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Changes from resolution motion to resolution motion joint

B-10-2025-0326 → RC-10-2025-0324

From
B-10-2025-0326 resolution motion of 7 Jul 2025
To
RC-10-2025-0324 resolution motion joint of 9 Jul 2025
Changes
Not comparable
Paragraphs
+37 added · −52 removed · 3 changed
More facts (2)
Title (from)
on tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions
Title (to)
on tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions

These two texts have too little in common to be compared paragraph by paragraph (under 15 % of their paragraphs match): they are different documents rather than versions of one — for example a group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted.

Every difference

The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.

Part 2 of 2: Paragraphs 61–96

RemovedS. whereas existing EU trade agreements and strategic partnerships on raw materials often lack sufficient binding commitments to ensure high environmental, social and governance standards, and have not yet proven effective in fostering genuine value addition or green industrialisation in partner countries;

Added7. Expresses deep concern over the requirements, imposed by Chinese authorities, that applicants must disclose sensitive data when applying for export permits, and over the considerable risk of technology leaks associated with this as regards the defence industrial base value chain and national security secrets, stressing that this may be used for future coercion; considers it essential for the Commission and the Member States to assess and mitigate the security implications of such data transfers, in line with the European economic security strategy;

RemovedT. whereas the reliance on voluntary schemes for corporate social and environmental responsibility has proven insufficient to guarantee respect for human rights and environmental protection;

Added8. Urges the Commission and the Member States to accelerate the implementation of the CRMA; stresses the important role of the European Raw Materials Board and its sub-groups for the rapid and efficient implementation of the CRMA; recalls the clear and ambitious targets set to reinforce EU capacities to extract, process and recycle SRMs domestically by 2030; highlights the selection of the first 60 strategic projects under the CRMA;

RemovedU. whereas foreign direct investment in raw materials sectors has a poor track record, often leading to low revenues for host governments, limited technology transfer, human rights abuses and the displacement of communities;

Added9. Regrets the fact that the CRMA was not accompanied by a dedicated EU budget, despite the lack of funding being the main bottleneck; stresses the urgent need to secure investments in the strategic projects approved under the CRMA and in other projects to boost extraction, refining, processing and recycling that contribute to de-risking from China and to achieving the CRMA benchmarks; urges the Commission to dedicate further EU-level support to the diversification of the REE and CRM supply, and to guarantee that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework will include a budget line to foster investment in extraction, processing, circularity, research and innovation, including for the substitution of CRMs;

RemovedV. whereas trade agreements, such as the EU-Chile free trade agreement, have been criticised for limiting partner countries’ ability to secure domestic supplies of critical minerals and to implement policies that foster local industrial development;

Added10. Underlines the need for the EU to mine domestically and re-establish processing capacity; underlines that increasing the efficiency of resource use through technological innovation is one of the objectives of the CRMA; emphasises the potential of recycling and urban mining to alleviate supply constraints in the short term and asks the Commission to take immediate measures to improve the collection and retention of REEs in the internal market;

RemovedW. whereas a truly just energy transition requires a fundamental shift in the EU’s approach to raw materials, prioritising reduced consumption, increased circularity and equitable partnerships that benefit all parties and the planet;

Added11. Underlines the need to ensure the long-term business case for and the viability of investments in CRM value chains, including through financial support such as price floors, offtake support and strategic stockpiling; calls on the Member States to request that large companies producing technologies in strategic sectors duly and regularly carry out risk-preparedness activities and measures to mitigate supply shortages, including via stockpiling;

Removed1. Calls for the EU and China to use the upcoming summit as an opportunity to ease trade tensions and to jointly revive multilateralism by advocating global trade rules, guided by the principles of solidarity, cooperation, sustainability and democracy;

Added12. Calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to assess the minimum level for the EU of strategic stocks of REEs listed as SRMs (neodymium, praseodymium, terbium, dysprosium, gadolinium, samarium and cerium) and the corresponding end-use applications, including those linked to the defence industry;

Removed2. Insists that the EU must not follow the Trump administration’s calls to confront China or to decouple its supply chains from it;

Added13. Calls, furthermore, for stronger engagement to conclude clean trade and investment partnerships (CTIPs) and bilateral strategic partnerships on raw materials that are based on true win-win partnerships and meet high sustainability and human rights standards; insists on the need to move towards binding agreements on CRMs to ensure the long-term security of the EU’s supplies, guarantee more transparency and ensure that Parliament has scrutiny powers; underlines the importance of free trade agreements and the Global Gateway initiative in enhancing access to CRMs;

Removed3. Recalls that export restrictions can be a legitimate policy tool for sovereign states to ensure the sustainable management of their natural resources, promote domestic processing, generate revenue, and protect their environment;

Added14. Encourages the use of preference clauses for sourcing REEs from EU suppliers and trusted partners in relevant procurement legislation; calls for greater coordination with like-minded international partners, particularly within the G7 and NATO frameworks and with the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security, in order to improve knowledge transfer, align supply chain security, joint investments and stockpiling strategies, and develop trusted-source standards for strategic sectors and projects;

Removed4. Rejects rivalry and bloc-building, which risk empowering authoritarian and ultranationalist forces, heightening geopolitical tensions and increasing competition for critical raw materials;

Added15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of the People’s Republic of China.

Removed5. Rejects current trade agreements as the primary solution for securing raw materials, as they reinforce neo-extractivism and lock developing countries into the role of raw materials exporters;

Removed6. Highlights that EU trade agreements, by pushing for liberalisation and restricting export taxes or dual-pricing policies, limit developing countries’ policy space to pursue their own industrialisation and value addition strategies; insists that any new agreements explicitly support value addition in partner countries, prioritising processing and recycling projects over extractive ones, and that they include incentives for domestic procurement and local processing of mined critical raw materials;

Removed7. Asserts that the EU’s historical approach, driven by business interests seeking cheap access to raw materials, has contributed to a ‘race to the bottom’ rather than fostering sustainable development; calls for the EU to develop a new type of sustainable trade and investment agreement for the clean transition that sets a ‘new gold standard’ by securing enforceable labour and environmental commitments, effective regulatory cooperation, and strong financing capacity to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes;

Removed8. Emphasises that trade agreements and strategic partnerships should facilitate, not hinder, the global circular economy by promoting international cooperation to establish a global market for secondary raw materials, including reviewing existing trade rules and waste directives to support this objective;

Removed9. Calls for a fundamental re-evaluation of the EU’s consumption patterns and a strong commitment to more sufficiency; insists that reducing the EU’s overall consumption of minerals and shifting towards a low-resource economic model must be at the heart of its raw materials strategy;

Removed10. Proposes a binding target to reduce Europe’s demand for primary raw materials by at least 10 % by 2030, by promoting efficiency, circularity and avoidance of use; demands that industrialised countries like the EU bear the main responsibility for reducing their consumption of raw materials;

Removed11. Demands significant investment in, and prioritisation of, circular economy principles domestically; calls for greater EU investment in research and innovation to develop new materials, enable substitution, and improve the recycling and reuse of critical raw materials;

Removed12. Calls for the promotion of a fair, industrialised circular economy at EU level, with clear eco-design standards to ensure that products are fit for reuse, repair and recycling;

Removed13. Emphasises the need to create new economic and business models that support the growth of recycling activities, recognising their potential for job creation;

Removed14. Insists on a review of the current export of waste outside Europe to ensure full implementation of the circular economy and secondary raw material production within the EU;

Removed15. Insists that any external sourcing of raw materials must adhere to the highest international social, environmental and governance standards and calls for strategic partnerships to include clear, specific and binding measures for mandatory due diligence on environmental, social and human rights impacts for companies involved in the supply chain;

Removed16. Emphasises the need to respect ‘no-go zones,’ including protected areas, the deep sea and sacred sites, and to enforce regulations on conflict minerals and minerals extracted through forced or child labour;

Removed17. Insists on robust and effective transparency measures, including public availability of all negotiation reports, memoranda of understanding, roadmaps, and impact assessments related to strategic partnerships on raw materials;

Removed18. Requires that financial support mechanisms, such as the Global Gateway and export credit agencies, be fully transparent, inclusive and aligned with development policy objectives and communities’ needs; stresses that companies with a history of human rights abuses or environmental destruction must be excluded from participating in strategic projects;

Removed19. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to actively engage in the negotiations for the United Nations Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights and support provisions to strengthen access to justice and remedy for victims of corporate-related human rights abuses;

Removed20. Calls for strategic partnerships to support producer countries’ own green transition through specific, tailored language on value addition, including support for the domestic energy transition and green industrialisation, and the sharing of knowledge, technology, patents and capital;

Removed21. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to uphold these principles in all their engagements concerning critical raw materials, ensuring that the EU’s green transition responds to the urgent need for a just global energy transition rather than replicating past colonial mistakes;

Removed22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
28 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2025). “Changes between B-10-2025-0326 and RC-10-2025-0324”. Text, 9 July 2025. from B-10-2025-0326, to RC-10-2025-0324. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/B-10-2025-0326/compare/RC-10-2025-0324?all=1&part=2 (retrieved 28 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-07-09,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between B-10-2025-0326 and RC-10-2025-0324}},
  year = {2025},
  date = {2025-07-09},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/B-10-2025-0326/compare/RC-10-2025-0324?all=1&part=2}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/B-10-2025-0326/compare/RC-10-2025-0324?all=1&part=2},
  urldate = {2026-09-28},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from B-10-2025-0326, to RC-10-2025-0324. Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}