Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Change 16

Added19. Expresses its disagreement with the Israeli Government’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state; reaffirms the importance of respecting the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia in accordance with its constitution, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations, as key for the peace and stability of the entire Horn of Africa region;

20. Considers the growing antisemitism around the world as an unacceptable consequence of Hamas’ brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks across Israel and Israel’s disproportionate large-scale military response in Palestine;

21. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attack of 7 October 2023 committed by the terrorist organisation Hamas against Israel;

Change 17

Changed20.22. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the existence, security and legitimate right to self-defence of the State of Israel as well as the security and dignity of Palestinians; recalls that Israel’s right to self-defence is enshrined in and constrained by international law and must be exercised with full respect for international courts; believes that Israel’s right tonotes self-defencewith cannotconcern justifythat the indiscriminate and disproportionate military actionwar in Gaza, whichGaza has had devastating humanitarian consequences and has led to unacceptable suffering for the civilian population, which has notably been exacerbated by Hamas through the deliberate abuse of civilian infrastructure and its use of the civilian population of Gaza as human shields, including the remaining Israeli hostages; stresses that the UN, the International Court of Justice and the ICC stated that Israeli military operations have not complied with international humanitarian law, including the principle of proportionality and civilian protection obligations; expresses its relief over the liberation of all living hostages and calls on Hamas to deliver the bodiesbody of allthe last deceased hostageshostage still being held by Hamas to theirhis families;family; reaffirms its position demanding a permanent ceasefire, urgent humanitarian access as well as relief corridors; deeply regrets the fragility of the ceasefire in Gaza, a circumstance which has jeopardised too many civilian lives;

23. Recalls that compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement is a crucial element of the partnership and calls for continued monitoring and assessment of its implementation by the Israeli Government; recalls that, in the context of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, on 10 September 2025 the Commission President announced proposals to suspend certain trade provisions of the Association Agreement, and support for targeted measures against specific Israeli ministers; takes note of the arrest warrants issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024; underlines that any such measures ought to be carefully considered and taken in a way that preserves the EU’s capacity to act as a credible partner and to advance the prospects of a negotiated two-state solution; believes that the EU-Israel Association Council remains an essential forum for frank dialogue; reaffirms that constructive engagement and sustained dialogue remain the most effective instruments to promote peace, security and lasting stability in the region; insists that the concrete roadmap for implementing the two-state solution must be the central focus of the Commission’s Middle East strategy, which is planned for 2026; regrets the consequences for the EU’s global image caused by the absence of a united response to the catastrophic situation in the Gaza Strip;

Change 18

Changed22.24. Underlines that sustainable peace requires a credible political process aimed at achieving a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as a shared capital; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution andsolution; condemns the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West BankBank, recalling the EU’s long-standing position that these remain illegal under international law and Eastconstitute Jerusalema asunilateral suchmeasure anthat obstacle;undermines trust and the prospects for a negotiated solution; welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; underscores the role of the Palestinian Authority as the EU’s main interlocutor in Palestine and reaffirms that any future governance in Gaza must exclude the participation of terrorist organisations and must ensure the demilitarisation of Gaza; reiterates its opposition to any annexation plan for Gaza or any other Palestinian territory and against mass forcible transfers;

Change 19

Added25. Insists that the Commission must guarantee that EU funds are not allocated or linked to any form of terrorism and/or religious and political radicalisation; reiterates its position that all schoolbooks and school materials supported by EU funds must be in line with UNESCO standards of peace, tolerance, coexistence and non-violence; is concerned about the antisemitism, hate speech, promotion of jihad and incitement to violence taught in Palestinian school textbooks funded by the EU;

26. Encourages the UN, the Arab League, regional partners and the EU to coordinate donor support, attach robust oversight to funding and ensure that reconstruction assistance supports civic institutions and effective governance; expresses, in this context, deep concern over the misuse by terrorist groups of humanitarian aid directed to Palestinian territories; calls for the control mechanisms for the distribution of EU funds to be strengthened;

27. Recognises the efforts made by certain Arab states and Israel to normalise diplomatic relations under the Abraham Accords; calls for the EU to support initiatives aimed at building broad regional and international backing for a better future in Arab-Israeli relations;

Change 20

Changed25.28. Notes that a significant weakening of Iran and its allies – including the fall of the Assad regime and the defeat of Tehran’s proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other militias – would offer hope for peace and for the continuation of regional normalisation in the spirit of the Abraham Accords; is deeply concerned about Hezbollah’s significant support for Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and its coordination with other Iran-backed militias;

Change 21

Changed26.29. Welcomes the positive changes in Lebanon since the beginning of 2025;2025, mirrored in the conclusions of the ninth EU-Lebanon association council, in particular the willingness to further support the Lebanese security sector through the full use of EU tools, including the European Peace Facility and programmes under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, and explore possible future common security and defence policy engagement; remains concerned about the impact of armed militias and terrorist organisations, such asand Hezbollah,regrets, in particular, the region;lack of progress with the pledged disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed groups, which represents a prerequisite for regional stability; reiterates the importance of an ambitious ‘Pact for the Mediterranean’ and its effective implementation, with sufficient technical and financial support for Lebanon, focusing on capacity building, energy infrastructure and social support; urges the VP/HR and the Commission to support the Lebanese Government in its reform agenda;agenda and in its plan to reestablish a monopoly on weapons; reiterates its full support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, state authority, territorial integrity, political independence, and stability, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701;

Change 22

Changed27.30. Stands with Syria’s religiously and ethnically diverse society, which has suffered over a decade at the hands of the Iran and Russia-bolstered Assad regime and terrorist groups; supports a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned inclusive political process that incorporates territorial integrity, transitional justice and reconciliation; urges the Syrian authorities to intensify efforts to include all components of Syrian society in decision-making, progress on the implementation of the agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces in the North-East and continue facilitating swift, transparent and independent investigations into acts targeting religious and ethnic communities, as well as to take all necessary actions to quell sectarian violence and fight impunity; regrets, in this context, the continuing persecution and forced displacement of, and discrimination and attacks against, religious communities, such as Christians, and reiterates the need for the EU to protect the rich multicultural identity of Syria; recognises the immense gaps in financial and human resources to reconstruct the country and supports the EU’s decision to lift sectoral sanctions, in line with the US and the UK, and provide significant development assistance, in addition to humanitarian aid, as announced in the first leg of the 2025 Brussels Conference for Syria; welcomes the visit to Syria on 8 January 2026 by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, António Costa, aimed at strengthening political ties and economic engagement; takes positive note of the agreement between Syria and Israel of 6 January 2026, setting up a dedicated communication cell to coordinate military de-escalation;

Change 23

Added31. Expresses grave concern at the ongoing fighting in areas such as Aleppo and North East Syria, which is resulting in further displacement and high number of casualties of civilian population and creating a serious security risk, notably due to the escape of Daesh fighters detained in north-eastern Syria; calls on the international coalition, including the United States, to take all necessary and immediate measures to mitigate this security risk without delay;

32. Affirms the key role of multilateral organisations, in particular the UN, alongside a functioning World Trade Organization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and regional forums, as indispensable platforms for conflict resolution and global governance; warns that ‘mini-lateral’ formats risk increasingly fragmenting global norms, and require the EU to prioritise a broad and inclusive conception of multilateralism in close cooperation with its like-minded partners; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to pioneer global leadership of multilateral initiatives; confirms its commitment to advancing comprehensive reforms to strengthen the UN’s role, efficiency and democratic representation;

33. Calls on the VP/HR to re-evaluate the EU’s approach towards the BRICS group and its partners and to develop a separate EU policy towards BRICS+; stresses that BRICS+ provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects;

34. Calls on the VP/HR to act consistently and to promote an effective and robust democratic narrative, in close cooperation with the Member States, to counter autocratic pressures that intend to undermine checks on the abuse of power, shrink civic space and erode human rights; calls for the creation of a European democracy assessment that enables the early detection of signs of authoritarian tendencies, as well as a toolbox for action centred on democracy support and countering authoritarian narratives, particularly in the light of the regrettable closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) operations; encourages, in this context, greater investment in strategic communication and the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); is of the opinion that the EU’s efforts to counter this threat should build on the already existing expertise developed within the EEAS and calls for greater coherence between existing and forthcoming EU regulations and efforts; calls for further efforts to fully operationalise the FIMI toolbox developed by the EEAS; believes that the EU should clearly identify the digital sphere as a field of action and recognise digital diplomacy as a strategic interest;

Change 24

Added35. Strongly condemns the targeted sanctions against legislators responsible for the Digital Services Act and other digital regulations, in particular against a former commissioner;

▸4 unchanged paragraphs

36. Encourages annual strategic reviews of threats to the rules-based international order, coordinated by the EEAS and followed by active measures to prevent further erosion of multilateral norms;

Fostering cooperation based on interests we share

37. Reaffirms that the EU’s external action requires credible values-based engagement; insists, however, that relying solely on normative power and principles is insufficient; encourages a more assertive pursuit of the EU’s strategic objectives, leveraging partnerships and alliances based on shared interests; underlines that leveraging partnerships and alliances successfully, including in the long-term, needs to be based on a level playing field among partners; underscores that EU support ought to be contingent on respect for fundamental democratic principles and the rule of law; reaffirms, in this context, that EU legislation is not a matter for negotiation with non-EU countries;

38. Encourages, in this context, the VP/HR to seek tailored policies that address the expectations of the Member States and partner countries and that deliver quickly on political agreements, thereby establishing the EU as a reliable strategic anchor, especially at a time when conflicts are proliferating and the use of force is increasingly being normalised as a means to pursue political objectives;

Change 25

Removed34. Stresses that a strong transatlantic partnership with the United States and Canada within NATO remains indispensable and forms the core of the European security architecture; recognises that the United States now follows a more transactional approach to foreign policy, marked by a reduced commitment to multilateralism and European security; highlights the importance for the EU of drawing lessons from the EU’s vulnerabilities and of taking the appropriate measures at EU level to avoid being in a position where it might be coerced in the future; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level, ensuring sustained coordination across areas such as security, technology and economic resilience, while showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic legislator’s dialogue and for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to future cooperation; calls for the deepening of the EU-US Dialogue on Security and Defence whose potential remains uncapped; recalls that, to be a strong transatlantic partner, Europe must ensure its own defence and security; reiterates, in this context, the immediate need for the EU and its Member States to fully operationalise the concept of strategic autonomy and defence readiness and, to this end, make collective and well-coordinated investments in the necessary defence capabilities; stresses the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to become more reliable and more self-sufficient in the domains of security, defence and technology, with the objective of strengthening the European pillar within NATO;

Added39. Stresses that a strong transatlantic partnership with the United States and Canada within NATO forms the core of the European security architecture; expresses, in this context, concerns about the fact that certain elements of the new US National Security Strategy fall significantly short in adequately addressing the threat posed by Russia, notably for European and hence also US security; regrets, furthermore, the National Security Strategy’s flawed assessment of the EU as a political system, including inadequate descriptions of the domestic political situations in EU Member States; reaffirms Parliament’s long-standing support for the EU’s core values of democracy and human rights; considers the National Security Strategy to further reinforce the imperative for Europe to advance its strategic autonomy, reduce its dependencies, and diversify its partnerships;

Added40. Regrets the decision of 7 January 2026 by the US President to withdraw from, suspend participation in, or terminate engagement with a significant number of international organisations, including numerous UN bodies; expresses its serious concern that such a move could undermine the financial sustainability of the UN system, weaken multilateral cooperation at a time when it is most needed and embolden authoritarian and revisionist actors, who have historically sought to exploit any withdrawal or disengagement by Western powers from international organisations; encourages the US administration to reflect on its decision and to reaffirm its commitment to the UN and multilateral cooperation;

Added41. Firmly rejects any attempt to undermine the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland; recalls, in this context, that Greenland is a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark and has the authority to decide on its economic development, international partnerships and raw materials policy; reiterates that only the people of Greenland can decide on their future; cautions, at the same time, that such political processes must not be instrumentalised or influenced by external actors; highlights in particular China’s strategic interest in the Arctic and its use of economic leverage to gain political influence; takes note of the fact that US interest is driven by security concerns linked to the evolving strategic environment in the Arctic but believes that the 1951 defence agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and the United States offers ample opportunities for an increased US presence in Greenland; recalls that Denmark, including Greenland, is a member of NATO and is therefore fully covered by the alliance’s collective security guarantees; welcomes the statement of seven European leaders of 6 January 2026 and underlines that security in the Arctic can only be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO; calls on the Commission and the European Council to define concrete support to Greenland and Denmark in line with EU principles, international law, and the NATO Charter;

Added42. Regrets that the United States now follows a more transactional approach to foreign policy, marked by a reduced commitment to multilateralism and European security; highlights the importance for the EU of drawing lessons from the EU’s vulnerabilities and of taking the appropriate measures at EU level to avoid being in a position where it might be coerced in the future; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level, ensuring sustained coordination across areas such as security, technology and economic resilience, while showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue and for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus for future cooperation; calls for the deepening of the EU-US Dialogue on Security and Defence, whose potential remains untapped; recalls that, to be a strong transatlantic partner, Europe must ensure its own defence and security; reiterates, in this context, the immediate need for the EU and its Member States to bring the concept of strategic autonomy and defence readiness fully into operation and, to this end, make collective and well-coordinated investments in the necessary defence capabilities; stresses the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to become more reliable and more self-sufficient in the domains of security, defence and technology, with the objective of strengthening the European pillar within NATO;

Added43. Confirms its full and unwavering solidarity with Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of Denmark; denounces the use of unilateral trade threats and economic intimidation against Denmark and other EU Member States as a form of coercion incompatible with international law and the core principles of cooperation between NATO allies; warns against attempts to instrumentalise security concerns in the Arctic to exert territorial or political pressure, fully supports the position of the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland, that Greenland is not for sale; stresses that Greenland must not be used as a tool to divide the European Union; calls on the Union to respond firmly, collectively and decisively and to resist any such actions.

44. Welcomes the EU-Canada Security and Defence Partnership, signed at the 2025 EU-Canada Summit, as the first such agreement with a partner in the Americas; calls for its swift operationalisation, including Canadian participation in missions and operations of the common security and defence policy (CSDP); supports the negotiation of a directive enabling Canadian entities to participate in EU joint procurement under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Instrument;

Change 26

Changed36.45. Commends the strong and constructive partnership with the United Kingdom; welcomes the joint statement by the UK and EU leaders of 19 May 2025 following the UK-EU Summit 2025, in particular the establishment of the comprehensive Security and Defence Partnership; calls for its swift and full implementation, including through (i) regular biannual strategic foreign and security dialogues at ministerial level between the UK Foreign and Defence Secretaries and the VP/HR to coordinate responses to crises and align strategic priorities, (ii) UK participation in the EU’s CSDP civilian and military crisis management missions, where legally possible, (iii) enhanced cooperation on cyber resilience, countering hybrid threats, safeguarding critical infrastructure, and tackling illicit finance, (iv) strengthened coordination on sanctions enforcement and (v) joint actions to counter Russia’s shadow fleet;fleet, and welcomes the joint commitment to enhance cooperation in the Western Balkans, especially in order to ensure the respect of the power sharing principle of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement; takes note of the political agreement on the core aspects of the future agreement between the EU and the UK in respect of Gibraltar, announced by the parties on 11 June 2025; awaits the publication of the full legal text for examination;

46. Commends the close relationship with non-EU western European countries and their strong cooperation with the EU on external action; welcomes, in this context, the conclusion of negotiations on and provisional sectorial application of a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; encourages its swift ratification; emphasises the significance of the defence and security partnership with Norway and stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway in the light of the country’s crucial role for the EU’s energy security; calls for enhanced cooperation on energy resilience and supply diversification as key instruments for advancing the Union’s strategic autonomy; welcomes the growing public support for EU accession in Iceland and the intention expressed by the Icelandic authorities to hold a referendum on the resumption of the EU accession negotiations by 2027; calls, in the meantime, for proactive engagement with the Icelandic Government to deepen the defence and security cooperation and to promote the benefits of EU membership; calls for the swift ratification of the EU association agreements with Andorra and San Marino;

Change 27

Changed38.47. Emphasises the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and supports a credible political and security cooperation on their merit-based path to EU integration; believes that the future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova lies within the EU, in accordance with the aspirations of their people; condemns Russian interference in the democratic processes of EU candidate countries, notably Moldova; expressestakes concernnote withof regardthe toresults of the politicalparliamentary deadlockelections held in Kosovo andon urges28 allDecember political2025; partiescalls for the swift formation of a new Kosovar assembly and government, in order to workaddress togethermuch needed EU-related reforms, particularly concerning the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, and to overcomeaddress it;obligations regarding the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia; welcomes the partial lifting of EU measures on Kosovo; reiterates that EU accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance on the basis of measurable and sustainable progress in the fundamentals cluster, including full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in particular the sanctions against Russia; welcomes the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and underlines the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement constitutes a geostrategic investment in regional security and stability, requiring commitment from both the Union and the candidate countries and calls, in this context, for the EU to make the enlargement process more predictable and politically visible to the citizens of the region; believes that, to this end, the EU must maintain the enlargement momentum and provide candidate countries with sufficient technical and financial assistance and consistent political support on their path towards full membership; stresses, however, the need to further improve the rule of law conditionality and to ensure that all EU funding for the accession countries is fully in line with the EU’s own strategic goals and interests; stresses, simultaneously, that progress on their EU accession path is merit based and conditional on full respect for international law and the EU acquis, as well as their alignment with the CFSP, including adherence to sanctions and EU visa policy; recalls that the enlargement process should proceed in parallel with institutional and decision-making reforms aimed at safeguarding the Union’s integration capacity; urges the EU candidate countries to actively support and collaborate with international justice tribunals and mechanisms to ensure that they can properly carry out their work, and prosecute and ensure accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression committed across the whole world;

Change 28

Added48. Underlines that one of the key priorities of the CFSP and CSDP in relation to the Eastern Partnership countries must be firm support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders; calls on the Russian Federation to withdraw all its troops from the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, from the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, and from the illegally occupied parts of Ukraine, with full respect for international law and the UN Charter;

49. Reiterates its support for the European Political Community as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening security and stability in Europe and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances become a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;

50. Underlines that Türkiye’s strategic role as a NATO member and its cooperation with the EU, notably by contributing to EU crisis management missions and operations, are important for European stability and security; believes in the importance of developing a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, with strict conditionality on respect for the rule of law, fundamental rights, international law and good neighbourly relations; regrets, in this context, that Türkiye continues to dispute the sovereignty of an EU Member State and stresses the fact that Türkiye is making an inadequate effort in aligning with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states; recalls, in this context, the signature and the evocation of the memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones; deplores, in addition, Türkiye’s refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organisation; underlines, further, the incompatibility between Türkiye’s candidacy for BRICS+ and the EU’s CFSP; calls on Türkiye to fully align itself with EU sanctions against Russia; expresses, furthermore, concern about the state of fundamental freedoms and the democratic backsliding in Türkiye; urges the immediate release of opposition leader Ekrem İmamoğlu, Selahattin Demirtaş, Osman Kavala, and all other political detainees, and calls for the end of the sustained targeting of and judicial harassment against the political opposition, members of the press and civil society representatives; supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far;

51. Expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to retain the threat of a casus belli against Greece and condemns the illegal occupation of part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkish military forces; regrets that Türkiye has failed to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; recalls that full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and normalisation of relations with all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, is a necessary component of the accession process; believes that, as a consequence of the above, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed under current circumstances;

Change 29

Changed42.52. Calls for the swift resumption of the Cyprus settlement talks within the UN-agreed framework, and urges against any unilateral actions that are inconsistent with a peaceful settlement; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected; draws attention to the Commission’s designation of Johannes Hahn as Special Envoy for Cyprus, which underlines the EU’s commitment to a comprehensive settlement on the agreed basis and its readiness to contribute to the settlement process within the UN framework;

53. Notes that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) has entered a new geopolitical phase, with partners on an accession path, others pursuing tailored cooperation, and Russia’s aggression dismantling the previous regional balance; whereas the EU must therefore redefine the strategic purpose of the EaP, anchoring it in resilience, democratic transformation, and security; recognises the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly as the parliamentary dimension of the EaP; calls on the Council, the EEAS and the Commission to integrate Euronest’s Parliamentary Assembly deliberations into policy planning;

54. Welcomes the EU’s long-term strategic approach to the Black Sea and its Connectivity Agenda as a cornerstone for regional prosperity, linking Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia; calls for the swift and effective implementation of the strategy in close cooperation with partner countries, bearing in mind that the promotion of human rights and the rule of law must remain central to the EU’s engagement in the region; underlines the strategic importance of completing key infrastructure projects in line with the extended Trans-European Networks; emphasises the role of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly in this context;

55. Emphasises the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and urges the EU to develop a long-term vision for its engagement with the region;

Change 30

Changed46.56. Condemns the authoritarian tendencies of the Georgian Dream Party and their pivot towards Russian interests, in spite of the protracted occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region / South Ossetia by Russia; rejects any recognition of the parliamentary elections and considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; urges the Georgian Parliament to repeal the laws on ‘foreign influence’ and ‘family values’; calls for an immediate end to politically motivated persecution of the political opposition, civil society and independent media and for the unconditional release of all political prisoners; urges the EU to finally respond adequately and decisively to this democratic crisis in a candidate country by leveraging all means available and reiterates its repeated call for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism;pluralism and against personalities promoting Russian-backed narratives and strongarming political processes; calls for Georgia to return to the European path in line with the clear choice of its people; recalls that, at the same time, Georgia should align with the CFSP, including compliance with sanctions against Russia;

57. Supports the August 2025 peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and calls for its implementation in good faith, with full respect for Armenian territorial integrity, as well as for the accompanying peace treaty to be formalised and ratified, starting with the withdrawal by Azerbaijan from territory it occupies in Armenia; calls for the EU to remain constructively involved in the further normalisation of the bilateral relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all 23 Armenian hostages detained following the attack against the Nagorno-Karabakh region; repeats its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with them, and to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights; demands the respect of Armenia’s territorial integrity and encourages transitional justice, as well as sustainable return processes; regrets the further deterioration of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan;

Change 31

Changed48.58. Welcomes the positive momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively endorse Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; commends the extension of EUMA’s mandate and increase in its size; calls on the Council, the EEAS and the Commission to explore other ways to support Armenia, notably, but not exclusively, in the domain of democratic resilience;

59. Expresses concern about Russian and Chinese pressure exerted in Central Asia and stresses the urgent need to scale up the EU’s political and economic presence in the region; welcomes the results of the first EU-Central Asia Summit of April 2025, also with a view to improving the human rights situation in the region; highlights the hesitation of Central Asian states to lend support to Russia’s war of aggression given the effect the war is having on the region; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular with its Sanctions Envoy; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations, intensifying political ties and enhancing cooperation on energy infrastructure with the countries of Central Asia, in part to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; urges the Commission and the Member States to continue promoting political and economic reforms and sustainable development, and strengthening the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights;

60. Stresses the need for an effective implementation of the EU’s Gulf strategy through tailored multilateral partnerships with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and with each country in the region; underlines that enhanced cooperation should prioritise migration, digital transformation, research and innovation, the green transition, energy, security and counterterrorism; welcomes the successful conclusion of the first EU-GCC Summit as a pivotal moment in advancing a comprehensive partnership for global and regional security and prosperity; welcomes the Gulf countries’ growing diplomatic role in contributing to international stability and conflict mediation;

61. Regrets that, 30 years after the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, a shared space of prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries has not been achieved; recognises the strategic importance of enhanced dialogue with countries in the Mediterranean region with a view to improving human rights and democratic standards, but also given their role in diversifying the Union’s energy supplies and in managing migration flows from countries of origin or transit; endorses the new Pact for the Mediterranean as a comprehensive framework to advance a more secure, stable and prosperous Mediterranean region; encourages sustained engagement, targeted investments and technical assistance to address shared challenges such as migration, climate change and security threats; stresses, further, the role that the Union for the Mediterranean can play as a forum to intensify cooperation programmes between European countries and those on the Mediterranean coast;

Change 32

Changed52.62. Condemns Iran’s destabilising role in the Middle East, in particular its military support for various non-state actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as for the Houthi, which undermines regional security; reiterates its call foron the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a EU terrorist organisation and to beextend addedEU sanctions to all of its members, as well as to all those responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran; expresses its unwavering solidarity with the EUIranian terroristpeople list;in their ongoing pursuit of fundamental rights and freedoms; condemns the systematic and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against peaceful demonstrators, which has resulted in loss of life and serious injuries; condemns the Iranian regime’s attempts to censor the protests by cutting internet access and telephone networks across the country; calls on the Iranian authorities to immediately cease the use of violence against peaceful assemblies, and to fully respect the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; strongly opposes Iran’s hostage diplomacy and demands that all European nationals being detained in Iran be freed and allowed to leave the country; expresses deep concern about the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification; points to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action in the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls on the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events; supports the re-imposition of all previously lifted UN and EU nuclear-related sanctions and restrictions against Iran due to its non-compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA;JCPOA and demands immediate and decisive action in the face of the regime’s entrenched, systematic, and brutal repression of the Iranian people, including mass arbitrary detentions, torture, and the execution of political dissidents; condemns in the strongest terms the regime’s renewed and escalating campaign of violence against protesters, which has resulted in the killing of thousands of protestors, including through the deliberate use of live ammunition and state-sanctioned executions and acts that amount to crimes against humanity under international law, while the regime continues to deny fundamental freedoms to a population that persistently demands dignity, liberty and the right to live in a free and democratic country;

▸10 unchanged paragraphs

63. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial, as well as military, vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation; strongly urges continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

64. Stresses the importance of continuous and increased EU support for the Afghan people, especially women and girls, and all those whose rights are persistently violated by the Taliban; insists on maintaining strictly conditional engagement with the Taliban based on the five benchmarks set by the Council and the UN Special Rapporteur’s recommendations;

65. Reiterates that a peaceful, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific is of vital European interest, not only for regional security, but also for safeguarding global trade routes, protecting freedom of navigation and ensuring resilience against economic coercion; is concerned that intensifying great power competition in the region, particularly between the United States and China, is increasingly imposing constraints on the EU’s ability to pursue its own agenda of promoting multilateralism and cooperative solutions in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; encourages, to this end, closer coordination on foreign, security and defence policy with like-minded partners, particularly Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); reaffirms that the Taiwan Strait is international waters, and supports the right to freedom of navigation by European democracies and their like-minded partners, which underscores that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are essential to global security and prosperity;

66. Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral relationship enabling effective policy-shaping in multilateral forums; welcomes the entry into force of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on 1 January 2025, alongside the existing Economic Partnership Agreement, and encourages the implementation of the SPA’s provisions for enhanced cooperation in security and defence, including the launch of a regular Japan-EU Security and Defence Dialogue, collaboration on industry-related defence matters, exploration of mutual involvement in defence initiatives and ongoing work on a security of information agreement; welcomes the intensification of cooperation in areas such as maritime security, cybersecurity, space and non-proliferation, as well as concrete joint activity under the Digital Partnership and Energy Dialogue;

67. Recognises the strategic importance of South Korea as a key democratic partner in east Asia, with whom the EU has established a comprehensive partnership encompassing political dialogue, trade and security cooperation; recalls that the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, the first of its kind with an Asian partner, has significantly deepened economic integration, while ongoing collaboration extends to non-proliferation, cybersecurity, counterterrorism and crisis management; underscores South Korea’s pivotal role in regional stability, particularly in addressing security challenges on the Korean Peninsula, and calls for strengthened coordination in multilateral forums to uphold peace, deter provocations and promote denuclearisation; welcomes, in this context, the establishment of the Security and Defence Partnership; highlights that the Partnership provides a structured framework for dialogue and cooperation across the full spectrum of security and defence issues, including annual ministerial-level Strategic Dialogues; supports the ambition to deepen practical cooperation in areas such as maritime security, building on joint operations, including Atalanta, and exploring new engagements under the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences initiative; underlines, finally, that the institutionalisation of this Security and Defence Partnership consolidates South Korea’s position as one of the EU’s most significant Indo-Pacific partners and provides a strong basis for long-term joint action to meet common geopolitical challenges;

68. Stresses the value of deepening ties with New Zealand, a long-standing partner that shares strong political, cultural and normative affinities with the EU; points out that New Zealand has demonstrated consistent leadership in multilateral diplomacy, nuclear disarmament, and climate action, making it an indispensable ally in advancing common global objectives; welcomes the conclusion of the EU-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement as a milestone in strengthening economic cooperation, while also recognising the potential to expand joint work in security and connectivity;

69. Emphasises the importance of strengthening strategic cooperation with Australia, which is a like-minded partner sharing the EU’s commitment to democracy, human rights, international law and a rules-based global order; underlines that Australia’s geographic position and active role in regional security make it a central actor in safeguarding stability in the Indo-Pacific; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement made at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Alberta by European Council President António Costa, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to launch negotiations on a Security and Defence Partnership; stresses that this initiative reflects growing recognition of the interconnectedness of European and Indo-Pacific security, and provides an opportunity to expand joint action on global security challenges; highlights that these negotiations, alongside renewed engagement to conclude an Australia-EU free trade agreement, demonstrate strong momentum in the bilateral relationship, reinforcing not only economic and technological ties but also collective resilience and strategic trust;

70. Points to the increased political and geostrategic importance of countries in Oceania, as well as organisations such as the Pacific Island Forum; recalls that, while among the countries most exposed to global challenges and geopolitical pressures, Pacific nations play a leading role in promoting multilateralism and remain key partners in the rules-based international order; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their diplomatic engagement in the region, where possible in close cooperation with Australia and New Zealand;

71. Is of the view that EU-China relations will be a determining factor for our future economic prosperity and international security; considers, in this context, that the accelerating militarisation of China, its increasing military presence and aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea and its unwarranted military provocations against its neighbours, as well as its military and political partnerships with Russia, North Korea and Iran, constitute a key geopolitical challenge of the 21st century; expresses its concern over the possible shift in China’s foreign policy from strongly assertive to openly aggressive;

72. Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties and thereby continue support for Russia’s war machine, including through the export of dual-use materials;

Change 33

Changed63.73. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; condemns China’s intimidations and threats to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding international waters, including large-scale air and sea manoeuvres such as the ‘Justice Mission 2025’ and the ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ exercises in April 2025;2025 which jeopardise stability in the region; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that anyongoing attemptattempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; calls, furthermore, for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; recalls that the White Paper for European Defence ‒ Readiness 2030 expresses concern over China’s coercion against Taiwan through the intensification of political, economic, military, cyber and cognitive measures; underscores that China’s territorial claims over Taiwan have no basis in international law, that neither side is subordinate to the other and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; opposes the People’s Republic of China’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations;

74. Denounces the government-led system of forced labour and the persistent violations of human rights, in particular the systematic repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province; observes with concern the intense crackdown on ethnic minorities in Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau and the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents; calls on China to comply with all mandatory conventions of the International Labour Organization;

75. Reiterates its strong condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments and its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law; calls on China to respect and guarantee Hong Kong’s autonomy and to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; calls on the Commission and the Council to review the status of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Brussels, as well as the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macau, in the light of the National Security Law and the People’s Republic of China’s violation of its international commitments; is concerned by Hong Kong’s role in assisting Russia to circumvent the sanctions in force and to procure critical components for the production of arms; deplores, in addition, the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the EEAS to closely monitor the trials of political prisoners in Hong Kong and call for the release of all political prisoners;

76. Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors, such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy; underlines that such dependencies restrict the EU’s foreign policy capacity and increase its vulnerability to political and economic coercion; calls, therefore, for effective de-risking measures, diversification of supply chains and the establishment of new partnerships;