Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from plenary report to adopted text
A-10-2026-0106 → TA-10-2026-0215
- From
- A-10-2026-0106 Plenary report of 21 Apr 2026
- To
- TA-10-2026-0215 Adopted text of 17 Jun 2026
- Changes
- 19 changes to the text
- Paragraphs
- +8 added · −6 removed · 20 changed
More facts (3)
- Dossier
- 2025/2256(INI)
- Title (from)
- on the 2025 Commission report on Türkiye
- Title (to)
- 2025 Commission report on Türkiye
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Updates figures on arrested mayors and trustees, reflecting new numbers and dates.15 Adds new events: CHP leadership removal, police storming, and Bilgi University closure.257 Strengthens language on media freedom, academic freedom, and foreign interference.68913 Adds details on Greek maritime rights and Cyprus meetings.1112 Other changes are formal or wording: renumbering, punctuation, decimal separators, and typo fixes.341014
The notes class 11 changes as substance, 6 as formal, 2 as wording only.
Changes that matter, 19
Changes to the text in document order — the ones the change notes describe. Cover page, renumbering and punctuation-only edits are left out (see “Every difference”); changes to citations and references stay in and are marked as formal in the notes.
Change 1
ChangedF. whereas Türkiye has systematically instrumentalised criminal law and counterterrorism laws to crack down on elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders; whereas the recent period has been marked by a severe deterioration in democratic standards and processes in Türkiye, both on the local and the national level, as a result of judicial decisions and governmental pressure exerted on opposition mayors and municipalities; whereas asince totalthe ofMarch 282024 local elections at least 39 mayors from opposition parties, specifically 1829 from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and 10 from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), were arrested and removed from office; whereas in 1113 cases, mayors were replaced with trustees appointed by the government;
AI: Note on change 1 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Updates the number of arrested opposition mayors from 18 to 29 for CHP and total from 28 to 39, and trustee replacements from 11 to 13, adding the date of local elections.
Change 2
AddedG. whereas, after a prolonged legal process, on 21 May 2026, an Ankara Regional Court of Appeals issued a ruling of ‘absolute nullity’ (‘mutlak butlan’) concerning the CHP’s 2023 party congress, thereby annulling the election that brought Özgür Özel to the chair and the current party leadership into office; whereas this court ruling, despite pending possible appeals, was accompanied by a specific injunction in order to effectively remove from office the elected leadership and transfer its authority to the former chair, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and the previous Party Assembly; whereas three days later, on 24 May 2026, upon the request of former chair Kılıçdaroğlu’s team, Turkish riot police stormed the CHP headquarters in Ankara, using tear gas and violence to enforce the court decision ousting the elected leadership and reinstating the previous one;
AI: Note on change 2 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a new recital describing the court ruling annulling the CHP's 2023 congress and the police storming of CHP headquarters.
Change 3
ChangedP.Q. whereas beyond the accession process, constructive engagement in EU-Türkiye relations is needed, whereas Türkiye is a member of NATO and a key partner for the stability in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region and in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, migration and cooperation against terrorism; whereas cooperation with Türkiye is advancing in a number of policy areas of common interest, including through high-level dialogues regarding the removal of trade barriers and increased cooperation on prevention of sanctions circumvention, and could further advance in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner fully in line with the April 2024 European Council conclusions,conclusions;
AI: Note on change 3 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Renumbers recital P to Q and changes punctuation from semicolon to period at the end.
Change 4
ChangedQ.R. whereas Türkiye continues to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world; whereas EU-Türkiye cooperation on migration management, security and regional stability continues to be of strategic importance and contributes to the reduction of irregular and dangerous crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe and in saving lives at sea; whereas since 2011 the EU has provided close to EUR 12.512,5 billion for the support of refugees and host communities in Türkiye;
AI: Note on change 4 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Changes the decimal separator in the amount from 12.5 to 12,5 billion euros.
Change 5
Removed12. Deplores the continued targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure, particularly severe in the last year with regard to the main opposition party CHP; reiterates its strong condemnation of the continued detention and the removal from office of the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Ekrem İmamoğlu of the CHP, in what has become a massive political case affecting more than 400 defendants including district mayors and officials, 105 of which are currently in pre-trial detention; welcomes the recent visits to Türkiye of EU mayors and city representatives and members of the European Committee of the Regions showing their solidarity and supportwith the defendants; echoes their call for the respect of municipal freedoms; is deeply concerned by the acceptance of the nearly 4 000-page indictment, prepared under the responsibility of the notorious former Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, in which İmamoğlu is accused of leading a vast criminal network and committing 142 offenses that could result in a sentence of up to 2 430 years in prison; welcomes the significant decision of the ECtHR to accept İmamoğlu’s application concerning alleged unlawful detention under its ‘priority case’ procedure; condemns the long-standing targeting of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the CHP’s current presidential candidate, through a maze of dozens of investigations, overlapping judicial cases and arbitrary administrative decisions, including another recent indictment on charges of ‘political espionage’ and the unlawful and politically motivated revocation of his university diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be Turkish President; deplores the Istanbul 5th Administrative Court’s decision on 23 January 2026 to reject İmamoğlu’s request to overturn the revocation decision; is deeply concerned by the staggering number of procedures filed at the GNAT seeking the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of current MPs, which overwhelmingly affect members of opposition parties; emphasises that these actions undermine the prospect for a stronger more comprehensive EU-Türkiye partnership and overall improved relations; calls on all political actors in Türkiye to engage seriously in strengthening the GNAT as a pluralist chamber, to address the challenges facing Turkish society, and to lay the foundations for a democratic future;
Added12. Condemns the Turkish Government’s relentless targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, which has been particularly severe over the last year in the case of the main opposition party CHP, moving Türkiye yet further away from already limited party competition toward fully authoritarian rule; strongly condemns the politically engineered removal from office of CHP elected Chairperson Özgür Özel and party leadership, following a court ruling that declared the 2023 CHP congress null and void and opted to reinstate the former party leadership; calls on the Government of Türkiye to cease these abuse tactics, which constitute a grave attack on democratic pluralism, the rule of law, and the sovereign will of party members and voters in Türkiye; considers this case the latest example of a broader pattern of repression against the opposition, involving the weaponisation of the judicial system with the aim of eliminating potential competitors in future elections, thereby further entrenching Türkiye in a fully authoritarian system; calls on the Commission and Member States to condemn the CHP leadership suspension publicly and privately in its exchanges with the Turkish Government and engage more constructively with opposition parties in Türkiye; is concerned about the risks of a protracted internal crisis inside the main opposition party in the absence of a swift congress that would allow party members to democratically determine their leadership;
Removed13. Is gravely concerned by the further deterioration of local democracy in Türkiye; strongly condemns the dismissals and arrests of 28 elected mayors from opposition parties and dozens of local officials, as well as the replacement of 11 mayors with trustees appointed by the government, often in connection with the overly broad and arbitrary application of Türkiye’s anti-terror legislation or unsubstantiated corruption allegations; reiterates its consideration of this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse the repression of opposition municipalities – including through the selective seizure of financial assets – and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; highlights that the dismantling of local democracy significantly weakens state capacity, notably for the provision of services, crisis response (such as for earthquakes) and social services for refugees and vulnerable groups, and therefore threatens human security;
Added13. Reiterates its strong condemnation of the continued detention and the removal from office of the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Ekrem İmamoğlu of the CHP, in what has become a massive political case affecting more than 400 defendants including district mayors and officials, 105 of which are currently in pre-trial detention; strongly rejects the Ankara regional court’s decision, on 21 May 2026, to annul the decision of the 38th ordinary and 21st extraordinary CHP conventions and to reinstall former CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu over current leader Özgür Özel; regards this ruling as a flagrant example of state interference in the internal matters of the biggest opposition party; condemns, furthermore, the arrest, on 4 April 2026, of elected opposition mayor Mustafa Bozbey, alongside several members of the CHP, reportedly on false charges of corruption and bribery; considers these developments as further evidence of the systemic erosion of democratic governance and political pluralism at local level in Türkiye; welcomes the recent visits to Türkiye of EU mayors and city representatives and members of the European Committee of the Regions showing their solidarity and supportwith the defendants; echoes their call for the respect of municipal freedoms; is deeply concerned by the acceptance of the nearly 4 000-page indictment, prepared under the responsibility of the notorious former Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, in which İmamoğlu is accused of leading a vast criminal network and committing 142 offenses that could result in a sentence of up to 2 430 years in prison; welcomes the significant decision of the ECtHR to accept İmamoğlu’s application concerning alleged unlawful detention under its ‘priority case’ procedure; condemns the long-standing targeting of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the CHP’s current presidential candidate, through a maze of dozens of investigations, overlapping judicial cases and arbitrary administrative decisions, including another recent indictment on charges of ‘political espionage’ and the unlawful and politically motivated revocation of his university diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be Turkish President; deplores the Istanbul 5th Administrative Court’s decision on 23 January 2026 to reject İmamoğlu’s request to overturn the revocation decision; is deeply concerned by the staggering number of procedures filed at the GNAT seeking the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of current MPs, which overwhelmingly affect members of opposition parties; emphasises that these actions undermine the prospect for a stronger more comprehensive EU-Türkiye partnership and overall improved relations; calls on all political actors in Türkiye to engage seriously in strengthening the GNAT as a pluralist chamber, to address the challenges facing Turkish society, and to lay the foundations for a democratic future;
Added14. Is gravely concerned by the further deterioration of local democracy in Türkiye; strongly condemns the dismissals and arrests of at least 39 elected mayors from opposition parties and dozens of local officials, as well as the replacement of 13 mayors with trustees appointed by the government, often in connection with the overly broad and arbitrary application of Türkiye’s anti-terror legislation or unsubstantiated corruption allegations; reiterates its consideration of this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse the repression of opposition municipalities – including through the selective seizure of financial assets – and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; is deeply concerned by the recent legal reform requiring local governments, their affiliated entities and municipally controlled companies to obtain presidential approval before establishing companies or cooperatives and making other strategic financial decisions, thereby significantly expanding central executive oversight over local economic decision-making and further undermining the shrinking autonomy of local governments; highlights that the dismantling of local democracy significantly weakens state capacity, notably for the provision of services, crisis response (such as for earthquakes) and social services for refugees and vulnerable groups, and therefore threatens human security;
AI: Note on change 5 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Replaces paragraph 12 with a new one condemning the removal of CHP chair Özgür Özel, and adds paragraphs 13 and 14 with updated details on mayors' arrests and the İmamoğlu case.
Change 6
Changed15.16. Continues to deplore the ongoing and intensifying prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; is deeply worried by reports indicating that up to 90 % of the national media is now pro-government or under government control; deeply regrets, in this regard, the seizure by the Turkish Government of TELE1, one of the few remaining critical broadcasters, which is now under trustee control, and considers this a deliberate attack on media freedom; condemns the harassment of independent journalists who, in 2025, suffered an increased number of arrests and detentions mainly connected to accusations of ‘membership of a terrorist organisation’, ‘insulting the President’ or the alleged violation of the law on assemblies and demonstrations; follows with great concern the cases of Deutsche Welle reporter Alican Uludağ, who was recentlyarrested detainedbecause byof thirtysocial policemedia officersposts made more than one year ago, was held in fronta ofmaximum-security hisprison familyfor over 90 days and was laterrecently arrestedreleased, overalthough socialthe mediacharges postsagainst madehim morehave thannot onebeen yeardropped ago,and his trial will resume in September, of TELE1 editor-in-chief Merdan Yanardağ, who is currently imprisoned over ‘espionage’ allegations, of Medyascope reporter Furkan Karabay, who was has been arrested repeatedly over the last three years and was recently put under house arrest for two months, of TV anchor Sedef Kabaş, who is facing another judicial case for her social media posts, of veteran journalist Fatih Altayli, who was recently released pending his appeal of a sentence of more than four years in jail on ludicrous charges of physically threatening the Turkish President, of BirGün reporter İsmail Arı, who was recently arrested on alleged charges of ‘disinformation’ for his investigative work, and of Swedish journalist Joakim Medin, among others; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all unjustly detained journalists; strongly deplores the instrumentalisation of the Radio and Television Supreme Council, which should be independent, to further stifle independent media through financial and broadcasting sanctions, which are overwhelmingly imposed on critical outlets; deplores the multiple and systematic actions against freedom of expression online, including repeated restrictions on internet access, bandwidth throttling, broadcast bans and blocking of social network accounts, websites and thousands of news stories, alongside content removal requests meant to silence journalists and ordinary citizens, frequently on the grounds of ‘national security and public order’; condemns the instrumentalisation of legal provisions by the Turkish authorities to curtail journalists’ work and exert targeted pressure on them; calls on the Turkish authorities to immediately ensure the protection of freedom of expression and media freedom and to guarantee that no individual is deprived of liberty solely for the peaceful exercise of their fundamental rights, in line with Türkiye’s international human rights obligations;
AI: Note on change 6 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Updates paragraph 16 to reflect the arrest and release of journalist Alican Uludağ, adding details about his detention and trial.
Change 7
Changed18.19. Remains deeply concerned about the state of academic freedom and institutional independence, as illustrated by the deteriorating situation in Boğaziçi University since the appointment, in 2021, of its rector by a decision of the Turkish President; considers this extension of the trustee model to academic institutions, which has produced a clear negative impact on the academic life and performance of the institution, to be a further departure from EU standards on academic freedom, mirroring the government’s attempts to tighten control on any space of possible dissent; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure democratic governance and autonomy in the country’s universities and to put an end to the crackdown on students that is taking place through restrictions on their freedom of association and expression and on their right to participate fully and freely in academic life; expresses its concern regarding the case of Bilgi University –abruptly closed down by presidential decree on 22 May 2026 and reopened three days later following significant public backlash and widespread protests from students and academics – as yet another example of threats to academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and state intervention in higher education;
AI: Note on change 7 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds a sentence to paragraph 19 expressing concern about the closure and reopening of Bilgi University.
Change 8
Changed22.23. Condemns reported cases of transnational repression targeting Turkish nationals abroad, including intimidation, forced returns and misuse of international cooperation mechanisms; condemns Türkiye’s past activities that have undermined European social cohesion, security and democratic processes, including interference in Member States’ internal affairs through diaspora communities;communities and the use of its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda; remains worried that the racist extremist movement Ülkü Ocakları, also known as the Grey Wolves, which is closely linked to the ruling coalition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), is spreading not only in TurkeyTürkiye but also in EU Member States; calls for the EU and its Member States to examine the possibility of banning their associations in EU countries; condemns the Turkish authorities’ policy of political, financial, media and logistical support for Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements;movements, networks, associations, charities and educational bodies operating within the territory of several EU Member States as well as the EU’s neighbourhood, which enables them to carry out activities involving ideological influence, funding and recruitment; calls on Türkiye to end all forms of support for these organisations;
AI: Note on change 8 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Expands paragraph 23 to include criticism of Anadolu agency propaganda and support for Muslim Brotherhood networks.
Show 11 more changes
Change 9
Changed26.27. Acknowledges that Türkiye provides generally adequate legal guarantees for freedom of religion or belief and that freedom of worship is generally respected in the country; urges the Turkish authorities to address the remaining shortcomings with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, the insufficient protection and promotion of minority languages, limited access to schooling supportsupport, andrestrictions clergyon the training, appointment and succession of clergy, restricted access to media and public advertising in minority languages, and persistent complications in the enjoyment of property rights; calls on Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations, Council of Europe resolutions and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard, including concerning the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the importance of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world, to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of the Ecumenical Patriarch, in accordance with the relevant Venice Commission recommendation; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora Museum, which are included in UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; expresses its serious concerns at the acts of vandalism and destruction targeting minority places of worship; strongly condemns the continued hate attacks against Alevi, Christian and Jewish minorities; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute those responsible for hate crimes, including hate speech, and all forms of discrimination committed against minorities, and to ensure that media regulators apply standards against incitement and hate speech, including against religious communities, notably the Alevi, Christian and Jewish communities; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary, which has been closed since 1971, as an important positive step in the recognition of religious and minority rights;rights and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; deplores the application in recent years of administrative measures, such as the N-82 and G-87 codes, to hundreds of foreign Christian pastors, missionaries and their family members, designating them as national security threats without evidence, trial or effective means of appeal, which has resulted in their deportation from Türkiye or their being denied re-entry to the country; urges the Turkish Government to take all the necessary steps to ensure full religious freedom and non-discrimination within the UN framework and according to the EU acquis and principles; calls on Türkiye to refrain from any statements or actions that could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of EU Member States concerning the situation of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, in view of the relevant ECtHR rulings;
AI: Note on change 9 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds calls for regulation on minority foundations and restrictions on clergy training in paragraph 27.
Change 10
Changed35.36. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 2.72,7 million refugees, including 2.32,3 million Syrians under temporary protection as at January 2026; notes that, according to Frontex reporting in January 2025, irregular migration along the Türkiye–EU border declined by approximately one quarter in absolute numbers; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further notes the fact that since 2011, the EU has contributed close to EUR 12.512,5 billion to assist Türkiye in supporting refugees and host communities; supports the continuation of EU funding to further sustain the healthcare, education, protection and integration of refugees in Türkiye; calls for the EU and the Member States to maintain and, where possible, scale up financial assistance for the humanitarian and protection space in Türkiye, increasing efforts to support Turkish civil society organisations and refugee-led organisations;
AI: Note on change 10 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Changes decimal separators in numbers from 2.7 to 2,7 and 2.3 to 2,3 million.
Change 11
Changed37.38. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive or aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood; welcomes the continued dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, including high-level meetings such as the summit between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan in February 2026, which can foster a constructive environment and further de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is of paramount importance amid the dangerous escalation of conflicts in the wider region; reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the region and encourages all sides to further advance in this line of dialogue and cooperation with the aim of resolving any pending dispute and difference within the framework of international law; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), which is inconceivable among allies and good neighbours;neighbours, should Greece exercise its lawful right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles into the Aegean Sea, in accordance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine, the significant increase in violations of Greek territorial waters and airspace compared to 2024 – although thesethe latter remain at relatively low levels – the political instrumentalisation of the NAVTEX system, the violation of the Greek continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone by impeding the progress of projects for EU connectivity, such as the Great Sea Interconnector and EastMed Pipeline, which have been designated as a EU project of common interest, the rejection of the publication of the Greek maritime spatial planning published under the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive and the publication of a Turkish maritime spatial planning covering areas under Greece’s sovereignty and jurisdiction, the objection to Greece’s establishment of a marine park in the Aegean Sea entirely within Greek territorial waters,waters and the announcement of the establishment of two Turkish marine parks extending into areas of Greek jurisdiction in August 2025, or the considerable increase, since 2024, of illegal fishing activities by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; expresses its serious concern about the proposal for a draft law prepared by the Ankara University National Center for the Sea and Maritime Law (DEHUKAM) that would codify the ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine and could be in direct contravention of established international law; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as their sovereign rights in accordance with EU and international law, including under UNCLOS, and including the right to delimitate continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones;Zones and the right to explore and exploit their natural resources; calls, in this regard, on Türkiye not to proceed with the adoption of any law that could contravene these principles; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third countries, does not comply with the law of the sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third countries;
AI: Note on change 11 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds details to paragraph 38 about Greek territorial waters, maritime spatial planning, and marine parks.
Change 12
Changed39.40. Welcomes the steps taken by the UN Secretary-General towards a resumption of comprehensive settlement talks, including his appointment of a Personal Envoy on Cyprus; calls on the Commission to rapidly appoint a new European Commission Special Envoy for Cyprus; welcomes the two informal meetings held in a broader format, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, in Geneva in March 2025 and New York in July 2025, as well as the various meetings in Cyprus of President Nikos Christodoulides and leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Tufan Erhürman inincluding the meeting of December 2025, in which a joint statement emphasised that ‘the real aim is the solution of the Cyprus problem with political equality as described in the UNSC Resolutions’ and in February 2026;Resolutions’; further welcomes the stance of both sides, following on from the fact that there is a new leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has contributed to renewed hope for the creation of a conducive environment for the resumption of settlement negotiations; warmly welcomes the agreement on further confidence-building measures as a positive and relevant step and encourages their implementation; strongly supports the continuation of contact between both sides under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and the work of his Personal Envoy on Cyprus; calls for the EU and its Member States to firmly support the continuation of this dialogue and to stand ready to support, in any way needed, the potential success of this process; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations and not to miss this window of opportunity;
AI: Note on change 12 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Updates paragraph 40 to include various meetings and a joint statement, and changes the reference to February 2026.
Change 13
Changed46.47. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which aligns with the EU’s position, and its active participation in the ‘Global Alliance for the Two-State Solution’ for its implementation; welcomes Türkiye’s contribution to mediation efforts in the Gaza ceasefire and with regard to the Gaza peace summit of October 2025 in Sharm El-Sheikh; deeply regrets, at the same time,condemns the Turkish authorities’ active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and its refusal to designate it as a terrorist organisation, which is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; deplores the fact that Türkiye did not condemn the attack on 7 October 2023 against Israel conducted by Hamas; warns against Türkiye’s engagement with regional actors associated with extremist agendas, noting that such ties could complicate EU-Türkiye relations and affect regional stability; calls on Türkiye to remain firmly anchored in the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its core, as the essential framework to advance a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
AI: Note on change 13 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Strengthens language in paragraph 47 from 'deeply regrets' to 'condemns' regarding support for Hamas.
Change 14
Changed50.51. Welcomes, in this view, the enhancing of EU-Türkiye relations beyond the accession process in areas of mutual interest and in line with the recommendations of the joint communication on EU-Türkiye relations of 2329 November 2023, in a phased proportionate and reversible manner; further welcomes the recent high-level dialogues on trade and the economy, migration and security, climate, and science, research, technology and innovation; calls again for the resumption of all relevant high-level dialogues and for the establishment of structured high-level dialogues on sectoral cooperation if needed to address other common challenges;
AI: Note on change 14 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Corrects the date of the joint communication from 23 to 29 November 2023.
Change 15
Changed52.53. Calls on the Commission, following the successful experience with other candidate countries, to undertake the necessary arrangements in order to extend as soon as possible the ‘roam like at home’ programme to Türkiye; calls on the Commission to consider working towards the extension of the Single Euro Payments Area and other relevant programmes so as to enhance people-to-people contacts; welcomes the good progress made on science and research cooperation in the reporting period, in particular linked to participation in Horizon Europe; supports Türkiye´s participation in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and calls for the deepening of EU-Turkey cooperationEU-Türkiyecooperation in the fields of civil protection and resilient infrastructure putting emphasis on the need to strengthen decentralised municipal capacity, civil society participation, better coordination and public communication;
AI: Note on change 15 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Fixes a typo in 'EU-Türkiye cooperation' by adding a hyphen.
Change 16
Changed55.56. Notes with deep regret that Türkiye has made no progress towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully satisfy the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member States while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets the fact that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests and applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while they themselves have not taken any of the necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; regrets the Turkish Government’s abusive use of servicespecial passports, the number of which is unknown, while not taking the necessary actions to advance towards a framework that could benefit the whole population; calls on the Turkish Government to address the remaining obstacles preventing the reopening of the visa liberalisation dialogue, and equally calls on the Council to do its share once such steps are taken; takes note of the EU and Member States’ decision to introduce a visa cascade framework on 15 July 2025;
AI: Note on change 16 · wording only Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Changes 'service passports' to 'special passports' in paragraph 56.
Change 17
Changed57.58. Supports the decision taken by the EU component of the EU-Türkiye Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to postpone its 82nd meeting, scheduled to take place on 14 and 15 April 2025 in Ankara, in the aftermath of the detention and arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and others; retains the view that parliamentary dialogue remains a crucial part of EU-Türkiye relations and expresses the hope that the work of the JPC will resume soon when conditions allow; regrets the Turkish authorities’ decision not to invite the European Parliament to observe the presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023 amid allegations of unfair treatment, noting that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were invited; expresses its hope that a European Parliament mission will be invited to observe any upcoming elections in the country ;country;
AI: Note on change 17 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Fixes spacing in 'country ;' to 'country;'.
Change 18
Changed61.62. Is of the opinion, nevertheless, that continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law in the near future will only make the country drift further away from the EU, eroding the trust that is needed for the real enhancement of cooperation and partnership in areas of mutual interest, such as trade, energy or securitysecurity;
AI: Note on change 18 · formal Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Changes punctuation from semicolon to period at the end of paragraph 62.
Change 19
Changed62.63. Believes that it is in the EU’s interest to reassess ways in which Türkiye can remain anchored to the EU, not only in terms of standards but also in terms of values and principles, and to design political initiatives according to that goal; expresses its alarm about the gradual consolidation of another autocratic system on the EU’s doorstep, as such developments have direct and far-reaching implications for the Union’s long-term interests and stability; urges all EU institutions, the Member States and the European Council to be vocal in addressing the persistent democratic backsliding and human rights violations in Türkiye, in particular regarding the ongoing dismantling of pluralist democracy, as doing so is not incompatible with pursuing the best possible relations between the EU and the country; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to ensure that the agendas of high-level officials visiting Türkiye include a plural representation of political and civil society stakeholders in order to obtain a more complete vision of the country;
AI: Note on change 19 · substance Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds alarm about autocratic consolidation and calls for addressing democratic backsliding in paragraph 63.
Sources & citation
Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.
- Data source
- Licensed CC BY 4.0.
- Retrieved
- 25 September 2026
Cite as
European Parliament (2026). “Changes between A-10-2026-0106 and TA-10-2026-0215”. Text, 17 June 2026. from A-10-2026-0106, to TA-10-2026-0215, reference 2025/2256(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0106/compare/TA-10-2026-0215 (retrieved 25 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2026-06-17,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between A-10-2026-0106 and TA-10-2026-0215}},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-06-17},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0106/compare/TA-10-2026-0215}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2026-0106/compare/TA-10-2026-0215},
urldate = {2026-09-25},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from A-10-2026-0106, to TA-10-2026-0215, reference 2025/2256(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}