Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Change 1

RemovedEXPLANATORY STATEMENT - SUMMARY OF FACTS AND FINDINGS

AddedP9_TA(2020)0361

RemovedIntroduction

AddedImplementation of the Dublin III Regulation

RemovedThe refugee crisis of 2015-16 turned into a crisis in the asylum system, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the Dublin III Regulation in responding to such a situation, its structural failings and the numerous shortcomings in its implementation.

AddedCommittee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

RemovedThe Commission has acknowledged that Dublin is a system ‘which by design or poor implementation [of the regulation] places a disproportionate responsibility on certain Member States and encourages uncontrolled and irregular migratory flows’. This is why in 2016 it put forward a new proposal to remedy this problem. However, despite the European Parliament approving a negotiating mandate in November 2017, the Council has still not adopted its general approach.

AddedPE648.425

RemovedTo break the deadlock, the Commission announced a ‘European Pact for Migration and Asylum’, including a new proposal for a revision of Dublin III.

AddedEuropean Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation (2019/2206(INI))

RemovedAn ambitious reform must be based on detailed knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the legal text in force. Although the Commission published two evaluations of the regulation, in December 2015 and March 2016 (Article 46), it has still not submitted its periodic assessment due in July 2018.

RemovedAgainst that backdrop, and in view of the failure of the Dublin III Regulation, the European Parliament has decided to prepare an updated analysis of the regulation, in keeping with its accountability to European citizens for the legislative acts which it adopts.

RemovedMethodology

RemovedThis assessment is based on a range of complementary sources: a public hearing in the LIBE committee held on 19 February 2020, field visits, interviews with stakeholders, two questionnaires sent to all the permanent representations and national parliaments of the Member States applying the regulation, a study by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and regular coordination meetings between the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs.

Removed1. PART I: Post-crisis feedback, learning lessons to overhaul Dublin III

Removed1.1. The emergence of the Dublin Regulation: gradual harmonisation

RemovedAt EU level, the establishment of the area of free movement went hand in hand with the launch of European cooperation on asylum. In 1990, the Schengen and Dublin Conventions came into force at roughly the same time.

RemovedFrom the outset, the primary purpose of the Dublin system was to determine the Member State responsible for dealing with an application for asylum in the EU, in an effort to rule out multiple applications. On the basis of the guidelines agreed at the Tampere European Summit in 1999, a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was set up with a view to bringing about closer harmonisation.

RemovedIn 2003, the Dublin Convention was incorporated into EU law in the form of the Dublin II Regulation.

RemovedIn 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon incorporated the solidarity principle into asylum policy (Article 80 TFEU) and provided for the use of the ordinary legislative procedure. The Council is still required to act unanimously, however, partly explaining the current deadlock.

RemovedIn 2008, the Commission launched the second phase of the CEAS, with a ‘Policy Plan on Asylum’, including a revision of Dublin III.

Removed1.2. Unprecedented pressure on the CEAS

RemovedIn recent years, the EU has faced the greatest migration challenge since the Second World War. In three years, the number of asylum seekers has increased more than fourfold. In 2015-16, 2.5 million people applied for asylum in the EU, compared to 562 000 in 2014 and 278 000 in 2012. The main countries of origin are still Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, countries torn by civil war, violence and conflict. According to the International Organization for Migration, 33 000 people have died trying to reach Europe since 2014.

RemovedEarly in 2020, 855 000 asylum applications were still pending, significantly fewer than five years ago. As the European Court of Auditors (ECA) has pointed out, however, in the Greek hotspots people who submitted an asylum application in 2018 were given an interview appointment only in 2022, or even in 2023. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of European policy on the return of persons who are not eligible for asylum is a further significant factor in the overloading of asylum systems.

Removed1.3. Deep imbalances in asylum matters

RemovedThe exceptional influx of migrants has highlighted imbalances within the EU.

RemovedBetween 2008 and 2017, one-third of the Member States hosted 90% of the asylum seekers in the EU. In 2018, Germany recorded the largest number of applications (184 180, or 28% of the total), followed by France (120 425 applications, or 19%), Greece (66 695 applications, or 11%), Italy (59 950 applications, or 10%) and Spain (52 700 applications, or 9%). Countries of first entry, such as Greece, Malta and Cyprus, also receive a large number of asylum applications in proportion to their population.

RemovedIn response to this crisis, some Member States stopped applying the regulation in 2015-16. Many migrants arriving via Greece, Italy or Spain were not registered on Eurodac, owing to a shortage of resources, but also in protest at a lack of solidarity among the Member States.

RemovedThere is no escaping it: the ‘Dublin system’, almost unchanged since 1990, has failed.

Removed1.4. Emergency measures during the crisis

RemovedIn response to the 2015 migration spike, the Commission took emergency measures: ‘hotspots’ were set up to manage the reception of migrants and the registration of asylum applications, a temporary relocation mechanism for applicants was introduced, and the operational and financial resources of Frontex and EASO received an unprecedented boost.

RemovedThese emergency measures failed to remedy the shortcomings in the CEAS and Dublin III. The Greek hotspots are notorious for massive overcrowding and unacceptable health conditions. Early 2020 they were still housing 42 000 migrants, as against a planned capacity of 6 000.

RemovedTo curb the influx of migrants and deter them from making perilous journeys from the Eastern Mediterranean, on 18 March 2016 the European Council concluded an agreement with Turkey. The Declaration, drawn up outside the international legal framework and without consulting the European Parliament, was intended as a temporary solution to the refugee crisis. However, the constant diplomatic pressure from the Turkish President, in particular regarding the situation at the Greek-Turkish border, has highlighted the fragility of this agreement and emphasised the need for a sustainable European solution.

RemovedThe humanitarian situation of migrants, in particular in Greece, means that it is essential to establish a sustainable mechanism for the sharing of responsibility among Member States for the registration of asylum seekers.

Removed1.5. Hotspots, ad hoc agreements and relocation: first signs of solidarity

RemovedAccording to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), the Dublin III Regulation was generally well applied in the hotspots between 2016 and 2018. Invoking the family reunification criterion, Greece transferred 8 604 asylum seekers to other Member States. With the support of EASO, it issued 19 784 requests to take charge of refugees, 43% of which concerned persons in the hotspots.

RemovedThe ECA is critical of the EU’s efforts to support Greece and Italy from 2015 onwards. It identifies operational weaknesses hampering the efficiency of relocation, the use of EASO expert support and poor compliance with deadlines.

RemovedIn 2015, with the support of Parliament, the Council adopted two decisions on the relocation of 160 000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy. However, the Member States committed themselves to relocating only 98 256 asylum seekers, and ultimately actually relocated only 34 705. Some Member States which were opposed to the decision simply refused to apply it.

RemovedIn the central Mediterranean, Italy and Malta were under heavy pressure from increased arrivals of migrants transiting through Libya. In the face of the deadlock among the EU27, a number of ad hoc agreements were concluded in 2019 to relocate people rescued at sea. The Dublin III legal framework provided for voluntary transfers to Member States which were signatories to the Malta Declaration.

Removed1.6. Responsibility of the country of first entry and solidarity between Member States

RemovedStarting in 1990, the principle of country of first entry was intended to make Member States responsible for the management of the EU’s external borders. However, this principle places a disproportionate burden on the countries concerned and makes the provision of operational support by Frontex officers essential.

RemovedIn addition, while the number of new asylum applications fell in 2017 (654 600) and 2018 (580 000) compared to the 2015-16 peak, 2019 brought a fresh increase of 18%, with 714 000 new asylum applications. That trend was confirmed in the early part of 2020: +20% compared to 2019. Migration routes and countries of origin are also becoming more diverse. Following on from Syrians and Afghans, Venezuelans and Colombians are now arriving in large numbers.

RemovedThe EU therefore needs a solidarity mechanism which makes for fair sharing of burdens and responsibility among Member States, including through relocation on the basis of objective criteria.

Removed2. PART II: Structural shortcomings, differences in interpretation, operational difficulties and political roadblocks

Removed2.1. Obstacles to determining the State responsible for dealing with an asylum application

Removed2.1.1. Requirement to register in Eurodac

RemovedWhen registering an asylum application submitted by a refugee entering the EU, the Member State in question is required to record the person’s fingerprints in the Eurodac database. By consulting the Eurodac file, the authorities can verify that the person has not been registered or has not lodged an application for asylum in another Member State.

RemovedIn 2015, however, before the hotspots were established, the two countries with the highest irregular entry rates, Greece (885 000) and Italy (154 000), recorded only 11 370 and 83 245 asylum applications respectively. These shortcomings significantly undermine the Dublin system and the country-of-first-entry principle and result in numerous secondary movements.

Removed2.1.2. Skewed application of the hierarchy of criteria for determining the State responsible

RemovedChapter III of the Dublin Regulation establishes a hierarchy of criteria to be used to determine which country must ‘take charge’ of an asylum seeker. Priority is given to maintaining the family unit (Articles 8 to 11), after which the order is possession of residence documents and visas (Article 12), irregular entry or stay (Article 13), visa-waived entry (Article 14), applications in an international transit area of an airport (Article 15) and the first country in which the application was made (Article 3(2)).

RemovedHowever, requests to take charge do not reflect this hierarchy. In 2018, the family unit criterion was invoked in 5% of cases in France (out of 12 000) and in 3.7% of cases in Germany (out of 17 500). The figures are even lower in Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland or Austria, in stark contrast to Greece: 79.3%.

RemovedApplications for family reunification are less frequently accepted: in only 48% of cases, compared to an average rate of 67.6% for all procedures. All too often, Member States impose rules to regulate and restrict family reunification by requiring a binding standard of proof (e.g. DNA test, age assessment).

Removed2.1.3. Administrative burden of the Dublin procedures and their inconsistent application

RemovedThe number of Dublin procedures increased from around 90 000 in 2014 to 160 000 in 2016-17. Between 2016 and 2019, Germany and France issued by far the most requests: 68% of the total for the two countries alone. Spain, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechia issue few Dublin requests. Surprisingly, Spain issues almost no Dublin requests (7 in 2016; 11 in 2017; 7 in 2018), despite a large and growing number of asylum applications (16 544 in 2016; 31 738 in 2017; 55 570 in 2018). By way of a comparison, Greece issued 2 886 requests in 2016 (against 51 091 asylum applications), 9 784 in 2017 (against 58 661 asylum applications) and 5 211 in 2018 (against 66 969 asylum applications).

RemovedThe Dublin system therefore generates a considerable administrative, human and financial burden, while only 11% of transfers are actually carried out. There are also significant differences between countries: 54.6% of transfers carried out in Greece, and 42.2% in Sweden, but only 11.2% in Germany, 6.7% in France, and 1.6% in Italy between 2016 and 2019.

RemovedMoreover, the discretionary clauses (Article 17) are rarely applied. The sovereignty clause was only invoked just under 2 000 times in 2018 against a total of more than 155 000 asylum applications. Germany (65%), the Netherlands (13%) and France (10%) used it most frequently. Some countries have used it only once (Austria, Denmark, Poland), others never (Slovenia, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia).

Removed2.1.4. Procedures that are too complex and too lengthy

RemovedThe administrative formalities to be completed by asylum seekers upon arrival in Europe are complex. The number of bodies involved (administrative, legal, medical, police, NGOs), their geographic dispersal and the fact that they are not always available to help significantly slow down the processing of applications. The lack of cooperation between these bodies and in some cases poor morale among their staff are also factors. In France, for example, asylum seekers are registered in one of the country’s 11 prefectures and must all travel to the Paris region for their interview at the National Asylum Agency (OFPRA).

RemovedThe proportion of Dublin procedures in the total number of asylum applications increased from 15% in 2014 to 26-27% in 2016-17. The Dublin units in the Member States have therefore faced a significant increase in their workload, leading to backlogs and longer processing times.

RemovedSome national authorities have undergone a reorganisation in an effort to deal with the overload of cases. The lack of human resources (in particular protection officers and interpreters) is a major factor in delays. According to the information available, Greece, Spain and Cyprus have fewer asylum officers compared to the number of asylum applications. In 2019, Spain had 197 officers for 55 290 applications, compared with 1 121 officers for 5 780 applications in Austria. The growing reliance on temporary staff, for example in Greece and Cyprus, can undermine the authorities’ ability to deal with applications.