Changes from plenary report to adopted text

– having regard the Council conclusions of December 2006, March 2020 and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on 30 years of Copenhagen criteria – giving further impetus to EU enlargement policy,

– having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the Manifesto of Ventotene,

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement,

– having regard to the Committee of the Regions’ opinion of 5-6 July 2022 on the Commission’s Enlargement Package 2022, as well as the President of the Committee of the Region’s statement of 8 November 2023 on the Commission’s 2023 Enlargement package,

– having regard to the Commission’s report of 9 February 2022 on cohesion in Europe towards 2050,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23-24 June 2022, and 29-30 June 2023, 26-27 October 2023, and 14-15 December 2023,

– having regard to the Commission’s Analytical reports of 2 February 2023 on Ukraine’s (SWD(2023)0030), Moldova’s (SWD(2023)0032) and Georgia’s (SWD(2023)0031) alignment with the EU acquis,

– having regard to the Commission’s Joint-Communication to the European Council of 29 November 2023 on the State of Play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations (JOIN(2023)0050),

– having regard to the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 29-30 April 1997 on the application of conditionality with a view to developing a coherent EU strategy for relations with the countries in the Western Balkan region,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the matter, in particular that of 24 October 2019 on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, and its resolutions on the 2022 Commission reports on Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Montenegro,

– having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Western Balkans, following the 2020 summit,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 and 20 June 2003 and the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans,

– having regard to EU Association Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine,

– having regard to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans (COM(2023)0692),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057), and to the Commission strategy for ‘A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’ of February 2018,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the candidate status of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia,

– having regard to its resolution of 5 October 2023 on taking stock of Moldova’s path to the EU,

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 01/2022 of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

– having regard to the Commission’s 2022 Enlargement package of 12 October 2022,

– having regard to the 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy to the Enlargement Package adopted by the European Commission on 8 November 2023 (COM(2023)0690),

– having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III),

– having regard to its resolutions of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, and of 11 July 2023 on the implementation of the passerelle clauses in the EU Treaties,

– having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 9 May 2022 and to its resolution of 4 May 2022 on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe,

– having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties, and of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, and activation of Article 48 TEU asking the European Council to agree on calling a Convention to reform the Treaties,

– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0015/2024),

A. whereas nine of the 10 countries currently aspiring to join the EU have candidate status, some of them for many years; whereas those candidate countries find themselves at various stages of the accession process and negotiations;

B. whereas following the Commission’s recommendations in the 2023 enlargement package, on 14 December 2023 the European Council decided to grant candidate status to Georgia and to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova as well as with Bosnia and Herzegovina, once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria has been achieved;

C. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other ongoing geopolitical challenges have given new geostrategic meaning to the enlargement of the European Union; whereas the stability, security and democratic resilience of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Neighbourhood are inextricably linked to those of the EU;

D. whereas enlargement is a moral and historic commitment, and a strategic geopolitical priority representing a geostrategic investment in the future, which will contribute to peace, stability, security, democracy, unity, the fight against climate change, as well as, ensuring prosperity and well-being on the European continent; whereas the EU’s security also rests on its ability to defend, advance and sustain peace, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental values; whereas enlargement can be mutually beneficial for both existing and future Member States, and their citizens as long as the proper conditions and requirements are met;

E. whereas enlargement has become one of the strongest EU policy and geopolitical tools; whereas according to the Eurobarometer of June 2023, the majority of the EU’s population is in favour of the future enlargement of the EU; whereas a new impetus, commitments and vision are urgently needed to re-energise the enlargement process, ensuring its continuity, consistency and impact; whereas the lack of engagement in previous years has created a vacuum, thus opening the space for Russia and China and other external actors; whereas the principle of mutual and sincere cooperation must always be respected;

F. whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure whereby each applicant is assessed on its own merits in terms of its fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria in their entirety, including those of ensuring a continuous full respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities, democracy, and the rule of law, as well as for the other fundamental values of the EU; whereas positive outcomes should be sought as quickly as possible, while avoiding fast-tracking or pre-defined deadlines;

G. whereas stagnation or backtracking must have consequences, as the entire accession process needs to be based on fair and rigorous conditionality;

H. whereas accession to the EU requires ambitious integration agenda capacity from both the EU and the candidate countries; whereas fundamental reforms in the areas of the judiciary, the fight against corruption, media freedom and pluralism are necessary for candidate countries to progress along their path towards the EU;

I. whereas it would be advantageous to complete the pending membership of the existing Member States in the Euro and Schengen area along with the next enlargement;

J. whereas the countries of the Western Balkans must also focus on conflict resolution, regional cooperation and reconciliation; whereas there is no place in the EU or in the countries aspiring to become Member States for inflammatory rhetoric, genocide denial or glorification of war criminals from any side; whereas coming to terms with the past is the only way to achieve genuine reconciliation, which is crucial for prosperous societies and successful integration;

K. whereas the processes of widening and deepening the EU must go in parallel as they have the capacity to mutually reinforce each other, multiplying their impact and significantly contributing to the overarching objectives for which the EU was created;

L. whereas the challenge of a bigger European Union demands an enhanced enlargement policy, based on gradual integration into common policies and with clear benefits for citizens throughout the process;

M. whereas, in the context of enlargement, there is a need to look in a holistic way at the review of current and future European policies, structural reforms, institutional changes and the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-2034;

N. whereas the countries of the Western Balkans have for decades stated their determination to join the EU; whereas on 23-24 June 2022 EU leaders reconfirmed a full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans;

O. whereas candidate countries must demonstrate their adherence to the fundamental values of the EU, and also alignment with the EU’s policies and positions, including its common foreign and security policy (CFSP);

P. whereas some Western Balkan countries have reached a high degree of alignment with the EU’s CFSP in recent years, including sanctions against Russia in response to its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas in March 2023 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia launched the ‘Western Balkans QUAD – 100 % alignment with EU Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)’ platform;

Q. whereas the EU must demonstrate a clear political will to support the candidate countries and should step up considerably its conditional technical and financial support for fundamental reforms, the resolution of bilateral disputes, economic convergence and regional economic integration in accession countries; whereas the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to accelerate fundamental reforms, enhance the countries’ integration into the EU’s single market as well as boost economic integration of the region;

R. whereas malign foreign actors are using hybrid interference methods to impact and derail EU integration;

S. whereas Parliament is undoubtedly the most supportive EU institution when it comes to enlargement; whereas Parliament’s role remains extremely limited throughout the entire enlargement process and should be strengthened in order to increase democratic legitimacy and accountability, including in evaluating the intermediate steps of the accession, inter alia through regular committee meetings and parliamentary scrutiny of pre-accession funding, while making use of its existing tools and instruments, including democracy support programmes; whereas regional and local administrations and civil society organisations should be structurally involved in the enlargement process and its scrutiny;

T. whereas major initiatives such as the European Political Community, which has already held three official meetings, enable political cooperation and contribute to regional dialogues in different domains between the EU and other countries, but are not alternatives to EU membership;

U. whereas significant pre-enlargement reforms are needed to guarantee the efficient functioning of the enlarged EU and its capacity to absorb new members and to promote their successful integration as well as to respond properly to the many challenges it currently faces; whereas this could imply significant changes in the EU’s institutional framework, and the possible advancement of differentiated integration solutions whenever the Treaties allow; whereas some of those solutions have been discussed for some time already; whereas in order to achieve this, the EU should also take full advantage of the flexibility afforded by the Treaty of Lisbon ahead of a more in-depth reform in the context of a possible revision of the treaties;