Changes from plenary report to adopted text

RemovedRecital 36: (36) Directive (EU) 2018/843 achieved the interconnection of Member States’ central registers holding beneficial ownership information through the European Central Platform established by Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council30. It is essential that the European Central Platform serve as a central search service, making available all information related to beneficial ownership to competent authorities, self-regulatory bodies, obliged entities and persons having a legitimate interest. Continued involvement of Member States in the functioning of the whole system should be ensured by means of a regular dialogue between the Commission and the representatives of Member States on the issues concerning the operation of the system and on its future development. The European Parliament should be informed about the evolution of this dialogue.

RemovedRecital 38: (38) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 31 applies to the processing of personal data for the purposes of this Directive. Natural persons whose personal data are held in national registers as beneficial owners should be informed about the applicable data protection rules. Furthermore, competent authorities, obliged entities and persons having a legitimate interest should be able to access the history of all beneficial owners in a given corporate entity, legal entity or legal arrangement in order to identify previous beneficial owners. Such information may be particularly necessary for monitoring, analysis and investigation related to money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing. Only personal data that is up to date and corresponds to the actual beneficial owners at a given moment in time should be made available and the beneficiaries should be informed about their rights under the Union legal data protection framework and the procedures applicable for exercising those rights.

RemovedRecital 39: (39) Delayed access to information by FIUs and other competent authorities on the identity of holders of bank, and payment and securities, accounts, custodial crypto-asset wallets and safe-deposit boxes, especially anonymous ones, hampers the detection of transfers of funds relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. National data allowing the identification of bank, and payments and securities, accounts, custodial crypto-asset wallets and safe-deposit boxes belonging to one person is fragmented and therefore not accessible to FIUs and to other competent authorities in a timely manner. It is therefore essential to establish centralised automated mechanisms, such as a register or data retrieval system, in all Member States as an efficient means to get timely access to information on the identity of holders of bank and payment accounts, including virtual bank accounts, securities accounts, custodial crypto-asset wallets and safe-deposit boxes, their proxy holders, and their beneficial owners. Such information should include the historical information on closed customer-account holders, bank, payment and securities accounts, custodial crypto-asset wallets and safe-deposit boxes. When applying the access provisions, it is appropriate for pre-existing mechanisms to be used provided that national FIUs can access the data for which they make inquiries in an immediate and unfiltered manner. Member States should consider feeding such mechanisms with other information deemed …

RemovedRecital 40: (40) In order to respect privacy and protect personal data, the minimum data necessary for the carrying out of AML/CFT investigations should be held in centralised automated mechanisms for bank accounts and crypto-asset wallets, such as registers or data retrieval systems. It should be possible for Member States to determine which data it is useful and proportionate to gather, taking into account the systems and legal traditions in place to enable the meaningful identification of the beneficial owners. When transposing the provisions relating to those mechanisms, Member States should set out retention periods equivalent to the period for retention of the documentation and information obtained within the application of customer due diligence measures. It should be possible for Member States to exceptionally extend the retention period, provided good reasons are given. The additional retention period should not exceed an additional five years. That period should be without prejudice to national criminal law on evidence applicable to ongoing criminal investigations and legal proceedings and allow or require the retention of such information or documents in concrete cases for a further maximum period of five years where the necessity and proportionality of such further retention have been established for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of suspected money laundering or terrorist financing. Access to those mechanisms should be on a need-to-know basis.

RemovedRecital 41: (41) Through the interconnection of Member States’ centralised automated mechanisms, the national FIUs and other competent national authorities designated according to Directive (EU) 2019/11531a would be able to obtain swiftly cross-border information on the identity of holders of bank, payment and securities accounts, custodial crypto-asset wallets and safe deposit boxes in other Member States, which would reinforce their ability to effectively carry out financial analysis, detect, investigate or prosecute criminal offences, and cooperate with their counterparts from other Member States. Direct cross-border access to information on bank, payment and securities accounts, custodial crypto-asset wallets and safe deposit boxes would enable the Financial Intelligence Units to produce financial analysis within a sufficiently short timeframe to detect potential money laundering and terrorist financing cases and guarantee a swift law enforcement action. / 1a Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA, OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 122–137.

RemovedRecital 42: (42) In order to respect the right to the protection of personal data and the right to privacy, and to limit the impact of cross-border access to the information contained in the national centralised automated mechanisms, the scope of information accessible through the bank account registers (BAR) central access point would be restricted to the minimum necessary in accordance with the principle of data minimisation in order to allow the identification of any natural or legal persons holding or controlling payment accounts and bank accounts identified by IBAN, securities accounts, custodial crypto-asset wallets and safe-deposit boxes. FIUs and the other competent authorities designated according to Directive (EU) 2019/1153 should be granted immediate and unfiltered access to the central access point. Member States should ensure that the FIUs’ staff maintain high professional standards of confidentiality and data protection, that they are of high integrity and are appropriately skilled including in detecting biases in and ethical use of big data sets. Moreover, Member States should put in place technical and organisational measures guaranteeing the security of the data to high technological standards.

RemovedRecital 44: (44) Land and real estate is an attractive commodity for criminals to launder the proceeds of their illicit activities, as it allows obscuring the true source of the funds and the identity of the beneficial owner. Proper and timely identification of natural or legal person owning land and real estate by FIUs and other competent authorities is important both for detecting money laundering schemes as well as for freezing, seizing and confiscation of assets, in particular in the case of targeted financial sanctions. Member States should set-up registers or electronic data retrieval systems to effectively put an end to real estate or land as a means to launder money. It is therefore important that Member States provide FIUs and competent authorities with access to information through a single access point in each Member State, which allows the identification in a timely manner of natural or legal person owning land and real estate, including through registers or electronic data retrieval systems, and information relevant for the identification of the beneficial owner, as well as timely access to the information relevant for the identification of the risk and suspicion of the transaction. Such data should be interconnected via the European real estate data single access point (E-RED) to be developed and operated by the Commission.

RemovedRecital 44 a (new): (44a) Certain goods registered under national law can be attractive commodities for criminals to launder the proceeds of their illicit activities. Member States should provide for systems to aggregate information on ownership of such goods, for example watercrafts and aircrafts. Member States should also consider aggregating, through registers or other systems, information on ownership of certain other goods of high value, particularly insured goods. Proper and timely identification of natural persons who are beneficial owners of those goods by FIUs and other competent authorities is important both for detecting money laundering schemes and for freezing assets. It is therefore important for Member States to provide FIUs and competent authorities with access to information which allows the identification in a timely manner of natural persons owning certain goods directly or via beneficial ownership and to information relevant for the identification of the risk and suspicion of transactions. Given the money laundering and terrorist financing risk posed by goods in freezones, it is similarly important for Member States to ensure that information on certain goods in freezones is available to competent authorities through registers or electronic data retrieval systems on free zones. Those registers or data retrieval system should be interconnected via the free zone goods’ information (FZGI) single access point to be developed and operated by the Commission.

RemovedRecital 45: (45) All Member States have, or should, set up operationally independent and autonomous FIUs to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FIU should be the single central national unit responsible for the receipt and analysis of suspicious transaction reports, reports on cross-border physical movements of cash through the customs information system and on payments in cash above a certain threshold as well as other information relevant to money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing submitted by obliged entities. Operational independence and autonomy of the FIU should be ensured by granting the FIU the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely, including the ability to take autonomous decisions as regards analysis, requests and dissemination of specific information. In all cases, the FIU should have the independent right to forward or disseminate information to competent authorities. The FIU should be provided with adequate financial, human and technical resources, in a manner that secures its autonomy and independence and enables it to exercise its mandate effectively. The FIU should be able to obtain and deploy the resources needed to carry out its functions, on an individual or routine basis, free from any undue political, government or industry influenc…

RemovedRecital 45 a (new): (45a) FIU staff should be of high integrity and appropriately skilled, including in detecting biases in, and in the ethical use of, big data sets, and maintain high professional standards. FIU staff should not be in a situation where a conflict of interest exists or could be perceived to exist. AMLA should adopt guidelines to address situations of conflict of interest.

RemovedRecital 46: (46) FIUs play an important role in identifying the financial operations of terrorist networks, especially cross-border, and in detecting their financial backers. Financial intelligence might be of fundamental importance in uncovering the facilitation of terrorist offences and the networks and schemes of terrorist organisations. FIUs maintain significant differences as regards their functions, competences and powers. The current differences should however not affect an FIU’s activity, particularly its capacity to develop preventive analyses in support of all the authorities in charge of intelligence, investigative and judicial activities, and international cooperation. In the exercise of their tasks, it has become essential to identify the minimum set of data FIUs should have swift access to and be able to exchange without impediments with their counterparts from other Member States. In all cases of suspected money laundering, its predicate offences and in cases involving the financing of terrorism, information should flow directly and quickly without undue delays. It is therefore essential to further enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of FIUs, by clarifying the powers of and cooperation between FIUs. FIUs should cooperate with each other to the greatest extent possible. An FIU should be able to refuse to exchange information with another FIU only in exceptional circumstances where the exchange could be contrary to fundamental principles of national law. Such exceptiona…

RemovedRecital 47: (47) The powers of FIUs include the right to access directly or indirectly the ‘financial’, ‘administrative’ and ‘law enforcement’ information that they require in order to combat money laundering, its associated predicate offences and terrorist financing. The lack of definition of what types of information these general categories include has resulted in FIUs having been granted with access to considerably diversified sets of information which has an impact on FIUs’ analytical functions as well as on their capacity to cooperate effectively with their counterparts from other Member States. It is therefore necessary to define the minimum sets of ‘financial’, ‘administrative’ and ‘law enforcement’ information that should be made directly or indirectly available to every FIU across the Union. Moreover, FIUs should be able to obtain swiftly from any obliged entity all necessary information relating to their functions. An FIU should also be able to obtain such information upon request made by another FIU and to exchange that information with the requesting FIU in compliance with existing legal provisions, such as Directive (EU) 2019/1153. Access to financial, administrative and law enforcement information by FIUs should be in accordance with the principle of data minimisation.

RemovedRecital 48: (48) The vast majority of FIUs have been granted the power to take urgent action and suspend or prohibit a transaction for a pre-determined period in order to analyse it, confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analytical activities to the competent authorities. However, there are certain variations in relation to the duration of the postponement powers across the different Member States, with an impact not only on the postponement of activities that have a cross-border nature through FIU-to-FIU cooperation, but also on individuals’ fundamental rights. Furthermore, in order to ensure that FIUs have the capacity to promptly restrain criminal funds or assets and prevent their dissipation, also for seizure purposes, FIUs should be granted the power to suspend, for the necessary and adequate period, the use of a bank or payment account in order to analyse the transactions performed through the account, confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis to the competent authorities. Given that postponement powers have an impact on the right to property, the preservation of affected persons’ fundamental rights should be guaranteed. Where an FIU decides to suspend or prohibit a transaction or an account that concerns another Member State, it should promptly forward that information to the FIU of that Member State and make it available to other FIUs through FIU.net. Each FIU should appoint a fundamental rights officer from within its own staff to ensur…

RemovedRecital 49: (49) For the purposes of greater transparency and accountability and to increase awareness with regard to their activities, FIUs should issue activity reports on an annual basis. These reports should at least provide statistical data in relation to the suspicious transaction reports received, the number of disseminations made to national competent authorities, the number of requests submitted to and received by other FIUs, information on trends and typologies identified and requests submitted to and received from competent authorities, Europol and EPPO. This report should be made public except for the elements which contain sensitive and classified information. At regular intervals, and at at least once annually, the FIU should provide obliged entities with feedback on the quality of suspicious transaction reports, their timeliness, the description of suspicion and any additional documents provided. Such feedback should be provided to individual obliged entities or groups of obliged entities, depending on the sector, and should aim to further improve the obliged entities’ ability to detect and identify suspicious transactions and activities and enhance the overall reporting mechanisms.

RemovedRecital 50: (50) The purpose of the FIU is to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and to disseminate the results of its analysis as well as additional information to the competent authorities where there are grounds to suspect money laundering, associated predicate offences or financing of terrorism. An FIU should not refrain from or refuse the exchange of information to another FIU, spontaneously or upon request, for reasons such as a lack of identification of an associated predicate offence, features of criminal national laws and differences between the definitions of associated predicate offences or the absence of a reference to particular associated predicate offences. Similarly, an FIU should grant its prior consent to another FIU to forward the information to other competent authorities regardless of the type of possible associated predicate offence and whether or not the predicate offence has been identified, in order to allow the dissemination function to be carried out effectively. FIUs have reported difficulties in exchanging information based on differences in national definitions of certain predicate offences, such as tax crimes, which are not harmonised by Union law. Such differences should not hamper the mutual exchange, the dissemination to other competent authorities and the use of t…

RemovedRecital 50 a (new): (50a) For FIUs to carry out their tasks effectively, given the cross-border nature of many transactions, they must cooperate with each other and with competent authorities, including not only law enforcement authorities, but also tax and customs authorities, Europol and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in a more meaningful and efficient manner. Cooperation with FIUs of third countries is also essential in order to fight money laundering and terrorist financing at the global level and to comply with international AML/CFT standards. Member States should enable, through their legislation, such cooperation and empower their FIUs to enter into effective cooperation arrangements.

RemovedRecital 50 b (new): (50b) In order to ensure appropriate follow up, it is essential that FIUs disseminate the results of their analysis to competent authorities, including information received from other FIUs. Where prior consent to further dissemination is necessary, Member States should ensure that the requested FIU’s prior consent is granted promptly and to the largest extent possible, regardless of the type of predicate offences and whether or not the predicate offence has been identified. Any refusal should be based solely on objective grounds and be grounded on a reasoned justification that such dissemination would fall beyond the scope of application of AML/CFT provisions, could lead to impairing ongoing investigations, or would affect fundamental principles of Union or national law.

RemovedRecital 50 c (new): (50c) When granting consent for the further dissemination of information to competent authorities, the requested FIU should be able to impose restrictions and conditions for the use of that information. The receiving FIU and the competent authorities concerned should comply with the restrictions and conditions set by the requested FIU. For example, a requested FIU might agree that the receiving FIU disseminate the information to competent authorities on the condition that that information can be used for operational and strategic analysis purposes only. In such an event, competent authorities in the receiving Member State should not automatically use the disseminated information as evidence in a judicial proceeding but the competent authorities of that Member State should rather use the applicable judicial cooperation mechanisms to seek information for evidentiary purposes.

RemovedRecital 51: (51) FIUs should use secure facilities, including protected channels of communication by using end-to-end encryption, to cooperate and exchange information amongst each other via the FIU.net and, when available, its one-stop-shop. In this respect, a fully encrypted, safe and secure system for the exchange of information between FIUs of the Member States (‘FIU.net’) should be set up. The system should be managed and hosted by AMLA. The FIU.net should be the only system used by FIUs to cooperate and exchange information amongst each other and may also be used, where appropriate, to exchange information with FIUs of third countries and with other authorities and Union bodies. The functionalities of the FIU.net should be used by FIUs to their full potential. Those functionalities should allow FIUs to match their data with data of other FIUs in an anonymous way, and their subject matter data with the Europol database in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/794, with the aim of detecting subjects of the FIU's interests in other Member States and identifying their proceeds and funds, whilst ensuring full protection of personal data.

RemovedRecital 51 a (new): (51a) Obliged entities should report suspicions of money laundering, its predicate offences and terrorist financing, including attempted transactions, directly to the FIU of the Member State in whose territory the obliged entity in question is established. For that purpose, obliged entities should follow the instructions from their FIU for reporting such suspicion by using protected communication channels. In order to further standardise the reporting of Suspicious Transaction Reports STRs, to reach efficiency gains in FIU operations, and to facilitate the reporting by obliged entities, it is essential to develop a common interface for such reporting based on the FIU.Net system (“FIU.Net one-stop-shop”). AMLA should develop the FIU.Net one-stop-shop reporting interface in order to enable an obliged entity to report directly information to the FIU of the Member State in whose territory the obliged entity transmitting the information is established. Such interface should also allow for the immediate transmission of that information to any other FIU which is concerned by a suspicious transaction report, based on the criteria to be determined through regulatory technical standards. The use of the FIU.Net one-stop-shop should be introduced gradually over time in order to allow a smooth and uninterrupted reporting of suspicion transaction reports and to leave sufficient time for FIUs and obliged entities to implement the necessary technical changes. FIUs should therefore be able to…

RemovedRecital 52: (52) It is important that FIUs cooperate and exchange information effectively with one another. In this regard, AMLA should provide the necessary assistance, not only by means of coordinating joint analyses of cross-border suspicious transaction reports, but also by developing draft regulatory technical standards concerning the format to be used for the exchange of information between FIUs and the relevant factors to be taken into account when determining if a suspicious transaction report concerns another Member State as well as guidelines on the nature, features and objectives of operational and of strategic analysis.

RemovedRecital 54: (54) The movement of illicit money traverses borders and may affect different Member States. The cross-border cases, involving multiple jurisdictions, are becoming more and more frequent and increasingly significant, also due to the activities carried out by obliged entities on a cross-border basis. In order to deal effectively with cases that concern several Member States, FIUs should be able to go beyond the simple exchange of information for the detection and analysis of suspicious transactions and activities and share the analytical activity itself. FIUs have reported certain important issues which limit or condition the capacity of FIUs and AMLA to engage in joint analysis. Carrying out joint analysis of suspicious transactions and activities will enable FIUs to exploit potential synergies, to use information from different Union and national sources, to obtain a full picture of the anomalous activities and to enrich the analysis. FIUs should be able to conduct joint analyses of suspicious transactions and activities and to set up and participate in joint analysis teams for specific purposes and limited period with the assistance of AMLA. The participation of third parties may be instrumental for the successful outcome of joint analyses. Therefore, FIUs may invite, when necessary and relevant, third parties to take part in the joint analysis where such participation would fall within the respective mandates of those third parties. Similarly, AMLA should be able to take t…

RemovedRecital 55: (55) Effective supervision of all obliged entities is essential to protect the integrity of the Union financial system and of the internal market. To this end, Member States should deploy effective, independent and impartial AML/CFT supervision and set forth the conditions for effective, timely and sustained cooperation between supervisors, and the supervisors should be accordingly granted with such legal powers.

RemovedRecital 56: (56) Member States should ensure effective, impartial, independent and risk-based supervision of all obliged entities, preferably by public authorities via a separate and independent national supervisor. National supervisors should be able to perform a comprehensive range of tasks in order to exercise effective supervision of all obliged entities.

RemovedRecital 58: (58) In order to assess and monitor more effectively and regularly the risks the obliged entities are exposed to and the manner in which they implement targeted financial sanctions, it is necessary to clarify that national supervisors are both entitled and bound to conduct all the necessary off-site, on-site and thematic investigations and any other inquiries and assessments as they see necessary. They should also be able to react without undue delay to any suspicion of non-compliance with applicable requirements and to take appropriate supervisory measures to address allegations of non-compliance. This will not only help supervisors decide on those cases where the specific risks inherent in a sector are clear and understood, but also provide them with the tools required to further disseminate relevant information to obliged entities in order to inform their understanding of money laundering and terrorist financing risks.

RemovedRecital 59: (59) Outreach activities, including dissemination of information by the supervisors to the obliged entities under their supervision, including on data protection issues, are essential to guarantee that the private sector has an adequate understanding of the nature and level of money laundering and terrorist financing risks they face and their obligations in that regard.

RemovedRecital 60: (60) Supervisors should adopt a risk-based approach to their work, which should enable them to focus their resources where the risks are the highest, whilst ensuring that no sector or entity is left exposed to criminal attempts to launder money or finance terrorism. AMLA should play a leading role in fostering a common understanding of risks, and should therefore be entrusted with developing the benchmarks and a methodology for assessing and classifying the inherent and residual risk profile of obliged entities, as well as the frequency at which such risk profile should be reviewed. In that regard, supervisors and self-regulatory bodies should adopt annual activity reports and make summaries thereof publicly available.

RemovedRecital 62: (62) Cooperation between national supervisors is essential to ensure a common supervisory approach across the Union. To be effective, this cooperation has to be leveraged to the greatest extent possible and regardless of the respective nature or status of the supervisors. In addition to traditional cooperation - such as the ability to conduct investigations on behalf of a requesting supervisory authority – it is appropriate to mandate the set-up of AML/CFT supervisory colleges, including with the participation of third-country financial supervisors under certain conditions and AMLA, with respect to obliged entities operating under the freedom to provide services or of establishment and with the respect of obliged entities which are part of a group. The supervisory activities of AML/CFT supervisory colleges should be proportionate to the level of risk posed by the relevant obliged entity and the scale of significance of cross-border activity.

RemovedRecital 66: (66) Cross-border groups need to have in place far-reaching group-wide policies and procedures. To ensure that cross-border operations are matched by adequate supervision, there is a need to set out detailed supervisory rules, enabling supervisors of the home Member State and those of the host Member State cooperate with each other to the greatest extent possible, regardless of their respective nature or status, and with AMLA to assess the risks, monitor developments that could affect the various entities that form part of the group, coordinate supervisory action and settle disputes by means of binding instructions. Given its coordinating role, AMLA should be entrusted with the duty to developing the draft regulatory technical standards defining the detailed respective duties of the home and host supervisors of groups, and the modalities of cooperation between them. The supervision of the effective implementation of group policy on AML/CFT should be done in accordance with the principles and modalities of consolidated supervision as laid down in the relevant European sectoral legislation.

RemovedRecital 69: (69) Directive (EU) 2015/849 allowed Member States to entrust the supervision of some obliged entities to self-regulatory bodies. However, the quality and intensity of supervision performed by such self-regulatory bodies has been insufficient, and under no or close to no public scrutiny. Where a Member State decides to entrust supervision to a self-regulatory body, it should also designate a public authority to oversee the activities of the self-regulatory body to ensure that the performance of those activities is in line with the requirements of this Directive. That public authority should be operationally independent and autonomous and should carry out its functions free of political, government or industry influence or interference.

RemovedRecital 70: (70) The importance of combating money laundering and terrorist financing should result in Member States laying down effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative sanctions and measures in national law for failure to respect the requirements of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation]. National supervisors should be empowered by Member States to impose such measures to obliged entities to remedy the situation in the case of breaches and, where the breach so justifies, issue pecuniary sanctions. The range of sanctions and measures should be sufficiently broad to allow Member States and competent authorities to take account of the differences between obliged entities, in particular between credit institutions, financial institutions and other obliged entities, as regards their size, characteristics and the nature of the business.

RemovedRecital 71: (71) Member States currently have a diverse range of administrative sanctions and measures for breaches of the key preventative provisions in place and an inconsistent approach to investigating and sanctioning violations of anti-money laundering requirements, nor is there a common understanding among supervisors as to what should constitute a "serious" violation and thus distinguish when an administrative sanction should be imposed. That diversity is detrimental to the efforts made in combating money laundering and terrorist financing and the Union's response is fragmented. Therefore, common criteria for determining the most appropriate supervisory response to breaches should be laid down and a range of administrative measures that the supervisors could impose when the breaches are not sufficiently serious to be punished with an administrative sanction should be provided. In order to incentivise obliged entities to comply with the provisions of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation], it is necessary to strengthen the dissuasive nature of administrative sanctions. Accordingly, the minimum amount of the maximum penalty that can be imposed in case of serious breaches of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation] should be raised, in a proportionate and adequate way. In that regard, it is essential that regulatory technical standards are developed to define indicators to classify the level of …

RemovedRecital 73: (73) Publication of an administrative sanction or measure for breach of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation] can have a strong dissuasive effect against repetition of such breach. It also informs other entities of the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks associated with the sanctioned obliged entity before entering into a business relationship and assists supervisors in other Member States in relation to the risks associated with an obliged entity when it operates in their Member State on a cross-border basis. For those reasons, the requirement to publish decisions on sanctions where such decisions are no longer subject to internal review should be confirmed. However, any such publication should be proportionate and, in the taking of a decision whether to publish an administrative sanction or measure, supervisors should take into account the gravity of the breach and the dissuasive effect that the publication is likely to achieve.

RemovedRecital 74: (74) There have been a number of cases where employees who have reported their suspicions of money laundering or of violations of AML/CFT requirements have been subjected to threats or hostile action. It is crucial that this issue be addressed to ensure effectiveness of the AML/CFT system. Member States should be aware of this problem and should protect individuals, including employees, such as data protection officers and AML compliance officers, and other representatives of the obliged entity, from such threats or hostile action, and provide, in accordance with Union and national law, in particular Directive EU 2019/1937, appropriate protection to such persons, particularly with regard to their right to the protection of their personal data and their rights to effective judicial protection and representation. Member States should apply the same approach with regard to employees of competent authorities, in particular staff from supervisory authorities or self-regulatory bodies who report potential or actual breaches of AML/CFT requirements.

RemovedRecital 75: (75) The new fully-integrated and coherent anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policy at Union level, with designated roles for both Union and national competent authorities and with a view to ensure their smooth and constant cooperation. In that regard, cooperation between all national and Union AML/CFT authorities is of the utmost importance and should be clarified and enhanced in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and to prevent the non-implementation and evasion of targeted financial sanctions. Internally, it remains the duty of Member States to provide for the necessary rules to ensure that policy makers, the FIUs, supervisors, including AMLA, and other competent authorities involved in AML/CFT, as well as tax authorities and law enforcement authorities when acting within the scope of this Directive, have effective mechanisms to enable them to cooperate and coordinate, including with other Union bodies and through a restrictive approach to the refusal by competent authorities to cooperate and exchange information at the request of another competent authority.

RemovedRecital 76: (76) In order to facilitate and promote effective cooperation, and in particular the exchange of information, Member States should be required to communicate to the Commission and AMLA the list of their competent authorities and registers and their relevant contact details. That list should take into account existing expertise and available networks, such as the expertise gained by the competent authorities of Member States and of third countries through their cooperation with Europol in their fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

RemovedRecital 78 a (new): (78a) Member States should ensure that credit institutions and financial institutions located on their territory provide legal persons and natural persons who are legally resident in the Union, including natural persons with no fixed address, asylum seekers and natural persons who have not been granted a residence permit but whose expulsion is impossible for legal or factual reasons, the right to open and use a payment account with basic features. Such a right should apply irrespective of the natural person’s place of residence. Such a right does not, in any way, exempt obliged entities from their obligations under this Directive and Regulation ... [please insert reference to Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - 2021/0239(COD)], in particular their obligation to ensure that proper due diligence checks are carried out on the persons in question.

RemovedRecital 79: (79) The cooperation between financial supervisors and the authorities responsible for crisis management of credit institutions and investment firms, such as in particular Deposit Guarantee Scheme designated authorities and resolution authorities, is necessary to reconcile the objectives to prevent money laundering under this Directive and to protect financial stability and depositors under the Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU. Financial supervisors should oversee the performance and quality of customer due diligence processes where the credit institution has been determined failing or likely to fail or when the deposits are defined as unavailable, and the reporting of any suspicious transactions to the FIU. Financial supervisors should inform the authorities responsible for crisis management of credit institutions and investment firms of any relevant outcome from the customer due diligence performed and of any account that has been suspended by the FIU.

RemovedRecital 83: (83) Supervisors should be able to cooperate and exchange confidential information, regardless of their respective nature or status. To this end, they should have an adequate legal basis for exchange of confidential information and for cooperation. Exchange of information and cooperation with other authorities competent for supervising or overseeing obliged entities under other Union acts should not be hampered unintentionally by legal uncertainty which may stem from a lack of explicit provisions in this field. Clarification of the legal framework is even more important since prudential supervision has, in a number of cases, been entrusted to non-AML/CFT supervisors, such as the European Central Bank (ECB). When imposing administrative sanctions and supervisory measures on obliged entities, or performing other tasks necessitating coordination between supervisors and non-AML/CFT authorities, the authorities concerned should take into account the differences between their respective supervisory mandates and cooperate accordingly.

RemovedRecital 83 a (new): (83a) The exchange of information among supervisors and with other authorities is a key enabler in order to ensure the effectiveness of the Union AML/CFT framework. Member States should authorise the exchange of information between supervisors and other relevant authorities, including, where relevant, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and OLAF with regard to possible cases pertaining to their respective legal mandates. Confidential information exchanged should only be used in the discharge of the duties of the authorities concerned and in the context of administrative or judicial proceedings specifically related to the discharge of those duties.

RemovedRecital 84: (84) The effectiveness of the Union AML/CFT framework relies on the cooperation between a wide array of competent authorities. To facilitate such cooperation, AMLA should be entrusted to develop guidelines in coordination with the ECB, the European Supervisory Authorities, Europol, Eurojust, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office on cooperation between all competent authorities at Union and national level. Such guidelines should also describe how authorities competent for the supervision or oversight of obliged entities under other Union acts should take into account money laundering and terrorist financing concerns in the performance of their duties.

RemovedRecital 86: (86) It is essential that the alignment of this Directive with the revised FATF Recommendations is carried out in full compliance with Union law, in particular as regards Union data protection law, including rules on data transfers, as well as the protection of fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’). Certain aspects of the implementation of this Directive involve the collection, analysis, storage and sharing of data within the Union and possibly with third countries. Such processing of personal data should be permitted only for the purposes laid down in this Directive, and for the activities required under this Directive, such as the exchange of information among competent authorities, and should fully respect fundamental rights obligations as required by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Union data protection rules as regards onward data transfers, including to third countries.

RemovedRecital 90: (90) In order to ensure consistent approaches among FIUs and among supervisors, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards setting out the criteria as regards appointment and functions of a central contact point of certain services providers, setting out indicators to classify the level of gravity of breaches and criteria for repeated failures to provide registers with up-to-date, accurate and adequate information on beneficial ownership, setting out benchmarks and methodology for assessing and classifying the inherent and residual risk profile of obliged entities and the frequency of risk profile reviews, laying down details of duties of the home and host supervisors, and the modalities of cooperation between them, specifying the general conditions for the functioning of the AML supervisory colleges and the operational functioning of such colleges, specifying the general conditions for supervision of groups of obliged entities other than credit or financial institutions, defining indicators to classify the level of gravity of breaches of this Directive and criteria to be taken into account when setting the level of administrative sanctions or taking administrative measures. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including…

RemovedRecital 91: (91) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission in order to lay down a methodology for the collection of statistics, establish the format for the submission of beneficial ownership information, define the technical conditions for the interconnection of beneficial ownership registers and of bank account registers and data retrieval mechanisms, define the technical conditions for the connection of the Member States' mechanisms to the single access point on land and real estate, specify the criteria and format to be used by FIUs for sharing information on suspended or prohibited transactions and on suspended accounts, adopt implementing technical standards specifying the format to be used for the exchange of the information among FIUs of the Member States and the relevant factors to be taken into account when determining if a suspicious transaction report concerns another Member State, and adopt implementing technical standards specifying a common template for the cooperation agreements between financial supervisors and their counterparts in third countries. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council. / (deleted)

RemovedRecital 92: (92) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter, in particular the right to respect for private and family life (Article 7 of the Charter), the right to the protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter) and the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter). It does not modify the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and legal principles enshrined in Article 6 TEU.

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point a: (a) measures applicable to sectors exposed to money laundering and terrorist financing at Union and national level

RemovedArticle 1 – paragraph 1 – point c: (c) access to information on beneficial ownership, bank accounts, land or real estate registers and relevant goods

RemovedArticle 2 – paragraph 2 – point 7: (7) ‘entity operating on a cross-border basis’ means an obliged entity having at least one establishment in another Member State or in a third country, or operating under the freedom to provide services

RemovedArticle 2 – paragraph 2 – point 8 a (new): (8a) ‘predicate offence’ means a criminal activity as defined in Article 2, point (3), of Regulation ... [please insert reference to Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - 2021/0239(COD)]

RemovedArticle 3 – paragraph 1: 1. Where the national risk assessment carried out by Member States pursuant to Article 8, information received from FIUs in other Member States or information from AMLA identifies that, in addition to obliged entities, entities in other sectors are exposed to money laundering and terrorist financing risks, Member States may apply the requirements of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - COM/2021/420 final] to those additional entities

RemovedArticle 3 – paragraph 2 – point c: (c) the text of the national measures that the Member State intends to propose or adopt

RemovedArticle 4 – title: Requirements relating to certain obliged entities

RemovedArticle 4 – paragraph 2 a (new): 2a. Member States shall ensure that the procedures for licensing currency exchange, cheque cashing offices and trusts or company service providers require applicants to demonstrate a good understanding of the risks of money laundering and terrorism financing in their sector of activity. They shall also ensure that applicants have access to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing training provided in accordance with uniform and high standards by supervisory authorities, certified service providers or obliged entities that have the knowledge and expertise necessary to provide such training.

RemovedArticle 4 – paragraph 2 b (new): 2b. Member States shall ensure that procedures under national law for entering regulated professions that are obliged entities as referred to in Article 3, point (3) of Regulation ... [please insert reference to Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - 2021/0239(COD)] require applicants to demonstrate a good understanding of the risks of money laundering and terrorism financing in their sector of activity.

RemovedArticle 4 – paragraph 2 c (new): 2c. Member States shall ensure that estate agents as referred to in Article 3 point (3) (d) of Regulation ... [please insert reference to –Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - 2021/0239(COD)] develop or have in place training programmes for professionals. Such training programmes may be facilitated or provided by professional associations representing estate agents and the real estate sector.

RemovedArticle 5 – paragraph 1: 1. Member States may require electronic money issuers as defined in Article 2(3) of Directive 2009/110/EC44, payment service providers as defined in Article 4(11) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 and crypto-assets service providers operating through an agent, a distributor or any other natural or legal person which acts on their behalf, located in the host Member State and operating under either the right of establishment or the freedom to provide services, and whose head office is situated in another Member State, to appoint a central contact point in their territory. That central contact point shall ensure, on behalf of the entity operating on a cross-border basis, compliance with AML/CFT rules and shall facilitate supervision by supervisors, including by providing supervisors with documents and information on request.

RemovedArticle 6 – paragraph 1: 1. Member States shall require supervisors to verify that the members of the senior management in the obliged entities referred to in Article 4 as well as in the obliged entities referred to in Article 3, points (3)(a), (b), (d), (e) and (h) to (l), of Regulation ... [please insert reference to Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - 2021/0239(COD)], and the beneficial owners of such entities, act with honesty and integrity. Senior management of such entities shall be of good repute and possess proven knowledge and expertise necessary to carry out their functions. In case no management role exists in an obliged entity, those requirements applies to the person referred to in Article 9(6), second subparagraph, of Regulation ... [insert reference to AML Regulation - 2021/0239(COD)].

RemovedArticle 6 – paragraph 3: 3. Member States shall ensure that supervisors verify at regular intervals and on a risk-sensitive basis whether the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 continue to be met. In particular, they shall verify whether the senior management is of good repute, acts with honesty and integrity and possesses proven knowledge and expertise necessary to carry out their functions in cases where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or there is increased risk thereof in an obliged entity

RemovedArticle 6 – paragraph 4: 4. Member States shall ensure that supervisors have the power to request the removal of any person convicted of money laundering, any of its predicate offences or terrorist financing from the management role of the obliged entities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. Supervisors shall have the power to remove or suspend members of the senior management where it is deemed that they are not of good repute, have not acted with honesty and integrity or do not possess proven knowledge and expertise necessary to carry out their functions. In cases where no management role exists in an obliged entity, supervisors shall have the power to take adequate measures where it has been deemed that the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 are not met.

RemovedArticle 6 – paragraph 4 a (new): 4a. Member States shall ensure that supervisors have the power to request the suspension of any person from the management role of an obliged entity as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or, in the case where no management role exists in an obliged entity, to take adequate measures, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or that the risk thereof could increase in connection with that obliged entity.