Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from plenary report to adopted text
A-10-2026-0163 → TA-10-2026-0261
- From
- A-10-2026-0163 Plenary report of 10 Jun 2026
- To
- TA-10-2026-0261 Adopted text of 8 Jul 2026
- Changes
- 6 changes to the text
- Paragraphs
- +4 added · −7 removed · 7 changed
More facts (3)
- Dossier
- 2025/2255(INI)
- Title (from)
- on the 2025 Commission report on Serbia
- Title (to)
- 2025 Commission report on Serbia
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds criticism of Serbia's cooperation with China and its governing party, and of intimidation against protesters and MEPs.45 Updates the status of the national minority action plan, noting its adoption.6 The other changes are formal: decimal separators and a date are corrected.123
The notes class 3 changes as substance, 3 as formal, 0 as wording only.
Changes that matter, 6
Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.
Change 1
ChangedC. whereas Serbia needs to make additional efforts to further align its foreign policy with the EU’s foreign and security policy, as certain actions, statements and high-level contacts, including participation by the Serbian President in the 9 May 2025 military parade in Moscow, run counter to key EU foreign policy positions, particularly with regard to Russia;
AI: Note on change 1 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds the year 2025 to the date of the military parade in Moscow.
Change 2
ChangedI. whereas the social situation in Serbia remains difficult; whereas UNICEF notes that Serbia is among Europe’s less equal countries; whereas 13.613,6 % of the population experienced severe material and social deprivation in 2024, the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate was 27.227,2 % in 2023, and the youth unemployment rate stood at 24.524,5 %; whereas rural populations remain especially vulnerable;
AI: Note on change 2 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces decimal points with commas in percentages for consistency with EU style.
Change 3
ChangedJ. whereas the EU remains Serbia’s main trading partner accounting for 58.358,3 % of Serbia’s total trade in 2024, its leading source of investment and its largest provider of financial assistance; whereas the EU by a large margin remains the biggest source of remittances, which are sent by Serbians working in the EU, and are a crucial and stable source of income for many Serbian households, playing a substantial role in the country’s economy;
AI: Note on change 3 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces decimal points with commas in percentages for consistency with EU style.
Change 4
Changed9. Expresses concern over Serbia’s ongoing military build-up, combined with the increasingly hostile rhetoric towards neighbouring countries and the deepening of Serbia’s security and defence cooperation with China, including special forces exercises and the expansion of strategic agreements, as well as the growing presence of Chinese security and surveillance technology; strongly condemns Serbia’s recent acquisition of Chinese CM-400AKG air-to-surface ballistic missiles; warns that this military build-up alters the regional security balance and undermines regional stability and good neighbourly relations with surrounding NATO member states; stresses that such procurement contradicts the EU’s CFSP and raises serious questions about Serbia’s geopolitical orientation; underlines that major defence procurements from authoritarian strategic competitors of the EU require full transparency and careful assessment of their implications for regional stability, interoperability and Serbia’s declared European orientation; notes with concern the recent memorandum of cooperation between the Serbian governing party and the Chinese Communist Party, which raises further questions regarding Serbia’s strategic commitment to pursuing its EU path;
AI: Note on change 4 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a note of concern about a memorandum of cooperation between the Serbian governing party and the Chinese Communist Party, questioning Serbia's EU commitment.
Change 5
Changed45. Expresses deep concern over credible allegations regarding the use of an acoustic weapon against peaceful protesters; notes the absence of a prompt and transparent investigation into the incident; recalls the Council of Europe’s interim measure of April 2025 concerning the protection of demonstrators and stresses that failure to investigate such allegations may constitute a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights; calls on the Serbian authorities to conduct an immediate, impartial investigation and to ensure accountability; notes that Serbia is purchasing Chinese hardware and software at reduced prices in order to step up surveillance of its citizens, notably with the deployment of extensive video-surveillance systems and advanced facial recognition in public spaces through cooperation with Huawei under the ‘Safe City’ project implemented in Belgrade; expresses serious concern over reports that Serbian authorities have used EU pre-accession funds to procure biometric and forensic software from Papilon, a Russian company subject to EU sanctions; calls on the Commission to ensure full compliance with EU restrictive measures in all EU-funded programmes; deplores the Serbian authorities’ campaign of intimidation against peaceful students, journalists and activists, which relies on a controversial report by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to falsely accuse protesters of using a sound cannon during the Slavija Square protest in Belgrade on 15 March 2025; underlines that weaponising fear to suppress civil dissent is entirely unacceptable and incompatible with EU fundamental values; strongly condemns the latest attacks by highest-ranking Serbian officials against Members of the European Parliament, including false accusations that they have spread lies and misinformation concerning the protest;
AI: Note on change 5 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds condemnation of intimidation against students, journalists, and activists, and of attacks by Serbian officials on MEPs.
Change 6
Changed55. Calls on Serbia to ensure respect for the rights of all national minorities in practice and to show sincere commitment in resolving outstanding issues, including access to education, information, dedicated media space, funding, facilities and religious services in minority languages, as well as full representation at all levels of government, in line with the principle of reciprocity, whenever possible, and with all relevant European standards; regrets the fact that since 2025, there has been no representation of national minorities at the ministerial level, particularly covering the human and minority rights portfolio; highlights that, while Serbia’s legal and policy framework regarding the protection of national minorities is broadly in place, significant shortcomings persist in its effective and consistent implementation; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rightsrights, which was finally adopted on 28 May 2026, and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; calls for further concrete measures, including clear timelines, adequate resources and robust monitoring mechanisms; calls for the full implementation of anti-discrimination legislation and for the stepping up of efforts to ensure the non-discriminatory treatment of all national and other minorities; calls for effective investigations and convictions for hate-motivated crimes; strongly condemns attacks, intimidation, targeting and harassment of minority communities, including Slovaks, Romanians, Bulgarians and Croatians, and the use of ethnic slurs by pro-government media; stresses that measurable and verifiable progress in minority protection should be treated as part of the fundamentals cluster, with clear benchmarks and monitoring;
AI: Note on change 6 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Updates the status of the action plan for national minority rights, noting its adoption on 28 May 2026, and removes the call to finalise it.
Sources & citation
Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2026). “Changes between A-10-2026-0163 and TA-10-2026-0261”. Text, 8 July 2026. from A-10-2026-0163, to TA-10-2026-0261, reference 2025/2255(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0163/compare/TA-10-2026-0261 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2026-07-08,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between A-10-2026-0163 and TA-10-2026-0261}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-07-08},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0163/compare/TA-10-2026-0261}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0163/compare/TA-10-2026-0261},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from A-10-2026-0163, to TA-10-2026-0261, reference 2025/2255(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}