Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

▸7 unchanged paragraphs

on the 2025 Commission report on Georgia

(2025/2257(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 4 November 2025 entitled ‘2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2025)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2025 Report’ (SWD(2025)0757),

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part1,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2441 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 as regards the revision of the suspension mechanism2,

– having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

Added– having regard to the Urgent Opinion on the Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code of Georgia of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), adopted on 12 November 2025,

Added– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Georgia is a party,

Added– having regard to the Commission’s previous enlargement reports on Georgia,

Added– having regard to the ‘Freedom in the World 2025’ report published by Freedom House,

Added– having regard to the 2025 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index,

Added– having regard to the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International,

Added– having regard to the report by the OSCE fact-finding mission on Georgia (2026) under paragraph 12 of the Moscow Mechanism Document entitled ‘Developments in Georgia in Respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms since Spring 2024’,

– having regard to the Council Presidency conclusions of 16 December 2025 on enlargement,

– having regard to the opinion on the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents, the amendments to the Law on Grants and other Laws relating to ‘foreign influence’, adopted by the Venice Commission on 9 to 10 October 2025,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

Added– having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2026 on the EU enlargement strategy3,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0000/2026),(A10-0140/2026),

Change 1

RemovedA. whereas the Commission considers Georgia a candidate country in name only, following the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024, which found that the Georgian Government’s actions have de facto led to a halt in the pre-accession process, and in the light of Georgia’s continued backsliding on the fundamentals since then;

AddedA. whereas Georgia applied for EU membership on 3 March 2022; whereas the European Council, at its meeting on 14 and 15 December 2023, granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023 would be taken; whereas Georgia’s accession process has, in practice, effectively been suspended since 2024;

RemovedB. whereas Commissioner Marta Kos described the Commission’s 2025 Georgia report as ‘the worst report ever prepared for a candidate country’;

AddedB. whereas the Commission considers Georgia a candidate country in name only, following the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024, which found that the Georgian authorities’ actions have de facto led to a halt in the pre-accession process, and in the light of Georgia’s continued and serious backsliding on the fundamentals since then;

RemovedC. whereas the situation in Georgia has continued to deteriorate dramatically, with further backsliding in democracy, human rights and rule of law due to the actions of Georgian Dream;

AddedC. whereas Commissioner Marta Kos rightly described the Commission’s 2025 Georgia report as ‘the worst report ever prepared for a candidate country’;

RemovedD. whereas protests against the actions of Georgian Dream have continued since 28 November 2024, despite violence against participants, their imprisonment and the introduction of increasingly draconian punishments for participation;

AddedD. whereas the situation in Georgia has continued to deteriorate dramatically, with further backsliding in democracy, human rights and rule of law due to the actions of Georgian Dream; whereas the methods of repression, disinformation campaigns and political harassment mirror Russian hybrid tactics;

RemovedE. whereas eight opposition politicians were sentenced to seven to eight months in prison and banned from holding public office for two years for refusing to appear before the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Parliament of Georgia;

AddedE. whereas on 29 January 2026, 24 OSCE participating States activated the Moscow Mechanism, which enabled an independent expert mission to examine alleged human rights violations, particularly developments since spring 2024; whereas the OSCE Moscow Mechanism expert report on Georgia, published on 12 March 2026, highlights serious concerns regarding the integrity of electoral processes, including allegations of irregularities and pressure on political opposition, as well as the use of legal measures against opposition leaders and political parties; whereas the report calls for the repeal of restrictive legislation, including the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence and amendments affecting media freedom; whereas it documents cases of disproportionate use of force against protesters and raises concerns about violations of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, with some cases reaching ‘the threshold of torture’; whereas it calls, furthermore, for the immediate release of individuals detained for political reasons, including opposition members and journalists, and stresses the need for Georgia to fully cooperate with international bodies, including the Venice Commission and relevant international mechanisms;

RemovedF. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli was awarded the 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought by the European Parliament, together with Andrzej Poczobut from Belarus;

AddedF. whereas the Georgian Dream government has systematically weakened checks and balances by undermining the independence of the judiciary, prosecution services and the Constitutional Court, making Georgia structurally incapable of meeting EU membership criteria under the current conditions;

AddedG. whereas protests against the actions of Georgian Dream have continued since 28 November 2024, demonstrating the enduring democratic will of the Georgian people, despite systematic and disproportionate violence against participants, their imprisonment and the introduction of increasingly draconian punishments for participation; whereas large-scale protests began after the government announced that it was suspending preparations for EU accession negotiations until 2028;

AddedH. whereas the British Broadcasting Corporation documentary entitled ‘When Water Burns’, aired on 1 December 2025, presented evidence suggesting that water mixed with a toxic chemical was used against protesters in Georgia in November and December 2024; whereas the use of toxic chemicals can cause long-term health problems;

AddedI. whereas the OSCE/ODIHR was prevented from observing the local elections held on 4 October 2025 because of a late invitation from the Georgian authorities;

AddedJ. whereas newly adopted legislative amendments introduce additional restrictions on foreign funding and criminalise so-called ‘external lobbying’; whereas the legislation significantly broadens the definition of ‘grants’ to include technical or free-of-charge assistance and transfers between foreign organisations and their local branches, expands the scope of entities considered grant recipients, including foreign-based organisations working on Georgia-related issues, and introduces criminal penalties for violations related to grants; whereas the legislation further introduces prison sentences of up to six years for ‘external lobbying’, eight-year bans on political party membership for individuals who have worked in foreign-funded organisations, and additional penalties for businesses engaging in political activity unrelated to their principal activity; whereas the legislation also introduces an ‘extremism’ clause, enabling the imposition of prison sentences of up to three years for ‘systematic acts’ aimed at ‘establishing the perception’ that the government lacks legitimacy;

AddedK. whereas adopted amendments to the Criminal Code provide for prison sentences for individuals who refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream government, which raises serious concerns regarding freedom of expression, political pluralism and democratic standards;

AddedL. whereas, in response to democratic backsliding in Georgia under the Georgian Dream regime and the country’s geopolitical reorientation, the United States has suspended its strategic partnership with Georgia and imposed sanctions that remain in force; whereas the US Congress has introduced a bill entitled 'Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia’s Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence Act' (the MEGOBARI Act), which seeks to increase scrutiny of the Georgian Government’s actions and its ties to Russia and other authoritarian regimes, including China;

AddedM. whereas in December 2024 the United States designated Bidzina Ivanishvili under its sanctions regime for undermining the democratic and Euro-Atlantic future of Georgia for the benefit of the Russian Federation; whereas the United States found that the actions of Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream have eroded democratic institutions, enabled human rights abuses and curtailed the exercise of fundamental freedoms in Georgia; whereas these actions have further derailed Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic future, leaving the country increasingly vulnerable to Russia, which continues to occupy more than 20 % of Georgia’s territory;

AddedN. whereas on 2 March 2026, nine opposition parties in Georgia announced the formation of an alliance in response to the ongoing democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation of power by Georgian Dream, demonstrating the consolidation of pro-European democratic forces and the growing societal demand to defend Georgia’s European path;

AddedO. whereas eight opposition leaders and politicians, namely Nika Gvaramia, Zurab Japaridze, Badri Japaridze, Mamuka Khazaradze, Nika Melia, Irakli Okruashvili, Givi Targamadze and Giorgi Vashadze, were sentenced to seven to eight months in prison and banned from holding public office for two years for refusing to appear before the Temporary Investigative Commission of the de facto parliament of Georgia;

AddedP. whereas the Georgian Dream authorities have created a system of politically motivated repression that has resulted in the imprisonment of numerous political prisoners, including opposition politicians, activists, journalists and peaceful protesters, who have been deprived of their liberty solely for refusing to submit to the ruling party’s authority or for exercising their fundamental rights; whereas such detentions amount to a deliberate strategy of intimidation aimed at silencing dissent, dismantling political pluralism and consolidating authoritarian rule; whereas the continued incarceration of these individuals constitutes a grave violation of Georgia’s constitutional order, its international human rights obligations and the fundamental values underpinning its EU candidate status; whereas numerous students, civil society representatives and artists have been detained or fined for participating in protests;

AddedQ. whereas the political persecution of opposition figures remains a serious matter of concern, including the systemic targeting of Giorgi Gakharia, leader of the For Georgia party, who has been subjected to two physical attacks and charged with politically motivated criminal offences, leading to his current residence in exile;

AddedR. whereas former President Mikheil Saakashvili has been deprived of his liberty for over four years and is a de facto political prisoner of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who exercises control over the state and exerts unlawful influence over its institutions;

AddedS. whereas since January 2026, Georgian civil society has identified 48 political prisoners who have been imprisoned unjustly because of their participation in and support for the protests, and 68 others who remain in pre-trial detention on politically motivated charges;

AddedT. whereas women protesters in Georgia regularly report facing degrading treatment by the police, including sexist verbal abuse, routine strip searches, rape threats and other threats of physical violence during protests, in detention and during house searches; whereas this trend is part of a broader pattern of abuse and impunity within Georgia’s law enforcement agencies;

AddedU. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli, an imprisoned Georgian journalist and director of online media outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, was awarded the 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought by the European Parliament, together with Andrzej Poczobut from Belarus; whereas the Supreme Court of Georgia has rejected Mzia Amaglobeli’s appeal, which makes the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg the only remaining legal avenue for her to seek justice;

AddedV. whereas the situation of media freedom and freedom of expression has deteriorated dramatically; whereas the Council of Europe’s ‘Safety of journalists’ platform reported 32 alerts concerning Georgia in 2025, a 78 % increase from 2024;

AddedW. whereas increasing pressure on the education system and attempts to undermine the autonomy of universities as a result of the ‘one city, one faculty’ initiative by Georgian Dream risk weakening one of the key institutional pillars supporting democratic debate, civic engagement and Georgia’s European integration trajectory and risk curtailing access to education; whereas attacks against civil society, independent media and the academic sector demonstrate a broader pattern of pressure on freedom of expression and academic freedom in Georgia;

AddedX. whereas the extraction of manganese in Georgia for export to the EU has caused landslides, polluted the surrounding areas and violated labour rights in the mining region of Chiatura; whereas environmental organisations claim that waste is being discharged directly into the Kvirila River; whereas those protesting against manganese mining have reported cases of surveillance, intimidation and detention by the Georgian authorities; whereas the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive4 requires European companies to ensure respect for human rights, good working conditions and regard for the environment in their supply chains;

AddedY. whereas some of Georgia’s internationally recognised territories remain under occupation; whereas Russia recognised Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia as independent states in 2008 and still has thousands of soldiers in the area, in breach of international law; whereas Russia is continuing its ‘borderisation’ policy, namely the erection of physical barriers along the administrative borders of the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, in breach of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; whereas the European Court of Human Rights has found, furthermore, that this has led to human rights violations such as restrictions on the freedom of movement, limited access to property or land, and the separation of family members;

AddedZ. whereas Russia exerts a growing influence over Georgia as the result of political, economic and informational campaigns; whereas the EU cannot remain reactive and merely take note of the deterioration of the situation in the country; whereas it must instead pursue a proactive and strategic approach towards Georgia in order to reduce the country’s vulnerabilities to external coercion and to safeguard regional connectivity;

AddedAA. whereas, since 2022, Georgia has significantly increased its imports of dual-use goods from Western countries and from China; whereas available statistical evidence indicates that Georgia is acting as a transit state, facilitating the transfer of sanctioned goods to the Russian Federation, where they can be used for the production of military equipment and weapons; whereas in numerous instances, such irregularities can be attributed to deliberate strategies aimed at circumventing international sanctions imposed on Russia; whereas serious concerns have been raised regarding the role of informal governance structures and individuals linked to Bidzina Ivanishvili in facilitating an environment conducive to sanctions circumvention; whereas around 40 000 companies owned by Russian citizens or entities are currently operating in Georgia, of which approximately 30 000 have been registered since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas companies engaged in trade with Russia, including in goods subject to sanctions, are often established through offshore structures, thereby complicating transparency and the identification of beneficial ownership, including in relation to business networks associated with Bidzina Ivanishvili; whereas there are persistent reports that sanctioned goods, including vehicles and technology, continue to enter the Russian market via Georgia;

AddedAB. whereas the EU’s attractiveness as a model of democratic governance, economic growth and rule-based cooperation remains a key source of inspiration for Georgian civil society; whereas public opinion surveys consistently show strong support among the Georgian population for integration with the EU, with approximately 75 % of citizens expressing support for the country’s European path;

AddedAC. whereas the full-scale war of aggression that Russia has waged against Ukraine since 2022 has changed the European security landscape and increased the strategic importance of EU enlargement; whereas, since the beginning of the war, many Georgians have been involved in supporting Ukraine;

AddedAD. whereas the EU is Georgia’s largest trading partner, accounting for approximately 22.1 % of the country’s total trade; whereas these exchanges are governed by the EU-Georgia Association Agreement and its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which entered fully into force in 2016 and provides Georgian businesses preferential access to the EU market and its more than 450 million consumers;

AddedAE. whereas on 6 March 2026 the Commission announced that it was suspending visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, official and service passports until at least March 2027 owing to concerns about the deterioration of democracy and the rule of law; whereas ordinary Georgian citizens continue to enjoy visa-free travel for short-term visits to the Schengen area in line with the 2017 decision;

Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

Change 2

Changed1. Expresses its full solidarity with the Georgian people, who continue their struggle for a European and democratic Georgia in the face of democratic backsliding, growing repression, unlawful arrests, relentless hostile rhetoric, disinformation and threats; stresses that nearly 75 % of Georgian people continue to support further integration with the EU; reiterates that the EU’s door remains wide open for the Georgian people to return to the European path;