Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Change 9

Changed13.14. Denounces Russia’s ongoing efforts to undermine stability and democratic governance in the Western Balkans, particularly through dis- and misinformation campaigns, political interference and energy leverage aimed at undermining stability and democratic governance and promoting pro-Russian sentiments fuelled by anti-Western rhetoric; notes China’s negative influence in the region; notes that EU efforts to counter these developments have been insufficient and ineffective; calls for the evaluation and streamlining of all efforts and further investment to counter pro-Russian and anti-European FIMI; expresses concern about the stability of BiH and the persistent tensions between Kosovo and Serbia; stresses that the Western Balkans is an area of strategic and geopolitical interest for the EU and that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the region directly influences that of the entire continent;14. Notes the deep instability in the Middle East and the West, North and Central Africa regions, and its linkage to the Jihadist terrorist threat;continent;

Change 10

Removed15. Deplores the fact that escalations and the violation of international law in Gaza and the broader region diminish the chances of long-term peace for all people in the Middle East; welcomes the US-negotiated peace plan between Israel and Hamas leading to a ceasefire; calls on all parties to fully comply with the ceasefire, to deliver the bodies of all deceased hostages to their families, to allow the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid and access for other civilian assistance missions, and calls for a workable roadmap towards a two-state solution, the restoration of security and public order, including the disarmament of Hamas, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, the reform and empowerment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as necessary priority steps; considers it a pivotal moment for the entire region and a starting point towards further de-escalation and stability; urges the EU to swiftly broaden the mandate of its EU Border Assistance Mission to Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) and the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law (EUPOL-COPPS) in order to play a pivotal role in progress towards a viable political solution, including through support for the rule of law, security-sector reform and transitional justice;

Added15. Notes the deep instability in the Middle East and the West, North and Central Africa regions, and its linkage to the Jihadist terrorist threat; stresses that this instability poses a serious threat to the security of Europeans, who are facing increased migratory pressure that facilitates the entry of terrorists into European territory;

Removed16. Notes with concern the escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran, and in the broader region, including Lebanon, Syria and Qatar; remains concerned about internal tensions in Lebanon and Syria; supports the contribution of the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to southern Lebanon and welcomes the extension of its mandate for one year; recalls that the majority of UNIFIL contingents come from EU Member States; condemns Iran’s persistent attempts to destabilise the region, either directly or through its proxies; highlights the need for the EU to support its partner, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, also by increasing EPF funding for the protection of the Jordan-Syria border, which is being used by traffickers as a crossing point for arms and drug trafficking and has been weakened by the ongoing crisis in the Middle East;

Added16. Deplores the fact that, in the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas, escalations and the violation of international law in Gaza and the broader region diminish the chances of long-term peace for all people in the Middle East; welcomes the US-negotiated peace plan between Israel and Hamas leading to a ceasefire, as endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803; calls on all parties to fully comply with the ceasefire, to deliver the body of the last remaining deceased hostage to his family, to allow the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid while holding international organisations to the highest neutrality standards and without imposing disproportionate or incapacitating restrictions on their operations, and to allow access for other civilian assistance missions, including through the Rafah crossing, and calls for a workable roadmap towards a two-state solution as provided by the UN General Assembly-endorsed New York Declaration, the restoration of security and public order, including the urgent disarmament of Hamas, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, the reform and empowerment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as necessary priority steps; underlines that the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip must be strictly and unequivocally conditional on robust international monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and subject to clear and binding conditionality; stresses that all financial assistance, reconstruction material and infrastructure support must be fully controlled, audited and safeguarded to prevent any diversion to terrorist organisations or violent activities; emphasises that sustainable reconstruction, security and long-term stability in Gaza are inseparable from the complete exclusion of terrorist and extremist actors, and the PA’s capacity to prevent terrorism and armed violence; notes with serious concern the persistent obstacles to humanitarian access and the alarm expressed by the VP/HR regarding recent licensing decisions constraining humanitarian organisations operating in Gaza; considers it a pivotal moment for the entire region and a starting point towards further de-escalation and stability; urges the EU to swiftly broaden the mandate of its EU Border Assistance Mission to Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) and the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law (EUPOL-COPPS) in order to play a pivotal role in progress towards a viable political solution, including through support for the rule of law, security-sector reform and transitional justice; is deeply concerned about the continued escalation of violence in the West Bank and the support by the Israeli Government and armed forces for settler activities, and welcomes the December 2025 Council conclusions in this regard; regrets the Israeli Government’s formal announcement of the establishment of 11 new settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank, as well as the legalisation or retroactive recognition of eight illegal outposts and neighbourhoods of existing settlements as new official settlements; recalls the EU’s long-standing position that the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem remains illegal under international law, and constitutes a unilateral measure that undermines trust and the prospects for a sustainable peace and a negotiated solution;

Removed17. Welcomes the commitment to increase security cooperation with Southern Mediterranean partners and calls for enhanced cooperation with Mediterranean partner countries in the field of maritime security, countering sanctions circumvention and ensuring the security of submarine cables, while also combating extremism, terrorism and illicit arms trade;

Added17. Notes with concern the escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran, and in the broader region, including Lebanon, Syria and Qatar; remains concerned about internal tensions in Lebanon and Syria; supports the contribution of the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to southern Lebanon and welcomes the extension of its mandate for one year; welcomes the conclusions of the ninth EU-Lebanon Association Council, in particular the willingness to further support the Lebanese security sector through the full use of EU tools, including the European Peace Facility and programmes under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, and to explore possible future CSDP engagement; underlines the need for progress on mutual confidence-building measures and the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, including the disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed groups, as a prerequisite for regional stability; recalls that the majority of UNIFIL contingents come from EU Member States; condemns Iran’s persistent attempts to destabilise the region, either directly or through its proxies; highlights the need for the EU to support its partner, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, also by increasing EPF funding for the protection of the Jordan-Syria border, which is being used by traffickers as a crossing point for arms and drug trafficking and has been weakened by the ongoing crisis in the Middle East;

Change 11

Changed19.20. Reiterates its concern about Russia’s intensified militarisation and its aggressive posture towards the EU Member States, increased geopolitical, climate-change- and resource-driven competition in the Arctic as well as malign activities in European territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, including through the activities of the Russian shadow fleet; is also concerned about increased Chinese presence and the deepened cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic, including joint exercises; stresses that it is essential to counterbalance Russia and China’s growing influence and military presence in the region; underlines the importance of overall stability and peace in the Arctic in accordance with the principles of international law; calls for concrete and effective action by the EU and its Member States using all available means and maximum strategic creativity to stop the shadow fleet, enhance Arctic and maritime domain awareness through enhanced surveillance, intelligence sharing and satellite monitoring, and protect critical infrastructure; stresses the need for the EU to ensure the effective monitoring of its external maritime borders to prevent illegal activities; is concerned by non-EU countries’ interference in Greenland, notably inflammatory narratives and the conduct of hybrid actions on Greenland’s territory, as well as the US Government’s formulation of explicit threats against Greenland’s sovereignty;sovereignty and the recent refusal to exclude military intervention to that end; underlines that this represents a fundamental threat to the EU’s strategic security interests, and calls for the EU and its Member States to act jointly in response; welcomes, in this regard, the joint statement of 6 January 2026 on Greenland by France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Denmark and the UK, joined by other EU Member States, reiterating that ‘Greenland belongs to its people’ and recalling that ‘it is for Denmark and Greenland, and them only, to decide on matters concerning Denmark and Greenland’;

Change 12

Removed20. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; is concerned by China’s accelerated militarisation and its assertive posture towards its neighbours; notes with growing concern the continued pressure on freedom of navigation and critical infrastructure, with attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait; underlines that such actions undermine freedom of navigation and that China’s refusal to exclude the use of military coercion to advance its irredentist ambitions towards Taiwan poses a serious threat to regional stability; expresses deep concern about China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the use of economic coercion, hybrid warfare tactics and dangerous manoeuvres against its neighbours; emphasises that any military escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have serious consequences for Europe’s security and supply chains; highlights the importance of preserving stability in the South China Sea in the light of the strategic need for security and defence cooperation with certain countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); commends the recent freedom of navigation operations carried out by the United States, the UK, France and Germany in the Taiwan Strait, which demonstrate strong international commitment to upholding international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to ensuring freedom of navigation;

Added21. Supports all European initiatives of solidarity with Greenland and Denmark, welcomes Greenland’s important decision to select Eutelsat, a European satellite operator, to provide its satellite internet coverage, and calls for the rapid development of the European space sector, which is essential for Europe’s security, particularly through the ongoing EU Space Act initiative;

Added22. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; is concerned by China’s accelerated militarisation and its assertive posture towards its neighbours; notes with growing concern the continued pressure on freedom of navigation and critical infrastructure, condemns the intensified and accelerated steps by China to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and recalls that the UN Charter’s explicit prohibition of the use of force applies to these regions; underlines that such actions undermine freedom of navigation and that China’s refusal to exclude the use of military coercion to advance its irredentist ambitions towards Taiwan poses a serious threat to regional stability; expresses deep concern about China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the use of economic coercion, hybrid warfare tactics and dangerous manoeuvres against its neighbours; emphasises that any military escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have serious consequences for Europe’s security and supply chains; highlights the importance of preserving stability in the South China Sea in the light of the strategic need for security and defence cooperation with certain countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); commends the recent freedom of navigation operations carried out by the United States, the UK, France and Germany in the Taiwan Strait, which demonstrate strong international commitment to upholding international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to ensuring freedom of navigation;

Change 13

Changed22.24. Expresses deep concern about the intensified military-technical cooperation between Russia and China, which poses a growing threat to stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, and risks undermining global peace, the rules-based international order and European security interests; notes with concern the dependency of the EU and its Member States on imports of rare earth elements and other critical raw materials from third countries, in particular China, which constitutes a growing security risk; regrets that recent Russia-China military signalling and exercises, as well as China’s ‘Justice Mission 2025’ exercise, have further increased tensions in the region, reinforcing the importance of de-escalation, deterrence and the protection of freedom of navigation;

Change 14

Changed27.29. Stresses the EU’s obligation and strategic long-term global interest in maintaining the rules and values-based international order, ensuring respect for international law and upholding multilateralism; notes that traditional peacebuilding, peace negotiation expertise, transitional justice and confidence-building measures remain critically important, despite current trends; calls for the EU to assume a leading role in shaping peace negotiations and peaceful transitions in the major conflicts affecting Europe and its immediate neighbourhood; underlines that the EU should ensure its relevance in this regard by exploiting the full potential of CSDP instruments in order to ensure that peace negotiations benefit from its expertise in securing sustainable and fair peace; urges the EU and its Member States to further deepen existing partnerships and seek new partnerships with countries that share the same belief in multilateralism and a rules-based international order; insists on the importance of a strong and close partnership with the UK on security and defence with specific conditions, and welcomes the EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership; regrets that the negotiations on the UK’s participation in the SAFE programme have not succeeded so far; welcomes the agreement on SAFE between the EU and Canada; calls for the EU and the UK to agree on a balanced and mutually beneficial solution;

Change 15

Changed29.31. Expresses its dismay at the currentDecember ambiguity2025 US National Security Strategy, which formalises a groundless US policy of considering the EU, including its fundamental values, democratic governance principles and several of its fundamental security objectives, opposed to US interests; underscores that such positions inevitably lead European countries to reinforce their strategic autonomy, including in the EU-US defence and security relationship; acknowledges NATO’s crucial role for Europe’s collective defence, but warns of the risks posed by the growing unpredictability, short-sighted isolationism and self-centredness in US foreign policy and its shifting relations with Russia and focus on Asia, which could be accompanied by a stark decrease in military posture and the rapid withdrawal of troops from Europe and be perceived as undermining its security commitments to Europe; calls, against this backdrop, for the development of contingency plans in case of rapid US troop withdrawalwithdrawal, or as a result of any other circumstances, to ensure European deterrence and capacity for autonomous action against aggression;

Change 16

Changed30.32. Underlines that the US remainshas so far remained the EU’s most important strategic ally and is essential to NATO’s collective defence and European security, resilience and deterrence; highlights that US engagement and close EU-US cooperation should therefore be fostered; underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to increase defence spending in a coordinated manner and for the Member States to strengthen their own defence capabilities and readiness, with the aim of ensuring strategic autonomy and developing credible deterrence independent of the United States and within the framework of a renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership; underlines that a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence would reinforce European interests, contribute to a stronger transatlantic partnership with the United States and achieve shared security objectives; notes the adoption of the US National Security Strategy 2025 and welcomes the stated US commitment to support its allies in preserving the freedom and security of Europe, while regretting the negative tone towards our continent and rejecting any insinuation of interference in the democratic processes of EU Member States; welcomes the adoption of the 2025 National Defence Appropriations Act by the US Congress and its realistic restrictions on possible troop and asset withdrawals from Europe and on the withdrawal of assistance to Ukraine and Baltic security; notes, with concern, reports that US officials have allegedly informed European interlocutors of their demand that Europe take over responsibility for the majority of NATO’s conventional defence capabilities in Europe by 2027; considers that such announcements are not indicative of a dialogue between partners and allies on how best to secure European security and burden-sharing; considers that the US National Security Strategy further reinforces the imperative for Europe to urgently take responsibility for its own security;

Change 17

Changed32.34. Recognises the significant efforts to advance European defence through proposals for regulations and initiatives such as EDIP, the ReArm Europe Agenda, SAFE, the defence mini-omnibus, the defence omnibus, as well as the Military Mobility package, BraveTech EU and the Defence Readiness 2030 Roadmap; urges the swift completion and implementation of the Defence Readiness Omnibus; welcomes the proposals offering Member States greater budgetary flexibility, in particular the EUR 150 billion loan facility under the SAFE instrument; considers, however, that these measures are insufficient and that massive additional budgetary investment will be necessary; welcomes the fact that the SAFE loans have been fully subscribed,subscribed and are leading to significant joint procurement actions, while reiterating its regret over the use of Article 122 TFEU, especially as Parliament has proven its ability to act swiftly when required; welcomes the announced intention for Member States to increase joint procurement by 40 % by the end of 2027 and to increase procurement with European preference by 55 % by the end of 2028 and by 60 % by the end of 2030; regrets the lack of incremental increases in joint procurement and notes that Member States have, to date, failed to implement joint procurement targets set in 2007; welcomes the adoption of EDIP Regulation (EU) XXX/2025, the first comprehensive industrial programme at EU level, which incentivises cooperation among Member States through the creation of the Structure for European Armament Programme (SEAP), the EU Military Sales Mechanism, and the EDPCIs; recalls the need for EU defence industrial funding to closely align with CSDP capability needs; calls for the creation of a dedicated EDIP-European Defence Fund (EDF) coordination mechanism to prioritise projects that enhance interoperability and operational resilience, while promoting innovation, supply-chain security and European industrial sovereignty;

Change 18

Changed41.43. Calls for appropriate measures to be taken to facilitate and incentivise the EDTIB, including through public-private cooperation models, mobilising private investment and savings, and the more active involvement of the European Investment Bank (EIB); calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently create a durable, robust and predictable funding mechanism, including by exploring the possibility of establishing a multilateral financing instrument or an EU defence, security and resilience fund, which can be used to support the expansion of the production-capacity stabilisation of supply chains and the technological independence of critical sectors, including through private investment; calls for the optimisation and better coordination of national and EU funding instruments to ensure joint capability development and the procurement of assets to ensure our collective defence; welcomes the fact that the EIB has significantly increased its investments in European security and defence, having allocated 3.53,5 % of its total financing to these projects in 2025; stresses, however, that the EUR 175 million budget of the Defence Equity Facility for the period 2024-2027 is clearly insufficient for meeting the financing requirements of the EDTIB and its value chain; calls, therefore, on the EIB to substantially increase the budget to better address the equity needs of the sector and support strategic European defence capabilities;

Change 19

Changed50.52. Calls for the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) to provide sufficient and flexible funding to address both the ‘security’ and ‘defence’ aspects comprehensively, thereby strengthening the EU’s capacity to safeguard its citizens and to ensure their protection both within its borders and beyond, and also to promote stability in its neighbourhood; considers the funding of physical border barriers essential to safeguarding Europe against hybrid threats, including the instrumentalisation of mass migration, the prevention of smuggling and trafficking and the provision of a deterrent against a potential military attack; welcomes the Commission’s proposals to simplify, facilitate and accelerate defence procurement; calls on the Commission to consolidate and clarify the defence envelope provided for in the draft 2028-2034 MFF, exploring all options to support the Member States’ defence investments; recalls the specific nature of the defence sector and considers that the future European Competitiveness Fund, provided for in the Commission’s draft MFF, should retain all the criteria and modalities of the European defence industry financing instruments, in particular the criteria relating to the EDF and EDIP, while welcoming the Commission and the EIB’s initiative to establish the Defence Equity Facility with a budget of EUR 175 million; calls on the EIB to substantially increase this budget to better support strategic European defence capabilities;

Change 20

Changed86.88. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the European Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the governments and parliaments of partner countries.count.