Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDATION

▸6 unchanged paragraphs

to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia and the need for closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the region

(2025/2169(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence approved by the Council on 21 March 2022, which underscores the role of partnerships for the Union’s security and resilience, including in the Indo-Pacific,

Added– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

Added– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’,

Added– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (JOIN(2025)0791),

Added– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

▸4 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and Japan of 1 November 2024,

– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Korea of 4 November 2024,

– having regard to the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part,

– having regard to the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other part,

Added– having regard to the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement,

Added– having regard to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part,

Added– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the 30th EU-Japan summit held on 23 July 2025 in Tokyo,

– having regard to the 42nd EU-Japan inter-parliamentary meeting held on 28 and 29 May 2025 in Tokyo,

Changed– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the 10th EU-Republic of2nd KoreaEU-Japan summitStrategic heldDialogue on 224 MayApril 20232025 in Seoul,Brussels,

Added– having regard to the 8th EU-Japan Digital Policy Dialogue on 1 April 2025 in Brussels,

Added– having regard to the Letter of Intent signed on 13 March 2025 by the EU and Japan on ‘Strengthening Cooperation in Quantum Science and Technology’ to deepen joint research, exchanges and ecosystem development,

Added– having regard to the commitment to enhance cooperation on critical raw materials given by the EU, Japan and the United States at the Critical Minerals Ministerial meeting on 4 February 2026,

Added– having regard to the EU-Japan Green Alliance of 27 May 2021,

Added– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the 11th EU-Republic of Korea summit held on 10 June 2026 in Brussels,

– having regard to the 23rd EU-Republic of Korea inter-parliamentary meeting held on 18 November 2025 in Brussels,

Added– having regard to the second EU-ROK Strategic Dialogue on 22 January 2026 in Brussels,

Added– having regard to the EU-Republic of Korea Green Partnership of 22 May 2023,

– having regard to the 4th EUIndoPacific ministerial forum held in Brussels on 20-21 November 2025,

Added– having regard to the statement following the recent visit by a delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Korea and Japan from 31 March to 2 April 2026,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Japan relations,

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025,

Added– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2024 on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia,

Added– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan,

Added– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations,

– having regard to its positions and recommendations on Indo-Pacific cooperation, including calls to work with like-minded partners to uphold freedom of navigation and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas,

– having regard to Rule 121 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0189/2026),

Change 1

ChangedA. whereas the ongoing geopolitical shifts and the growing strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific are reshaping the global order; whereas East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region are pivotal to global prosperity and security, energy security and democratic resilience, hosting vital sea lanes, advanced technology ecosystems, major trade routes, over half the world’s population, and critical supply chains essential to EUthe EU’s economic resiliencecompetitiveness and long-term industrial resilience in strategic sectors, as well as its geopolitical influence;

Change 2

RemovedB. whereas East Asia’s geopolitical landscape has become increasingly volatile in recent years, with regional power dynamics being increasingly shaped by systemic rivalry, maritime disputes, coercive economic practices and military build-ups that challenge the rules-based international order;

AddedB. whereas economic security, including resilient and diversified supply chains for critical raw materials, semiconductors and clean technologies, is an integral part of trade, foreign and security policy; whereas reducing strategic dependencies and making supply chains more resilient and more diversified in critical sectors are essential for the EU’s economic security and competitiveness, in line with the its derisking strategy, while avoiding unnecessary economic decoupling;

RemovedC. whereas the increasingly complex security challenges have a profound impact on both Europe’s and Indo-Pacific’s stability and prosperity, with the two regions’ stability more interlinked than ever; whereas both are directly affected by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the support of third countries that are enabling Russian aggression;

AddedC. whereas East Asia’s geopolitical landscape has become increasingly volatile in recent years, with regional power dynamics being increasingly shaped by systemic rivalry, maritime disputes, military build-ups, and the expanding influence of authoritarian governance models that deploy economic coercion, including discriminatory market access, hybrid threats including foreign information manipulation and interference, and commercial and political espionage that challenge peace, stability and the rules-based international order and require coordinated responses with partners that share democratic values and high regulatory standards;

RemovedD. whereas the EU’s interests are best protected by deepening practical cooperation with like-minded partners in the region – notably Japan, the Republic of Korea (RoK) and Taiwan – and by engaging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a central convening actor;

AddedD. whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is built on the conviction that the security and prosperity of the EU and the Indo-Pacific are inextricably linked; whereas the strategy underscores the importance of strengthening the EU’s engagement in the region through deeper political dialogue, enhanced economic cooperation and expanded security partnerships; whereas the unravelling of the rules-based order and traditional alliances, and the emergence of aggressive actors guided by imperialistic ambitions, warrant stronger ties between the EU and like-minded partners in the region in order to increase mutual security and prosperity;

RemovedE. whereas the strategic partnership between the EU and Japan serves as a model for effective bilateral cooperation that strengthens policy-shaping in multilateral fora; whereas the entry into force of the EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on 1 January 2025, allows for deeper collaboration, including in areas such as security and defence, maritime security, cybersecurity, space, and non-proliferation, alongside tangible joint efforts under the Digital Partnership and Energy Dialogue;

AddedE. whereas the freedoms of navigation and overflight are fundamental principles of international law, as enshrined, in particular, in the UNCLOS, and are of key importance for the Union’s economic security;

RemovedF. whereas the comprehensive relationship between the EU and the RoK, a key Indo-Pacific ally, spans political dialogue, trade and security cooperation; whereas the EU-RoK Security and Defence Partnership provides a structured framework for engagement across all security domains; whereas the RoK plays a pivotal role in regional stability;

AddedF. whereas the increasingly complex security challenges have a profound impact on both Europe’s and the Indo-Pacific’s stability and prosperity, with the two regions’ stability more interlinked than ever; whereas both are directly affected by Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the support of third countries such as China and North Korea that are enabling Russian aggression; whereas a robust EU-Japan and EU-Republic of Korea (RoK) defence-industrial cooperation is indispensable; whereas Japan and the RoK stand out for their substantial financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine; whereas Japan has provided and pledged over USD 20 billion to Ukraine in financial and military assistance since 2022; whereas instability in the Middle East has significant repercussions for Europe and East Asia with regard to energy security and supply-chain disruptions;

RemovedG. whereas Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the East Asia region; whereas the White Paper for European Defence: Readiness 2030 expresses concern over China’s coercion of Taiwan through the intensification of political, economic, military and cyber measures; whereas peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are essential to global security and prosperity;

AddedG. whereas the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence’ states that certain actors, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), continue to endanger regional and international peace and security; whereas the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes constitute grave threats to the rules-based international order, as well as the country’s possible nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) transfer from Russia in return for arms and military personnel; whereas the DPRK has repeatedly violated United Nations Security Council resolutions through ongoing missile launches, including tests conducted over Japan and into the Sea of Japan;

RemovedH. whereas the EU’s presence in the East Asia region is of the utmost importance for fostering peace and stability in the region, for safeguarding economic security and for strengthening the rules-based international order as the security challenges in the region have direct implications for global peace and EU interests;

AddedH. whereas the growing importance of the digital space for the functioning of our societies and our economies has increased the number and scale of cyberattacks; whereas the joint communication on the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade states that fighting those threats and vulnerabilities requires cooperating with partners that are attached to the rule of law, fundamental freedom, democracy and human rights;

AddedI. whereas the EU’s interests and global security are best protected by deepening practical cooperation with like-minded partners in the region – notably Japan, the RoK and Taiwan while pursuing principled and constructive engagement with regional actors, and by engaging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a central convening actor; whereas these partnerships should serve to bolster the EU’s strategic autonomy by consolidating a robust industrial and technology base for European defence, without leaving the EU too heavily reliant on external powers; whereas the EU should avoid bloc-based confrontation dynamics and instead promote cooperative multilateralism and dialogue based on international law;

AddedJ. whereas the strategic partnership between the EU and Japan serves as a model for effective bilateral cooperation that strengthens policy-shaping in multilateral forums; whereas the entry into force of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on 1 January 2025, allows for deeper collaboration, including in areas such as security and defence, hybrid threats, maritime security, cybersecurity, space and non-proliferation, alongside tangible joint efforts under the Competitiveness Alliance, the Green Alliance and the Digital Partnership and Energy Dialogue;

AddedK. whereas Japan is the EU’s closest strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas global challenges and, in particular, growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region require an ever closer partnership between the EU and Japan; whereas a free and open Indo-Pacific is a core interest pursued both by Japan and the EU, in particular by promoting a rules-based international order in which all countries adhere to international law and the principle of the peaceful settlement of conflicts; whereas Japan is an important actor in several forums in the Indo-Pacific such as the East Asia Summit; whereas the EU and Japan seek common approaches at bilateral level and in multilateral forums such as the G7, G20, the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as alignment as like-minded donors;

AddedL. whereas the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in 2019 and was amended to include provisions on the free flow of data in 2024; whereas Japan ranks as the EU’s seventh-largest trading partner;

AddedM. whereas in May 2025 the third EU-Japan Digital Partnership Council expanded cooperation on artificial intelligence (AI), 5G/6G, semiconductors, cybersecurity and data governance and included the launch of the ‘6G MIRAI-HARMONY’ joint research project;