Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

▸10 unchanged paragraphs

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia

(2025/2022(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans,

– having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

Added– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

Added– having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

▸10 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

– having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

Added– having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

Added– having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

– having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

Added– having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

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– having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

– having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo, and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

Changed– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0072/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

Change 1

AddedB. whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

C. whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

Change 2

RemovedC. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits;

AddedD. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

RemovedD. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine;

AddedE. whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

AddedF. whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

AddedG. whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

AddedH. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

AddedI. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

AddedJ. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

AddedK. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

AddedL. whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

AddedM. whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

AddedN. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

AddedO. whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

AddedP. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

Commitment to EU accession

Change 3

Changed1. Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EUEU, by showing strong political will and toconsistency communicatein the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously onwith its citizens about the EU;EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

Change 4

Changed2. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in today’sthe current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole,whole; andoutlines highlightsthat, owing to its geopolitical position, the significancecountry has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence inundermining the region;sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

Change 5

Changed3. NotesAcknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies;policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

Change 6

Changed4. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged;unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

Change 7

Removed5. Calls on Serbia to align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia, systematically and without delay;

Added5. Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;