Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from plenary report to adopted text
A-9-2023-0039 → TA-9-2024-0003
- From
- A-9-2023-0039 Plenary report of 2 Mar 2023
- To
- TA-9-2024-0003 Adopted text of 16 Jan 2024
- Changes
- Not comparable
- Paragraphs
- +8 added · −123 removed · 1 changed
More facts (2)
- Title (from)
- on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments
- Title (to)
- Amendments to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)
These two texts have too little in common to be compared paragraph by paragraph (under 15 % of their paragraphs match): they are different documents rather than versions of one — for example a group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted.
Every difference
The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.
Part 1 of 3: DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION
RemovedDRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION
AddedP9_TA(2024)0003
Changedon the proposal for a directiveAmendments ofto the European Parliament and ofMarkets thein CouncilFinancial amendingInstruments Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial(MiFID instrumentsII)
Removed(COM(2021)0726 – C90438/2021 – 2021/0384(COD))
AddedCommittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
AddedPE735.505
AddedEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 16 January 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (COM(2021)0726 – C9-0438/2021 – 2021/0384(COD))
6 unchanged paragraphs
(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0726),
– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 53(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C90438/2021),
– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– after consulting the European Central Bank,
Change 1
Removed– after consulting the European Economic and Social Committee,
Added– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 18 October 2023 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
5 unchanged paragraphs
– having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0039/2023),
1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;
2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;
3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Change 2
RemovedAMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT*
AddedP9_TC1-COD(2021)0384
Removedto the Commission proposal
AddedPosition of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 16 January 2024 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments
Removed---------------------------------------------------------
Added(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2024/790).
RemovedDIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
Removedamending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments
Removed(Text with EEA relevance)
RemovedTHE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
RemovedHaving regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 53(1) thereof,
RemovedHaving regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
RemovedAfter transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
RemovedHaving regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,
RemovedHaving regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,
RemovedActing in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
RemovedWhereas:
Removed(1) In its 2020 CMU Action Plan, the Commission announced its intention to table a legislative proposal to create a centralised data base which was meant to provide a comprehensive view on prices and volume of equity and equity-like financial instruments traded throughout the Union across a multitude of trading venues (‘consolidated tape’). On 2 December 2020, in its conclusion on the Commission’s CMU Action Plan, the Council encouraged the Commission to stimulate more investment activity inside the Union by enhancing data availability and transparency by further assessing how to tackle the obstacles to establishing a consolidated tape in the Union.
Removed(2) In its roadmap on ‘The European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience’ of 19 January 2021, the Commission confirmed its intention to improve, simplify and further harmonise capital markets’ transparency, as part of the review of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 the European Parliament and of the Council. As part of efforts to strengthen the international role of the Euro, the Commission also announced that such reform would include the design and implementation of a consolidated tape, in particular for corporate bond issuances to increase the liquidity of secondary trading in euro-denominated debt instruments.
Removed(3) Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 was amended by Regulation (EU) XX/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council removing the main obstacles that have prevented the emergence of a consolidated tape. That Regulation therefore introduced mandatory contributions of market data to the consolidated tape provider and enhanced the data quality including harmonizing the synchronisation of the business clock. In addition, that Regulation reduced the recourse to possibilities to waive pre-trade transparency for venues and systematic internalisers. Furthermore, it introduced enhancements to the trading obligations and the prohibition of the practice of receiving payment for forwarding client orders for execution. Since Directive 2014/65 also contains provisions related to consolidated tape and transparency, the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 should be reflected in Directive 2014/65/EU.
Removed(4) Article 1(7) of Directive 2014/65/EU requires operators of systems in which multiple third-party buying and selling trading interests in financial instruments are able to interact (‘multilateral systems’) to operate in accordance with the requirements concerning regulated markets (‘RMs’), multilateral trading facilities (‘MTFs’), or organised trading facilities (‘OTFs’). However, market practice, as evidenced by the European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) in its final report on the functioning of the organised trading facility has shown that the principle of multilateral trading activity requiring a license has not been upheld in the Union, which has led to an uneven playing field between licensed and unlicensed multilateral systems. In addition, that situation has created legal uncertainty for certain market participants as to the regulatory expectations for such multilateral systems. To provide market participants with clarity, safeguard a level-playing field, improve the internal market functioning and ensure a uniform application of the requirement that hybrid systems can only perform multilateral trading activities where they are licensed as a regulated market, a multilateral trading facility (‘MTF’) or an organised trading facility (‘OTF’), the content of Article 1(7) of Directive 2014/65/EU should be moved from Directive 2014/65/EU to Regulation (EU) No 600/2014.
Removed(5) Article 2(1), point (d), point (ii), of Directive 2014/65/EU, exempts persons dealing on own account from the requirement to be licensed as an investment firm or credit institution, unless those persons have direct electronic access to a trading venue. Articles 17(5) and 48(7) of Directive 2014/65/EU require that providers of direct electronic access are licensed investment firms or credit institutions. Investment firms or credit institutions that do provide direct electronic access are responsible for ensuring that their clients comply with the requirements laid down in Articles 17(5) and 48(7) of Directive 2014/65/EU. That gatekeeper function is effective and makes it unnecessary for clients of the direct electronic access provider, including persons dealing on own account, to become subject to Directive 2014/65/EU. In addition, removing that requirement would contribute to a level playing field between third country persons accessing EU venues via direct electronic access, for which Directive 2014/65/EU does not require a license, and persons established in the Union.
Removed(6) Due to the removal of multilateral systems from the scope of Article 1(7) of Directive 2014/65/EU and into Regulation (EU) 600/2014, it is equally logic to move the corresponding definition of ‘multilateral system’ into that Regulation.
Removed(6a) Article 4(1), point (20), of Directive 2014/65/EU provides that an investment firm shall be considered to be a systematic internaliser only when it is deemed to perform its activities on an organised, frequent, systematic and substantial basis or when it chooses to opt-in under the systematic internaliser regime. The quantitative criteria, related to the transaction reporting role of systematic internalisers, have led to a significant increase in the number of systematic internalisers in the Union and in the regulatory burden both on ESMA, which is required to assess the quantitative criteria for investment firms that qualify as systematic internalisers, and on investment firms themselves. In particular, the regulatory burden disproportionately affects smaller investment firms, which would benefit from a lighter and more flexible regime. Article 4(1), point (20), should therefore limit the systematic internaliser regime to investment firms that meet the qualitative criteria or investment firms that choose to opt-in to the systematic internaliser regime. Complementing those changes, Regulation (EU) ... /...+ amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 introduces the concept of a ‘designated reporting entity’, decoupling the systematic internaliser status from the function of making transactions public through an approved publication arrangement.
Removed(7) Article 27(3) and (6) of Directive 2014/65/EU contain the requirement for execution platforms to publish a list of details relating to best execution. Factual evidence and feedback from stakeholders has shown that those reports are rarely read and do not enable investors or any users of those reports to make meaningful comparisons based on the information provided in those reports. As a consequence, Directive (EU) 2021/338 of the European Parliament and of the Council suspended the reporting requirement under Article 27(3) for two years in order for that requirement to be reviewed. Regulation (EU) XX/XXXX has amended Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 to remove the obstacles that have prevented the emergence of a consolidated tape. ▌The data that the consolidated tape is expected to provide are pre-trade and post-trade information regarding all transactions in shares and ETFs, and post-trade information regarding all transactions in bonds and derivatives. That information can be used for proving best execution. The reporting requirement laid down in Article 27(3) of Directive 2014/65/EU will therefore no longer be relevant and should therefore be deleted.
Removed(7a) More generally, Article 27 of Directive 2014/65/EU contains provisions related to the obligation to execute orders on terms most favourable to the client (‘best execution’). However, different interpretations of that Article by national competent authorities have led to widely diverging application of best execution requirements and of market practice supervision. That divergence is particularly evident in the different regulation across the Union of practices related to receiving payments for forwarding client orders for execution (‘payment for order flows’). Regulation (EU) .../...+ amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 bans the payment for order flows across the Union. However, feedback from regulators and stakeholders has shown that best execution requirements for professional clients could also benefit from further clarification. ESMA should develop draft regulatory technical standards on the criteria that should be taken into account for the purpose of defining and assessing the order execution policy under Article 27(5) and (7) of Directive 2014/65/EU.
Removed(8) The correct functioning of market data consolidation via a consolidated tape depends on the quality of the data the consolidated tape provider receives. Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 sets out requirements for the quality of data that contributors to the consolidated tape should adhere to. In order to ensure that investment firms and market operators operating an MTF or an OTF, and regulated markets, effectively meet those requirements, Member States should require that those investment firms and market operators have the necessary arrangements in place to do so.
Removed(9) The receipt of high quality data is of the utmost importance for the functioning of the consolidated tape and the internal market. That includes the need for all market data contributors and the consolidated tape provider to timestamp their data in a synchronized manner and thus to synchronise their business clocks. Regulation (EU) XX/XXX has therefore amended Regulation (EU) 600/2014 to extend that requirement, which under Directive 2014/65/EU only applied to trading venues and their members, to systematic internalisers, APAs and CTPs. Since that requirement is now laid down in Regulation (EU) 600/2014, it can be removed from Directive 2014/65/EU.
Removed(10) Within the framework regulating the Union’s markets in financial instruments, many substantive requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 are supervised and sanctioned at national level and in accordance with Articles 69 and 70 of Directive 2014/65/EU. Regulation (EU) XX/XXXX has amended Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 to include new rules on the volume cap mechanism, on mandatory contributions of core market data to the consolidate tape, on data quality standards to which those contributions are subject and on the ban on receiving payments for forwarding client orders for execution. As the supervision of the relevant entities lies with national authorities, those new substantive requirements should be added to the list in Directive 2014/65/EU of provisions for which the Member States should provide sanctions at national level.
Removed(10a) The current ancillary activity exemption was amended by Directive (EU) 2021/338. That Directive also sets out that instead of a regulatory technical standard, the criteria for establishing when an activity is to be considered to be ancillary to the main business at group level would be established through a Commission delegated act. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1833 entered into force on 3 August 2021 and reduced the administrative burden for persons that trade in commodity derivatives or emission allowances or derivatives thereof on a professional basis to ascertain if they are eligible for the ancillary activity exemption. This exemption entails that they are not required to obtain authorisation as an investment firm when their trading activity is ancillary to their main business. All Union commodity firms can currently benefit from that exemption. Considering the size and nature of the business of some of these entities, and following the energy crisis of 2022, the Commission should review the ancillary activity exemption and how that rule has affected liquidity in and the orderly functioning of commodity markets. A review of this exemption was also mentioned in ESMA's answer to the Commission's call for advice to address the excessive volatility in energy derivatives markets. The Commission might also consider whether to mandate ESMA to revise or replace the current exemption test to ensure that the biggest entities are duly licenced and supervised as investment firms for their trading and investment service provision activities.
Removed(10b) Directive 2014/65/EU contains rules that require trading venues to implement mechanisms designed to limit excessive volatility in the markets, notably trading halts and price collars. However, the extreme circumstances that energy and commodity derivatives markets have experienced throughout the energy crisis of 2022 have led to a very low number of activations of those mechanisms and have shown that there is a lack of transparency around the activation of those mechanisms by the relevant trading venues in the Union, as highlighted in ESMA's answer to the Commission's call for advice to address the excessive volatility in energy derivatives markets. Market participants would benefit from further information and more transparency on the circumstances that lead to trading being halted and on the main principles for establishing the technical parameters connected to the activation of those mechanisms. In addition, ESMA should consider to what extent the level of discretion left to trading venues regarding to the activation of those mechanisms should be reduced. These considerations should be carefully weighted against the necessity to account for the differences in liquidity of different asset classes and sub-classes, the nature of the market model and the types of users of different trading venues across the Union. In addition, national competent authorities should carefully monitor the use of those mechanisms by trading venues and make use of their supervisory powers as appropriate.
Removed(10c) Directive (EU) 2021/338 also modified the regime on position limits and position management controls. Following the energy crisis of 2022 and the resulting higher and more frequent margin calls and extreme volatility, a comprehensive revision of the appropriateness of the position limits and position management controls regime to assess whether they are still conducive to the prevention of market abuse and the support for orderly pricing and settlement conditions is warranted. To ensure that all relevant elements are considered when carrying out the review, ESMA should consider not just the effectiveness of the regimes but also the appropriateness of the definition of a critical or significant position and of the limitation of the scope. In carrying out its analysis, ESMA should consider that commodity derivatives markets play an important role in ensuring that market participants can properly risk manage the necessary investments for the energy transition, and that setting the right parameters is very important to ensure that the Union has competitive liquid commodity derivatives markets that ensure the strategic autonomy of the Union, while preventing market abuse and supporting orderly pricing and settlement conditions.
RemovedHAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
RemovedDirective 2014/65/EU is amended as follows:
Removed1. in Article 1, paragraph 7, is deleted;
Removed2. ▌Article 2 is amended as follows:
Removed(a) in paragraph 1, point (d), point (ii) is replaced by the following:
Removed‘(ii) are members of or participants in a regulated market or an MTF, with the exception of non-financial entities that execute transactions on a trading venue for the purpose of liquidity management or that are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly related to the commercial activities or treasury financing activities of those non-financial entities or their groups;’;
Removed(b) in paragraph 4, the first two subparagraphs are replaced by the following:
Removed‘4. By [18 months after the entry into force of this amending Directive], the Commission shall adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 89 in order to supplement this Directive by specifying, for the purpose of point (j) of paragraph 1 of this Article, the criteria for establishing when an activity is to be considered to be ancillary to the main business at group level.
Sources & citation
Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 26 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2024). “Changes between A-9-2023-0039 and TA-9-2024-0003”. Text, 16 January 2024. from A-9-2023-0039, to TA-9-2024-0003. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2023-0039/compare/TA-9-2024-0003?all=1 (retrieved 26 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2024-01-16,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between A-9-2023-0039 and TA-9-2024-0003}},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-01-16},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2023-0039/compare/TA-9-2024-0003?all=1}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2023-0039/compare/TA-9-2024-0003?all=1},
urldate = {2026-09-26},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from A-9-2023-0039, to TA-9-2024-0003. Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}