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Changes from plenary report to adopted text

A-9-2020-0245 → TA-9-2020-0361

From
A-9-2020-0245 Plenary report of 8 Dec 2020
To
TA-9-2020-0361 Adopted text of 17 Dec 2020
Changes
10 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+6 added · −112 removed · 8 changed
More facts (2)
Title (from)
on the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation
Title (to)
Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation

Every difference

The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.

Part 4 of 6: Paragraphs 158–210

4. Considers it essential to provide more resources and capabilities to frontline Member States, for instance via EASO, as long as Dublin is not reformed;

5. Recalls that the right to asylum is a fundamental right; stresses that the asylum procedure serves to examine applications and grant international protection to applicants who qualify, while providing for a swift and fair decision for those who do not;

Change 5

Changed6. Notes that, according to articleArticle 24(4) of the Dublin III Regulation, Member States may either request to take back a person or carry out a return procedure in the case of persons whose application for international protection has been rejected by a final decision in a Member State; stresses that, in the context of the application of articleArticle 24(4), the return of persons who do not qualify for international protection, especially on the basis of voluntary compliance, could help the functioning of EU migration policies;

Change 6

Changed7. Welcomes the Council Decisions on relocation of 2015 and 2016 that were adopted as an urgent solidarity measure; expresses its disappointment at the Member States’ unfulfilled commitments to solidarity and responsibility sharing, while acknowledging the positive contribution of some Member States; recalls that the European Commission did not follow Parliament’s call in its resolution of 18 May 2017 for a proposal to extend the relocation measures until the adoption of the reform of the Dublin III Regulation; stresses that ad hoc agreements on relocation are not a substitute for a harmonised and sustainable Common European Asylum System (CEAS);

31 unchanged paragraphs

8. Deplores the fact that the Council, unlike Parliament, did not adopt a position on the Dublin IV recast proposal, and therefore blocked efforts to reform the Dublin III Regulation, in spite of its well-documented failings; takes the view that this blocking might be interpreted as a violation of the principle of mutual and sincere cooperation between the EU institutions in Article 13(2) of the TEU, and also in view of the fact that the Council has always sought unanimous agreement even though qualified majority is prescribed by the Treaties; finds it particularly regrettable that the Union still has the same set of rules which have proven to be ineffective in managing a high number of arrivals; calls for a swift reform of the CEAS;

9. Notes that the mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management in Article 33 has not been applied to date, not even during the high number of arrivals in 2015-16; notes, further, that the provisions in the Temporary Protection Directive that aimed to address temporary protection in case of mass influxes of displaced person unable to return to their country of origin have yet to be invoked;

10. Considers that a solidarity-based mechanism in the EU should be established to ensure continuity of the fundamental right of asylum in the EU with a view to ensuring access to asylum and responsibility sharing among Member States; emphasises that the protection of asylum applicants’ fundamental rights should always remain at the centre of this mechanism; considers that such a mechanism should allow for the participation of civil society organisations providing professional assistance to people in need of international protection, particularly where this is of a legal nature;

11. Underlines that the discretionary clause in Article 17, which enables a Member State to take responsibility for an asylum application, even if it has not been identified as the responsible Member State under the Dublin III Regulation, is used differently, rarely, and only by a few Member States; notes that Germany, the Netherlands and France accounted for the majority of cases in 2018; calls on all Member States to make better use of the discretionary clause in Article 17 to deal with challenging situations and humanitarian emergencies in the absence of a permanent solidarity mechanism; takes the view that the discretionary clauses of Article 17 should be used as a solidarity tool for responsibility sharing, in particular in situations of high numbers of arrivals by land and sea, or to transfer asylum seekers currently living in the hotspots in inhuman, degrading, unsanitary and unsafe conditions and without sufficient access to physical and mental health support;

12. Takes the view that provisions on family unity, which are the first in the hierarchy of criteria for the establishment of responsibility, should be effectively implemented, and that the provisions on dependent persons (Article 16) and discretionary clauses (Article 17) could be used more widely to support family unity;

13. Highlights the many challenges involved in implementing the Dublin III Regulation; notes the significant operational and technical support provided by EASO to Member State authorities in implementing the Dublin procedures, in particular in the hotspots;

14. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate the work of EASO staff by allowing interviews of asylum seekers to be held in a language other than that of the country in which it is conducted while ensuring that the applicant is provided with interpretation in a language they understand; stresses the need for EASO to abide by the highest standards in its operational work, and to put the interests of applicants in need of international protection, including the best interests of the child, at the heart of its work; calls for the establishment of a European Asylum Agency, with sufficient financial and human resources, to support Member States with Dublin procedures; urges adequate organisation and staffing of European Dublin units in order to streamline and expedite the completion of Dublin-related procedures, and particularly to ensure the correct application of Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation, which links an asylum-seeker to a particular Member State;

Protecting fundamental rights

15. Points out that the protection of fundamental rights must be at the heart of all the measures taken to implement the Dublin III Regulation, including the protection of children, victims of trafficking, LGBTI persons and other vulnerable people; points out the human cost that the deficiencies of the CEAS is causing asylum seekers, whose mental health is already weakened by the traumas they have experienced in their country of origin and potentially along migratory routes;

16. Recalls that asylum seekers have the right to be fully informed on procedures; regrets that the level of information provided to asylum seekers differs considerably between Member States; urges the Member States to guarantee that minors have tailored, child-friendly information and specific support; stresses that providing legal assistance and interpretation are key to ensuring applicants’ right to information;

17. Points out that transfers of asylum seekers, and in particular of vulnerable people, minors and families, can result in violations of their human rights; reiterates that non-refoulement and human rights abuses are reason enough to suspend a transfer even when the destination country does not present systemic deficiencies; urges Member States to properly assess the risks to which applicants would be exposed in the Member State of destination; stresses in particular that transfers must be carried out in a way that under no circumstances exposes individuals to a risk of refoulement;

18. Notes that, as set out in Article 28, detention of asylum seekers under the Dublin procedure may take place only as a last resort, only if it complies with the proportionality principle, and if no alternative and less coercive measure can be effectively implemented to ensure the transfer procedure can be carried out in cases where there is a significant risk of absconding; calls on Member States to make concrete efforts to find valid alternatives to detention;

19. Considers that such detention shall be as brief as possible, and be for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the administrative procedures required with due diligence until the transfer under this Regulation is carried out; stresses that in the absence of harmonised criteria for determining the risk of absconding, Member States have adopted divergent and sometimes controversial criteria; calls on the Member States and the Commission to clarify a ‘significant risk of absconding’;

20. Urges the Member States and the Commission to clearly state that detention is never in the best interests of the child;

21. Recalls that according to the European Court of Human Rights it is unlawful to impose a detention measure on a minor without any consideration of their best interests, of their individual situation as unaccompanied minors if applicable, or without a proportionality assessment or without alternatives to detention being available;

22. Stresses that the ultimate purpose of the protection of children, such as against child trafficking, shall always prevail, in order to ensure that children in migration have swift access to education, healthcare and appropriate accommodation; underlines that unaccompanied children should benefit from appropriate protection measures such as effective guardianship;

23. Points out numerous and systematic deficiencies in compliance with the hierarchy of criteria; stresses that family unity is far from being the most frequent criterion applied, although it is at the top of the hierarchy in Chapter III of the Regulation; considers that Member States, based on the principle of mutual cooperation, should help the competent authorities and third country nationals in improving the establishment of existing proven family links in the procedure for determining the Member States responsible; calls on the Commission to ensure full compliance with the hierarchy of criteria;

24. Regards it as essential to clarify the conditions for applying the family reunification criterion, and to give priority, as set out in Article 7(3) of the Regulation, to the application of Articles 8, 10 and 16 as the main criteria for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the right to family unity and quicker implementation of family reunification decisions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to harmonise the standard of proof required for family reunification in the direction of more achievable standards and requirements; points out that interpretations of what constitutes a ‘family’ vary across Member States, contributing to the lack of compliance with the hierarchy of criteria and the dysfunctionality of the system; calls therefore on the Commission to carefully monitor the sound application of the family-related definitions by Member States, as defined in Article 3 of the Regulation;

25. Recalls that according to the Regulation the best interests of the child should be the primary consideration in all Dublin procedures and decisions concerning children; regrets that Member States apply different interpretations of the best interests of the child;

26. Deplores that inadequate identification mechanisms and sometimes erroneous methods of age assessment often further exacerbate the situation of minors, causing delays or negatively affecting the outcome of Dublin procedures; notes that good practices have been developed in certain Member States, such as the use of specialised staff for unaccompanied minors or a multidisciplinary approach to determine age;

27. Is seriously concerned that in many Member States due to practical challenges the appointment of a representative to assist unaccompanied minors in Dublin procedures is often delayed or is not guaranteed; notes also that in some countries these representatives are insufficiently informed about Dublin procedures, and that unaccompanied minors lack child-friendly support;

Simplify procedures, significantly reduce processing times and uphold the right to an effective remedy

28. Stresses that the number of transfer procedures increased significantly in 2016-17, generating considerable human, material and financial costs; deplores, however, that transfers were carried out in only 11 % of cases, a further factor in the frequent overloading of asylum systems, which clearly demonstrates the lack of effectiveness of the Regulation; regards efforts to guarantee access to information and swift procedures for family reunification and the transfer of asylum seekers as essential;

29. Highlights the important body of ECtHR and CJEU case law in recent years that has clarified the admissible grounds for preventing Dublin transfers, in particular any source of risk to the individual; notes in particular the increasing number of decisions by European and nationals courts to suspend transfers to Member States where an asylum seeker would be unfairly denied international protection (cases of indirect refoulement) or would be denied their rights in the Dublin procedure; deplores that asylum seekers are victims of inhuman or degrading treatment in certain Member States;

30. Notes that shortcomings in the structural organisation and functioning of national asylum authorities, together with shortages of resources, have contributed to delays in Dublin procedures and hindered the application of the regulation; notes that while most countries have a single specialised authority for asylum, some Member States have chosen to share the responsibility between different authorities, creating practical complexities for asylum seekers in certain cases and divergences in the implementation of the Regulation;

31. Stresses that the effectiveness of Dublin procedures also depends on the quality and staffing levels of each national asylum authority; notes important gaps between asylum authorities in terms of number of staff per asylum applicant; stresses that national Dublin units are understaffed while facing a significant increase in their workload; calls on the Member States to increase the resources for making Dublin III operational, particularly the number of asylum officers;

32. Stresses the lack of cooperation and information sharing between Member States, which actively undermines the principle of EU solidarity, and directly contributes to the overburdening of systems in certain Member States;

33. Stresses that the excessive and partly inappropriate application of the ‘irregular entry’ criterion puts a disproportionate burden on first entry countries, which often lack the resources and capacity to host and register asylum seekers; notes that ‘take back’ requests have been the predominant form of Dublin procedure used in recent years, meaning that most persons placed in a Dublin procedure have already applied for asylum in another Member State; notes that adequate measures to prevent secondary movements should apply to Member States in the Schengen Area, and also those outside it;

34. Recalls that the time limits at each stage of the Dublin procedure are meant to keep the procedure short, and enable fast access to the asylum procedure; notes that there are still a lack of clarity and variations between Member States on the calculation of time limits and the time when the clock starts for each procedure; proposes the clarification and harmonisation of the conditions that trigger transfer procedures;

35. Considers that in some cases the rules on transfer of responsibility under Dublin III undermine the efficiency of asylum procedures and the carrying out of transfers by increasing the danger of absconding; deplores the often spurious reasons adduced by Member States for refusing transfers; considers that these factors, among others, have contributed to the increase in the number of secondary movements by encouraging asylum-seekers to remain outside the system; calls on the Commission to revise the rules in order to improve the execution of transfers and do away with the transfer of responsibility in cases where an asylum seeker absconds, to foster trust between Member States, to monitor the situation and, where necessary, impose penalties on Member States which refuse transfers;

36. Notes that the incorrect application of the rules on the hierarchy of criteria, particularly regarding family reunification and the situation of unaccompanied children, as well as the disproportionate use of the criterion of the first country of irregular entry also undermines asylum procedures; notes that these implementation gaps may encourage asylum seekers to remain outside the system; stresses that further harmonisation of the Member States’ asylum systems is key to a functioning Dublin III Regulation and to preventing secondary movements; calls on the Commission to propose a system which duly takes account of asylum seekers’ proven meaningful links to a Member State, such as previous legal residence or educational diplomas, and which ensures that the treatment of asylum seekers is equal in relative terms across the EU;

Change 7

Changed37. Considers that providing asylum seekers with legal assistance for Dublin procedures, in particular in the hotspots, is fundamental to ensuring applicants are informed of their rights and obligations during a Dublin procedure; stresses that this would enhance rights-compliant procedures, simplify Dublin procedures, and improve decision-making; notes that a legal representative can ensure that each case file is complete and accurate, and contribute to reducing the rate of appeals and safeguarding the right to non-refoulement; notes with concern that some specific issues remain at national level, such as limited access to independent legal representatives in remote asylum centres, low rates of financial remuneration for legal assistance, a lack of adequate facilities for preparatory and private interviews, and inadequate provision of legal aid for applicants in detention centres; calls on the Member States and the European Commission to increase the funds available for the provision of legal assistance during the Dublin procedure;

9 unchanged paragraphs

38. Stresses that the quality and amount of information provided to the applicants during the Dublin procedure is far from satisfactory, varies significantly between countries, and in some cases, within countries; notes that different factors affect compliance with the right of information, such as the quality and clarity of information, access to an interpreter, the availability of translated documents, access to information in due time; recalls that the right to information under Article 4 of the Regulation is essential given the complex nature of Dublin procedures, and for guaranteeing access to a fair examination of an asylum application in the EU; underlines that gaps in this field can attributed to a lack of resources, but also result from deliberate policy choices in certain countries where very few legal representatives have been appointed; urges the Member States, with the support of the Commission and the EASO, to improve the information made available to asylum seekers on complex Dublin procedures, to ensure that it is clear and accessible to everyone, particularly with regard to family reunification, in accordance with Articles 4 and 26 of the Regulation, and access to an effective remedy and legal assistance, in accordance with Article 27;

39. Calls on the Commission to assess the overall implementation of the CEAS, as well as any gaps and shortcomings in the Dublin III Regulation that lead to a disproportionate burden of responsibility being placed on countries at the external borders of the EU;

A single and rights-centred implementation of Dublin arrangements in asylum cases throughout the EU

40. Stresses that the principle of a single EU asylum application cannot be upheld, a state of affairs at odds with the very purpose of the Dublin III Regulation; notes that implementation of this principle is hampered by various factors, meaning that there are multiple reasons for the submission of subsequent asylum applications; considers that the competent national authorities should share their relevant information, in particular on the granting and rejection of asylum applications, in a European database such as Eurodac, in order to speed up procedures and prevent multiple asylum applications, while protecting personal data; considers that registering all applicants and migrants crossing the borders irregularly is a priority;

41. Notes that the extent of protection for asylum seekers varies greatly between Member States for certain nationalities, and that this can contribute to onward movement; considers that taking into account applicants’ individual needs in Dublin procedures would reduce secondary movements; believes that taking account of ‘proven meaningful links’ to a particular Member State is an effective approach to reducing secondary movements, and calls for this to be included as a criterion for relocation;

Strengthening governance and convergence between Member States

42. Stresses that the Commission's network of Member States’ Dublin units has met only once or twice a year, and has not played an operational role; considers that the non-coordinated use of the EASO Dublin Units Network prevents the Dublin III Regulation from functioning effectively; notes however that the EASO Dublin Network has been more active, and that EASO has carried out a number of useful missions to support Member States in implementing the Dublin III Regulation, such as the production of guidance documents and analysis, the organisation of training courses, or the deployment of agents; urges closer cooperation between national asylum authorities in order to share information, foster the development of uniform and best practices, streamline transfers and contribute to preventing cases of multiple applications; proposes that EASO be given the task of drawing up enhanced governance arrangements for the application of the Dublin III Regulation, including a monthly operational dialogue between national authorities, and a platform for the exchange and sharing of information and best practices;

43. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include, among the sources used to monitor implementation of the Regulation, reliable, up-to-date information provided by non-state actors, in particular international organisations and NGOs;

44. Notes that between 2008 and 2017 a significant number of asylum applications were lodged by third country nationals who travelled visa-free or with a short-term visa to enter the Schengen Area; notes, further, that some of these applications were submitted in a Member State other than the one for which the visa was issued; underlines that for subsequent Dublin procedures, it has been proven that the rules in Articles 12 and 14 are not sufficiently clear, thus hindering the determining of the Member State responsible; calls on the Commission to clarify how Articles 12 and 14 of the Regulation should be applied when determining what Member State should be responsible for an asylum application; proposes the evaluation, as one of the hierarchy of criteria, of the possible impact of visa-waived entry applications on the proper functioning of the Dublin system;

Change 8

Changed45. Notes that bilateral agreements have been concluded between Member States to improve the efficiency of Dublin procedures or ensure the transfer of asylum seekers; underlines however that they have also proven to have an adverse effect, in certain cases weakening the achievement of the objectives of the Regulation at European level; urges the Commission and all Member States to rather take stock of the factors contributing to greater efficiency, to take joint and coordinated action to optimise the effective implementation of the Dublin III Regulation, and work towards harmonising the implementation of the Regulation; 46. Notes that Member States may draw up preventive action plans, with the support of the Commission and in coordination with it, where the application of the Regulation may be jeopardised due to a substantiated risk of particular pressure on Member States’ asylum systems and/or to problems in the functioning of their asylum systems, in accordance with Article 33; notes that these preventive measures may take into account information from the Commission and EASO, and may lead to genuine and practical solidarity, in accordance to Article 80 of the TFEU, with Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum systems in general, including as a result of mixed migration flows, and with applicants, allowing for better preparedness in the event of a potential asylum crisis;

Change 9

Added46. Notes that Member States may draw up preventive action plans, with the support of the Commission and in coordination with it, where the application of the Regulation may be jeopardised due to a substantiated risk of particular pressure on Member States’ asylum systems and/or to problems in the functioning of their asylum systems, in accordance with Article 33; notes that these preventive measures may take into account information from the Commission and EASO, and may lead to genuine and practical solidarity, in accordance to Article 80 of the TFEU, with Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum systems in general, including as a result of mixed migration flows, and with applicants, allowing for better preparedness in the event of a potential asylum crisis;

6 unchanged paragraphs

47. Considers that the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation is not proving effective, because its primary objectives are not being met, namely swift and fair determination of the Member State responsible for an application for international protection; recalls that significant implementation gaps have been identified for a number of Dublin provisions; stresses that the implementation of the Regulation is highly inefficient in relation to the efforts, human resources and staff dedicated to it by the Member States;

48. Calls on the Council to adopt qualified majority voting when reforming the Dublin III Regulation, and when acting with regard to Article 78(2) of the TFEU;

49. Deplores the fact that the Commission has still not published its Article 46 assessment report; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Dublin III Regulation is implemented more effectively;

°

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50. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments of the Member States and the national parliaments.

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European Parliament (2020). “Changes between A-9-2020-0245 and TA-9-2020-0361”. Text, 17 December 2020. from A-9-2020-0245, to TA-9-2020-0361. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2020-0245/compare/TA-9-2020-0361?all=1&part=4 (retrieved 29 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2020-12-17,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between A-9-2020-0245 and TA-9-2020-0361}},
  year = {2020},
  date = {2020-12-17},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2020-0245/compare/TA-9-2020-0361?all=1&part=4}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2020-0245/compare/TA-9-2020-0361?all=1&part=4},
  urldate = {2026-09-29},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from A-9-2020-0245, to TA-9-2020-0361. Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}