sensor coverage and a sparse permanent presence create vulnerabilities that hostile actors may seek to exploit through unmanned systems and hybrid operations, thereby increasing the risk of hostile drone incursions deep into EU territory;

Removed3. Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and stresses the urgent need to improve detection and defence; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that focuses on better equipping police forces and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones;

Added1. Strongly condemns Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into the EU Member States;

Removed4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be suitable for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;

Added2. Reaffirms its full solidarity with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, whose territory, airspace and critical infrastructure have been targeted by Russian hybrid provocations; reaffirms that the EU will not be intimidated by Russia’s campaign of destabilisation and that it stands united in its determination to defend the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU Member States and to continue to support Ukraine;

Removed5. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework and calls for the launch of another off-budget financial facility that would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget European Peace Facility, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the United Kingdom; stresses, therefore, the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current European Peace Facility governance model;

Added3. Recognises the particular vulnerability of, and expresses its full solidarity with, citizens in the EU border regions along the eastern flank, who are most exposed to serious threats and who also bear significant economic and social costs as a result; calls for targeted EU-level measures, including dedicated financial support, to strengthen the protection of affected communities and critical infrastructure, and ensure prevention, preparedness, resilience and emergency response and reconstruction in these particularly exposed regions;

Removed6. Stresses that countering drones and other emerging threats requires the EU to develop and field innovative defence solutions at speed; supports, in this context, the proposed programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) and calls for its contract-based model to be scaled up substantially; underlines the importance of EU action to foster innovation by small and medium-sized enterprises, start-ups and new defence actors, in particular on the eastern flank, so that they can scale up and help meet the EU’s capability needs, especially in drone and counter-drone warfare; calls for increased and dedicated support to this end under the next multiannual financial framework;

Added4. Unequivocally condemns the Russian drone strike on a residential building in Galați, Romania, which caused direct civilian casualties, constituting a grave and serious escalation; considers that repeated drone incursions and airspace violations into EU countries are not isolated incidents but an integral part of Russia’s broader strategy of intimidation directed against the EU and its allies;