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Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

AFET-PR-775385 → A-10-2025-0266

From
AFET-PR-775385 report parliamentary committee draft of 24 Jun 2025
To
A-10-2025-0266 Plenary report of 15 Dec 2025
Changes
26 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+41 added · −13 removed · 21 changed
More facts (3)
Dossier
2025/2049(INI)
Title (from)
on addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (so-called ‘EU Magnitsky Act’)
Title (to)
on addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (so-called ‘EU Magnitsky Act’)
Cite Link to this page
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

The report updates listing figures and adds new recitals on national regimes, the Magnitsky ruling, and the regime's scope, including corruption and transnational repression.1245 It strengthens calls for accountability, extending sanctions to leaders, family members, and those benefiting from violations, and adds measures on digital surveillance and environmental destruction.9101516 It enhances Parliament's role in listing and de-listing, adds review requirements, and proposes new mechanisms for civil society and asset use for victims.12192021 It addresses implementation gaps, calling for harmonised enforcement, secondary sanctions, and cooperation with financial authorities to prevent circumvention.2324 The other changes are formal or wording: renumbering, spelling corrections, and minor rephrasing.371113

The notes class 19 changes as substance, 0 as formal, 7 as wording only.

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Changes that matter, 26

Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.

Change 1

ChangedB. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act, adopted in December 2020, enables the EU to impose restrictive measures on individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations worldwide; whereas certain EU Member States have adopted their own national Magnitsky-style legislation and these are important tools to complement EU sanctions; whereas the United States, Canada andCanada, the United KingdomKingdom, Australia and other like-minded countries have adopted similar sanctions regimes; whereas cooperation and coordination among like-minded countries on sanctions increases their effectiveness;

AI: Note on change 1 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds that certain member states have national Magnitsky laws and that Australia and other like-minded countries adopted similar regimes; stresses cooperation and coordination among them.

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Change 2

AddedC. whereas the European Court of Human Rights, in a unanimous ruling of seven judges in the case Magnitsky and Others v Russia (application nos 32631/09 and 53799/12) on 27 August 2019, held that Russia was responsible for Sergei Magnitsky’s death in prison and that he had been subjected to intentional acts of violence amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment; whereas, despite investigations into his detention, torture, unlawful posthumous prosecution and death, no one has been held criminally accountable;

AI: Note on change 2 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds a recital on the European Court of Human Rights ruling in the Magnitsky case, noting Russia's responsibility and lack of criminal accountability.

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Change 3

ChangedD.E. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act applies to a broad range of human rights violations and the persons and entities listed can include perpetrators, enablers and third parties supplying material or expertisetechnical assistance for repression;

AI: Note on change 3 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Renumbers recital D to E and rephrases 'material or expertise' to 'material or technical assistance'.

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Change 4

RemovedE. whereas numerous Parliament resolutions have called for sanctions instruments to be used more often in cases of core international crimes or serious human rights violations;

AddedF. whereas the EUGHRSR targets individual perpetrators and entities, instead of broad economic sectors, which reduces collateral damage to the general population and avoids harming access to food, medicine or public services;

RemovedF. whereas as at 28 May 2025, 156 listings had been made under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act (120 individuals and 36 entities);

AddedG. whereas the EUGHRSR also covers widespread violations or abuses and systematic or serious concerns as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU, such as torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, slavery, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, arbitrary arrests or detentions, human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression, and violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief;

RemovedG. whereas despite progress, substantial gaps remain in the geographical and thematic coverage of listings and in the establishment of benchmarks aligned with the sanctions’ objectives;

AddedH. whereas the EUGHRSR listings are a form of international recognition for victims of human rights abuses;

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RemovedH. whereas listings have primarily focused on violations of physical integrity and civil-political rights, particularly those targeting male political opponents and activists in authoritarian regimes, rather than on core international crimes and systemic violations of socio-economic rights;

AddedI. whereas transnational repression has not yet been included in the list of serious human rights violations that trigger sanctions under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

RemovedI. whereas listings have largely been geographically concentrated, leaving other areas and contexts under-addressed;

AddedJ. whereas numerous Parliament resolutions have called for sanctions instruments to be used in a more flexible way and more often in cases of core international crimes or serious human rights violations;

RemovedJ. whereas confidentiality around potential listing or de-listing is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; whereas Parliament has no role or say in this process;

AddedK. whereas as at 4 November 2025, 168 listings had been made under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act (131 individuals and 37 entities); whereas the list of designations under this regime has grown, and not much is known about its impact and effectiveness;

AddedL. whereas despite progress, substantial gaps remain in the geographical and thematic coverage of transnational listings and in the establishment of benchmarks aligned with the sanctions’ objectives; whereas, despite several calls by Parliament, corruption is still not considered a crime within the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

AddedM. whereas listings have primarily focused on violations of physical integrity and civil-political rights, particularly those targeting political opponents and activists, predominantly males, in authoritarian regimes, rather than on core international crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, and systemic violations of socio-economic rights;

AddedN. whereas listings, in line with the EU’s strategic relationships and geopolitical interests, have largely been geographically concentrated, leaving other areas and contexts under-addressed;

AddedO. whereas confidentiality around potential listing or de-listing is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; whereas Parliament should have a role in this process;

AddedP. whereas parliamentary scrutiny of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act is necessary in order to strengthen its legitimacy; whereas Parliament’s resolutions containing recommendations for additional listings continue to be insufficiently considered by the Council;

AI: Note on change 4 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Replaces several recitals: adds new ones on the regime's scope, listings count as of November 2025, gaps, corruption, and Parliament's role; drops old ones on Parliament resolutions and listing statistics.

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Change 5

RemovedL. whereas guidance from the Commission remains insufficient to clarify the scope of the prohibitions on delivering technical and material support to sanctioned persons and entities;

AddedR. whereas the current regime of asset freezes and visa bans could be complemented by additional measures, such as restrictions on financial services, public procurement and participation in EU-funded projects, and its scope should be extended to cover the immediate family members of human rights violators;

RemovedM. whereas some implementation loopholes, such as derogation clauses allowing contracts that were concluded before an individual or entity was listed, create opportunities for sanction circumvention;

AddedS. whereas guidance from the Commission remains insufficient to clarify the scope of the prohibitions on delivering any kind of support, including technical and material support to sanctioned persons and entities;

AddedT. whereas some implementation loopholes, such as derogation clauses allowing contracts that were concluded before an individual or entity was listed, create opportunities for sanction circumvention and diminish the effectiveness of sanctions;

AI: Note on change 5 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds recitals on complementary measures like restrictions on financial services and family members, and on implementation loopholes; rephrases existing ones on Commission guidance.

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Change 6

RemovedO. whereas civil society actors continue to engage informally with EU institutions in proposing names for listing, in the absence of a structured mechanism for their input;

AddedV. whereas the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act has largely focused on lower-level officials and functionaries, while those holding real political and military power have often remained beyond the scope of its designations;

AddedW. whereas listings under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to date have not targeted any actors responsible for committing some of the core international crimes recognised in the Rome Statute;

AddedX. whereas civil society actors continue to engage informally with EU institutions in proposing names for listing, in the absence of a structured mechanism for their input; whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) lacks the resources to assess, investigate and respond to the information it receives;

AI: Note on change 6 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds recitals on the regime's focus on lower-level officials, lack of listings for core international crimes, and EEAS resource constraints; rephrases civil society engagement.

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Change 7

ChangedQ.Z. whereas some Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter the territory of the EU; whereas such failure to comply with the sanctions considerably harms the EU’s credibility and undermines the effectiveness of EU sanctionsanctions regimes;

AI: Note on change 7 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Renumbers recital Q to Z and corrects 'sanction regimes' to 'sanctions regimes'.

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Change 8

AddedAA. whereas implementation is largely carried out at national level and each Member State is responsible for enforcing the sanctions on its territory; whereas this creates a risk of weak links where individuals or companies may try to circumvent the sanctions by moving money or activities to Member States with slower or less strict implementation; whereas the EU institutions have repeatedly stressed the need for more uniform and coordinated application to make sanctions truly effective;

AI: Note on change 8 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds a recital on national implementation creating risks of circumvention and the need for uniform application.

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Change 9

Changed1. Reiterates its support for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act as aan significantindispensable foreign policy tool tofor strengthenenhancing human rights worldwide and for strengthening the EU’s human rights toolbox, particularly given its capacity to contribute to changing the behaviour of the targeted persons and entities and to efforts to hold accountable the direct perpetrators, enablersenablers, instigators and indirect supporters of serious human rights violations;violations, as well as those who directly or indirectly benefit from such violations, including their immediate family members; highlights that the instrument is designed so as to not affect the enjoyment of human rights by the population;

AI: Note on change 9 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Changes paragraph 1 to call the tool 'indispensable' and extends its purpose to include those who benefit from violations and their family members.

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Change 10

Changed2. Reaffirms its unwavering commitment to combating impunity for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide through the effective use of existing EU sanctions instruments and tools, including the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the international justice system, which is facing unprecedented challenges, including baseless sanctions against judges and staff of the International Criminal Court, some of whom are EU nationals; urges the EU, in that regard, to activate its Blocking Statute to contain the impact of those sanctions;

AI: Note on change 10 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds a commitment to the international justice system, urging activation of the Blocking Statute against sanctions on International Criminal Court staff.

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Change 11

Changed3. Calls for a comprehensive impact assessment of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and its linksinteractions with the EU country-specific sanctions and the other EU horizontal restrictive measures in order to evaluate its coherence, proportionality and effectiveness, including in changing the behaviour of those listed, to identify operational gaps and to ensure consistent and strategic application worldwide, and calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed in accordance with the findings of this impact assessment;

AI: Note on change 11 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Changes 'links' to 'interactions' and adds 'coherence, proportionality and' before 'effectiveness' in the impact assessment call.

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Change 12

Removed4. Considers that more information on the de-listing criteria should be made available in order to enhance legal clarity, due process and accountability;

Added4. Calls for the listings drawn up under the EU’s EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed continuously and systematically, at least once every 12 months, so as to ensure their consistency, proportionality and conformity with the latest information and judicial decisions;

Added5. Considers that more information on the de-listing criteria should be made available in order to enhance legal clarity, due process, transparency and accountability;

AI: Note on change 12 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds a new paragraph calling for continuous review of listings at least every 12 months; moves the de-listing criteria paragraph to a new number.

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Change 13

Changed6.7. Encourages the Council to seek to align EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act listings with the sanctions lists of like-minded partnerspartners, in particular those in the G7, and the UN Security Council, where politically and legally feasible, in order to enhance global legitimacy and effectiveness;

AI: Note on change 13 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Renumbers paragraph 6 to 7 and adds 'in particular those in the G7' to the alignment call.

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Change 14

Added8. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance synergies between the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act and international accountability mechanisms, such as the UN, the International Criminal Court and regional human rights courts, to improve the effectiveness of EU actions against serious human rights violations;

AI: Note on change 14 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds a call for synergies with international accountability mechanisms like the UN and International Criminal Court.

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Change 15

Changed8.10. Fully supports the possibilityimposition of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act or under a different regime; recommends extending the regime’s scope to cover large-scale corruption cases and abuse of state procurement contracts that directly sustain authoritarian regimes, thereby linking human rights abuses with kleptocratic practices; stresses, furthermore, that anti-corruption sanctions should take into account the broader systemic context and be closely linked with comprehensive strategies towards the respective actors; welcomes the fact that the Commission put forward a proposal for an anti-corruption sanctions regime; finds it regrettable that the file has been blocked at the Council by some Member States;

AI: Note on change 15 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Expands paragraph on anti-corruption sanctions: recommends extending scope to large-scale corruption, links to kleptocracy, welcomes Commission proposal, regrets Council blockage.

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Change 16

Removed9. Urges the Member States to refrain from bilateral political or diplomatic actions that undermine or contradict the EU’s unified stance on sanctions;

Added11. Stresses that the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act should also address human rights violations enabled through digital surveillance, spyware exports and other technologies used for repression, and deliberate acts of environmental destruction with a clear intent to harm the civilian population; calls for explicit listings of individuals involved in such abuses;

Removed10. Condemns the fact that some EU Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter EU territory, thereby harming the credibility and effectiveness of sanctions; urges all EU Member States to fully and unconditionally comply with EU sanctions; calls for the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to ensure that EU Member States comply with the sanctions and to rigorously address any instances of non-compliance by Member States;

Added12. Welcomes the recent use of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act against actors responsible for the transnational repression of dissidents and human rights defenders, and calls for more listings to reflect this growing global trend and to systematically assess acts of transnational repression, including digital surveillance, harassment of exiles, and cross-border intimidation, disinformation and legal abuse; calls on the Council to adopt a working definition of transnational repression to ensure consistent sanctioning, including of non-state proxies such as private security companies and diaspora organisations; calls for the EU to step up the application of sanctions against individuals and entities credibly documented as responsible for acts of transnational repression against human rights defenders, including harassment of relatives, digital attacks and intimidation abroad;

Added13. Urges the Member States to refrain from bilateral political or diplomatic actions that undermine their commitment to international criminal justice mechanisms, including the Rome Statute, and the defence of human rights, or that contradict the EU’s unified stance on sanctions; instructs the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, if this recommendation is not taken into account, to call on the Member States concerned to align their actions and maintain EU unity; invites the Member States to enhance coordination and make use of their own instruments, such as universal jurisdiction and national sanctions, provided that these are applied in a coordinated manner in support of the common EU objectives, so as to bring about significant change and help achieve the objectives of EU sanctions;

Added14. Condemns the fact that some EU Member States have failed to comply with EU sanctions by allowing sanctioned individuals to enter EU territory, thereby harming the credibility and effectiveness of sanctions; urges all EU Member States to fully and unconditionally comply with EU sanctions; calls on the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to ensure that EU Member States comply with the sanctions and to rigorously and without discrimination address any instances of non-compliance by Member States;

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Added15. Stresses that EU restrictive measures can only be fully effective if they are interpreted, enforced and implemented consistently, swiftly and uniformly by all Member States; notes the differences between Member States in terms of legal frameworks, administrative structures and operational resources for the implementation of sanctions; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure a more harmonised and coordinated application, including by strengthening the capacity for asset freezes, improving the exchange of information and developing common EU-level monitoring and enforcement mechanisms;

Added16. Urges the EEAS to define legal pathways for mobilising the interest accrued from the frozen assets of individuals sanctioned under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act so that it can be used to benefit the victims of the serious human rights violations for which the sanctioned individuals are responsible; encourages the EU, furthermore, to explore the possibility of establishing a specific procedure regarding ill-gotten gains;

Added17. Strongly welcomes the Council’s adoption of thematic sanctions packages under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act; urges the Council to systematically and proactively adopt similar targeted measures to address other specific and grave human rights violations, including torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and the repression of civil society and human rights defenders;

Added18. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the common foreign and security policy that do not have military or defence implications, such as sanctions;

AI: Note on change 16 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds paragraphs on digital surveillance, transnational repression, member state compliance, harmonised implementation, frozen assets for victims, thematic packages, and qualified majority voting.

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Change 17

Changed12.20. Urges the EU to strategically align EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act listings with national and international criminal justice efforts, including by listing individuals indicted by international courtscourts, such as the International Criminal Court, and perpetrators of core international crimes;crimes and other actors who frustrate such accountability processes;

AI: Note on change 17 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Changes paragraph 12 to include listing individuals indicted by international courts and other actors frustrating accountability.

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Change 18

Removed13. Urges the Council to correct current geographical and thematic imbalances in listings under the EUGHRSR - EU Magnitsky Act by extending listings beyond the current geographical concentration;

Added21. Underlines that sanctions should also serve the purpose of ensuring that perpetrators of serious human rights violations and corruption do not remain anonymous, thereby exposing those responsible;

Added22. Urges the Council to ensure that all regions of the world are treated with equal scrutiny and commitment, and to correct current geographical and thematic imbalances in listings under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act by extending listings beyond the current geographical concentration to all persons and entities responsible for serious human rights violations, irrespective of their country of origin;

Added23. Encourages the Council to pay particular attention to violations such as sexual and gender-based violence, discriminatory policies, and the persecution of women leaders, journalists and activists, so that these categories are adequately reflected in future listings;

Added24. Notes that, so far, a significant proportion of individuals sanctioned under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act were involved in the state’s repressive apparatus, but did not make decisions, while only a minority of those listed hold political or military leadership positions; urges the Council to extend designations beyond low-level designations to include political and military leaders, sanctioning those responsible for making decisions that led to grave human rights violations;

Added25. Calls for greater and more effective communication on imposed sanctions to reiterate the EU’s global stand on human rights and the fight against impunity, as in some cases sanctioned individuals are being portrayed as heroes by national propaganda and are even rewarded by repressive regimes; notes that the deterrent element of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act works most effectively against individuals and entities with property in, or means to travel to, the EU;

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Added26. Condemns any countersanctions imposed on the EU or its institutions, Member States, bodies or citizens solely for promoting and upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law through the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;

AI: Note on change 18 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds paragraphs on anonymity, equal regional scrutiny, gender-based violence, leadership listings, communication, and countersanctions.

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Change 19

Changed14.27. Recommends enhanced transparency and clear guidelines in the sanctions process, while upholding the rights of listed individuals to effective judicial review;

AI: Note on change 19 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Renumbers paragraph 14 to 27 and adds 'and clear guidelines' to transparency recommendation.

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Change 20

Changed15.28. Recommends that sustained, demonstrable, real and lasting behavioural change by listed individuals and entities, such as ongoing cooperation with international justice mechanisms, be formally recognised as a de-listing criterion to incentivise accountability and compliance;

AI: Note on change 20 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds 'sustained, demonstrable, real and lasting' to behavioural change criterion for de-listing.

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Change 21

Changed16.29. Proposes the establishment of a structured and transparent consultation mechanism for civil society reporting and engagement in the sanctions process, with protective measures for whistleblowers, including the establishment of a dedicated EEAS contact point; recommends the introduction of a budgetary window to strengthen the EEAS’s capacity to systematically assess, investigate, react to and process information and proposals from civil society;

AI: Note on change 21 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds 'reporting' and 'with protective measures for whistleblowers' to civil society consultation mechanism, and a budgetary window for EEAS.

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Change 22

Changed17.30. Calls foron the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to envision a complementary role for Parliament in collecting and proposing cases of serious human rights violations to be considered under the sanctions regime, and to provide Parliament with timelyannual informationreports about decisions on sanctions under the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act;Act, including in the circumvention of sanctions; calls for the listings recommendations contained in Parliament’s resolutions to be thoroughly considered by the Council;

AI: Note on change 22 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Changes paragraph 17 to call for annual reports and a complementary role for Parliament in proposing cases.

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Change 23

Changed18.31. Calls for the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act to be reviewed to prevent sanction circumvention by issuing explicit and updated guidance on the prohibition on providing economic resources and technical and material support to listed individuals and entities;entities, clarifying that the prohibition on providing technical and material support includes non-financial assistance such as ICT infrastructure, software, legal facilitation and cyber tools used for repression; emphasises the need to strengthen the EU’s sanctions regime by broadening and diversifying the use of secondary sanctions with a view to targeting government officials, entities, businesses and individuals involved in facilitating breaches or the circumvention of sanctions, which would enable authoritarian regimes to continue their grave human rights violations;

AI: Note on change 23 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Expands paragraph 18 to include non-financial assistance in prohibition guidance and secondary sanctions.

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Change 24

Added32. Calls on the Commission to enhance cooperation with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the Anti-Money Laundering Authority and national financial intelligence units in order to systematically identify whether opaque financial products, crypto-assets and offshore structures are being used to evade sanctions;

AI: Note on change 24 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Adds a call for cooperation with financial authorities to identify evasion through opaque products and crypto-assets.

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Change 25 under “EXPLANATORY STATEMENT”

ChangedAs of May 2025, 154 listings (118 individuals and 36 entities) have been made under the regime. However, with the report concerns are expressed over the narrow focus of the listings – both geographically and thematically – as they tend to centercentre on certain geographical areas, and specific political and civil rights violations in authoritarian contexts, while under-addressing core international crimes and systemic socio-economic rights abuses. The gender perspective of the application of the EUGHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act is also under analysis.

AI: Note on change 25 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Updates listing count in explanatory statement and changes 'center' to 'centre'.

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Change 26 under “EXPLANATORY STATEMENT”

ChangedAdditionally, the text proposes to identify avenues for improving the sanctions instruments, and measures to close implementation loopholes and prevent sanctionssanction circumvention. The report also aims to identify ways for the European Parliament and other relevant actors such as civil society organisations to contribute to the process of suggestions for listing criteria. It also reiterates its long-standing support for including anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework.

AI: Note on change 26 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

Changes 'sanctions circumvention' to 'sanction circumvention' in explanatory statement.

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https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-775385/compare/A-10-2025-0266
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Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
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Cite as

European Parliament (2025). “Changes between AFET-PR-775385 and A-10-2025-0266”. Text, 15 December 2025. from AFET-PR-775385, to A-10-2025-0266, reference 2025/2049(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-775385/compare/A-10-2025-0266 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX 
@misc{epw-text-2025-12-15,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between AFET-PR-775385 and A-10-2025-0266}},
  year = {2025},
  date = {2025-12-15},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-775385/compare/A-10-2025-0266}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/AFET-PR-775385/compare/A-10-2025-0266},
  urldate = {2026-09-25},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from AFET-PR-775385, to A-10-2025-0266, reference 2025/2049(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}