Changes from resolution motion to resolution motion joint

RemovedB100468/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

(2025/2917(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Removed– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia,

Added– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 2 and 6 thereof,

Changed– having regard to theits Commissionprevious staffresolutions workingon documentSerbia, in particular those of 8 NovemberFebruary 20232024 entitledon ‘Serbiathe 2023situation report’in (SWD(2023)0695),Serbia accompanyingfollowing the Commissionelections, communicationand of 87 NovemberMay 20232025 entitledon ‘2023the Communication2023 onand EU2024 EnlargementCommission policy’reports (COM(2023)(0690),on Serbia,

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD)(2024)0695), accompanying the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),

Removed– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,

Added– having regard to the previous EU statements on Serbia, in particular the open letter on Serbia of 5 February 2025 by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, and to her subsequent visit to Serbia in April 2025,

Removed– having regard to the European Council Presidency conclusions of 14-15 December 2006, to the Council conclusions of 25 March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

Added– having regard to the interim measure of 29 April 2025 issued by the European Court of Human Rights instructing Serbia to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

Removed– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2011 entitled ‘Commission Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union’ (COM(2011)0668), the European Council decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia EU candidate status and the European Council decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

Added– having regard to the statement made by several UN Special Rapporteurs on 4 August 2025 condemning the Serbian Government’s violent crackdown on peaceful protesters,

Added– having regard to the numerous reports and statements by domestic and international human rights organisations, independent media and civic groups documenting systemic abuses in Serbia,

Added– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

Added– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

Added– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Added– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 22 December 2009,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

Change 1

Removed– having regard to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia,

Added– having regard to the European Council Presidency conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

Removed– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

Added– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council decision of 27-28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

RemovedA. whereas 16 people lost their lives following the collapse of the concrete canopy of the railway station in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024;

Added– having regard to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) of 31 October 2003, to which Serbia is a signatory,

RemovedB. whereas renovation work on the station had begun in 2021, and was officially unveiled during an election campaign in 2022; whereas further reconstruction work was done by two Chinese companies, namely China Railway International (CRI) and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), both of which are predominantly state-owned, publicly traded Chinese companies;

Added– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

RemovedC. whereas, citing corruption as the main cause of the accident, protesters across Serbia have been demanding snap elections to remove Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), from power; whereas the increase in internal political tensions demonstrates the growing public discontent in Serbia with government corruption and authoritarian tendencies;

AddedA. whereas on 1 November 2024, a newly renovated concrete canopy at Novi Sad railway station collapsed, killing 16 people and injuring others; whereas one year after the tragedy, the investigations have not progressed;

RemovedD. whereas the Serbian Government has resorted to violence against political opponents and the use of excessive force against demonstrators across the country; whereas according to the Serbian Constitution, the president has no formal authority over policing;

AddedB. whereas China’s presence and influence in Serbia has significantly increased in recent years through large-scale infrastructure investments, raising concerns about transparency, adherence to EU standards and environmental compliance; whereas the station project formed part of the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway line and was carried out under a Serbia-China intergovernmental agreement, outside the scope of the EU’s ordinary public procurement legislative framework, by two Chinese companies; whereas the 2024 Commission report on Serbia had already warned about the circumvention of procurement rules via such agreements; whereas in March 2025, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated an investigation into the potential misuse of EU funds allocated to the reconstruction of the Novi Sad railway station;

RemovedE. whereas the Novi Sad tragedy has unveiled further structural weaknesses in Serbia’s public administration, transparency and rule of law, which remain essential areas of reform for any country aspiring to EU membership;

AddedC. whereas the canopy collapse triggered unprecedented nationwide protests led by students demanding justice, institutional accountability, transparency, snap elections, electoral integrity, respect for civil liberties, the separation of powers, media freedom, an end to systemic corruption and investment in education; whereas the protests have since spread across Serbian society;

RemovedF. whereas concerns have also been raised regarding the activities of certain foreign contractors, particularly Chinese state-owned companies, operating in Serbia; whereas the 2018 sale of the Serbian mining and smelting complex RTB Bor to the Chinese company Zijin has led to uncontrolled exploitation of copper and gold ore in the municipalities of Bor and Majdanpek, affecting local communities and the environment; whereas reports indicate that the local population, which is almost entirely comprised of people belonging to Serbia’s Romanian minority, are at risk of being displaced, which would threaten the local ethnic composition, thereby breaching the Serbian Constitution;

AddedD. whereas from February to the end of September 2025 more than 10 700 protests took place across more than 630 communities and 1 200 local community assemblies, including the largest demonstration in Serbia’s history on 15 March 2025 and the secondlargest on 28 June 2025, making this the largest grassroots movement in decades;

RemovedG. whereas Serbian President Aleksander Vučić has claimed that EU Member States are involved in organising a ‘colour revolution in Serbia’;

AddedE. whereas the protests organised by the student movement have been largely peaceful, although there were unfortunately a few violent incidents over the summer of 2025;

Removed1. Expresses its profound sorrow following the tragic Novi Sad railway station collapse on 1 November 2024, which led to the deaths of 16 people, and offers its heartfelt condolences to the victims and their families;

AddedF. whereas there were isolated cases of radical symbols being displayed and extreme nationalist, pro-Russian and chauvinistic rhetoric being used during the mass protests, which have faced significant criticism from abroad and from within Serbia;

Removed2. Expresses concern about the main issue raised by the student protests, namely corruption related to large-scale infrastructure projects in Serbia; notes the that the criminal justice system in Serbia fails to investigate and prosecute cases of high-level corruption;

AddedG. whereas previous elections, marred by pressure on voters, vote buying and organised busing of voters within Serbia and from abroad, were held under unfair conditions and the decisive involvement of the president and the ruling party’s systemic advantages undermined the election process overall; whereas independent observers reported that the recent local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić were neither free nor fair;

Removed3. Condemns the use of unlawful surveillance on protesters and the deployment of unidentified or plainclothes officers, including individuals employed by private security companies, against demonstrators;

AddedH. whereas the Serbian authorities have resorted to violence against political opponents and the use of excessive force against demonstrators across the country; whereas by early 2025, the repression had escalated;

Removed4. Condemns in the strongest terms the conduct of members of the Unit for the Security of Certain Persons and Facilities (JZO) and its commanding officer, Marko Kričak, which has included illegal detention, the beating of restrained detainees, spitting, verbal degradation including threats of sexual violence and death; reiterates that these actions amount to inhumane and degrading treatment prohibited by international law and policing protocols;

AddedI. whereas in March 2025, during the largest protest in Serbian history, protesters were attacked by a sonic weapon according to independent sources, raising serious concerns about the proportionality and legality of the use of force; whereas human rights organisations collected testimonies from 3 400 attendees impacted by the incident, despite official denials by the authorities; whereas the Serbian Government invited Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) to investigate the incident; whereas the official investigation into the incident, which includes more than 170 witness statements, remains at an early stage, with no indictments;

Removed5. Reminds the Serbian authorities that freedom of assembly and freedom of speech are fundamental human rights and basic democratic freedoms; reiterates that these rights form a central part of the Copenhagen criteria and are to be upheld by EU candidate countries;

AddedJ. whereas since late 2024, protests have been met with repression, including beatings, arbitrary arrests, the use of tear gas, politically motivated detentions, deportations and mass surveillance; whereas more than 1 028 arrests and at least 340 violent incidents have been recorded, some of which caused serious injuries and involved high school students, while independent observers stress that this figure is not exhaustive;

Removed6. Deplores the unfounded allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in any way with the organisation of student protests; reiterates that the protest movement began as a genuine and authentic grassroots effort by the Serbian student community to demand action against systemic corruption and authoritarian tendencies;

AddedK. whereas since August 2025 violence has further intensified, including police brutality, torture and sexual violence against students, threats by the police protection service (JZO), politically motivated prosecutions by the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office, and smear campaigns by pro-government media;

Removed7. Reiterates that Serbia must ensure the consistent and effective implementation of the legislative and institutional frameworks for the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of assembly, and furthermore, the equal respect of the rights of people belonging to national minorities, in line with the Copenhagen criteria and Serbia’s commitments under the EU accession process;

AddedL. whereas security agencies have unlawfully recorded and televised private conversations, some of which were then used to accuse students and activists of preparing attacks against the constitutional order and security of Serbia, while the Cobras elite military unit has been deployed to respond to domestic clashes, even firing live ammunition on one occasion;

Removed8. Calls on the Serbian authorities to ensure full transparency and due diligence in public procurement and concession processes involving foreign state-owned companies, including Chinese contractors; stresses that Serbia must safeguard its constitutional order, environmental standards, and the rights of local and national minority communities when approving such projects;

AddedM. whereas pro-government mobs and prior convicts have been shielded by police during violent counterdemonstrations, while opposition figures, students and members of Serbia’s parliament have been beaten and abducted by plainclothes officers;

Removed9. Condemns the visits and attendance of President Vučić at the military parades held in Moscow in May 2025 and Beijing in September 2025 in the midst of Serbia’s biggest political and societal crisis since he came to power; reiterates that China remains a strategic rival and that the Russian Federation is an enemy, which continues to wage an illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine – a candidate country for EU membership;

AddedN. whereas between July and August 2025, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Serbian authorities to exercise restraint, halt their crackdown on the student movement and uphold human rights and academic freedom;

Removed10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Serbia.

AddedO. whereas concerns have been raised by civil society organisations regarding the proposed draft law on amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles, which introduce new offences and harsher penalties that could disproportionately restrict freedom of expression and assembly; whereas such provisions risk criminalising forms of peaceful protest or everyday civic behaviour that do not endanger public safety or constitutional order;

AddedP. whereas President Vučić, who according to the Serbian Constitution has no formal authority over policing, has framed the protests as ‘colour revolutions’ organised and financed by foreign secret services of Western states, and has transmitted this via pro-government media; whereas Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has supported this narrative and accused the EU of carrying out ‘subversive activities’ to fuel the protests; whereas a number of journalists have been assaulted or denied protection while reporting on the protests;

AddedQ. whereas President Vučić has also been using dehumanising language towards EU politicians, including Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who have expressed their support for the protesters;