Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from resolution motion to adopted text
B-10-2025-0445 → TA-10-2025-0254
- From
- B-10-2025-0445 resolution motion of 13 Oct 2025
- To
- TA-10-2025-0254 Adopted text of 23 Oct 2025
- Changes
- 15 changes to the text
- Paragraphs
- +3 added · −4 removed · 18 changed
More facts (3)
- Dossier
- 2025/2666(RSP)
- Title (from)
- on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30)
- Title (to)
- UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30)
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Every difference
The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.
Part 2 of 4: Paragraphs 61–120
4 unchanged paragraphs
P. whereas the UN General Assembly has recognised the right to access a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a universal human right and Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines the principle that environmental protection must be integrated into the policies of the Union;
Q. whereas air pollution is a major environmental and public health threat and is inextricably linked with the climate crisis, both in terms of shared energy sources such as fossil fuel combustion and the need for integrated policy solutions; whereas short-lived climate pollutants, such as methane and black carbon, are responsible for nearly half of current global warming levels and cause severe health impacts, particularly among vulnerable populations;
R. whereas the United States has decided for the second time to unilaterally withdraw from the Paris Agreement; whereas the US retreat from multilateralism and from providing development assistance, humanitarian aid and international climate finance will leave a significant gap; whereas the EU has a responsibility and strategic interest in helping to fill that gap;
S. whereas making global financial flows consistent with a pathway towards a net zero and climate-resilient economy is an essential goal for the green transition, in accordance with Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;
Change 7
ChangedT. whereas the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance’s report of 2021, entitled ‘First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties’, states that national reports submitted by developing country Parties to the UNFCCC demonstrate that the costs for meeting their needs until 2030, in relation to implementing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, cumulatively amount to USD 5.8-5.95,8-5,9 trillion; whereas the UNFCCC’s NCQG on climate finance includes a commitment to scale up finance to the amount of at least USD 1.31,3 trillion per year by 2035;
5 unchanged paragraphs
U. whereas the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative is inspired by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls for a binding international treaty to stop fossil fuel expansion, to phase out existing production and to support a just global transition; whereas only 17 countries have so far endorsed the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, and none of these is an EU Member State;
V. whereas the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change recommends the urgent and full phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies in the EU, in line with existing commitments; whereas the 8th EAP requires the establishment of a clear deadline for ending such subsidies, in line with this climate ambition;
W. whereas children are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including by way of deadly diseases, pollution, food and water insecurity, and extreme weather events; whereas nearly 1 billion children live in 33 countries classified as ‘extremely high-risk’ due to a combination of exposure to climate and environmental hazards and high levels of vulnerability;
X. whereas ambitious multilateral climate frameworks, and the actions aligned with them, serve the strategic interests of the EU and present opportunities for the EU as a global frontrunner in the green transition;
Global stocktake, NDCs and the COP30 in Belém
Change 8
Changed1. Highlights the fact that the outcome of the first global stocktake (GST) at COP28 recognises that pathways limiting global warming to 1.51,5 °C with no or limited overshoot and to 2 °C require a peaking of global GHG emissions by 2025, and that limiting global warming to 1.51,5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions of 43 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035 relative to the 2019 level, reaching net zero GHG emissions by 2050;
2. Takes note of the relative progress made in some areas at COP29 in Baku, especially as regards the NCQG on climate finance, the progress on making the loss and damage fund operational, and the carbon market agreement; regrets, however, the lack of sufficient progress on mitigation;
Change 9
Changed3. Notes with concern that the aggregated emissions reductions from the submitted NDCs fall significantly short of the emission pathways required to respect the Paris Agreement target and the conclusions of the first GST; urges COP30 to reaffirm the commitment to the 1.51,5 °C target and to agree on the need to continue to strengthen ambition, and to take concrete decisions to support the implementation of the NDCs; considers that GSTs should take place more frequently and calls for all parties that are not on track to achieving the Paris Agreement goal to update and strengthen their NDCs every second year, in addition to the five-yearly review cycle;
4. Stresses that a collective effort and further action by all parties is required to close the emissions gap and implement the actions included in the first GST through concrete targets, and to scale up nationally determined action; underlines the particular responsibility of all major emitters, including emerging economies and the G20 countries, to demonstrate leadership, in this regard; calls for the EU and like-minded partners to spearhead a coalition of high ambition and work collaboratively with all parties to secure a successful outcome at COP30;
5. Strongly regrets the decision by the US Government to withdraw, for the second time, from the Paris Agreement; calls for the United States to re-consider its withdrawal, and to contribute its fair share to the global effort to tackle climate change and to global climate finance in line with the Paris Agreement, especially in regard to its responsibility, based on its cumulative past emissions; encourages US states and non-governmental actors to continue to engage in international climate cooperation, including at UN climate change conferences; notes that no other country has followed the United States in withdrawing from the Paris Agreement; underlines the particular responsibility and strategic interest of the EU to provide leadership and restore trust in global climate action, including through measures to prevent any further withdrawals from the Paris Agreement; considers that all aspects of the EU’s external action, including trade policy and development policy, can contribute to these aims;
6. Reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed, and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;
Change 10
Changed7. Recalls that in the first GST, the Parties to the UNFCCC recognised the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.51,5 °C pathways and committed themselves to contributing to the global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and to double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030; remains concerned about the insufficient progress towards these targets; underlines that it is essential that COP30 build on these targets, take concrete decisions on their implementation and undertake additional measures should an ambition gap remain; reaffirms its commitment to deliver on the consensus reached in the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health; takes note of the commitment to contribute to accelerating the development of zero- and low-emission technologies; recalls in this regards point (e) of paragraph 28 of the first GST as adopted at COP28;
8. Recalls that in the first GST, countries committed themselves to accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power and the phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner, with a view to accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050, in keeping with the science; calls on all Parties to step up efforts in this direction and to engage in the development of a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty; expects COP30 to strengthen the commitment to the transition away from fossil fuels and insists on the urgent need for ambitious and time-bound plans to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and fossil fuel production;
Change 11
Changed9. Notes that 2025 is the deadline for countries to submit their NDCs for 2035, which are essential for raising climate ambition, tracking progress and enhancing resilience; considers it essential that the EU lead by example and calls for the EU and all Parties that have not yet done so to respond to the COP28 GST and submit economy-wide absolute, as opposed to relative, emissions reduction targets covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with the 1.51,5 °C goal, as soon as possible and well before COP30; regrets that most parties failed to meet the deadline for submitting their updated NDCs, stresses the importance of respecting all UNFCCC processes and submission deadlines for the good functioning of multilateralism in climate politics;
10. Stresses the importance of granular and transparent reporting to assess progress on the NDCs;
11. Acknowledges progress on the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and emphasises that the use of Article 6 should always result in a guaranteed net benefit for the climate and thus calls on all Parties to ensure that projects accounted towards Article 6 do not deter domestic emission reductions; urges the Supervisory Body and all Parties to stand by the Glasgow Agreement, and hence ensure that all approved Clean Development Mechanism activities comply with Article 6.4 methodologies by the end of 2025 at the latest; calls on the Commission to advocate and support the development of a robust international governance framework for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) at international level that includes binding standards on international carbon credits to guarantee environmental, climate and social integrity, fair sharing of the mitigation benefits, clear implementation rules to ensure transparency, additionality and permanence, strict reporting obligations, and effective oversight mechanisms for all Article 6 projects, in order to eliminate the risk of double-counting and safeguard the environmental integrity of the system; calls for clear rules on liability sharing for monitoring and reversal risks, to avoid undue burdens on host Parties; highlights the need for private carbon market initiatives to implement the highest standards of integrity;
Change 12
Changed12. Calls on all Parties to make meaningful progress at COP30 to ensure that the second GST, beginning in 2026, is guided by the best available science and integrates cross-cutting issues such as gender equality,equity, human rights and ecosystem protection;
4 unchanged paragraphs
International climate finance and sustainable finance
13. Emphasises that the provision of adequate climate finance is crucial for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; recalls that many developing countries’ NDCs are conditional on international climate finance; stresses that, according to various UN reports, the global climate finance gap between what is needed and what is currently provided is large and growing, and that this growing gap stems from a number of factors, all of which should be adequately addressed;
14. Stresses that delayed mobilisation of climate finance will lead to increased costs, rising opportunity costs and diminishing climate returns; notes, in this regard, that the IEA estimates that, for every US dollar not invested in clean energy before 2030, four or five dollars may be needed subsequently to compensate;
15. Stresses that adaptation is underfunded, and that the NCQG does not respond sufficiently to adaptation finance needs; highlights the fact that, while all sources of finance – public and private – are needed, international public finance is needed in particular for responding to adaptation needs and addressing loss and damage;
Change 13
Changed16. Notes that the EU and its Member States provide roughly one third of global public climate finance, making them the largest providers globally, with EUR 28.628,6 billion provided from public sources in 2023 and EUR 7.27,2 billion in private finance also mobilised; reiterates that EU and national budgets should be adapted to meet the agreed NCQG, so that the EU delivers its fair share of international climate finance, including by mobilising private climate finance; considers that the NCQG represents the lower end/boundary for climate finance mobilisation;
30 unchanged paragraphs
17. Recognises that the EU played a significant role in brokering a deal to achieve agreement on the NCQG; calls on all Parties to contribute their fair share towards meeting the NCQG, which should include subgoals for finance for mitigation and adaptation and for loss and damage; calls for the EU and its Member States to scale up new and additional climate finance, through a dedicated and predictable EU public finance mechanism, to be in line with the agreed NCQG; recalls that, in order to achieve the necessary global climate finance levels, a broader contributor base reflecting Parties’ evolving financial capabilities is needed; expects upper-middle income countries with high emissions to contribute their fair share and increase their contributions more than currently is the case; calls on all parties to identify new and innovative sources of public and private finance; calls for Parties, when financing the NCQG, to prioritise instruments and measures that are grant-based and non-debt inducing in order to ensure that the recipient countries are able to implement necessary mitigation and adaptation measures without increasing their debt burden; expresses its concern about the NCQG being met by re-categorising other funds; points also to concerns about the ambiguity around the kinds of funding that contribute to the NCQG, in particular the issue of double-counting;
18. Calls on all actors to ensure that the Baku-to-Belém roadmap provides a clear and actionable plan for mobilising the relevant resources; urges all Parties to foster strong public-private cooperation and mobilise private investment at scale by strengthening regulatory frameworks for accountable and sustainable investment; notes that private investment will have to cover the largest share of the required investment in the global climate transition; stresses the need for the roadmap to include a robust and independent accountability mechanism to ensure transparency and track progress effectively;
19. Notes that many climate-vulnerable countries, including several least-developed countries, are in debt distress or at significant risk of debt distress and that climate finance should therefore be allocated in way that does not exacerbate their debt burden, giving priority to grant-based finance; calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess their options for contributing to alleviating this debt distress and to take relevant action without delay;
20. Stresses that there is consensus across UN bodies that climate finance cannot be scaled up equitably unless the debt crisis is addressed; highlights the importance, in this context, of debt relief instruments;
21. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and international partners to integrate climate microfinance as a core component of climate adaptation and mitigation strategies, by supporting local microfinance institutions to develop and scale up financial products for vulnerable populations, including microcredit for green technologies, micro-insurance against climate risks, and micro-savings for community resilience, with a particular focus on women, young people and rural communities;
22. Stresses the urgent need to simplify, accelerate and adapt climate finance procedures to the realities of developing countries, notably by establishing single-window access points, harmonising application criteria and providing technical assistance for project preparation, to ensure that climate finance is accessible, rapid and effective for local organisations and communities that are most affected by climate change;
23. Considers it essential to make progress at COP30 on the operationalisation of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and to make this a standing point on the COP agendas; calls for the EU to engage in international initiatives such as the Bridgetown Initiative 3.0; calls for swifter reform of the international financial architecture, and calls on all the major international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to assume their role as climate banks and to align their portfolios and lending policies with the Paris Agreement in a way that is financially sustainable in the long term; calls also on domestic and international financial systems to better address the challenges of climate change by removing barriers to accessing climate finance for clean technologies and shifting public and private finance flows away from emission-intensive activities;
24. Considers that the European Investment Bank (EIB) should serve as the Union’s climate bank and takes note therefore of its climate bank roadmap and updated energy lending policy, as well as the additional efforts of the European Investment Fund, as important steps in spearheading climate investment;
Adaptation, loss and damage, and a just transition
25. Underlines the need to step up climate adaptation, resilience and preparedness within the EU and globally to minimise the negative effects of climate change and biodiversity loss and to address this comprehensively at the COPs while emphasising the important role of local and regional authorities in designing and implementing these actions; recognises the importance of global cooperation and the exchange of know-how and of the best available science and of best practices in climate adaptation; stresses that the costs of adaptation will increase with inaction and delayed action, in terms of both mitigation and adaptation;
26. Reiterates its deep concern about the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events in the EU and globally, including wildfires, droughts, heatwaves and floods, and their impact on human health and the increasing loss of lives; notes that sea levels are expected to rise more quickly throughout this century in all the IPCC scenarios, incurring financial costs and causing the loss of coastal areas all around the world;
27. Highlights the need, at COP30, to operationalise the framework for the global goal on adaptation, including through adopting impactful and manageable indicators and robust, comprehensive tracking systems and addressing means of implementation in order to enable effective monitoring of progress towards the adaptation targets set at COP28; points out that, while mitigation finance and implementation have progressed, adaptation efforts continue to lag behind, with a widening gap in both funding and concrete action;
28. Highlights the importance of national adaptation plans and stresses the need to align them with the Baku-to-Belém roadmap; calls on Parties that have not yet done so to put in place their national adaptation plans as soon as possible, and on all Parties to have progressed in implementing them by 2030, and to include a focus on nature-based solutions; calls on all Parties to integrate cross-cutting elements such as gender equality and human rights into their plans;
29. Calls for increased investment in early warning systems and risk management systems in vulnerable regions, highlighting their essential role in protecting lives, safeguarding livelihoods and strengthening resilience to climate risks;
30. Encourages greater support for the collection, sharing and analysis of climate and disaster risk data, as well as the deployment of appropriate technologies for these activities, in order to enhance the availability and quality of information for at-risk populations; recommends that all EU-supported early warning initiatives allocate dedicated resources to ongoing system maintenance and updates, especially in the light of global challenges to science-based observation and procedures;
31. Welcomes the decision at COP28 to establish the loss and damage fund and expects further progress on its implementation and financing; calls on all Parties to ensure transparent rules in this regard; stresses the importance of acknowledging the distinct character of loss and damage by treating it separately from adaptation, including in the GST framework;
32. Calls on all Parties to secure transparent pledges and predictable delivery mechanisms for loss and damage finance, including early disbursements from the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage; calls on all Parties to ensure that resources directed to the fund are in addition to existing contributions to climate finance; strongly believes that loss and damage funding should prioritise grants and be supplementary to, and distinct from, official development assistance;
33. Reiterates its call for loss and damage to be a standing agenda item at COP meetings;
34. Calls on all Parties to advance the Just Transition Work Programme by promoting concrete actions that address inequalities exacerbated by climate change; considers that the work programme should encompass the objectives of decent work creation and a just transition for all, and calls on all Parties to promote social dialogue with employers’ and workers’ organisations and stakeholder engagement as a basis for forging strong social consensus; calls on all Parties to work constructively to reach agreement on further implementation of the work programme, recognising that the means of implementation must be delivered urgently;
35. Stresses that climate change is threatening the fundamental rights and well-being of children and young people; highlights the need to integrate child rights and intergenerational equity into all aspects of climate policy, including adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, and climate finance;
EU climate policy aligned with the Paris Agreement
36. Highlights the fact that the EU’s current climate legislation, if fully implemented, will reduce the EU’s net GHG emissions by around 57 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels; notes that the EU is currently on course to reduce net GHG emissions by only around 54 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, if the Member States fully implement existing and planned national measures and EU policies; calls on the Member States to take the necessary measures to address this gap, and on the Commission to take additional measures to support Member States in that effort; stresses the need for EU climate policy to continue to set ambitious goals, in line with the agreed targets, and to prioritise in its actions cost-effectiveness, the competitiveness of the European economy, social inclusion and a high level of environmental protection;
37. Stresses the importance of respecting the submission deadlines for updates to National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) to allow the Commission to conduct a proper review process; welcomes the Commission’s assessment of the final 2030 NECPs of the Member States that have submitted them; urges the Commission and the Member States to act decisively to close the gap between the NECPs and the EU’s binding targets, including through implementation plans;
38. Underlines the need to adopt a science-based EU climate target for 2040 in accordance with the European Climate Law, considering all the criteria of Article 4(5) thereof, and in keeping with the conclusions of the first GST; recalls the recommendations of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change and notes the Commission’s proposal of a 2040 climate target accompanied by enabling policies; regrets, furthermore, that the Council was not able to agree on an NDC for 2035 before the deadline of 23 September 2025; urges the Council to agree on an NDC that is at the upper end of the indicated range as soon as possible;
39. Recalls the need for the EU to remain a leader in international climate negotiations and climate action to contribute to a global level playing field and avoid the risk of carbon leakage for European companies, as well as to maintain public support for climate action and avoid carbon leakage;
40. Underlines the role of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC), as established by the European Climate Law; calls on the Commission to provide justification, in impact assessment reports or other publicly accessible documents, of deviations from the ESABCC’s advice and to address the policy trade-offs; calls on the Commission, moreover, to safeguard sufficient funding for the ESABCC in upcoming budgetary proposals to enable it to fulfil its legal mandate;
41. Reiterates the need to integrate climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures transposing them and underlines that Article 6(2) and 6(4) of the European Climate Law obliges the Commission to assess whether all current measures, draft measures and legislative proposals, including budgetary proposals, are consistent with the EU’s climate targets; recalls that, according to the European Climate Law, the EU’s and the Member States’ actions should be guided by the precautionary and the ‘polluter pays’ principles established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and should also take into account the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle of the Energy union and the ‘do no harm’ principle;
42. Underlines that effective access to justice in environmental matters, in line with the Aarhus Convention, is critical to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; believes that the EU and the Member States should lead by example and apply the findings and recommendations of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, while respecting their own international commitments under the Aarhus Convention and the rule of law;
43. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that the national energy and climate plans and long-term strategies of the Member States include sufficient action and financial means to achieve EU targets for 2030 and beyond; calls on the Member States to increase their efforts to ensure that the EU meets its 2030 targets;
44. Points out that, at a time of rising geopolitical instability and volatile energy markets, decarbonisation is a powerful driver of strategic autonomy and economic competitiveness for the EU; recalls that this is acknowledged in the Clean Industrial Deal and its objective to bring climate action and competitiveness together in one overarching strategy;
Change 14
Changed45. Notes with concern that fossil fuel subsidies rose in recent years, with fossil fuel consumption subsidies totalling USD 620 billion globally in 2023 and a substantial share of subsidies observed in emerging and developing economies; regrets that fossil energy subsidies in the EU remained high, at EUR 111 billion in 2023, despite a decrease from 2022 levels; recalls that subsidies for imported fossil energy place a burden on European economies and distort incentives for clean energy transitions; underlines the importance of reducing subsidies for the most polluting fuels at international level and of transparent reporting of those subsidies; reiterates the need for the Commission and the Member States to implement the requirement in the 8th EAP to ‘set a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1.51,5 °C’; regrets the lack of progress since the programme’s adoption in 2022, and calls on the Commission to put forward its roadmap to further reduce and phase out fossil fuel subsidies, in line with the EU’s climate commitments;
46. Stresses that the current geopolitical context underscores the urgent need to end the EU’s fossil fuel dependence and accelerate the energy transition; welcomes progress under REPowerEU and calls for the EU and the Member States to act faster;
47. Looks forward to the upcoming EU climate adaptation plan, including legislative action, as appropriate, to ensure coordinated the EU’s preparedness to confront increasing climate risks;
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Cite as
European Parliament (2025). “Changes between B-10-2025-0445 and TA-10-2025-0254”. Text, 23 October 2025. from B-10-2025-0445, to TA-10-2025-0254, reference 2025/2666(RSP). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/B-10-2025-0445/compare/TA-10-2025-0254?all=1&part=2 (retrieved 29 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-10-23,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between B-10-2025-0445 and TA-10-2025-0254}},
year = {2025},
date = {2025-10-23},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/B-10-2025-0445/compare/TA-10-2025-0254?all=1&part=2}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/B-10-2025-0445/compare/TA-10-2025-0254?all=1&part=2},
urldate = {2026-09-29},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from B-10-2025-0445, to TA-10-2025-0254, reference 2025/2666(RSP). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}