Changes from plenary report to adopted text

51. Stresses the importance of creating additional logistics hubs and transhipment terminals along the four priority military mobility corridors; calls for the existing logistics hubs and commercial transhipment terminals relevant for military transport along the military mobility corridors to be adequately adapted and designated as dual-use infrastructure and equipped with fit-for-purpose equipment, such as direct-access loading platforms and ramps suitable for military assets;

52. Highlights the importance of establishing a network of strategically located logistics hubs, along the four priority military mobility corridors, including inland ports, capable of providing the necessary infrastructure for maintenance, storage, and repair to ensure swift intermodal transfers between road, rail, maritime, inland waterway and airport infrastructures and military installations; stresses in this respect that such hubs should provide the necessary dual-use energy infrastructure, such as refuelling and repowering stations, to support mobility needs and security of supply;

53. Underscores that logistics hubs should provide space, capacity and infrastructure for troops in transit, in particular regarding shelter, food and fuel supply;

54. Calls for the development of logistics hubs to be supported also under relevant European industrial programmes to strengthen the resilience of the European industrial and technological base; recalls the need to take action on the digitalisation of logistics processes to ensure the resilience and security of strategic infrastructure;

55. Considers it of the utmost importance to extend transport corridors, including for military mobility, into Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans, in order to enhance interoperability, increase operational responsiveness, support partners where appropriate in their resistance against Russian aggression and other hybrid threats in the region, and deter future aggression on the EU’s territory; notes the use of the Solidarity Lanes for military mobility and considers it important to strengthen them in order to enhance Ukraine’s security and resilience;

56. Underlines that accurate, secure and up-to-date digital modelling, digital maps, geographic information systems and geospatial data services are indispensable for both civilian and military infrastructure and route planning, cross-border coordination and the rapid deployment of troops and equipment; stresses that the protection of data and communications during military movements is of the utmost importance to the security of civilians and military personnel, and the preservation of capabilities; stresses that all transport information services used for military and defence purposes should be duly secured and legally protected to avoid digital leaks of sensitive information regarding military mobility operations and economic data; urges the Commission to coordinate digital and electronic security measures along the four priority military mobility corridors;

57. Stresses that the entire European Union is vulnerable to cyberattacks and digital intrusion; underlines that the digital systems that control physical transport infrastructures and assets represent priority targets for cyber-attacks; calls for the EU and the Member States, therefore, to support the development and adoption of innovative European sovereign digital technologies, including Galileo, to strengthen both the cybersecurity and resilience of these infrastructures and assets; highlights, in this regard, the potential of artificial intelligence and encourages further research and development efforts to develop next-generation digital capabilities;

58. Expresses serious concern regarding the increase of Russian cyberattacks against navigation systems in the Baltic Sea region; calls on the Commission to include and address the nature of hybrid threats in the upcoming omnibus, as well as the jamming and spoofing of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) as a hybrid attack on European maritime and air traffic;

59. Stresses the need to accelerate the transposition and implementation of the NIS2 Directive, and to enhance cooperation between sectoral transport authorities, competent cybersecurity agencies, computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) and the European cyber crisis liaison organisation network (EU-CyCLONe); stresses the importance of including concrete measures addressing military mobility aspects in EU and national cybersecurity risk assessments;

61. Calls for the establishment of a European mechanism for monitoring and providing rapid response in the event of cyber or hybrid attacks on critical transport, energy and communication infrastructure, to be developed in close cooperation with NATO;

62. Asks the Commission to urgently take measures to simplify and accelerate procedures for investments serving military mobility purposes, in particular to establish targeted exemptions from the current public procurement rules for military mobility infrastructure and assets having a significant military or dual-use component; stresses that projects of strategic European interest must be implemented without excessive delays, while ensuring transparency, fair competition and the right to due process;

63. Notes the importance of public-private partnerships for military mobility; encourages the EU and the Member States to facilitate and incentivise civil-military cooperation in relation to military mobility; highlights the importance of predictability in terms of the demand for military mobility capabilities, combined with sufficient funding and simplified procurement rules, which would enable the supply industry to increase and maintain production levels;

64. Believes that the European preference principle should be a priority in the EU’s efforts to strengthen its strategic autonomy and resilience, while acknowledging the Member States’ freedom to build their military capacities to respond to threats in the short term; recalls that this principle should be applied to ensure that EU funds invested in defence and security through programmes such as SAFE, EDIP and EDIRPA, in particular in technologies related to critical dual use infrastructure, support the EDTIB;

65. Reiterates that the resilience of critical infrastructure requires a more harmonised and thorough screening of foreign direct investment in the EU; stresses that the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on the screening of foreign direct investment represents a major step towards a more coherent and effective European framework for protecting security and public order while preserving openness and transparency; welcomes, in that regard, the Commission’s proposal to review Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on the screening of foreign direct investment, which should aim at adequately balancing investment needs and the protection of essential security interests and the EU’s defence capacities;

66. Stresses that over the next decade, while advancing with transport decarbonisation efforts, the use of fossil fuels in military mobility will remain critical, such as the use of dual-mode locomotives, and locomotives with internal combustion engines, which is the only operational solution in the event of a wide-scale shortage of electric power;

67. Draws attention to the need to extend fuel supply chains for the armed forces along the four priority military mobility corridors; highlights that energy infrastructure across the Eastern flank requires development to support military mobility activities, and calls on the Commission to address the ‘fuel drought’; encourages stockpiling of strategic reserves of energy that could be particularly relevant for the regions with insufficient pipeline infrastructure and fuel storage capacity; calls on the Commission, in this respect, to review the Oil Stocks Directive in the light of recent geopolitical shifts in order to enhance energy security and resilience against emerging threats;

68. Recalls that, given that the railway system relies on electric power to enable the circulation of trains, rail operations require the resilience of energy grids to be increased and power to be restored rapidly in the event of any outage or shortage;

69. Notes with concern that the EU is highly dependent on imports of crude oil and petroleum products; calls on the Commission to recognise that a robust European military mobility strategy demands resilient and predominantly EU based fuel and alternative fuel production and refinery capacities to also enhance strategic autonomy; calls for the immediate development of a comprehensive fuel distribution and storage network, and the diversification of energy supply to guarantee energy security; underlines that the timely implementation of the provisions and targets of the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR) can also play a relevant role in diversifying the energy supply options for military mobility, and contribute to the EU’s general transport decarbonisation objectives;

70. Calls on the Commission, therefore, to take military mobility capabilities and needs into account when developing the EU energy system, taking into consideration decarbonisation objectives and the need for strategic autonomy and resilience;

Eastern flank

71. Highlights that given Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the eastern flank of the EU has been repeatedly targeted by cyberattacks, hybrid threats and acts of sabotage, including incidents against transport operators; calls for the EU, therefore, to step up efforts in support of Member States to ensure that critical transport infrastructure on the eastern flank is fully protected and resilient, including through rapid mechanisms for reinforcement and enhanced cyber defence for rail, road, ports and energy supply nodes; highlights in that regard the extreme vulnerability of the Baltic states, notably owing to the Suwalki Gap, and stresses that an accelerated response time and faster troop movements would be needed in the event of Russian aggression;

72. Recalls that the four priority military mobility corridors play a crucial role in the EU’s security and defence; considers that allowing the swift and efficient functioning of all identified priority military mobility corridors will allow effective security for the Member States currently most exposed to the threats posed by Russia; draws attention to the fact that the four priority EU military mobility corridors also ensure NATO’s ability to quickly reinforce and effectively defend the eastern flank, thus bolstering collective security, deterrence and resilience across the Alliance;

73. Notes that military mobility in and towards Poland is essential for the security of the entire eastern flank; underlines the added value of multimodal logistics hubs located in western Europe to ensure the rapid movement of European and allied troops and heavy equipment to eastern Europe;

74. Welcomes the Eastern Regions Pact initiative, recently announced by the Commission, which aims to provide tailored support for Member States along the EU’s eastern border to improve infrastructure and boost resilience in the border regions; stresses the fundamental importance of the ‘Eastern Shield’ project as a strategic undertaking aimed at strengthening Europe’s security, including through the protection of relevant military corridors to maintain the capacity to respond, noting its inclusion in the white paper on defence readiness; calls for the provision of adequate financial resources to ensure its implementation;

75. Recalls that military mobility infrastructure projects must be continuously re-evaluated and updated as part of the European semester of defence, in line with the latest military threats and capabilities, going beyond the territorial expansion of ports to include the training of staff and improved maritime traffic management, as well as resilience capabilities against rapidly evolving threats, such as underwater drone detection;

76. Supports the European Drone Defence Initiative, in the light of recent and repeated violations in the European airspace by unmanned drones; calls for improvements to and increases in drone capabilities across all Member States in cooperation with NATO, and based on field experiences by the Ukrainian armed forces; stresses that these European drone capabilities should build on lessons learned from Ukraine about the key value of creating innovative drone and counter-drone ecosystems, linking research and development with production, and relying on scalable production capacity and continuous technological development, ranging from underwater, reconnaissance and combat drones, to defence and counter-drone capabilities;

77. Recalls that a counter-drone network would be adaptable for dual-use purposes and help deal with non-defence related threats or other hazards common to every EU border, including border protection, the instrumentalisation of migration, the protection of critical infrastructure and transnational organised crime;

Enhancing capabilities

78. Reiterates that surface transport systems are the main transport modes for the movement of military assets, which are usually heavy and oversized and contain dangerous goods;

79. Notes with concern the current shortage of certain military mobility equipment such as flatbed wagons, and their decline in production since the Cold War period; calls for their development to be supported under European industrial programmes; stresses the critical need for collaboration between public and private stakeholders to leverage and maximise the potential of available railway resources for military mobility and encourages the use of standby contracts;

80. Stresses the need to urgently address the lack of rolling stock fleet across the European railway organisations; stresses the importance of a harmonised authorisation procedure for rolling stock, managed by the EU Agency for Railways (ERA); recalls the need to replace national rules by technical specifications for interoperability (TSI) to increase the availability of cross-border rolling stock for military and civilian purposes;

81. Calls for a coordinated approach to the acquisition of railway rolling stock, with a view to maximising the efficient use of available manufacturing capacity; underlines that common procurement of such vehicles should be encouraged;

82. Notes that, in addition to surface transport, air transport is the fastest way to move the first military assets and logistical materials; highlights the need to develop a European strategic airlift reserve and to strengthen strategic enablers for aerial military mobility, such as heavy airlifters;

83. Notes the growing use of autonomous vehicles in the delivery of military supplies, which provides a solution to the shortage of personnel in military logistics units and minimises human losses in times of conflict; urges the adjustment of EU and national legislation and regulations to allow the introduction of semi-autonomous logistics into military mobility corridors;

84. Calls for a reflection on the availability and adequacy of the EU capabilities for the medicalised transport of multiple patients for injured personnel, in order to ensure their timely evacuation and appropriate care;

85. Highlights the need to evaluate and aggregate Member States’ demands to ensure the steady availability and supply of dual use assets, such as locomotives, vessels, trucks, trailers suitable for abnormal loads, strategic airlifters, air-to-air refuelling systems, and fixed and mobile cranes;

86. Stresses the importance of registering the aforementioned transport assets in a civil - military ‘solidarity pool’ so they can be used whenever and wherever necessary in the most efficient manner, building on rescEU strategic reserves of European crisis response capabilities; calls on the Commission to ensure EU-level coordination with the Member States, allowing for predictability and planning for the supply industry;

87. Stresses the need to ensure coherence between the priorities of the military mobility action plan and the programming of EDIP, ensuring that the capability gap assessments (CDP and the coordinated annual review on defence (CARD)) guide the definition of funding priorities; calls on the Commission to incentivise the EDTIB to address these gaps; notes the need to support investment in purchasing, repairing, maintaining and sharing transport assets through EU-wide funding instruments; highlights the importance of predictability in terms of the demand for military mobility capabilities, combined with sufficient funding and simplified procurement rules, which would enable the supply industry to increase and maintain production levels;

88. Calls for investment in research and development to advance dual-use capabilities; stresses the importance of EU support to stimulate innovation in dual-use vehicle technologies, including modular platforms adaptable for both civilian and military use, as well as in the civilian naval and airspace industries to foster new technologies;

Enhancing EU-NATO cooperation

89. Believes that enhanced military mobility reinforces both the CSDP and the transatlantic alliance; stresses that NATO relies on the infrastructure of EU Member States to move troops and equipment; notes with approval that, thanks to progress in EU-NATO cooperation, including through the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility, the EU’s relevant military requirements are consistent with NATO’s technical and geographical requirements to a level of around 95 %;

90. Calls on the Member States to strengthen cooperation among themselves and with NATO, in particular within the existing Central Europe Pipeline System and the NATO Security Investment Programme, in order to ensure interoperability, cybersecurity and sufficient transport and storage capacity for EU and NATO military operations;

91. Regrets the persistence of political and procedural obstacles to sharing classified information on logistical networks between between NATO and the EU and urges shared understanding in this regard to achieve synergies; underlines that these obstacles, in particular the absence of an agreement with NATO for the exchange of classified information, undermine the efficiency of both organisations’ defence efforts significantly; calls for strong efforts by EU Member States to overcome the political obstacles preventing an agreement on the exchange of classified information; calls for the establishment of a permanent EU-NATO information sharing platform to support the work of NATO’s Joint Support and Enabling Command;

92. Calls for the organisation of regular joint EU-NATO exercises and stress tests involving the armed forces, civil protection, infrastructure managers, and transport operators to improve communication and coordination, streamline procedures, and identify and remove obstacles to military mobility;

93. Calls on the Commission and NATO to deepen coordination on maritime mobility, ensuring interoperability standards for naval transport, port access and the protection of sea lines of communication, paying particular attention to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the outermost regions; urges close EU-NATO cooperation on securing the transatlantic delivery of military equipment and supplies via sea and air because of their importance; recognises the important role of Türkiye in securing transport routes and overall EU-NATO military mobility, notably its decision to close the Black Sea Straits in February 2022, which prevented Russia from reinforcing its naval presence in the Black Sea;

94. Notes that NATO’s operational-level planning timeline is three days; therefore, insists on complying with commitments to meet the maximum three to five-day objective for completing relevant border crossing and abnormal, oversized and overweight transport permitting procedures, relying on streamlined, harmonised and digital procedures; calls for the time to be reduced to three days for rapid reaction units in ‘peacetime’ and to 24 hours in a crisis situation; reiterates its call for the two forms 302 in use by NATO and the EU to be merged into one, in order to reduce unnecessary duplication and facilitate faster cross-border movements; in order to speed up permitting procedures, calls for the introduction of automatic recognition for route and bridge analyses within Member States and across borders and of a notification-based fast-track regime for certified operators running military or emergency-related transports as part of the military mobility package;

95. Calls on the Member States to urgently develop the necessary defence capabilities for military transport, including extending the NATO pipelines networks and strategic airlift capabilities, based on the coordinated annual review on defence findings and the 2023 EU capability development priorities; considers it important to meet, in consultation with NATO as appropriate, the military requirements and to mitigate the technical and geographical gaps;

96. Stresses the added value of the exceptional participation of the US, Canada, the UK, Norway and Switzerland, as well as that of other likeminded partners, in the military mobility project of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); calls for the implementation of capability objectives and for the extension of participation to strategic partner countries such as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, in line with PESCO rules;

97. Underlines the need for interoperability also with key regional partners and candidate countries, such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans; calls for specific assistance to the Republic of Moldova making it more resilient to hybrid threats and better connected with EU transport and security systems; underlines the importance of strengthening coordination with regional partners on technical standards, the security of critical infrastructure and the protection of networks against hybrid threats and attacks; considers that interoperability with third countries must be accompanied by regular assessments;

98. Highlights the importance of Parliament not only as co-legislator in the military mobility policy, as part of the EU’s ambition to achieve defence readiness by 2030, but also in its role in democratic oversight over EU action; calls on the Commission, therefore, to provide more systematic follow-up and stricter reporting, including relating to EU NATO cooperation and PESCO, on military mobility measures, implementation and funding;

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99. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.