Changes from plenary report to adopted text

RemovedDRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

AddedP9_TA(2024)0364

Removedon the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mechanisms to be put in place by the Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849

AddedThe sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive

Removed(COM(2021)0423 – C90342/2021 – 2021/0250(COD))

AddedCommittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

AddedPE730.070

AddedEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mechanisms to be put in place by the Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849 (COM(2021)0423 – C9-0342/2021 – 2021/0250(COD))

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0423),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C90342/2021),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Removed– having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2022,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021,

Added– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committees responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 14 February 2024 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Added– having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0150/2023),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Change 1

RemovedRecital 1: (1) Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council 22 constitutes the main legal instrument for the prevention of the use of the Union financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. That Directive sets out a comprehensive legal framework, which Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and the Council 23 further strengthened by addressing emerging risks and increasing transparency of beneficial ownership. Notwithstanding its achievements, experience has shown that Directive (EU) 2015/849 should be further improved to adequately mitigate risks and to effectively detect criminal attempts to misuse the Union financial system for criminal purposes and to further the integrity of the internal market.

AddedP9_TC1-COD(2021)0250

RemovedRecital 6: (6) Specific money laundering and terrorist financing threats, risks and vulnerabilities affecting certain economic sectors at national level diminish in distinct manners Member States ability to contribute to the integrity and soundness of the Union financial system. As such, it is appropriate to allow Member States, upon identification of such sectors and specific risks to apply AML/CFT requirements to additional sectors than those covered by Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation]. With a view to preserving the effectiveness of the internal market and the Union AML/CFT system, the Commission should be able, with the support of AMLA, to assess whether the decisions of the Member States to apply AML/CFT requirements to additional sectors are justified. In cases where the best interests of the Union would be achieved at Union level as regards specific sectors, the Commission should inform that Member State that it intends to take action at Union level instead and the Member State should abstain from taking the intended national measures.

AddedPosition of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 April 2024 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, and amending and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849

RemovedRecital 6 a (new): (6a) With a view to protecting the Union’s financial system it is essential that applicants entering into regulated professions that are obliged entities have a good understanding of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing in their sector of activity. Therefore, Member States should ensure that licensing procedures and entry requirements under national law to regulated professions that are obliged entities as referred to in Regulation ... [please insert reference to Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - 2021/0239(COD)] require applicants to demonstrate a good understanding of the risks of money laundering and terrorism financing in their sector of activity. AML/CFT training, provided either by obliged entities or by supervisors, should be accessible to such applicants.

Added(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2024/1640.)

RemovedRecital 7: (7) In light of anti-money laundering vulnerabilities related to the electronic money issuing, the payment services and the crypto-assets service providing industry, it should be possible for Member States to require that those providers established on their territory in forms other than a branch and the head office of which is situated in another Member State appoint a central contact point. Such a central contact point, acting on behalf of the appointing institution, should ensure the establishments' compliance with AML/CFT rules.

RemovedRecital 8: (8) Supervisors should ensure that, with regard to currency exchange offices, cheque cashing offices, trust or company service providers or gambling service providers, the persons who effectively manage the business of such entities and the beneficial owners of such entities are of good repute and act with honesty, good faith and integrity and possess proven knowledge and expertise necessary to carry out their functions. The criteria for determining whether or not a person complies with those requirements should, as a minimum, reflect the need to protect such entities from being misused by their managers or beneficial owners for criminal purposes. AMLA should issue guidelines for the purposes of fostering a common understanding of the elements which supervisors are to take into account in order to determine whether senior management is of good repute, acts with honesty and integrity and possesses the necessary knowledge and expertise.

RemovedRecital 8 a (new): (8a) Member States should ensure that estate agents as referred to in Regulation [please insert reference to Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - 2021/0239(COD)] develop or have in place training programmes for professionals. Such training programmes could be facilitated or provided by professional associations representing agents and the real estate sector. The nature and extent of training should be tailored to the scale and complexity of the business and be appropriate to the level of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing faced by the obliged entity.

RemovedRecital 10: (10) The Commission is well placed to review specific cross-border threats that could affect the internal market and that cannot be identified and effectively combatted by individual Member States. It should therefore be entrusted with the responsibility for coordinating the assessment of risks relating to cross-border activities. Involvement of the relevant experts, such as the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and the representatives from the FIUs, as well as, where appropriate, from other Union-level bodies, is essential for the effectiveness of the process of the assessment of risks. Ongoing national risk assessments and experience are also an important source of information for that process. Such assessment of the cross-border risks by the Commission should not involve the processing of personal data. In any event, data should be fully anonymised. National and Union data protection supervisory authorities should be involved only if the assessment of the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing has an impact on the privacy and data protection of individuals.

RemovedRecital 12: (12) Member States remain the best placed to identify, assess, understand and decide how to mitigate risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, and how to fight money laundering and terrorist financing affecting them directly. Therefore, each Member State should take the appropriate steps to properly identify, assess and understand its money laundering and terrorist financing risks on an ongoing basis, as well as risks of non-implementation and evasion of targeted financial sanctions and to define a coherent national strategy to put in place actions to mitigate those risks. Such national risk assessment should be updated regularly and should include a description of the institutional structure and broad procedures of the Member State's AML/CFT regime, as well as the allocated human and financial resources. National risk assessments should be kept up to date and should be reviewed at least every three years. Based on the identification of country-specific risks and for justified reason, the Commission should be able to require that Member States review their risk assessment earlier in order to reduce the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing in the Union..

RemovedRecital 12 a (new): (12a) Member States should make a summary of the results of their risk assessment publicly available. Such a summary should not contain classified information. The information contained in such a summary should not name any natural or legal person. In specific circumstances, Member States might need to refer to prominent money laundering cases, relevant information from leaks or other major suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing that were widely reported in the media. It is accepted that in such cases it might not be possible to avoid the identification of certain natural or legal persons or that their identity can be inferred from the factual information.

RemovedRecital 13: (13) The results of risk assessments should, be made available to obliged entities in a timely and appropriate manner to enable them to identify, understand, manage and mitigate their own risks.

RemovedRecital 14: (14) In addition, to identify, understand, manage and mitigate risks at Union level to an even greater degree, Member States should make available the results of their risk assessments to each other, to the Commission and to AMLA. In order to respect privacy and protect personal data, the results of risk assessments should only be made available to the extent that the data provided is the minimum level of data necessary for the carrying out of AML/CFT duties.

RemovedRecital 15: (15) To be able to review the effectiveness of their systems for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, Member States should maintain, and improve the quality of, relevant statistics. With a view to enhancing the quality and consistency of the statistical data collected at Union level, the Commission and the AMLA should keep track of the Union-wide situation with respect to the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing and should publish regular overviews. The Commission should adopt implementing acts laying down the methodology for the collection of statistics and the arrangements for transmission of such statistics to the Commission and AMLA.

RemovedRecital 16: (16) The FATF has developed standards for jurisdictions to identify, and assess the risks of potential non-implementation or evasion of the targeted financial sanctions, and to take action to mitigate those risks. Those new standards introduced by the FATF do not substitute nor undermine the existing strict requirements for countries to implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with the relevant United Nations Security Council Regulations relating to the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing. Those existing obligations, as implemented at Union level by Council Decisions 2010/413/CFSP26 and (CFSP) 2016/84927 as well as Council Regulations (EU) 267/201228 and (EU) 2017/150929 remain strict rule-based obligations binding on all natural and legal persons within the Union. Strict rule-based obligations should also apply with regard to terrorism and terrorism financing-related sanctions and other targeted financial sanctions adopted by the Union.

RemovedRecital 17: (17) In order to reflect the latest developments at international level and ensure a comprehensive framework for implementing targeted financial sanctions, multiple requirements have been introduced by this Directive to prevent, identify, understand, manage and mitigate risks of potential non-implementation or evasion of financial sanctions at Union level and at Member State level.

RemovedRecital 18: (18) Central registers of beneficial ownership information are crucial in combating the misuse of legal entities. Therefore, Member States should ensure that the beneficial ownership information of legal entities and legal arrangements, information on nominee arrangements and information on foreign legal entities and foreign legal arrangements are held in a central register. To ensure that the registers of beneficial ownership information are easily accessible and contain high-quality data, consistent rules on the collection and storing of this information should be introduced. Central registers should be accessible in a readily usable and machine readable format.

RemovedRecital 19: (19) With a view to enhancing transparency in order to combat the misuse of legal entities, Member States should ensure that beneficial ownership information is stored in a central register located outside the company, in full compliance with Union law. Member States should, for that purpose, use a central database, which collects beneficial ownership information, or the business register, or another central register. Member States may decide that obliged entities are responsible for filling in the register. Member States should make sure that in all cases that information is made available to competent authorities and FIUs and is provided to obliged entities when they take customer due diligence measures.

RemovedRecital 20: (20) Beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be registered where the trustees and persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements are established or where they reside. In order to ensure the effective monitoring and registration of information on the beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, cooperation between Member States is also necessary. The interconnection of Member States’ registries of beneficial owners of trusts and similar legal arrangements should make this information accessible, and should also ensure that the multiple registration of the same trusts and similar legal arrangements is avoided within the Union.

RemovedRecital 22: (22) The accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data, and to make valid, lawful decisions based on that data. Therefore, Member States should ensure that entities in charge of the central registers verify, at the time of submission of the beneficial ownership information and on a regular basis thereafter, that that the information submitted is adequate, accurate and up to date. Member States should ensure that entities in charge of central registers have at their disposal state-of-the-art technology to carry out automated verifications in a manner that safeguards fundamental rights and avoids discriminatory outcomes. Furthermore, where sufficient reasons arise, after careful analysis by the registrars, to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers, legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. In addition, it is important that Member States entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers and resources to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it, and to report any suspicion to their FIU. Such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities and, where applicable, to obliged entities, in accordance with national law. Similarly, such powers should extend…

RemovedRecital 22 a (new): (22a) Where a verification carried out at the time of submission of the beneficial ownership information leads an entity in charge of the register to conclude that there are inconsistencies or errors in that information , or where that information otherwise fails to fulfil the necessary requirements, Member States should ensure that such entity is able to withhold and suspend the certification of registration until the beneficial owner information provided is in order. Where the inconsistencies are detected at a later stage, Member States should ensure that the legal consequences attached to the registration cannot follow.

RemovedRecital 22 b (new): (22b) Member States should ensure that, in the event of repeated failure to provide up-to-date, accurate and adequate information to the authorities in charge of the central registers, the relevant national authorities impose appropriate sanctions. Such sanctions should be able to include restrictions in the access to certain professions and in the exercise of certain functions within a corporate, legal entity or legal arrangement, restrictions in the establishment of a business relationship with an obliged entities, in the exercise of ownership rights of a corporate and legal entity or in the ability to receive dividends, and suspension or discontinuation of activities. The entity in charge of registers should notify the national authorities competent for imposing appropriate sanctions of the repeated failures. In the event of repeated failures to provide up-to-date, accurate and adequate information, sanctions should be increased to the level necessary to ensure compliance.

RemovedRecital 22 c (new): (22c) Entities in charge of central registers should be operationally independent and autonomous and have the authority and capacity to carry out their functions free of political, governmental or industry influence or interference. Staff of such entities should be of high integrity and appropriately skilled and maintain high professional standards. Employees or managers of the central register who report breaches of the requirements under this Directive should be legally protected from being exposed to threats, retaliatory or hostile action and, in particular, adverse or discriminatory employment actions in accordance with Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a. / 1a Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17).

RemovedRecital 22 d (new): (22d) Peer reviews are an effective instrument to ensure that registers established in Member States fulfil the requirements of this Directive and to identify best practices and shortcomings. AMLA should therefore have a role in conducting peer reviews of some or all of the activities of the entities in charge of the central beneficial ownership registers with the purpose of assessing whether those entities have mechanisms to fulfil the requirements of this Directive and effectively check whether the beneficial ownership information held in those register is accurate, adequate and up to date.

RemovedRecital 22 e (new): (22e) Beneficial ownership registers are well placed to identify, in a rapid and efficient manner, the individuals who ultimately own or control legal entities and arrangements, including individuals designated in relation to targeted financial sanctions. Timely detection of such ownership structures contributes to improving the understanding of the exposure to risks of evasion of targeted financial sanctions, and to the adoption of mitigating measures to reduce such risks. It is therefore important that such registers be required to screen the beneficial ownership information they hold against designations in relation to targeted financial sanctions, both immediately upon such designation and regularly thereafter, in order to detect whether changes in the ownership or control structure of the legal entity or arrangement are conducive to risks of evasion of targeted financial sanctions. Entities in charge of beneficial ownership registers should promptly share such findings with competent authorities, including FIUs and AML/CFT supervisors, for the purposes of ensuring compliance with targeted financial sanctions.

RemovedRecital 24: (24) In view of ensuring that the mechanism of discrepancy reporting is proportionate and focused on the detection of instances of inaccurate beneficial ownership information, Member States should allow obliged entities to request the customer to rectify discrepancies of a technical nature directly with the entity in charge of the central registers. Such option only applies to low-risk customers and to those errors of a technical nature, such as minor cases of misspelt information, where it is evident that that those do not hinder the identification of the beneficial owner(s) and the accuracy of the information.

RemovedRecital 27 a (new): (27a) FIUs, other competent authorities, self-regulatory bodies and obliged entities should have prompt, unrestricted and free access to information on beneficial ownership through the European Central Platform for the purposes of combating money laundering and terrorism financing and carrying out due diligence.

RemovedRecital 28: (28) Registers of beneficial ownership are important tools for advancing the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, and corruption, tax abuse and other predicate offences. The access to that information also helps investigations on money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing.

RemovedRecital 29: deleted

RemovedRecital 30: (30) In its judgment of 22 November 2022 in Case C-37/2011a, the Court of Justice ruled that persons connected with the prevention and combating of money laundering and terrorist financing are considered as having a legitimate interest in accessing the information on beneficial owners. Notably, the Court identified several categories of persons as having a legitimate interest in accessing such information, namely persons acting for the purpose of journalism, reporting or other form of expression in the media that are connected with the prevention and combating of money laundering, any of its associated predicate offences or terrorist financing; civil society organisations that are connected with the prevention and combating of money laundering, any of its associated predicate offences or terrorist financing; persons who are likely to enter into transactions or business relationship with a corporate, legal entity or legal arrangements; and financial institutions and authorities in so far as they are involved in the prevention and combat of money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing and do not already have access pursuant to Article 11 of this Directive. Therefore, this Directive aims at defining a minimum and non-exhaustive list of persons that have a legitimate interest in accessing information on beneficial owners. Other categories of persons could also claim a legitimate interest based on grounds other than those listed in this Directive. While fully re…

RemovedRecital 31: (31) With regard to corporate, legal entities and legal arrangements, a fair balance should be sought in particular between the general public interest in the prevention of money laundering, its predicate offences and terrorist financing and the data subjects’ fundamental rights. The set of data to be made available to the persons having a legitimate interest should be limited, clearly and exhaustively defined, and should be of a general nature, so as to minimise the potential prejudice to the beneficial owners. At the same time, information made accessible to the persons having a legitimate interest should not significantly differ from the data currently collected. In order to limit the interference with the right to respect for their private life in general and to protection of their personal data in particular, that information should relate essentially to the status of beneficial owners of corporate, legal entities and legal arrangements and should strictly concern the sphere of economic activity in which the beneficial owners operate. In cases where the senior managing official has been identified as the beneficial owner only ex officio and not through ownership interest held or control exercised by other means, this should be clearly visible in the registers.

RemovedRecital 32: deleted

RemovedRecital 33: (33) In order to ensure that the information available to persons having a legitimate interest allows the correct identification of the beneficial owner, a minimum set of data should be accessible to persons having a legitimate interest. Such data should allow for the unequivocal identification of the beneficial owner, whilst minimising the amount of personal data accessible. In the absence of information pertaining to the name, the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner, it would not be possible to establish unambiguously who the natural person being the beneficial owner is. Similarly, the absence of information on the nature and extent of beneficial interest held, including information on ownership and control chain, as well as the date somebody became a beneficial owner, would make it impossible to determine why that natural person should be identified as being the beneficial owner at a given moment. Therefore, in order to avoid misinterpretations of the beneficial ownership information available and to ensure a proportionate disclosure of personal data consistent across the Union, it is appropriate to lay down the set of data that can be accessed by persons having a legitimate interest.

RemovedRecital 34: (34) Competent authorities, obliged entities and persons having a legitimate interest need to access information on the beneficial owners of corporate, legal entities and legal arrangements that have been struck off from registers. This is due to the fact that investigations, monitoring, analysis or research need sufficient time to detect, uncover and identify facts related to money laundering and terrorist financing cases. Money laundering schemes often involve corporate entities, legal entities and legal arrangements which are created for a short period to limit traceability. An immediate deletion of the data would create a loophole whereby criminals would strike off related corporate entities, legal entities or legal arrangements for the purpose of removing any trace of them for competent authorities, obliged entities and persons having a legitimate interest. Therefore, it is essential that the information on beneficial ownership remains available through the national registers and through the system of interconnection of beneficial ownership registers for a minimum of five years and up to ten years after the grounds for registering beneficial ownership information of the trust or similar legal arrangement have ceased to exist. Without prejudice to national law on evidence applicable to ongoing criminal investigations and legal proceedings, Member States should be able to allow or require the retention of such information or documents in concrete cases for a further maximu…

RemovedRecital 35: (35) Moreover, with the aim of ensuring a proportionate and balanced approach and to guarantee the rights to private life and personal data protection, Member States should provide for exemptions to the disclosure of the personal information on the beneficial owner through the registers of beneficial ownership information and to access to such information, in exceptional circumstances, where that information would expose the beneficial owner to a disproportionate risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, harassment, violence or intimidation. Such exemptions should be granted by competent authorities on a case-by-case basis and upon a detailed analysis of the nature of the exceptional circumstances in each case. It should also be possible for Member States to require online registration in order to identify any person who requests information from the register, as well as the payment of a proportionate and adequate fee for access to the information in the register, which should not exceed the direct costs of requesting or making the information available. Where the access to the register is provided online through electronic means, Member States should not require the payment of any fees since it is assumed that there is no direct cost of making the information available.

RemovedRecital 35 a (new): (35a) Currently, certain Member States require online registration in order to be able to identify any person who requests information from the register of beneficial ownership information, and the payment of a fee to obtain information from the register. Identification of users can be a legitimate requirement but it should not lead to discrimination based on their country of residence or nationality. Furthermore, requirements linked to registration or to fees can impede access to registers of beneficial ownership information. It is essential that Member States ensure access to beneficial ownership information without any restrictions based on geographical location or nationality.