Changes from plenary report to adopted text

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which enshrines the EU’s founding values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 3 and 21 thereof,

– having regard to the increasing acts of transnational repression, and to the responsibility of Member States to protect all people residing within their territory,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 83 and 215 thereof,

– having regard to the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders of 1998,

– having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolutions of 4 April 2025 entitled ‘Human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies: protecting human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, in the digital age’ and of 1 July 2025 entitled ‘Civil society space’,

– having regard to the brief of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on transnational repression, published on 18 June 2025,

– having regard to the statement of 13 January 2025 by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on improving protection for human rights defenders,

– having regard to the annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General ‘A/HRC/60/62: Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights - Report of the Secretary General’ of September 2025,

– having regard to the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ endorsed in UN Human Rights Council Resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011,

– having regard to the statement by a group of independent UN human rights experts, expressing concern about the proliferation of trials in absentia in Belarus, published on 22 January 2025,

– having regard to the preliminary examination conducted by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court into the situation in the Republic of Lithuania / Republic of Belarus (ICC-01/24-1),

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in June 2004 and updated in 2008, and to its resolution of 16 March 2023 on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 January 2025 on ‘EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025’,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 30 January 2026 on ‘EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2026’,

– having regard to the EU action plan on human rights and democracy 2020-2024, extended until 2027,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859 (Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence),

– having regard to the 2024 and 2025 EU Annual Reports on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘EU Strategy for Civil Society’ (COM(2025)0790),

– having regard to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware,

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (JOIN(2025)0791),

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 June 2025 entitled ‘An International Digital Strategy for the European Union’ (JOIN(2025)0140),

– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2025 on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders,

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (so-called ‘EU Magnitsky Act’),

– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to the work of its special committee on the European Democracy Shield,

– having regard to the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol), in particular Article 2, which requires the organisation to act in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the G7 Leaders’ statement on transnational repression of 17 June 2025 and the G7 multistakeholder dialogue on transnational repression held in February 2025,

– having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting communiqué of 19 April 2024 on ‘addressing global challenges, fostering partnerships’,

– having regard to Resolution 2509 (2023) and Recommendation 2257 (2023) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe entitled ‘Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights’,

– having regard to the study of its Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union of June 2025 entitled ‘Transnational repression of human rights defenders: The impacts on civic space and the responsibility of host states’,

– having regard to the study of its Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union of January 2026 entitled ‘Perpetrators and methods of transnational repression and possible counter strategies’,

– having regard to the seventh report of Session 2024-25 of the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the Parliament of the United Kingdom entitled ‘Transnational repression in the UK’,

– having regard to the annual report published by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior in June 2025 entitled ‘Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024’,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0142/2026),

A. whereas transnational repression (TNR) is a deliberate, systematic, targeted and repressive practice, whereby regimes or their proxies reach across borders and perpetrate acts outside their territorial jurisdiction to intimidate, threaten, silence, coerce, control or harm in any other way individuals or groups residing abroad, or family members or their support networks by using a broad range of physical, psychological, digital, legal, administrative and other means, in violation of fundamental rights; whereas targets of TNR include thousands of pro-democracy figures forced to flee their countries of origin due to domestic repression;

B. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights;

C. whereas TNR undermines these founding values, contributes to the manipulation of public debate and violates fundamental rights and international law, as well as the EU’s and Member States’ sovereignty and security; whereas increased human rights violations in the countries of origin often go hand in hand with increased TNR activity abroad;

D. whereas TNR committed on territories of EU Member States is part of a broader strategy of foreign interference aimed at weakening democratic institutions and societies and directly interferes with the Union’s internal democratic space by silencing voices, fragmenting communities and generating fear and self-censorship, while also undermining the EU’s external action by restricting the ability of individuals residing in the EU to advocate for democracy, human rights and accountability in non-EU countries;

E. whereas TNR may constitute a crime against humanity within the meaning of Article 7(h) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, taking into account the systematic and widespread nature of such acts;

F. whereas everyone residing in the EU, irrespective of their ethnic or national origin, enjoys equal rights and protections under EU law, including those guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; whereas the individual rights of everyone residing in the EU must be safeguarded and upheld by the competent national and EU authorities; whereas TNR requires specific, victim-centred responses to close existing protection gaps; whereas treating TNR primarily as a security or foreign interference issue risks obscuring its other dimensions, limiting the effectiveness of the response and leaving persons and communities affected by TNR insufficiently protected;

G. whereas foreign actors have carried out TNR against individuals and groups residing in EU Member States; whereas Member States are affected by TNR to differing degrees and demonstrate varying levels of awareness, institutional preparedness and availability of protection mechanisms; whereas perpetrators operate across borders and exploit such divergences between national legal and institutional frameworks, thereby reducing the effectiveness of isolated national responses;

H. whereas TNR cuts across multiple policy domains and therefore demands additional coordination; whereas TNR tactics often exploit grey zones between agencies and departments;

I. whereas Member States play a fundamental role in preventing, investigating and responding to acts of TNR; whereas fragmented national approaches, and a lack of coordination between Member States, undermine the EU’s ability to identify, prevent and combat TNR effectively and consistently, and are insufficient to address its cross-border nature; whereas such fragmentation may, in practice, exacerbate insecurity for affected individuals and communities, including by increasing exposure, visibility or vulnerability to coercion by states of origin; whereas stronger coordination at EU level should support and complement Member States’ competences in the field of national security;

J. whereas data collected over the last decade indicate a sustained increase in the scale, geographic reach and sophistication of TNR; whereas the number and types of actors involved in TNR have also expanded due to the outsourcing of repression to proxies such as organised crime networks, former intelligence officers, and cyber actors, including within EU Member States, thereby increasing deniability, complicating attribution and undermining accountability;

K. whereas TNR frequently exploits the ordinary operation of host-state administrative, financial, and migration systems, including compliance-driven financial controls, rigid documentation requirements and fragmented data-handling practices; whereas, as a result, EU institutions and Member States risk their structures being abused by perpetrators, even in the absence of intent or direct cooperation with perpetrator states; whereas addressing TNR therefore requires scrutiny of internal EU and national procedures to prevent their exploitation for repressive purposes;

L. whereas individuals and communities targeted by TNR are also key first responders with unique knowledge of repressive tactics, proxy networks and evolving risk patterns; whereas therefore meaningful engagement with affected communities is essential for effective prevention, early warning, and the development of durable counter-strategies;