Changes from plenary report to adopted text

44. Regrets Türkiye’s low level of alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which has decreased from 6 % in 2024 to a record low of 4 % in 2025; notes, however, that this indicator, based solely on statistics regarding alignment with the statements by the VP/HR and Council decisions on sanctions, might not fully capture all levels of engagement and dialogue in the framework of foreign and security cooperation; welcomes, in this sense, the recently increased level of dialogue with the EU and the active participation and substantial contribution to EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; takes note of the growing anti-Western stance of the Turkish authorities; expresses concern about its possible implications for the EU’s interests in the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East; believes, however, that, in the current geopolitical landscape, it is important to explore the possibilities for cooperation with Türkiye in the context of current and future EU policies in the field of security and defence; urges Turkish authorities, nevertheless, to urgently address the country’s extremely low level of alignment with the CFSP and to remove other key obstacles to ensuring the necessary trust among partners and allies, such as maintaining a casus belli against an EU Member State, questioning the sovereignty of others or maintaining the Russian-made S-400 air defence system; notes with concern that Türkiye has applied to become a member of BRICS+ while it currently holds a partnership status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; expresses serious concern about the fundamental incompatibility of Türkiye's potential full membership of BRICS+ with the EU accession process; underlines that such an engagement, reflecting a non-liberal model of global and regional governance, could complicate efforts for a more comprehensive EU-Türkiye partnership;

45. Recognises, as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s efforts in terms of its facilitation and potential mediation role, as underpinned by its hosting of several direct talks between both sides in Istanbul, as well as through the provision of military, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, including defence equipment, which has contributed to Ukraine’s defence efforts; acknowledges that Türkiye has traditionally maintained a position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework; nevertheless continues to regret the fact, that Türkiye does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, while welcoming the measures it has taken to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via Turkish territory, such as to prevent the re-export of common high priority items, which are delivering some results, and calls for alignment with the EU sanctions framework against Russia; urges the Turkish authorities to increase their efforts to detect and prevent the circumvention of restrictive measures, in particular on advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia, to prevent the ‘false transit’ of these items to Russia via Central Asia, to extend these measures to other economically critical goods, to reduce the use of energy resources originating from Russia, and to address the risks linked with Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ in terms of maritime and environmental safety; further expresses concern that Türkiye has not restricted the operations of Russian state-controlled media in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes the widespread presence of pro-Russian narratives and Russia-linked disinformation in the Turkish information space, particularly on Ukraine, NATO and energy security; calls on Türkiye to strengthen efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and disinformation; notes with concern that, through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines, Türkiye is a major importer of Russian natural gas, as well as a major source of oil and petroleum products; reiterates its concern about Türkiye’s close cooperation with Russia on the development of large nuclear power plants, including the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which is expected to become operational in 2026, and which is owned and will be operated by Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom; urges the Turkish Government to join the Espoo Convention, which commits its parties to notifying neighbouring countries on major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries;

46. Expresses concern over Türkiye’s close diplomatic, economic and energy relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, including regular high-level contact, sustained trade relations and the continued import of Iranian gas; regrets Türkiye’s lack of alignment with the EU’s response to Iran’s crackdown on protesters, including restrictive measures regarding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); takes note of the recent judicial developments in the United States concerning Halk Bankası A.Ş. (Halkbank), including proceedings related to sanctions evasion and money laundering schemes; calls on Türkiye to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP positions and sanctions regime; notes with concern that the military operations against the Iranian regime will have implications for Türkiye as a result of its geographic proximity, including through spill-over effects, in particular with regard to renewed migration pressures; underlines the importance of regional coordination and close cooperation with Türkiye and other international partners in this context;

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Changed46.47. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which aligns with the EU’s position, and its active participation in the ‘Global Alliance for the Two-State Solution’ for its implementation; welcomes Türkiye’s contribution to mediation efforts in the Gaza ceasefire and with regard to the Gaza peace summit of October 2025 in Sharm El-Sheikh; deeply regrets, at the same time,condemns the Turkish authorities’ active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and its refusal to designate it as a terrorist organisation, which is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; deplores the fact that Türkiye did not condemn the attack on 7 October 2023 against Israel conducted by Hamas; warns against Türkiye’s engagement with regional actors associated with extremist agendas, noting that such ties could complicate EU-Türkiye relations and affect regional stability; calls on Türkiye to remain firmly anchored in the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its core, as the essential framework to advance a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;

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48. Notes Türkiye’s increased leverage over developments in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and its intensive engagement with the current Syrian transitional authorities, which includes providing them with military training and advisory support; remains concerned about the continued presence of Turkish forces in the country and about the involvement of Turkish-backed armed groups in the latest episodes of violence in the north and north-east of Syria, including against groups that played a decisive role in the international fight against Daesh; condemns the establishment of long-term military infrastructure and administrative structures in occupied areas under Turkish control; calls on Türkiye to engage constructively with the Syrian authorities, to respect Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to address its security concerns in full accordance with international law while ensuring that all Syrians, including Kurds, can enjoy security and fundamental rights, and to refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes; condemns the attacks on the civilian population during the latest episode of violence between the Syrian army and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), causing numerous deaths and the displacement of large numbers of civilians, as well as the lack of access to humanitarian aid; expresses its hope that the latest agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF, which envisages the gradual integration of Kurdish forces and institutions into the state and the historic recognition of Kurdish cultural, linguistic and civil rights, will allow for stability in the north-east region of Syria, which is key for the success of an inclusive political transition in the country; warns that any serious deterioration in regional security could promote a resurgence of Daesh; stresses that any transfer to Türkiye, or via Türkiye, of adult Daesh fighters or suspects originating from detention facilities in Syria must remain subject to effective custody, monitoring and information-sharing arrangements, including in any cross-border transfers; notes the significant investment required for the reconstruction of Syria’s economy and acknowledges Türkiye’s interest in contributing to these efforts; expresses its support for close and constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye in this regard;

49. Reaffirms its support for the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security, and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far, including the easing of certain visa procedures, the preparations for the upcoming opening of the border for third-country nationals and holders of diplomatic passports and the resumption of direct flights by Turkish Airlines; encourages Türkiye to firmly advance in this process on its own merits without making it dependent on its relations with a third country; calls on both countries to continue to work towards better connectivity in order to facilitate the land connection between Europe and Asia, as well as to promote historical reconciliation, an improved business climate, and stronger people-to-people contacts; supports the Commission’s efforts in bringing forward an EU Cross-Regional Connectivity Agenda involving Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan – including projects such as the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway line – which has great potential to contribute to regional stability and economic and social development; encourages Türkiye to support the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples, and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

Wider EU-Türkiye relations

50. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the accession process, which is currently at a standstill because of non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and a lack of democratic reforms, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest, including in relation to Cyprus, and in a phased proportionate and reversible manner and in line with the European Council conclusions of April 2024; reaffirms that the EU continues to be committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

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Changed50.51. Welcomes, in this view, the enhancing of EU-Türkiye relations beyond the accession process in areas of mutual interest and in line with the recommendations of the joint communication on EU-Türkiye relations of 2329 November 2023, in a phased proportionate and reversible manner; further welcomes the recent high-level dialogues on trade and the economy, migration and security, climate, and science, research, technology and innovation; calls again for the resumption of all relevant high-level dialogues and for the establishment of structured high-level dialogues on sectoral cooperation if needed to address other common challenges;

52. Supports deepening the connectivity agenda with Türkiye in the fields of energy, transport, digital and people-to-people contacts, in accordance with EU and international law, as an example of good pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation with the potential to foster peace and stability in the region; stresses the strategic importance of accelerating the completion of key infrastructure projects improving the connectivity between the EU and Türkiye, in line with the extended Trans-European Networks; stresses the relevance of Türkiye for the development and functioning of transcontinental connectivity initiatives, including the increasingly important alternative trade route between Europe and Asia (the Middle Corridor), which could contribute significantly to strengthening the EU’s supply chain resilience and economic cooperation and can play an important role in advancing the EU’s broader strategic autonomy objectives; urges the timely development of the Black Sea ring highway and railroad connections; welcomes Türkiye’s readiness to invest in the construction of a Black Sea highway connecting Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania;

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Changed52.53. Calls on the Commission, following the successful experience with other candidate countries, to undertake the necessary arrangements in order to extend as soon as possible the ‘roam like at home’ programme to Türkiye; calls on the Commission to consider working towards the extension of the Single Euro Payments Area and other relevant programmes so as to enhance people-to-people contacts; welcomes the good progress made on science and research cooperation in the reporting period, in particular linked to participation in Horizon Europe; supports Türkiye´s participation in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and calls for the deepening of EU-Turkey cooperationEU-Türkiyecooperation in the fields of civil protection and resilient infrastructure putting emphasis on the need to strengthen decentralised municipal capacity, civil society participation, better coordination and public communication;

54. Reiterates its view that full implementation and modernisation of the EU customs union is needed, particularly given the current geopolitical landscape; is aware of the importance that large sectors of the EU and Turkish economies attach to the updating of this instrument, which has been in force for more than 30 years; stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass substantial economic and strategic benefits for both partners, strengthening trade, investment and supply chain resilience, boosting digital and green transition, public procurement and sustainable development commitments, and contributing to the economic security of both the EU and Türkiye; underlines, however, that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law, adherence to the CFSP, and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion, and include measures to support the green transition and to help small and medium-sized enterprises adjust; welcomes the positive steps, including the decrease in trade barriers, observed in the most recent period, which also followed the holding of the high-level dialogue on trade;

55. Underlines the relevance for EU-Türkiye trade of upcoming initiatives from the Commission such as the industrial accelerator act and the ‘Made in Europe’ approach, with possible strong requirements that could eventually require an overhaul of EU procurement rules and severely affect the already outdated customs union between the EU and Türkiye; welcomes the fact that the Commission’s proposal for the industrial accelerator act already provides that content from partners with which the EU has concluded an agreement establishing a free trade area or a customs union – such as Türkiye – will be deemed to be of EU origin; supports this approach and calls for any other relevant legislation to be proposed in the same vein in the future to keep taking into account the importance of further integrating the markets and economies of the candidate countries, particularly those that have a customs union with the EU;

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Changed55.56. Notes with deep regret that Türkiye has made no progress towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully satisfy the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member States while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets the fact that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests and applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while they themselves have not taken any of the necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; regrets the Turkish Government’s abusive use of servicespecial passports, the number of which is unknown, while not taking the necessary actions to advance towards a framework that could benefit the whole population; calls on the Turkish Government to address the remaining obstacles preventing the reopening of the visa liberalisation dialogue, and equally calls on the Council to do its share once such steps are taken; takes note of the EU and Member States’ decision to introduce a visa cascade framework on 15 July 2025;

57. Welcomes the reengagement of the European Investment Bank in Türkiye and the Turkey Investment Platform under the European Fund for Sustainable Development, which enables stronger investment support through guarantee programmes in the three overarching policy priorities, namely the Green Deal, the Global Gateway strategy as well as jobs and growth, in accordance with the relevant conditions on respect for EU values; highlights the need to ensure that no EU programmes benefit entities in Türkiye that fail to respect fundamental EU values;

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Changed57.58. Supports the decision taken by the EU component of the EU-Türkiye Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to postpone its 82nd meeting, scheduled to take place on 14 and 15 April 2025 in Ankara, in the aftermath of the detention and arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and others; retains the view that parliamentary dialogue remains a crucial part of EU-Türkiye relations and expresses the hope that the work of the JPC will resume soon when conditions allow; regrets the Turkish authorities’ decision not to invite the European Parliament to observe the presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023 amid allegations of unfair treatment, noting that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were invited; expresses its hope that a European Parliament mission will be invited to observe any upcoming elections in the country ;country;

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The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

59. Reiterates its view that the Turkish Government has neglected to take the necessary steps to address the fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore maintains that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, while recognising the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; takes note of recent calls by relevant Turkish opposition figures advocating renewed engagement and the reopening of accession talks; expresses appreciation for this innovative and bold approach; remains, however, sceptical about supporting it unless there is a clear signal from the Turkish Government of its willingness to recommit to the EU path through concrete and credible actions;

60. Recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye; considers, in this regard, that when advancing their declared EU aspirations, the Turkish authorities should place less emphasis on the country’s capabilities in security and defence and instead address the grave state of democracy in the country; notes that it is committed to advancing the accession process provided that the Turkish Government takes these necessary steps;

61. Continues to urge the Turkish Government to engage constructively with the EU institutions and Member States and to keep working towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, can encompass the interests of all parties involved; stresses the need to strengthen the EU-Türkiye partnership by, for example, the modernisation and enhancement of the current Association Agreement;

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Changed61.62. Is of the opinion, nevertheless, that continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law in the near future will only make the country drift further away from the EU, eroding the trust that is needed for the real enhancement of cooperation and partnership in areas of mutual interest, such as trade, energy or securitysecurity;

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Changed62.63. Believes that it is in the EU’s interest to reassess ways in which Türkiye can remain anchored to the EU, not only in terms of standards but also in terms of values and principles, and to design political initiatives according to that goal; expresses its alarm about the gradual consolidation of another autocratic system on the EU’s doorstep, as such developments have direct and far-reaching implications for the Union’s long-term interests and stability; urges all EU institutions, the Member States and the European Council to be vocal in addressing the persistent democratic backsliding and human rights violations in Türkiye, in particular regarding the ongoing dismantling of pluralist democracy, as doing so is not incompatible with pursuing the best possible relations between the EU and the country; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to ensure that the agendas of high-level officials visiting Türkiye include a plural representation of political and civil society stakeholders in order to obtain a more complete vision of the country;

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64. Reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining its support for Türkiye’s independent civil society; calls on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; is of the opinion that while incentives-based and transactional approaches work in many areas of EU-Türkiye cooperation, they have failed to advance the democratisation of the country; highlights, in this view, that the resumption of the accession process depends mainly on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

65. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between the societies of Türkiye and the EU, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; stresses, in this context, the importance of facilitating people-to-people exchange for EU-Türkiye relations, notably for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people;

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66. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.