Changes from plenary report to adopted text

RemovedThe Dublin Regulation sets deadlines at each stage of Dublin procedures. However, these deadlines are regularly missed by large margins, often several months. There are also differences in interpretation regarding the starting point of each of the procedures, necessitating clarification from the CJEU (see Mengesteab judgment).

RemovedThe failure to apply certain clauses (e.g. family reunification, taking charge of unaccompanied minors) and to meet deadlines also highlights difficulties linked to the need to verify information concerning applicants. Many arrive without an identity document, complicating the task of determining their age, nationality and family ties and necessitating additional checks.

Removed2.2. Obstacles to the transfer of asylum seekers

Removed2.2.1. Too short a period of responsibility for Member States

RemovedOnce a transfer decision has been taken, Member States have six months (18 months if the applicant absconds) to carry out the transfer. After that, the issuing State becomes responsible for the request.

RemovedIn practice, this limited period of responsibility can encourage Member States who have been asked to take in asylum seekers to delay transfers. It also prompts asylum seekers to stay out of the procedure, and then to apply in another State.

RemovedExtending the period of responsibility would make it possible to combat secondary movements and irregular stays.

Removed2.2.2. Multiple obstacles

RemovedThe obstacles are many and varied. They range from refusal or unwillingness to cooperate on the part of the Member States to which requests are made, to the annulment of decisions by national appeal bodies or a failure to meet deadlines. Another important factor is that persons being transferred seek to escape the system. At operational level, the national authorities cite the difficulties in making transfers and the restrictions on transport (often by air) imposed by airlines (limit on the number of persons per flight, requirement to have a ticket bearing a name, no connecting flights, etc.).

RemovedThe lack of proper reception facilities or non-compliance with Dublin procedures have been the subject of cases brought before the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The courts ruled out transfers to Member States where applicants would be unjustly denied international protection or exposed to violations of their fundamental rights.

RemovedAppeals against Dublin decisions are also very common. It is a fundamental right, but it prolongs many Dublin procedures, as the rate of appeal is high in all States, up to 80%. In some cases the appeal is used as a way to remain on the territory of a Member State by asylum seekers who do not wish to be transferred.

Removed2.3. Migrants’ pathways, an underestimated factor in the European asylum system

Removed2.3.1. Secondary movements, enemy of the principle of the single asylum application

RemovedA secondary movement is the movement of a person from the Member State responsible for an asylum application to another Member State. This phenomenon has a profoundly disruptive effect on the Dublin machinery. It hampers the process of designating the responsible Member State, increases the number of Dublin procedures and undermines the principle of a single application for asylum in the EU.

RemovedAccording to the Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, although the number of asylum applications fell after 2015-16, the number of secondary movements increased considerably. Germany and France are the two main destinations for asylum seekers who undertake secondary movements. The reasons for making them are many: family ties, presence of a diaspora, knowledge of a language, reception conditions, labour market opportunities, refusal of a transfer.

RemovedSecondary movements are also prompted by another major flaw in the system: differences in rates of protection. To give one striking example, the rate of protection enjoyed by Afghans varies between 6% and 98%, depending on the Member State concerned. For Iraqis it varies between 8% and 98%. In the absence of a European list of safe countries of origin and a shared analysis of country risks, these differences of assessment push asylum seekers to move to the Member State where they are most likely to receive international protection. Differences in reception conditions for asylum seekers are also an incentive to undertake secondary movements.

RemovedAn analysis of secondary movements and the relevant trends casts doubt on the pertinence of some of the original Dublin III principles. Differences in living conditions among Member States have an impact on reception conditions. The failure to take account of asylum seekers’ aspirations and the limited period of responsibility of Member States push people to move to their desired Member State and to remain outside the system, in order to be able to apply for asylum elsewhere.

RemovedNational strategies that focus only on sanctions or restrictions on access to asylum, as favoured by a majority of Member States to date, offer only a partial response to this phenomenon. A system that fails to take at least some account of asylum seekers’ pathways and their reasons for seeking asylum in a given country is bound to fail.

Removed2.3.2. Trends in migratory flows

RemovedIt is essential, therefore, to analyse migrants’ pathways in order to respond to influxes in a more structured manner and streamline asylum procedures.

RemovedThere has been an increase in the number of asylum applications submitted by people who have entered a country lawfully, on a visa waiver or a residence visa. According to EASO, in 2019 one-quarter of applications were submitted by persons who entered the EU on a visa waiver. The countries they come from, although regarded as safe, offer a very low rate of protection: North Macedonia (1%), Moldova (1%), Venezuela (5%), Albania (6%), Colombia (7%), Ukraine (9%). These many applications, which have little chance of being accepted, clog up asylum systems.

RemovedThe lack of data on migrants’ pathways is a barrier to a better understanding of the dysfunctions of Dublin III. Interoperability of asylum data is therefore essential. EASO should also be given access to Eurodac data under secure conditions to carry out this analysis work and expand eu-LISA’s role.

Removed2.3.3. The human impact of the failure of the Dublin system

RemovedThe ineffectiveness of the Dublin Regulation primarily affects migrants who have already been traumatised in their home countries or during their journey to Europe. The months, even years, of administrative toing and froing, of insecurity, constitute a new trauma and enable human traffickers to maintain a hold on migrants, through prostitution or forced labour networks. The failure of the Dublin system and the CEAS has given rise to numerous violations of fundamental rights. Conditions in the Greek hotspots are now deplorable, and inhumane.

RemovedParticular attention needs be paid to the protection of the best interests of children and unaccompanied minors. A number of Member States (Belgium, France, Hungary) have set up specialist units to deal with unaccompanied minors, others (Germany, Poland, Cyprus) employ specially trained personnel. But these good practices are not universal.

RemovedOne of the main obstacles is the difficulty of determining migrants’ ages. Practices differ from one Member State to another and the reliability of the assessments, for example those based on medical tests, is uncertain. Multidisciplinary approaches, carried out by qualified experts, make it possible to compile sets of relevant indicators and to establish a person’s age more reliably (the United Kingdom, Malta, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands and France use such approaches). In addition, although the appointment of a legal representative to accompany or represent minors in asylum procedures is compulsory (Article 6), there are significant gaps in implementation. Lastly, some States do not provide information tailored to minors’ needs.

RemovedThe right to information (Article 4) is another principle that is not properly complied with. Problems include: provision of partial information; limited access to legal aid for applicants; language barrier and lack of interpreters; delays in providing information. A lack of resources on the ground can explain these shortcomings, but they are also the result of political decisions.

Removed2.4. Discontinuation of the CEAS and Dublin procedures during the COVID-19 crisis

RemovedDuring the health crisis, and as a result of the lockdown measures imposed, Dublin procedures have been significantly cut back or even suspended completely. This is the case in particular for asylum interviews. While some countries have opted for ‘remote’ sessions, many interviews have been postponed. On 16 April 2020, EASO published recommendations designed to ensure continuity of the right to asylum, but there is no crisis management plan tailored to the current circumstances, which is further undermining the application of Dublin III.

Removed2.5. Emerging governance arrangements, the growing role of EU agencies

RemovedThe many disparities in the interpretation and application of Dublin III between Member States are undermining the effectiveness of the regulation. Some are the result of national strategies to combat secondary movements or reduce processing times. Others reflect historical practices or a lack of dialogue between national asylum authorities. The Community interest suffers each time: secondary movements prevented in one country become a problem for another.

RemovedMoreover, bilateral agreements have been concluded between Member States and third countries, or between Member States, to improve the efficiency of procedures or ensure the transfer or return of asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected (e.g. the Spain-Morocco agreements; Germany-Albania). Lessons must be learnt from these agreements and replicated on the largest possible scale, to prevent future mistakes.

RemovedConvergence in visa policy between Member States is also likely to improve the functioning of the CEAS and of Dublin III, as many asylum seekers arrive lawfully on the territory of the EU, because they qualify for a visa or visa waiver.

RemovedTo improve convergence between national systems, the Commission runs a network of Member States’ Dublin experts. However, it meets too infrequently (once or twice a year) to have an operational role.

RemovedIt is EASO which is playing an increasingly important and proactive role in improving convergence and mutual trust between Member States and developing a common asylum culture. In 2016, EASO set up the Dublin Units Network, which is more active than its Commission counterpart. EASO also produces many guidance documents. Lastly, the agency carries out training sessions for staff in Dublin units.

RemovedOperational support to Member States is thus far the most significant input from EASO in the implementation of the Dublin system. Fostering EASO’s emergence as a genuine independent agency is a priority to improve the effectiveness of the CEAS.

RemovedLastly, in the context of the implementation of Dublin III the Commission must also ensure greater consistency with the other CEAS provisions (reception, asylum procedures). An overhaul of the CEAS would be pointless without a significant improvement in the rate of return of persons not eligible for asylum.