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Changes from plenary report to adopted text

A-10-2025-0253 → TA-10-2026-0012

From
A-10-2025-0253 Plenary report of 17 Dec 2025
To
TA-10-2026-0012 Adopted text of 21 Jan 2026
Changes
37 changes to the text
Paragraphs
+28 added · −13 removed · 24 changed
More facts (3)
Title (from)
on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025
Title (to)
Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026

The report updates positions on Ukraine, adding support for a EUR 90 billion loan package and a multinational force, while adjusting language on using frozen Russian assets.91112 On the Middle East, it adds support for UN Resolution 2803, criticises Israel's recognition of Somaliland, and softens language on Israel's self-defence.14151617 It adds new paragraphs on Venezuela, Greenland, and the US National Security Strategy, criticising US actions and reaffirming support for democratic transitions.2537 Other changes include new paragraphs on Belarus, Syria, Myanmar, and Africa, and updates on Iran, China, and the Western Balkans.10222327 The remaining changes are formal, such as renumbering and minor wording adjustments.4567

The notes class 36 changes as substance, 1 as formal, 0 as wording only.

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The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.

Part 1 of 6: MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

RemovedMOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

AddedP10_TA(2026)0012

Changedon the implementationImplementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025

Removed(2025/2164(INI))

AddedCommittee on Foreign Affairs

AddedPE776.921

AddedEuropean Parliament resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025 (2025/2164(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 14, 16, 21, 24, 36 and 41 thereof,

– having regard to the report of 25 June 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2025’,

Added– having regard to the European Council Conclusions of 18 December 2025,

26 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to its resolution of 8 May 2025 on the return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred and deported by Russia,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2025 on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,

– having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s remarks of 22 September 2025 to the General Assembly marking the 80th Anniversary of the United Nations,

– having regard to the State of the Union address of 10 September 2025 by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,

– having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2025 on EU political strategy on Latin America,

– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021-2025 (GAP III),

– having regard to the Declaration of the third summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), adopted on 18 July 2023,

– having regard to the joint declaration of the fourth EU-CELAC summit of 9 November 2025,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,

– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to The Hague NATO Summit Declaration of 25 June 2025,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in 2004, updated in 2008 and further specified in 2020 with a guidance note on their implementation,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 January 2025 on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations of 26 June 1945,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union,

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 September 2025 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023,

– having regard to the Joint Statement of the EU-UK Leaders’ Summit of 19 May 2025,

– having regard to the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit of 4 April 2025,

– having regard to the Kiruna Declaration of 15 May 2013,

Added– having regard to the US National Security Strategy, published in December 2025,

Added– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 2025 on emergency measures addressing the serious economic difficulties caused by Russia’s actions in the context of the war of aggression against Ukraine,

8 unchanged paragraphs

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security,

– having regard to its resolution of 27 November 2025 on the EU position on the proposed plan and EU engagement towards a just and lasting peace for Ukraine,

– having regard to its resolution of 11 September 2025 on Gaza at breaking point: EU action to combat famine, the urgent need to release hostages and move towards a two-state solution,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025) welcoming the comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0253/2025),

A. whereas the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) should preserve peace, reinforcing international security and promoting international cooperation, thereby serving Europe’s strategic interests as set out in Article 21 TEU by safeguarding the Union’s security and the interests of all Member States, including through credible deterrence; whereas these objectives must be pursued while fostering democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including women’s and minority rights;

B. whereas over the past year, wars and armed conflicts, including direct confrontations and rising tensions as well as hybrid attacks, have affected almost every continent; whereas the intensifying geopolitical and economic confrontation constitutes a factor conducive to the re-escalation of frozen conflicts and to the outbreak of new ones; whereas the international organisations established to prevent such tensions from arising have encountered challenges in their endeavours to fulfil their mandates, making their reform urgent and indispensable and requiring greater collective engagement among democracies in strengthening defence;

Change 1

ChangedC. whereas there is an urgent need to continue to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order and its institutions, the universal norms, values and principles of the UN Charter such as human rights and international justice, multilateralism, and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;borders and the prohibition of the use of force; whereas the EU is, by nature, a promoter of the multilateral interdependence of different institutional actors;

D. whereas certain historic and other emerging powers exhibit complex behaviours ranging from close cooperation to sectoral confrontation and coercion; whereas Russia, which is waging an unlawful and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, plays the leading role in undermining the rules-based international order; whereas Russia is deliberately prolonging its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine with the aim of exhausting Ukraine and destabilising the EU and NATO; whereas the protection of the entire eastern flank of the EU is essential for the stability, security and resilience of the EU as a whole; whereas the currently fragmented geopolitical climate compels the EU to adapt and better defend its interests and those of its Member States;

E. whereas the EU engages with transatlantic partners and like-minded countries to bolster its economic security;

Change 2

AddedF. whereas the Dayton-Paris Agreement brought an end to the devastating war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 30 years ago; whereas the full implementation of its principles is crucial;

5 unchanged paragraphs

G. whereas the EU and the UK, in their Joint Statement of 19 May 2025, assume a shared commitment to the stability of the Western Balkans; whereas the EU and the UK should define concrete areas of cooperation in the region, in particular to ensure respect for the power-sharing principle of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement;

H. whereas certain international actors, most notably authoritarian states, are jeopardising European security and stability by employing a vast set of hybrid tactics, notably the sabotage of critical infrastructure and interference in the democratic functioning of our societies as well as fully fledged security threats such as drone incursions and attacks on rail networks; whereas addressing such threats forms part of the EU’s CFSP, necessitating a credible, first-hand intelligence information system on external threats that contributes to the EU’s ability to respond rapidly and effectively, as well as to safeguard its interests abroad;

I. whereas enlargement represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires internal EU reforms and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity; whereas a credible enlargement policy strengthens the EU’s geopolitical influence and resilience; whereas compliance with the fundamental principles of the Union and respect for international law is a prerequisite for accession to the EU;

J. whereas the EU continues to promote its own autonomous European diplomacy in all areas, including public, cultural, economic, climate, artificial intelligence, digital and cyber diplomacy; whereas achieving an EU diplomatic service shaped by a common diplomatic culture nurtured from a predominantly EU perspective is an essential step in this regard; whereas the European Diplomatic Academy contributes to this objective;

K. whereas the EU prioritises partnerships with like-minded democracies; whereas the conclusion of new global partnerships is based on political due diligence in order to avoid dependencies that expose the EU to coercion and to guarantee that cooperation does not undermine human rights, sustainable development or EU solidarity; whereas sectoral cooperation cannot be pursued to the detriment of EU fundamental values; whereas divisions within the EU or the transatlantic alliance, as well as with our strategic partners, make us all weaker, and benefit our opponents, rivals and competitors;

Change 3

AddedL. whereas, compared to the 2021 version, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 4 December 2025 reflects a radical shift in emphasis, as it stops short of a substantive assessment of the challenges posed by actors such as Russia and China, and includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member States; whereas the NSS frames global developments largely in terms of economic and strategic interests, revealing a more transactional approach to traditional allies and thus questioning the principles that have underpinned US foreign policy for decades; whereas the NSS was publicly welcomed by the Kremlin’s spokesperson and met with concern in several EU capitals, raising questions about its impact on transatlantic unity and the credibility of collective deterrence;

M. whereas the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) associated with the EU share close constitutional, historical and cultural ties with the Member States; whereas they provide the EU with a unique global presence and geostrategic advantages, particularly in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as in the Arctic and Antarctica; whereas the CFSP should strengthen the structured cooperation with the OCTs in areas such as security, strategic commercial routes, resilience to climate change, maritime security and critical raw materials, thereby ensuring that the OCTs are more closely integrated into the Union’s external action priorities;

N. whereas the space for civil society is shrinking worldwide and human rights defenders and civil society organisations are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors;

Change 4

ChangedMO. whereas vibrant civil societies worldwide play an essential role in advancing human rights, democracy and pluralism, as well as in promoting good governance and social progress;

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
27 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2026). “Changes between A-10-2025-0253 and TA-10-2026-0012”. Text, 21 January 2026. from A-10-2025-0253, to TA-10-2026-0012, reference 2025/2164(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0253/compare/TA-10-2026-0012?all=1 (retrieved 27 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2026-01-21,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between A-10-2025-0253 and TA-10-2026-0012}},
  year = {2026},
  date = {2026-01-21},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0253/compare/TA-10-2026-0012?all=1}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0253/compare/TA-10-2026-0012?all=1},
  urldate = {2026-09-27},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from A-10-2025-0253, to TA-10-2026-0012, reference 2025/2164(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}