Text · Comparison of two versions

Changes from plenary report to adopted text

A-10-2026-0212 → TA-10-2026-0303

From: A-10-2026-0212 Plenary report of 20 Jul 2026
To: TA-10-2026-0303 Adopted text of 16 Sept 2026
Changes: 7 changes to the text
Paragraphs: +7 added · −19 removed · 14 changed

More facts (3)

Dossier: 2026/2024(INI)
Title (from): on Hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure
Title (to): Hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure

Dossier: 2026/2024(INI)
Title (from): on Hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure
Title (to): Hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure

What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 17 Sept 2026

Parliament adds a recital and a paragraph describing recent hybrid attacks, including incidents attributed to Russia and the assault on Ceuta, and calls for an independent investigation into the latter.1 7 It also welcomes the completion of the cyber coordination centre project and progress towards a permanent EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre, and calls for its swift operationalisation.3 4 The other changes are formal: a recital letter and decimal separator are updated and footnote markers are removed.2 5 6

The notes class 4 changes as substance, 3 as formal, 0 as wording only.

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Changes that matter, 7

Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.

Change 1

AddedE. whereas, in the summer of 2026, the EU witnessed an intensification of physical hybrid activities and attacks across EU territory; whereas this included an attempted explosive drone attack targeting Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany, an attempted attack by an explosive-laden maritime drone against a Romanian offshore gas project, a foiled Russian-directed sabotage and espionage plot targeting military infrastructure and Ukrainian cargo aircraft in Romania, an arson attack targeting a defence contractor in Estonia, deliberate sabotage and arson attacks targeting defence and drone manufacturing facilities in Poland, a Russian cruise missile violating Polish airspace and crashing in the Lublin region, and a foiled arson plot in Slovakia targeting a Ukrainian drone manufacturer; whereas the Leipzig/Halle Airport attack, the targeting of the Romanian offshore gas project and the sabotage plot targeting military infrastructure and Ukrainian cargo aircraft in Romania have been publicly attributed to Russia by the respective national authorities; whereas following the attack on Leipzig/Halle Airport, the German authorities closed the Russian consulate in Bonn and the Russian House in Berlin;

Note on change 1 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 17 Sept 2026

Adds a recital listing physical hybrid activities and attacks across the EU in the summer of 2026, including incidents attributed to Russia by national authorities and the closure of the Russian consulate in Bonn.

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Change 2

ChangedL.M. whereas there has been a drastic increase in cognitive warfare together with FIMI; whereas, according to the European External Action Service (EEAS) 4th Annual Report on FIMI Threats, Russian FIMI activity is expected to intensify in 2026, with the budget for state-controlled media projected to reach approximately EUR ~~1.56~~1,56 billion, 7 % higher than in 2025, with the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions anticipated to be among the primary targets;

Note on change 2 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 17 Sept 2026

Updates the letter of the recital and the decimal separator in the figure for the projected budget of state-controlled media.

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Change 3

Changed26. Stresses the EU’s added value in helping Member States to connect national capabilities, build common situational awareness and enable faster, more coherent responses to hybrid threats; recommends that the Commission explore proposals for a more unified framework to support Member States in the planning, operational coordination and execution of cyber operations; welcomes the completion of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project on the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC) and the ~~proposal~~progress ~~for~~towards anits transition into a permanent EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre (EU CDCC);

Note on change 3 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 17 Sept 2026

Welcomes the completion of the PESCO project on the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre and progress towards its transition into a permanent EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre.

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Change 4

Changed31. Stresses that cyber resilience and defensive measures are insufficient to ensure credible deterrence against hybrid threats as highlighted in the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030; calls on the Commission and the Member States in cooperation with NATO to examine the legal, procedural and operational prerequisites for proportionate, legally compliant cyber countermeasures; ~~reiterates~~welcomes ~~its~~the ~~position~~progress ~~calling~~made ~~for~~towards the establishment ~~without undue delay~~ of the EU CDCC and calls for ~~the~~its swift operationalisation and for the implementation of a mandate in line with the Council conclusions on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence, in order to achieve a more credible and capable EU cyber defence;

Note on change 4 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 17 Sept 2026

Welcomes progress towards establishing the EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre and calls for its swift operationalisation and for implementation of a mandate in line with the Council conclusions on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence.

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Change 5

Changed38. Stresses that undersea cables are a key strategic vulnerability and target of hybrid sabotage, espionage and influence operations due to their physical exposure and systemic disruption potential as they carry the vast majority of intercontinental internet traffic; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable ~~Infrastructures9~~Infrastructures and the 2025 Joint communication on the EU action plan on cable security (JOIN(2025)0009) as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure; calls further for maritime domain awareness capabilities, integrating satellite, surface and subsea sensor data to detect, monitor and attribute physical threats to submarine cable and offshore energy infrastructure in strategic maritime areas, including the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Black Sea, and Arctic and Mediterranean regions; recommends strong criminal liability provisions to deter such attacks and redundant systems to ensure resilience; stresses further the need for a comprehensive, multilayered approach combining technological innovation, enhanced intelligence integration, improved attribution capabilities, and strengthened cooperation between NATO, the EU Member States, and relevant private-sector actors in order to ensure coherent protection of undersea infrastructure;

Note on change 5 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 17 Sept 2026

Removes footnote markers from the references to the 2024 Commission Recommendation and the 2025 Joint communication on cable security.

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Change 6

Changed41. Welcomes the adoption of the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) ~~Directive10~~Directive and the NIS2 ~~Directive11~~Directive as important steps towards strengthening resilience against hybrid attacks, but stresses that implementation delays across the Member States represent a shared urgent vulnerability and calls for their full and timely implementation; urges the Commission to make full use of its monitoring and enforcement powers; calls on the Member States to embed resilience by design as a standard requirement in all new and revised legislation;

Note on change 6 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 17 Sept 2026

Removes footnote markers from the references to the Critical Entities Resilience Directive and the NIS2 Directive.

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Change 7

Added65. Strongly condemns the assault on the EU’s southern border in the city of Ceuta, carried out on 30 and 31 July 2026, as well as the subsequent invasion of Ceuta, constituting an attack on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a Member State; deplores the use of irregular migration flows as an instrument of hybrid warfare directed against the stability and security of a Member State, and therefore calls for an independent and comprehensive investigation to clarify responsibility for the planning and execution of this attack and identify the objectives pursued;

Note on change 7 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-flash · 17 Sept 2026

Adds a paragraph condemning the assault on the EU's southern border in Ceuta on 30 and 31 July 2026 and the subsequent invasion of Ceuta, and calls for an independent investigation.

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Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Permalink: https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0212/compare/TA-10-2026-0303
Data source: European Parliament Open Data
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved: 25 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2026). “Changes between A-10-2026-0212 and TA-10-2026-0303”. Text, 16 September 2026. from A-10-2026-0212, to TA-10-2026-0303, reference 2026/2024(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0212/compare/TA-10-2026-0303 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).

BibTeX

@misc{epw-text-2026-09-16,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between A-10-2026-0212 and TA-10-2026-0303}},
  year = {2026},
  date = {2026-09-16},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0212/compare/TA-10-2026-0303}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0212/compare/TA-10-2026-0303},
  urldate = {2026-09-25},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from A-10-2026-0212, to TA-10-2026-0303, reference 2026/2024(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}