Changes from resolution motion to resolution motion joint

RemovedB100179/2024

European Parliament resolution on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud

(2024/2933(RSP))

The European Parliament,

Changed– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular its resolutionthat of 9 October 2024 on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part,

Changed– having regard to the joint statement byof thepreliminary Chairfindings and conclusions of the Committeeinternational onelection Foreignobservation Affairs,mission the(I-EOM) Chairled ofby the DelegationOrganization for relationsSecurity withand theCo-operation Southin CaucasusEurope’s andOffice thefor ChairDemocratic ofInstitutions theand DelegationHuman toRights (OSCE-ODIHR) on the Euronestparliamentary Parliamentaryelections Assemblyheld ofin 28Georgia on 26 October 2024 onand to the parliamentarystatement electionsby inthe Georgia,Head of the European Parliament’s election observation delegation,

Changed– having regard to the statement by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, of 27 October 2024, the joint statementStatement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and the European Commission of 2729 October 2024 on the Parliamentarylatest developments following the parliamentary elections in GeorgiaGeorgia, and to the joint statement by the High Representative,Representative Josepand Borrell,the Commission of 2927 October 2024 on the latest developments following the Parliamentaryparliamentary elections in Georgia,

Removed– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024, 27 June 2024 and 14 and 15 December 2023 and to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690) and the accompanying 2024 Georgia report,

– having regard to the joint statement by Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland on the situation in Georgia of 7 November 2024,

Changed– having regard to the joint statement by the Chair of EUthe ministersCommittee on theForeign electionsAffairs, inthe GeorgiaChair of 28the OctoberDelegation 2024for andrelations towith the jointSouth statementCaucasus byand the FriendsChair of Georgia groupthe ofDelegation 6to Novemberthe 2024Euronest onParliamentary anAssembly ‘internationalof inquiry28 commissionOctober to2024 investigateon irregularitiesthe ofparliamentary elections in Georgia’,Georgia,

Removed– having regard to the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024 and to the statement by the Head of the European Parliament’s election observation delegation,

Added– having regard to the joint statement of EU ministers of 28 October 2024 on the elections in Georgia,

Changed– having regard to the Preliminary Statement on the 2024 Georgia Parliamentary Elections of 27 Octoberjoint 2024statement by the InternationalFriends Republicanof InstituteGeorgia, andwhich therepresents preliminaryEuropean statementparliaments, of 276 OctoberNovember 2024 by the National Democraticentitled Institute‘On international election observerinquiry delegationcommission to Georgia’sinvestigate 26irregularities Octoberof 2024elections parliamentaryin elections,Georgia’,

Removed– having regard to the Transparency International interim report entitled ‘Misuse of Administrative Resources in Parliamentary Elections 2024’ of 21 October 2024, the summary statement on Georgia’s parliamentary election on 26 October 2024 by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) and to the final joint assessment by three independent Georgian domestic election observation missions led by ISFED, MyVote and the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA),

Added– having regard to Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country, granted by the European Council at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023,

Changed– having regard to the ConstitutionCommission ofcommunication Georgia,of and30 inOctober particular2024 Articleentitled 78‘2024 thereofCommunication on integrationEU intoenlargement Europeanpolicy’ and(COM(2024)0690), Euro-Atlanticwhich structures,includes the first progress report on Georgia,

Changed– having regard to RuleRules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

Change 1

RemovedA. whereas parliamentary elections were held in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas numerous credible reports of violations cast doubt on the election results, leading many people both within and outside Georgia to question their legitimacy and to refuse to recognise the results;

AddedA. whereas parliamentary elections were held in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas the months leading up to the elections were characterised by significant attacks on democracy in Georgia, such as the hasty adoption of anti-democratic legislation criticised by the United Nations, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), and the EU; whereas the pre-election period failed to meet democratic standards due to actions by the ruling Georgian Dream party and the authorities that fostered a climate of fear, including through the arrest, home raids and intimidation of opposition politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, researchers and other persons critical of the government, and violence committed against them;

RemovedB. whereas the pre-election period failed to meet democratic standards due to actions by the ruling Georgian Dream party and the authorities that fostered a climate of fear, including through the arrest, home raids and intimidation of opposition politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, researchers and other persons critical of the government, and violence committed against them; whereas this also included the failure to investigate the violence committed against civil society and opposition figures, and the introduction of laws on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and the protection of minors’, which limited the capacity of civil society and media organisations to operate freely, curtailed freedom of expression and stigmatised minorities; whereas these measures collectively had a detrimental effect on political discourse and diverted resources away from essential election monitoring activities;

B. whereas, during the campaign, the ruling Georgian Dream party exploited Georgian society’s natural fear of war by reiterating that it was the ‘party of peace’, claiming that the opposition would supposedly drag the country into war with Russia under orders from the West, conspiratorially referred to as the ‘Global War Party’; whereas leaders of the Russian Federation and its propagandists openly supported Georgian Dream both before and after the elections; whereas the top leaders of the ruling party made public statements during the campaign expressing their intent to ban key opposition parties following the elections, raising concerns about the fairness and inclusivity of the political process;

Change 2

RemovedD. whereas the ruling party’s influence over a polarised media environment restricted access to unbiased information for the electorate, while targeted attacks on independent media further hindered balanced coverage; whereas disinformation narratives were disseminated and amplified by ruling party officials in the run-up to the elections; whereas at least two foreign journalists were denied entry to Georgia, where they intended to cover the elections;

AddedC. whereas Georgia’s 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections offered a choice of candidates but were marred by serious irregularities, documented reports of vote manipulation and the suppression of voter freedoms, particularly through vote buying, observer harassment, removal of media from polling stations, intimidation of voters inside and outside of polling stations, tracking of voters and confiscation of identity documents in rural areas, which were then handed to loyal activists of the ruling party to vote, organised transportation of voters, hate speech, insufficient polling access for Georgian citizens abroad, and improbable differences in female and male voter turnout in rural precincts; whereas public sector employees and recipients of social benefits faced pressure to support the ruling party;

RemovedE. whereas Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), despite appeals and lawsuits from citizens, civil society organisations and the President of Georgia, failed to take the action necessary to provide sufficient polling access for Georgian citizens abroad, thereby compromising the inclusivity and accessibility of the electoral process;

AddedD. whereas international observers noted deepening political divisions and a significant imbalance in the allocation of financial resources, as well as the many advantages enjoyed by the ruling party, making an already uneven playing field even more uneven; whereas the effectiveness of the financial oversight of the campaign was undermined by limited enforcement and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalisation of the oversight body;

RemovedF. whereas independent third-party fact checkers, as well as dedicated research organisations, documented and reported on multiple cases of electoral disinformation, as well as Russia’s information manipulation in the campaign, such as, but not restricted to, public statements made by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service;

AddedE. whereas Georgia’s parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 marked the country’s first full use of a proportional system, with electronic devices for voter identification and vote counting; whereas these technologies raised concerns over transparency, voter secrecy and a lack of independent verification​;

RemovedG. whereas the joint observation mission of the OSCE-ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly noted that the campaign was competitive but subdued, with language and imagery that were highly divisive, creating an atmosphere of tension and division among the electorate; whereas the OSCE-ODIHR-led observation mission also noted that reports of pressure on voters, particularly on public sector employees, remained widespread in the campaign and that this, coupled with extensive tracking of voters on election day, raised concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution;

AddedF. whereas recent amendments to the Electoral Code, including the removal of gender quotas, changed the composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and, along with the enactment of the ‘law on transparency of foreign influence’, have restricted fundamental freedoms, stigmatised civil society organisations and undermined the integrity of Georgia’s democratic institutions;

RemovedH. whereas international and local observers documented systemic, organised violations during the elections, including violence, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, multiple voting, large-scale breaches of voter secrecy, voter coercion, undue pressure and intimidation of voters, particularly among public sector employees and other vulnerable groups, voting fraud, including the confiscation of state workers’ identity cards, which were then handed to loyal activists to use for voting, hate speech, systematic observer obstruction, organised transportation of voters and improbable deviation in female and male voter turnout as well as in rural precincts;

AddedG. whereas respected Georgian independent election observation missions concluded that a combination of pre-election coercion, election day manipulation and restricted observer access meant that the elections did not reflect the true will of the Georgian people; whereas a system of identity card confiscations, data gathering and unauthorised presence created a coercive environment, reinforcing the complicity of state actors in facilitating electoral fraud; whereas the principle of voter secrecy was widely violated on election day; whereas the elections were rigged through a combination of voter intimidation, obstruction of observation, and manipulation of voter procedures, and cannot be considered as free and fair;

RemovedI. whereas, on election day, observers noted a lack of intervention by the election administration and law enforcement, which reinforced the appearance of complicity by state actors in facilitating electoral fraud;

AddedH. whereas widespread anomalies in voter turnout and party vote shares for the ruling party were consistent with many reports of electoral malpractice;

RemovedJ. whereas the final joint assessment by three independent Georgian domestic election observation missions – International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), MyVote and Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) – concluded that the outcome of the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections could not be seen as truly reflecting the preferences of Georgian voters nor be considered free and fair;

AddedI. whereas almost all the polls before the election suggested that Georgian Dream would fall short of a majority; whereas the discrepancy between pre-election polling and the election results reported by the CEC cannot be explained by a statistical margin of error;

RemovedK. whereas Georgian non-governmental organisations observing the elections claimed that there had been widespread violations of voter secrecy and called for the annulment of the results in all districts where electronic voting had been used; whereas Georgian civil society organisations filed court complaints and called for investigations into electoral fraud, but investigative bodies often did not initiate inquiries and the courts did not properly examine the reported violations; whereas the My Vote Coalition, a leading electoral watchdog, filed appeals to annul the election results in 245 precincts, representing over 415 000 voters citing breaches of voter secrecy, harassment of observers, procedural irregularities and restrictions to observation, but all these appeals were ultimately rejected by the courts; whereas the CEC has so far refused to publish the audit commissioned on the electronic voting system, and certified the results of the elections on 16 November 2024 notwithstanding the above-mentioned irregularities;

AddedJ. whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, publicly condemned the elections as rigged, refused to recognise the validity of the result, and called for an international investigation and fresh elections; whereas the President asserted that acknowledging the outcome would be tantamount to ‘accepting Georgia’s subjugation to Russia’ and described the election process as a ‘Russian special operation’; whereas the four opposition coalitions that surpassed the electoral threshold rejected the election results and refused to legitimise the resulting parliament; whereas four opposition blocs – the United National Movement, the Strong Georgia Coalition, the Coalition for Change and Gakharia for Georgia – turned down their parliamentary mandates and refused to join the 11th convocation of parliament, arguing that the parliamentary elections of 26 October were illegitimate; whereas on 13 November 2024, repeating statements he made in August, Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze iterated plans to constitutionally ban major opposition parties if they refuse to accept their parliamentary mandates; whereas Georgia thus finds itself in a constitutional crisis;

RemovedL. whereas legal action by Georgian civil society organisations was followed by punitive measures by the authorities against civil society representatives, including unwarranted summons for questioning and heavy fines for speaking out about electoral fraud;

AddedK. whereas the new parliament was convened on 25 November 2024 without the participation of opposition members; whereas President Salome Zourabichvili stated in reference to the inaugural session of parliament that ‘today the parliament of Georgia no longer exists’ as Georgian Dream has ‘trampled the constitution’;

RemovedM. whereas the four opposition coalitions that surpassed the electoral threshold rejected the election results and refused to legitimise the resulting parliament; whereas three opposition blocs – the United National Movement, the Strong Georgia Coalition and the Coalition for Change – turned down their parliamentary mandates and refused to join the 11th convocation of parliament, arguing that the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections were illegitimate;

AddedL. whereas, in his statement after the elections, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) recalled that the international observers had not declared the elections free and fair, asked for a transparent inquiry and investigation into the irregularities and the pressuring and intimidation of voters, and highlighted the need to reverse the trend of democratic backsliding in Georgia;

RemovedN. whereas Georgia’s President, Salome Zourabichvili, refused to recognise the validity of the results, citing profound irregularities and abuses that undermined the credibility of the electoral process and compromised the fundamental right of citizens to a free and fair election, and called for fresh elections; whereas Georgia thus finds itself in a constitutional crisis; whereas this crisis is unfolding ahead of the January 2025 presidential election, which will be the first to take place under reformed constitutional rules whereby the president is elected by parliamentary and regional representatives;

RemovedO. whereas the Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, has again subsequently threatened the main opposition parties with a constitutional ban if they refuse to accept their parliamentary mandates;

RemovedP. whereas on 16 November 2024, despite numerous complaints and calls by independent election observers for the results to be annulled, Georgia’s Central Election Commission announced the final summary protocol of the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections, attributing victory to the ruling Georgian Dream party with 54 % of the vote;

RemovedQ. whereas systematic and organised electoral violations have sparked massive and ongoing protests in several Georgian cities; whereas several demonstrators have been arrested, and whereas Georgia has a record of violence against peaceful demonstrators;

M. whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, travelled to Tbilisi to congratulate the Georgian Dream party before the final election results were published and without first consulting other EU leaders, and was the only EU leader to do so;

Change 3

AddedN. whereas Georgian civil society organisations filed court complaints and called for investigations into electoral fraud, though in many cases investigative bodies did not initiate inquiries and did not properly examine the violations; whereas the CEC has so far refused to publish the commissioned audit on the electronic voting system, and has certified the results of the elections, notwithstanding the above-mentioned irregularities;

AddedO. whereas legal action by Georgian civil society organisations was followed by punitive measures by the authorities against civil society representatives, including unwarranted summons for questioning and heavy fines for speaking out about election fraud;

AddedP. whereas Georgian courts have continued to fast-track and dismiss, en masse, lawsuits brought by opposition political parties and local observers alleging voting irregularities, while rejecting motions to summon witnesses and motions that would oblige the CEC to hand over the delivery and receipt records of markers and papers procured and used for ballots;

AddedQ. whereas on 16 November 2024, despite numerous complaints and calls by independent election observers for the results to be annulled, Georgia’s CEC announced the final summary protocol of the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, attributing victory to the ruling Georgian Dream party, with 53.92 % of the vote;

AddedR. whereas protests in Tbilisi initially erupted on 28 October 2024, with thousands gathering to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling party’s declared victory; whereas the demonstrations continued on 4 November 2024, growing in scale and intensity; whereas police forcibly dispersed demonstrations in Tbilisi using disproportionate violence against peaceful protesters and journalists, and arrested several demonstrators;

S. whereas, according to Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia, ‘the constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’;

Change 4

RemovedT. whereas oligarch and EU citizen Bidzina Ivanishvili, as Georgian Dream’s ‘honorary chairman’ and de facto leader, who also wields considerable influence on Georgia’s economy, has played a defining role in the country’s democratic backsliding and in undermining its Euro-Atlantic orientation in favour of pivoting towards Russia;

AddedT. whereas Georgia, as an EU candidate country, should abide fully by the Association Agreement and fulfil the nine steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023; whereas although the European Council granted candidate status to Georgia in December 2023, its EU accession process has since been de facto halted due to the course of action taken by the Georgian Government since the spring of 2024;

RemovedU. whereas the integrity of Georgia’s electoral processes and the protection of political freedoms are crucial for the country’s future democratic development and its potential membership of the European Union; whereas these elections did not meet the standards expected of an EU candidate country;

AddedU. whereas oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of Georgian Dream, who also wields considerable influence over Georgia’s economy, has played a defining role in the country’s democratic backsliding and in undermining its Euro-Atlantic orientation in favour of a pivot towards Russia;

Removed1. Strongly deplores the continuing democratic backsliding in Georgia and holds the ruling Georgian Dream party responsible for it; condemns all violations of international norms for free and fair elections documented during the recent elections in Georgia; deplores the refusal of responsible institutions to investigate complaints submitted by independent observer organisations and calls for a thorough, swift, transparent and independent investigation into all reported election-related irregularities and violations;

Added1. Deplores the fact that Georgia, a candidate country for EU accession, held parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024 that did not respect international standards for democratic elections or its commitments as a member of the OSCE to carry out free and fair elections; emphasises that violations of electoral integrity are incompatible with the standards expected from an EU candidate country; highlights the fact that the conduct of the election was a further manifestation of the continuing democratic backsliding for which the ruling party is fully responsible;

Removed2. Is appalled by the extent of the information provided by international and local observers on systematic and organised violations aimed at ensuring the victory of the ruling party; refuses to recognise the results of the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia; calls on Georgian political forces and civil society to engage in an inclusive dialogue in order to overcome the current political crisis and to proceed with organising new elections under international supervision within a year;