Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Q. whereas there is an urgent need to intensify coordinated and integrated efforts at EU, NATO and Member State levels to increase resources and address those physical, legal and regulatory barriers;

R. whereas internal audits and recent experience show serious shortcomings in the EU’s military mobility policy, with delays from bureaucratic red tape and inadequate infrastructure meaning it could potentially take more than one month to move military equipment across borders in response to an attack;

S. whereas many European transport routes are not yet fit for heavy military vehicles; whereas tanks have been barred from entering certain Member States because they exceed the national weight limit, and convoys have been halted at bridges not designed for such loads, highlighting the urgent need to upgrade key infrastructure such as rail lines, roads, tunnels and bridges to meet military standards;

T. whereas investments in improving the existing dual-use air, rail, road and waterways infrastructure bring sizable benefits to communities and businesses in times of peace as well as benefiting passenger and freight transport systems and contributing to the decarbonisation of transport, the completion of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), civil protection capabilities, and the strengthening of the single market;

U. whereas transport operators play an important role in military mobility; whereas non-harmonised procedures, however, often cause severe delays in transport operations and the issuance of cross-border permits;

Responding to changing geopolitical realities

1. Underlines the importance of military mobility for European security and defence; stresses that addressing the EU’s strategic deficiencies and the need for enhanced military mobility has become more urgent in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

2. Welcomes the ambition of the EU and the Member States to substantially increase their defence readiness, reduce strategic dependencies, address capability gaps and strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base in the framework of relevant EU policies and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and in the context of NATO; welcomes EU-NATO cooperation on enhancing military mobility; considers, nevertheless, that the time has come to urgently turn stated EU-NATO common objectives into real progress;

3. Commends the collective efforts to support Ukraine; insists on the need to systematically draw lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine including on military mobility, in particular based on the experience of the Ukrainian armed forces, and also from national and multinational exercises; underlines the importance of ensuring logistical contingencies and back-up planning as well as of identifying weak and missing links; stresses the importance of early and effective coordination with strategic partners, particularly with NATO;

4. Stresses that Russia poses a considerable threat to the security of the European Union, and that developing the capability for fast deployment of troops and military capabilities to the EU’s eastern flank is of the essence;

5. Underlines the strategic need for investments in all Member States along the four EU priority military mobility corridors – the Northern, Eastern, Central Southern and Central Northern Corridors – as enhanced and effective military mobility is essential to the security of all Member States and all European citizens;

6. Highlights that enhanced military mobility will reinforce the EU CSDP and its missions and operations; calls for the EU and the Member States to adopt a common vision on how to move their actions on military mobility forward, and to formulate specific deliverables which should be integrated into the EU Strategic Compass; urges concrete preparedness on military mobility by moving towards a comprehensive approach to military logistics, including security of critical infrastructure, transport hubs, maintenance, storage, refuelling, repair and ammunition;

7. Stresses that military mobility is not limited to the movement of troops, weapons and equipment, but also concerns humanitarian aid and actions of solidarity; underlines that support for military mobility can also bring significant benefits to citizens, since the ability to rapidly deploy military forces may facilitate faster delivery of humanitarian aid and medical support, as well as the repair of infrastructure in the event of natural disasters, pandemics or other crises; stresses, furthermore, that EU investments in military mobility infrastructure may generate tangible benefits for local communities and for connectivity, thereby increasing local resilience, economic integration, job creation and public support for the European security agenda;

Tackling financial issues

8. Stresses that a centrally managed and dedicated EU transport funding instrument such as the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) must be continued in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) as the main source for robust military mobility funding, and its overall budget for transport must be significantly increased; welcomes, therefore, the proposal for an increased budget for military mobility in the forthcoming MFF, which allocates over EUR 50 billion for transport under the CEF for 2028-2034, including over EUR 17 billion for military mobility;

10. Insists, taking this investment need as well as the recommendations of the Draghi report into consideration, on the importance of at least preserving the indicated amount of EUR 17 billion in the subsequent negotiations on the overall MFF ceiling, while protecting the allocation for the achievement of the TEN-T; stresses that the Council must not make any proposal to cut the amount of this funding and believes that the channelling of these funds towards military mobility will need to be closely monitored;

11. Stresses the need to successfully foster cooperation and alignment among the Member States on cross-border and large-scale transport projects and the deployment of dual-use infrastructure to enable the swift and efficient large-scale mobilisation and movement of military troops, equipment and assets across the whole of the EU;

12. Reiterates that military mobility initiatives and funding should not hinder the overall implementation of actions relating to the completion of a smart, resilient, interoperable, decarbonised and sustainable TEN-T; recalls the objective of completing the TEN-T core network by 2030, including the deployment of the European rail traffic management system (ERTMS), and the extended core network by 2040;

13. Emphasises that the timely completion of cross-border transport infrastructure projects within the TEN-T network is an indispensable objective for achieving effective dual-use and military mobility objectives in Europe; recalls that according to the TEN-T coordinators’ position paper of April 2024, the total investment needed to complete the core and extended core TEN-T network is EUR 845 billion over the next 15 years, and that for projects with the highest EU added value alone, the remaining amount to be invested is estimated to be at least EUR 210 billion;

14. Recalls that the implementation of large transport infrastructure projects crucial to military mobility requires long-term funding owing to the nature of the actions to be undertaken;

15. Highlights the need to streamline and simplify procedures for obtaining funding for dual-use infrastructure projects within the military mobility framework of the CEF in the forthcoming MFF;

16. Welcomes the starting loans of the European Investment Bank (EIB) for investment in dual-use infrastructure projects to enhance military mobility; calls for the sustained implication of the EIB to contribute to the financing of other dual-use infrastructure projects and capabilities;

17. Encourages the development of additional financial mechanisms to be explored, such as a Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, to address the funding needs of security, defence and resilience;

18. Recalls that Member States may use the maximum funding available under the current MFF, including the recently introduced measures to re-allocate resources in the European Regional Development Fund and in the Cohesion Fund, as well as quickly redirect unused Recovery and Resilience Facility funds towards investments in defence, including dual-use infrastructure and mobile assets to foster military mobility, including military counter-mobility;

19. Calls for assurances that the dedicated budgets under EDIP, the European Defence Fund, the SAFE programme and the measures adopted under the Defence Readiness Omnibus package and other EU defence initiatives can be used to support the expansion and upgrading of both physical and digital dual-use infrastructure and the collaborative and predictable acquisition of enabling capabilities for defence, including on military mobility, to strengthen a genuine European Defence Union;

Removing obstacles to military mobility and moving towards a ‘military Schengen area’

20. Reiterates calls for a ‘military Schengen area’ and encourages the Commission to provide a roadmap towards this objective with no further delay;

21. Reiterates its profound concern about the current lack of responsiveness and efficiency in military mobility, which is hampered by regulatory and procedural complexity and lack of harmonisation resulting in slow coordination and time loss;

22. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to embed a ‘whole-of-society’ approach towards military mobility, involving all relevant stakeholders, including the public, private and civil sectors, by communicating and explaining measures taken;

23. Demands that the Commission and the Member States fully implement, as a matter of urgency, the 13 commitments taken under the Military Mobility Pledge 2024, focusing on investments in transport infrastructure and transport assets, regulatory harmonisation, accelerating cross-border movement permissions and enhancing the CSDP and EU-NATO cooperation;

24. Urges the Commission to take a horizontal approach when proposing further actions by harmonising and simplifying regulations and procedures with the urgent aim of integrating and coordinating the EU’s approach to removing all existing administrative, diplomatic, logistical and infrastructure barriers to military mobility;

25. Calls for the establishment of a European digital one-stop shop for the issuance of cross-border movement authorisations for military equipment, including a codified priority system and a database shared with NATO;

26. Highlights the need to streamline complex, lengthy and divergent national rules and procedures; insists that the upcoming military mobility package proposes simplified, harmonised, uniform and digitalised procedures across all transport modes, including on customs, transport of dangerous goods, abnormal transport, diplomatic clearances and the use of identical permits, such as for cross-border movement bids/credits and EU/NATO form 302 documentation, which should be recognised and used by all Member States; further calls for the development of a military customs system to digitalise customs formalities and reduce administrative burden and cost, with respect to the existing EU projects such as the Secure Digital Military Mobility System;

27. Underlines the importance of removing the administrative barriers and infrastructural obstacles faced by companies that operate abnormal road transport for military equipment and cranes for critical infrastructure projects; calls, therefore, for further harmonisation of the rules on abnormal road transport within the framework of the ongoing revision of the Weights and Dimensions Directive;

28. Underlines that the provision of war risk insurance coverage for high-risk logistics providers can serve as an incentive for companies, as it contributes to mitigating operational risks;

29. Stresses that the harmonisation of procedures and effective interoperability will strengthen mutual trust among Member States and boost cross-border connectivity;

30. Welcomes the objective of simplifying the legal and administrative frameworks as proposed in the Defence Readiness Omnibus package and the upcoming Joint Communication on Military Mobility 2025 and calls for its swift entry into force and implementation;

Crisis framework

31. Urges the Commission to present a legal and operational framework addressing ‘crisis situations’, clearly distinguishing at least three ‘phases’, such as ‘peacetime’, ‘crisis’ and ‘wartime’, and including rules for each phase in order to ensure interoperability and priority access for armed forces to transport facilities, networks and assets, with streamlined movement for military personnel and equipment throughout and across military corridors; asks for this framework to provide clear definitions for ‘fall-back situations’ and ‘fall-back solutions’ to guarantee continuity of military transport in case of disruption, as well as guidance to Member States in mandating different security providers with the surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure;

32. Expects that the forthcoming legal framework will establish an efficient and clear communication and coordination system between military and public authorities, including NATO, to also exchange information, on a need to know basis, with infrastructure managers and transport operators qualified to provide military logistic services in order to foster resilience across entire networks for each phase; notes, in particular the lack of cooperation and limited communication between port authorities and military or relevant defence building actors; understands the sensitivity of information sharing practices, especially with foreign-owned European port authorities; stresses, however, that a reliable and secure channel for specific information exchange is necessary;

33. Highlights the need for the establishment of a permanent decision-making mechanism enabling heads of state and government to take immediate action in ‘crisis’ and ‘wartime’ phases;

34. Calls on the Commission to establish a military mobility taskforce with representatives of all competent EU bodies to streamline the preparation, implementation and monitoring of all initiatives concerning military mobility in a horizontal manner, and, in parallel, calls for the designation of national contact points to improve overall governance and coordination of military mobility;

35. Urges the Commission to take into account all the recommendations made by the European Court of Auditors regarding governance in all future initiatives within the domain of military mobility;

36. Recognises the crucial role of transport workers in military mobility and in facilitating supply chains; calls on the Commission and the Member States to tackle labour shortages, to invest in the transport workforce, to improve working conditions, training opportunities to equip workers with the skills required for military mobility and the attractiveness of the sector;

Improving and constructing new dual-use infrastructure

37. Welcomes the adoption by the Council of the four priority military mobility corridors in the EU for short-notice and large-scale movements, created in cooperation with NATO, and the ongoing identification of 500 hotspots which need urgent upgrading; highlights that more than 94 % of these corridors are a part of the TEN-T, underlining the strong synergies between civilian and military infrastructure; calls for a precise evaluation of the financial needs to complete these military mobility corridors;

38. Underlines the need to accelerate transport infrastructure development and to enhance both the physical and cyber protection of its critical components along the four priority military mobility corridors;

39. Highlights that the weakest links and bottlenecks have knock-on effects on the functioning and effective continuity of entire corridors and the transport network as a whole; calls on the Commission and the Member States, therefore, to allocate adequate resources to ensuring a well-connected military mobility network, including improvements in the maintenance, modernisation and interoperability of existing infrastructure;

40. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess the need to appoint a dedicated European coordinator for each priority military mobility corridor to facilitate their implementation, as members of the military mobility taskforce;

41. Recalls that counter-mobility infrastructure, including dual-use obstacles, fortifications and rapid deployment systems to reinforce border and territorial defence, also forms an important part of military mobility; calls on the Commission and the Member States to carry out thorough coordinated planning and preparation for counter-mobility infrastructure in the four priority corridors of military mobility, prioritising the Eastern and Northern Corridors;

42. Recalls that railways are the backbone of the land-based mobility system to move large quantities of oversized, heavy, hazardous and dangerous military assets; insists that priority should be given to immediate and short-term solutions, such as removing administrative burdens for military personnel for cross-border movement; calls on the Commission to ensure increased capacity building, especially in transport hubs and key areas in line with the four priority military mobility corridors;

43. Underlines the crucial role played by rail interoperability in ensuring seamless operations across the Member States; expresses its strong concern about the persistent lack of rail interoperability caused by differences in track gauges within the EU, such as those in the Baltic states, Finland and the Iberian peninsula, which affects cross-border movements of troops, equipment and assets, making road transport indispensable; asks the Commission to continue addressing the various obstacles to seamless rail operations across the EU, inter alia the slow rollout of ERTMS and digital automatic coupling (DAC), and differences in track gauge; recalls the requirement of the TEN-T regulation for the Member States concerned to present their plans by July 2026 for the migration of their networks to the European standard nominal track gauge; welcomes, in that regard, the Rail Baltica project, connecting the Baltic states to the EU’s railway network by adapting their track gauges; considers this project strategic for both civilian and military mobility, as it provides interoperable, sustainable, and high-capacity rail connections across the EU’s eastern flank;

44. Notes that digital technologies that are relevant to increasing civilian rail capacity, such as ERTMS and DAC, are also relevant for military mobility and should be improved; warns that the ERTMS was developed in a different geostrategic context and calls for an assessment of its robustness and cybersecurity resilience; underlines that, given its reliance on radio technology, any network unavailability due to jamming or other factors would lead to the immediate suspension of rail traffic; calls for an assessment of a similar nature within the framework for the development of the Future Railway Mobile Communication System (FRMCS);

45. Notes that road and rail connections to ports and freight terminal networks are often key to facilitating the ‘last mile’ movements of military equipment to required areas and, as such, play an integral role in the success of military mobility; recalls that all strategic points of road transport, such as parking facilities, refuelling stations and car-wash stations, should be urgently upgraded to accommodate large numbers of military transport units and personnel in times of emergency; calls, therefore, for investments in key road infrastructures along the four priority military mobility corridors to be among the priorities to facilitate military mobility in the most effective way possible;

46. Calls for a harmonised European framework facilitating the movement of military convoys operated by authorised civilian providers, such as those operating abnormal road transport services, specialised cranes and heavy equipment, through the four priority military mobility corridors, while ensuring civilian safety;

47. Highlights that ports play a strategic role as critical nodes in the military mobility network, serving as entry and exit points for large-scale military deployments, and enabling sea-to-land transport integration, especially for transatlantic cooperation, as well as in the resilience of the Union’s strategic economic interests; notes that maritime infrastructure suffers from structural shortcomings with many EU terminals not designed to handle military cargo; stresses the need to ensure sufficient capacity for military supplies and to establish contingency plans for diverting civilian cargo if necessary;

48. Underlines that the ownership and control of certain critical maritime infrastructure requires immediate action and stricter rules, as highlighted in the white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030;

49. Calls for investments in port infrastructure and for amended requirements for access to financial instruments for both seaports and inland water ports, to strengthen their integration within the TEN-T corridors and to enhance EU energy security policies; urges the Commission to create and implement strategies that increase the capabilities and build the capacity of ports; underlines both the surface and sub-surface dimensions of the maritime domain, calls for the inclusion of Ro-Ro (Roll-On/Roll-Off) and Ro-Pax (Roll-On/Roll-Off Passenger) vessels as dual-use mobile assets within the scope of the EU military mobility strategy;

50. Notes that inland waterways are also an important element of military mobility, offering seamless and sustainable means of dual-use transportation owing to their available capacity, intermodal complementarity and reduced vulnerability to opportunistic intelligence; notes the existing capacity of the waterborne network to transport oversized military assets, dangerous goods and fuels for regular supplies, as well as to provide back-up solutions as part of contingency planning; suggests assessing the need for the further expansion of existing locks, and for increasing the availability of cranes and the waterborne fleet;