Changes from resolution motion to resolution motion joint

RemovedB100326/2025

European Parliament resolution on tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions

(2025/2800(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Removed– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (Critical Raw Materials Act),

Added– having regard to its previous resolutions on China,

Removed– having regard to the strategic partnerships on raw materials signed by the EU with Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Greenland, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Norway, Rwanda, Serbia, Ukraine and Zambia,

Added– having regard to the upcoming EU-China summit planned for 24 and 25 July 2025,

Changed– having regard to DirectiveRegulation (EU) 2024/17602024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 1311 JuneApril 2024 onestablishing corporatea sustainabilityframework duefor diligenceensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending DirectiveRegulations (EU) 2019/1937No and168/2013, Regulation(EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2023/2859,2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020, also known as the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA),

Removed– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on Shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims,

Added– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724(Net-Zero Industry Act),

Removed– having regard to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials 2025,

Added– having regard to the G7 Leaders’ statement on the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan,

Removed– having regard to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Safety and Health in Mines Convention (No176) of 1995,

Added– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

Removed– having regard to the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No 169) of 1989,

Added– having regard to the clean trade and investment partnerships being negotiated by the EU, and to the EU’s critical raw material partnerships,

Changed– having regard to the statementsjoint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020), and to the speeches about de-risking given by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the G7European summitPolicy inCentre Kananaskis,on Alberta30 fromMarch 162023 toand 17in JuneParliament 2025,on 18 April 2023,

Added– having regard to the 13th EU-China Strategic Dialogue, held between the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, in Brussels on 2 July 2025,

Added– having regard to the statements made by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the G7 summit held in Kananaskis, Canada from 16 to 17 June 2025,

Added– having regard to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, in particular the principles of non-discrimination and of transparency regarding export restrictions,

Added– having regard to WTO dispute settlement rulings DS431, DS432 and DS433 on China’s rare earth export restrictions,

– having regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,

Changed– having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Change 1

RemovedA. whereas critical raw materials are essential for the EU’s technological and green transition goals, playing a vital role in industries such as renewable energy, electronics and electric vehicles;

AddedA. whereas on 4 April 2025, China started to enact export restrictions on 7 of the 17 rare earth elements (REEs) and on permanent magnets produced from these, introducing a system for non-automatic licences, and cited dual-use and security considerations as justification; whereas the list of items covered by the restrictions includes medium and heavy REEs (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium);

RemovedB. whereas the International Energy Agency estimates that China accounts for approximately 61 % of rare earth production and 92 % of their processing;

AddedB. whereas critical raw materials are essential inputs for a wide array of industrial products and processes, including in critical sectors such as clean technologies, digital technologies, healthcare and defence; whereas a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials is fundamental to achieving the Union’s climate, digital, competitiveness and defence objectives;

RemovedC. whereas the EU depends on China for over 90 % of its supply of rare earths; whereas any meaningful reduction in this dependency might take three to four years;

AddedC. whereas export volumes have reportedly decreased by as much as 80 %, having a heavy impact on a wide range of sectors, including electronics and consumer tech, green energy and renewables, the automotive industry, aerospace and healthcare;

RemovedD. whereas China is the EU’s second largest trading partner for goods after the United States, with bilateral trade reaching EUR 739 billion in 2023; whereas the European Union’s stated goal of de-risking from China has led to a number of adjustments in European economic governance;

AddedD. whereas the EU’s dependence on China for critical raw materials has continued to grow or, at best, remains stubbornly high; whereas the global REE supply chain is heavily concentrated in China, which has control of around 75 % of mining output and of 85 % of processing capacity, reaching more than 95 % in the case of some REEs such as terbium, yttrium and dysprosium; whereas the EU remains overly reliant on non-EU countries for the supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) and is almost entirely dependent on China for the supply of heavy REEs; whereas the EU covers 98% of its demand for permanent magnets, and 92 % of its demand for NdFeB magnets, with imports from China;

RemovedE. whereas on 4 April 2025, in response to US President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products, China’s Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs issued Announcement 18, imposing export restrictions on seven of the 17 rare earth elements, permanent magnets, and other finished products;

AddedE. whereas China has significantly expanded its dominance in the global mining, processing and refining of CRMs and intermediate products, creating strategic dependences along key value chains, , which have, at times, been deliberately leveraged through restrictive trade measures; whereas China first restricted the export of REEs in 2010 over a territorial dispute with Japan, and this restriction was declared incompatible with WTO rules by the Appellate Body; whereas China has also applied extensive restrictions on the export of raw minerals classified as strategic and/or critical by the EU, including gallium and germanium since 1 August 2023, graphite since December 2023, antimony products since 15 September 2024, tungsten and bismuth since 4 February 2025, and scandium since 17 April 2025;

RemovedF. whereas these export restrictions affect global supply chains and demonstrate China’s ability to leverage its dominance in critical mineral processing;

AddedF. whereas the implementation of these export restrictions has already started to cause severe disruptions to industry in the EU, including the automotive industry, with as many as 17 assembly lines experiencing temporary shutdowns in May 2025; whereas a wide array of sectors could face disruption, such as healthcare, space and defence – including fighter jets, frigates, drones and precision-guided weapons systems – wind turbines and batteries, as could the green and digital transitions more generally;

RemovedG. whereas the number of export restrictions on industrial raw materials globally increased more than fivefold between 2009 and 2023; whereas China accounted for 21 % of new export restrictions in 2023;

AddedG. whereas China’s licensing procedure requires applicants to disclose sensitive information to the Chinese authorities, which breaches economic secrecy; whereas China’s updated export control framework of December 2024 gives greater discretionary powers to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the State Council and the Central Military Commission to subject items not formally listed as dual-use goods to export controls; whereas these new regulations include measures with extraterritorial applications;

RemovedH. whereas the EU has formally challenged China at the World Trade Organization regarding its export restrictions on rare earth elements and other critical raw materials;

AddedH. whereas the EU applies export controls to certain types of critical and advanced materials, but these controls are clearly focused on material types, with precise technical parameters relating to their use in specific military applications, do not affect trade in commercial non-sensitive products and account for only a small share of total exports of the materials in question;

RemovedI. whereas the EU has introduced tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and has decided to exclude Chinese companies from EU government purchases of medical devices valued at over EUR 5 million; whereas China introduced anti-dumping tariffs on brandy imports from the EU;

AddedI. whereas China has deliberately pursued a strategy of undercutting global market prices while keeping its domestic market closed, generally to the benefit of state-owned enterprises, and couples this with huge subsidy schemes, leading to significant distortions in global competition and jeopardising recent efforts by the EU and the Member States to keep the EU’s remaining mining sectors afloat;

RemovedJ. whereas China’s Commerce Ministry has undertaken to speed up the approval of rare earth export licences for EU firms;

AddedJ. whereas the EU adopted the CRMA in April 2024 as the starting point of efforts towards improving the resilience and autonomy of the EU’s supply of CRMs and strategic raw materials (SRMs); whereas the CRMA addresses both the supply side and the demand side, including through production targets, through resource efficiency aimed at moderating consumption, and through the substitution of SRMs; whereas circularity is at the core of the CRMA, which aims to cover 25 % of the Union’s SRM needs through recycling by 2030 and has the objective of recycling substantially larger amounts of each SRM from waste, including for permanent magnets;

RemovedK. whereas an EU-China summit will take place in China in July, marking 50 years of bilateral diplomatic relations;

AddedK. whereas the upcoming EU-China summit is an opportunity to engage in dialogue while continuing to stand strong against coercion;

RemovedL. whereas the EU consumes 25-30 % of the metals produced globally and its consumption levels are significantly higher than in Latin America, Asia and Africa;

AddedL. whereas China still has sanctions in place against a former MEP, members of Member State parliaments and European think tanks;

RemovedM. whereas the EU itself has acknowledged that export restrictions can be justified for development objectives, environmental protection, or to ensure the sustainable exploitation of natural resources;

Added1. Strongly condemns China’s decision to enact REE export restrictions, which has halted exports and significantly disrupted supply chains vital for the automotive industry, defence manufacturers, semiconductor companies, green technologies, healthcare applications and many other sectors in the EU and across the world; considers that China’s action is unjustified and has a coercive intent, building on the enormous leverage its quasi-monopolistic position on the global market provides;

RemovedN. whereas many developing countries have successfully used such policies, as seen in Kenya’s leather industry, which benefited from a 40 % export duty on raw hides and skins, creating thousands of jobs and boosting incomes;

Added2. Believes that China is using these export restrictions to strengthen its negotiating position; stresses that the EU must firmly reject any attempts by China to use these restrictions to force concessions on other ongoing trade irritants, and believes that any concessions to China in this respect would harm the EU’s ability to protect itself from current and future coercion;

RemovedO. whereas the current high dependence of the EU on external sources for critical raw materials is largely a result of the EU’s own lack of strategic foresight and an unsustainable consumption model, rather than solely the actions of other countries;

Added3. Underlines the importance of expressing concern regarding China’s export restrictions on REEs and the broader implications of these restrictions for global supply chains at the upcoming EU-China summit; is convinced that export controls should be part of a multilateral approach designed to protect international security and ensure a global level playing field, insists that unilateral controls must be limited to those made strictly necessary by national security considerations, with transparent and clearly defined rules, and therefore stresses that making China’s actions run counter to multilateral rules and practices, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to take a firm and unified stance, engage with China to find a structural solution and continue dialogue with China in this regard;

RemovedP. whereas the pursuit of critical raw materials for the green transition must not replicate historical patterns of ‘green colonialism’ or ‘new resource grabs’ that disproportionately impact the Global South;

Added4. Urges the Chinese authorities to follow up tangibly on their proposal and fully lift the export restrictions; takes note, in the meantime, of the recent proposal by the Chinese authorities to establish so-called ‘green lanes’ aimed at simplifying procedures for European companies;

RemovedQ. whereas the current EU approach, often driven by European businesses seeking cheap access to raw materials, risks hindering the economic prospects of developing countries by reinforcing their dependence on unprocessed raw material exports and limiting their policy space for industrialisation;

Added5. Stresses the urgent need for the EU to enhance its strategic leverage and indispensability by identifying, operationalising and strengthening areas in which it holds critical advantages over China in essential goods and technologies, with the objective of strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy, or by limiting access to the EU internal market for high-risk Chinese vendors in accordance with EU and international trade law;

RemovedR. whereas the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act designates strategic projects to increase EU capacity to extract, process and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify EU supplies from non-EU countries;

Added6. Considers China’s measures to be an unjustified weaponisation of its CRM supply lines, rendering it an untrustworthy source of input for critical sectors and a threat to the Union’s economic and essential security interests;